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  List	  of	  Abbreviations	  
	  
	  
IEM	  –	  immunity	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification	  
Immune	  –	  immune	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification	  
GRR	  –	  guaranteed	  right	  reference	  
GRR1	  –	  guarantee	  against	  lack	  of	  reference	  
GRR2	  –	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference	  
Fa	  (B)	  –	  a	  is	  F	  based	  on	  a	  basis	  B,	  where	  ‘F’	  is	  a	  predicate,	  ‘a’	  is	  a	  singular	  referring	  term	  and	  ‘B’	  is	  a	  particular	  basis	  
Fi	  –	  I	  am	  F	  
B	  –	  basis:	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  like	  proprioception,	  introspection,	  vision,	  or	  testimony	  	  
W	  –	  a	  way	  of	  knowing,	  like	  proprioception,	  introspection,	  vision,	  or	  testimony	  
OI	  –	  Object-­‐identification	  
FI	  –	  Frege-­‐identification	  
IF	  –	  Identification-­‐freedom	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  The	  aim	  of	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	  understand	  how	   the	   reference	  of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed.	   I	  will	  propose	  how	  and	  to	  which	  object	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  without	  assuming	  what	  essential	  kind	  of	  object	  it	  is.	  In	  particular,	  I	  propose	  that	  the	  subject	  knows	  through	  internal	  ways	  of	  knowing	  (like	  proprioception	  and	  introspection)	  of	  the	  object	  which	   she	   is,	   and	   uses	   ‘I’	   for	   this	   object.	   As	   I	  will	   argue,	   the	   subject	   is	  directly	   acquainted	   with	   the	   object	   which	   she	   is	   through	   internal	   ways	   of	  knowing.	   Only	   a	   unique	   object,	   the	   subject,	   is	   present	   to	   the	   subject	   through	  internal	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  The	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  for	  this	  unique	  object;	  this	  fixes	  the	  
referent	  of	  ‘I’.	  My	  proposal	  will	  be	  called	  the	  Simple	  View.	  My	  main	  concern	  is	  to	  answer	  the	  question	   ‘How	  is	   the	  referent	  of	   ‘I’	   fixed?’	  My	  contention	   is	   that	  the	  Simple	  View	  provides	  the	  most	  fundamental	  answer.	  	  	  
1.	  The	  strategy	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  (chapters	  1-­‐7),	  my	  concern	  is	  elaborating	  what	  the	  essential	  features	  of	  the	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  are	  (including	  guaranteed	  right	  reference	  and	  immunity	   to	   error	   through	  misidentification).	   In	   the	   second	  part	  of	   the	   thesis	  (chapters	   8-­‐10),	   I	  will	   try	   to	   show	   that	   only	   the	   Simple	   View	   can	   explain	   the	  essential	   features	   of	   ‘I’.	   Consequently,	   the	   Simple	   View	   provides	   the	   most	  fundamental	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  ‘How	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  fixed?’	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  is	  special.	  It	  has	  features	  which	  other	  singular	   terms	   and	   even	   other	   essential	   indexicals	   (‘now’,	   ‘here’)	   lack.	   For	  example,	  uses	  of	  ‘now’	  and	  ‘here’	  lack	  a	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference.	  I	  can	   think	   that	  my	   current	   location	   in	   time	   or	   space	   is	   different	   from	  what	   it	  actually	  is.	  Thus	  I	  can	  be	  incorrect	  about	  what	  the	  referent	  of	  my	  use	  of	  ‘here’	  or	  ‘now’	   is.	  However,	   I	  cannot	   try	   to	  refer	   to	  myself	  but	   fail	   to	  refer	   to	  myself	  by	  using	   ‘I’	   or	   refer	   to	   the	   incorrect	   thing.	   It	   is	   only	   plausible	   to	   think	   that	  what	  fixes	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   should	   explain	   those	   features	   which	   make	   the	   first-­‐
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person	  pronoun	  different	  from	  other	  referring	  terms	  (Peacocke	  2008:	  92,	  2012:	  144,	  Campbell	  2012).	  When	  one’s	  project	   is	   to	  understand	  how	  the	  reference	  of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed,	   then	  one	  has	  to	  consider	  the	  essential	  features	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  I	  take	  the	  essential	  features	  of	  the	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  to	  be	  constitutive	  for	  understanding	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  	  What	   are	   the	   essential	   features	   of	   uses	   of	   ‘I’?	   Building	   on	   the	   work	   of	  Peacocke	   (2008:	   92	   and	   2012)	   and	   Campbell	   (2012)	  we	   can	   find	   two	   strong	  candidates	  for	  essential	  features	  of	  ‘I’:	  guaranteed	  right	  reference	  (hence	  GRR)	  and	   immunity	   to	   error	   through	   misidentification	   (hence	   IEM).	   I	   discuss	   why	  each	  is	  an	  essential	  feature	  in	  turn.	  Guaranteed	  right	  reference	  is	  agreed	  to	  be	  essential	  for	  understanding	  the	  first-­‐person	   pronoun.1	  Uses	   of	   ‘I’	   have	   a	   double	   guarantee,	   guaranteed	   right	  
reference:	  (i)	  they	  cannot	  lack	  reference	  and	  (ii)	  they	  have	  a	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	   reference	   (hence	   GRR2).	   All	   uses	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   are	  supposed	  to	  have	  guaranteed	  right	  reference	  and	  only	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  has	  this	  feature.2	  	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  hard	  to	  answer	  how	  a	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference	  is	   possible.	   But	   this	   is	   an	   easy	   question	   for	   the	   Simple	   View.	  Nothing	   but	   the	  subject	  can	  be	  known	  though	  internal	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Accordingly,	  the	  subject	  cannot	  be	  wrong	  about	  which	  object	  she	  knows	  through	  such	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  and	   so	  which	   object	   she	   uses	   ‘I’	   for.	   This	   enables	   the	   subject	   to	   know	   of	   the	  object	  which	  she	  is	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistake	  as	  the	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference	  requires.	  	  IEM	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  some	  self-­‐ascriptions	  made	  on	  a	  certain	  basis	  –	  as	  I	  will	  argue.	  A	  self-­‐ascription,	  I	  am	  in	  pain,	  based	  on	  feeling	  pain,	  is	  immune	  to	  error	  
through	  misidentification	   (hence,	   for	   the	   adjectival	   form,	   immune)	   because,	  on	  this	  basis,	  feeling	  pain,	  the	  subject	  cannot	  misidentify	  who	  is	  in	  pain.	  IEM	  is	  only	  a	  feature	  of	  certain	  but	  not	  all	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  chapter	  7	  that	  
                                                1	  There	  are	  some	  dissenters.	  Some	  deny	  GRR	  because	  they	  deny	  that	  ‘I’	  refers	  (e.g.	  Wittgenstein	  and	   Anscombe),	   and	   some	   deny	   it	   for	   cases	   when	   one	   is	   a	   brain	   in	   a	   vat	   (e.g.	   Evans).	   Pace	  2	  For	   ‘now’	  and	   ‘here’,	   the	  subject	  can	   intend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  wrong	   location	   in	  time	  or	  space.	   I	  can	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  Paris	  by	  using	   ‘here’	  when	  I	  am	  in	  Budapest	  and	  I	  can	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  tomorrow	  using	  ‘now’	  when	  I	  am	  mistaken	  which	  day	  it	  is	  today.	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the	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  involves	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule.	  In	  chapter	  8,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  explains	  why	  and	  when	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  immune.	  I	  will	  show	  that	  because	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  and	  demonstratives	  are	  fixed	   differently	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   between	   first-­‐person	   IEM	   and	  demonstrative	  IEM	  (chapter	  6).	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  propose	  a	  view.	  What	  is	  hard	  is	  deciding	  whether	  it	  is	  correct.	  It	  would	  be	  best	  if	  we	  could	  find	  a	  solid	  test	  that	  a	  view	  has	  to	  pass	  in	  order	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	   the	   fundamental	  explanation	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed.	   If	  the	   Simple	   View	   were	   the	   only	   view	   that	   could	   pass	   the	   test,	   then	   it	   would	  appear	   to	   be	   the	   most	   fundamental	   explanation	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   (from	  amongst	  the	  examined	  views).	  In	  the	  literature,	  we	  can	  find	  such	  a	  test	  for	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	   rule	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun,	   suggested	   independently	   by	  Peacocke	   (2008:	   92)	   and	   Campbell	   (2012).	   The	   idea	   is	   straightforward.	   If	  we	  wish	  to	  have	  a	  theory	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  is	  fixed,	  then	  this	  theory	  should	  account	  for	  the	  essential	   features	  of	  the	  uses	  of	  the	   ‘I’,	  especially	  GRR	  and	   IEM.	  Call	   this	   the	  Reference-­‐fixing	  Test.	   I	  will	  use	   this	   to	  test	  the	  Simple	  View	  in	  chapter	  9.	  	  For	   this	  project	   to	  work,	  we	  will	   have	   to	  have	  a	  precise	  understanding	  of	  GRR	  and	  IEM.	  Consequently,	  the	  thesis	  is	  written	  in	  two	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	   thesis,	   I	  will	   concentrate	  on	  getting	  a	   firm	  handle	  on	   IEM	  and	  GRR.	   In	   the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  thesis,	  I	  will	  develop	  the	  Simple	  View	  and	  test	  whether	  it	  can	  explain	   IEM	   and	   GRR.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   only	   the	   Simple	   View	   can	   pass	   the	  Reference-­‐fixing	  test.	  	  
2.	  Conceptual	  assumptions	  and	  preliminaries	  I	  find	  it	  plausible	  that	  the	  subject	  refers	  to	  a	  particular	  object	  by	  using	  ‘I’	  and	  all	  uses	   of	   ‘I’	   have	   GRR	   and	   some	   judgments	   are	   immune.	   I	   have	   not	   found	   any	  sound	  challenge	  to	  ‘I’	  being	  a	  referring	  term	  so	  I	  will	  simply	  accept	  that	  ‘I’	  refers.	  It	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  subject,	  whatever	  essential	  kind	  it	  falls	  under,	  should	  be	   embodied	   (Shoemaker	  1984c,	  Wiggins	  2001,	  Burge	  2010,	   Snowdon	  2014).	  Thus,	  ‘I’	  refers	  to	  a	  physical	  object.	  I	  treat	  the	  main	  question	  of	  the	  thesis	  (‘How	  is	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   fixed?’)	   as	   distinct	   from	   the	   main	   question	   of	   personal	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identity	   (‘Which	   essential	   kind	   are	  we?’).	   I	   try	   to	  be	   as	  neutral	   on	   the	   second	  question	  as	  possible.	  	  	  One	   of	   the	   leading	   themes	   of	   the	   thesis	   is	   why	   and	   how	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  judgment	  matters	  for	  whether	  it	  is	  immune.	  When	  I	  judge	  something	  it	  could	  be	  based	  on	  different	  bases	  like	  vision	  or	  touch.	   ‘Basis’	  means	  a	  ways	  of	  knowing	  through	   which	   the	   subject	   acquires	   knowledge.	   Accordingly,	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  judgment	   could	   be	   vision,	   touch,	   audition,	   olfaction,	   proprioception,	  kinaesthesia,	   introspection,	   inference	  or	   testimony.	  A	   judgment	   is	  not	   IEM	  per	  
se,	   but	   immune	   relative	   to	   a	   certain	   basis;	   it	   is	   not	   immune	   relative	   to	   all	  possible	   bases.	   I	   call	   this	  basis-­‐relativity	   (argued	   for	   in	   chapters	  1-­‐4).	  Basis-­‐relativity	  is	  an	  important	  point	  for	  me	  because	  I	  try	  to	  show	  in	  chapters	  7-­‐8	  that	  a	  judgment	  about	  a	  is	  immune	  relative	  to	  ‘a’	  on	  a	  basis	  B	  iff	  a’s	  reference	  is	  fixed	  through	  this	  very	  basis	  B.	  	  Let	  me	  introduce	  some	  notation	  that	  will	  be	  used	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  to	  express	  judgements	  and	  their	  basis-­‐relativity.	  I	  will	  abbreviate	  the	  claim	  ‘a	  is	  F’	  as	   Fa.	   In	   ‘Fa’,	   ‘F’	   is	   a	   predicate	   and	   ‘a’	   is	   a	   singular	   referring	   term,	   it	   could	  represent	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘I’.	   ‘I	  am	  F’	  will	  be	  abbreviated	  as	  Fi.	  When	  I	  want	  to	  express	  that	  a	  judgement	  Fa	  is	  made	  on	  a	  certain	  basis	  B,	  I	  will	  abbreviate	  ‘Fa,	  relativized	  to	  a	  certain	  basis	  B’	  as	  Fa	  (B).	  	  What	   is	   the	   item	   that	   can	   be	   qualified	   as	   being	   immune	   to	   error	   through	  misidentification?	   It	   seems	   that	   there	   is	   no	   agreement	   on	   this	   front	   in	   the	  literature.	  The	  only	  thing	  which	  is	  agreed	  by	  all	  parties	  is	  that	  something	  like	  Fa	  relative	  to	  ‘a’	  would	  be	  immune.	  Variations	  are	  plenty.	  The	  majority	  of	  authors	  relativise	   the	   judgment	   to	   its	   basis,	   while	   a	   minority	   of	   authors	   think	   that	   a	  judgment	  independent	  of	  its	  basis	  can	  be	  immune.3	  In	  my	  discussion,	  I	  will	  use	  ‘thought’	   and	   ‘judgment’	   interchangeably	   as	   candidates	   for	   the	   item	   that	   is	  immune	   on	   a	   certain	   basis.	   I	   try	   to	   be	   as	   neutral	   as	   possible	   about	   specific	  
                                                3	  Just	   to	   take	   some	   examples.	   For	   Wittgenstein,	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   immune	   per	   se	   (without	  relativizing	  it	  to	  its	  basis).	  For	  Shoemaker,	  Campbell	  and	  O’Brien	  a	  basis-­‐relative	  judgment/self-­‐
ascription,	  Fa	  (B),	  is	  immune.	  For	  Evans,	  knowledge	  of	  a	  basis-­‐relative	  proposition/judgment,	  Fa	  (B),	  is	  immune.	  According	  to	  Peacocke,	  a	  basis-­‐relative	  thought	  relative	  to	  a	  Circumstance:	  Fa	  (B,	  C),	  is	  immune.	  Higginbotham	  holds	  that	  a	  thought,	  Fa,	  is	  immune.	  For	  Recanati,	  a	  basis-­‐relative	  
thought/judgment/belief	   is	   immune,	   Fa	   (B).	   I	   assume	   that	   these	   differences	   depend	   on	   the	  framework	  and	  on	  what	  else	  the	  theorist	  assumes.	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technical	   and	   ontological	   details	   and	   to	   be	   fairly	   independent	   from	   any	  particular	  framework.	  	  Below	  I	  will	  sketch	  each	  chapter	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
3.	  The	  chapters	  	  
Chapter	  1.	  Wittgenstein	  on	  Immunity:	  How	  does	  the	  Subject	  Know	  of	   the	  
Referent	  of	  ‘I’?	  	  In	   chapter	   1,	   I	   will	   discuss	   Wittgenstein’s	   original	   characterisation	   of	   IEM.	  Wittgenstein	  distinguishes	  between	   two	  kinds	  of	   self-­‐ascription:	   (i)	   ‘I’	  used	  as	  subject	   and	   (ii)	   ‘I’	   used	   as	   object.4	  The	   two	   uses	   exclude	   each	   other	   and	   are	  introduced	   through	  examples.	  Wittgenstein	  provides	  a	  criterion	   to	  distinguish	  the	   two	   sets	   of	   examples:	   whether	   self-­‐ascriptions	   are	   recognition-­‐based.	   ‘I’	  used	  as	  object	  is	  recognition-­‐based,	  while	  ‘I’	  used	  as	  subject	  is	  not.	  	  Wittgenstein	  assumes	  that	  recognition	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  subject	  to	  know	  of	  the	  physical	  object	  which	  she	  is;	  recognition	  enables	  the	  subject	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  physical	  object.	  Subject	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  are	  recognition-­‐free.	  Thus	  subject	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  do	  not	   refer.	   I	   will	   show	   that	   the	   subject	   is	   able	   to	   know	   of	   the	   physical	   object	  which	   she	   is	   without	   recognition	   (in	   the	   sense	   that	   she	   need	   not	   single	   the	  object	  out	  from	  among	  many).	  	  Against	  Wittgenstein,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  recognition-­‐freedom	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	   IEM.	   Additionally,	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   not	   immune	   simpliciter,	   but	   only	  immune	   relativized	   to	   its	   basis.	   Throughout	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   thesis	   I	   will	  argue	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  IEM	  is	  basis	  relative	  which	  Wittgenstein	  denies.	  	  	  
Chapter	  2.	  Anscombe’s	  Challenge:	  Guaranteed	  Right	  Reference	  In	   chapter	   2,	   I	   will	   discuss	   GRR	   as	   presented	   in	   Anscombe’s	   paper	   ‘The	   first	  person’	  (1975).	  However,	  in	  elaborating	  a	  more	  accurate	  understanding	  of	  GRR,	  I	  will	  move	  away	  from	  the	  original	  formulation	  by	  Anscombe.	  	  I	   will	   explicate	   the	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	   reference	   (GRR2)	   by	  employing	   a	   distinction	   introduced	   by	   Kripke	   (1977).	   On	   this	   picture,	   the	  
                                                4	  Wittgenstein’s	  notion	  of	  ‘use	  of	  ‘I’	  as	  subject’	  is	  different	  from	  Kant’s	  notion	  of	  ‘consciousness	  of	  oneself’	  as	  subject.	  Wittgenstein	  only	  discusses	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  while	  Kant	   discusses	   transcendental	   presuppositions	   of	   thinking	   in	   general.	   I	   return	   to	   the	  Kantian	  notion	  briefly	  in	  chapter	  5	  and	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  chapter	  10.	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subject,	   by	   using	   ‘I’,	   cannot	   intend	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   wrong	   thing	   because	   the	  speaker’s	   referent	   and	   the	   semantic	   referent	   cannot	   come	   apart.	   This	   new	  notion	   will	   be	   called	   aboutness-­‐error	   freedom	   and	   will	   provide	   the	  explanation	  of	  the	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference.	  For	  Anscombe,	  GRR	  is	  essential	  for	  referential	  uses	  of	  ‘I’.	  But,	  as	  she	  argues,	  there	   is	   a	   circumstance	   when,	   for	   a	   token	   ‘I’,	   GRR	   cannot	   be	   satisfied.	   GRR	  excludes	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistakenly	  taking	  the	  wrong	  object	  to	  be	  me.	  This	  is	  not	   possible	   unless	   the	   subject	   is	   directly	   acquainted	   with	   the	   object,	   as	  Anscombe	   argues.	   (The	   relevant	   object	   has	   to	   be	   physically	   present	   to	   the	  subject.)	  Anscombe	  uses	   the	  sensory	  deprivation	   tank	  (where	  all	   the	  subject’s	  senses	   are	   suspended)	   to	   argue	   that	   ‘I’	   cannot	   be	   a	   referring	   term	   (used	  referentially)	  because	   the	   subject	  might	  use	   ‘I’	  without	  being	  acquainted	  with	  its	  referent.	  Anscombe	   provides	   a	   challenge	   to	   the	   Simple	   View.	   The	   Simple	   View	  requires	   that	  whenever	   the	   subject	   can	  use	   ‘I’	   she	   is	   directly	   acquainted	  with	  the	  object,	  herself.	  Anscombe’s	  challenge	  is	  how	  direct	  acquaintance	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank	  when	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’.	  Call	  this	  Anscombe’s	  
challenge.	  I	  will	  return	  to	  answer	  it	  in	  the	  last	  chapter.	  	  	  
Chapter	  3.	  The	  Basic	  Characterisation	  of	  IEM	  In	  chapter	  3,	  I	  will	  characterise	  the	  basic	  notion	  of	  IEM	  through	  explicating	  the	  notion	  of	  misidentification	  that	  is	   involved	  in	  IEM.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  a	   judgment,	  
Fa,	  based	  on	  basis	  B,	  is	  immune	  iff	  the	  subject	  cannot	  misidentify,	  on	  this	  basis,	  B,	   that,	   this	   object,	   a,	   is	   F.	   Accordingly,	   misidentification	   happens	   when	   the	  subject	  thinks	  Fa	  on	  a	  basis,	  B,	  which	  is	  for	  thinking	  Fb.	  Pryor	  (1999)	  offers	  an	  alternative	   to	   this	   standard	   notion	   of	   misidentification:	   which	   object	  misidentification.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  standard	  notion	  of	  misidentification	  does	  a	  better	  job	  at	  characterising	  IEM.	  	  The	   basic	   notion	   of	   IEM	   requires	   basis-­‐relativity;	   the	   judgment	   has	   to	   be	  relativized	   to	   its	   basis.	   An	   immune	   judgement	   cannot	   be	   misidentified	   on	   a	  particular	  basis.	  This	  will	  be	  argued	  for	  conclusively	  only	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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Chapter	  4.	  The	  Myth	  of	  Absolute	  Immunity	  In	  chapter	  4,	  I	  will	  discuss	  Shoemaker	  and	  his	  introduction	  of	  IEM.	  We	  owe	  the	  distinction	  between	  absolutely	  immune	  as	  opposed	  to	  circumstantially	  immune	  judgments	   to	   him.	   A	   judgment	   is	   absolutely	   immune	   if	   it	   is	   immune	   in	   all	  possible	   circumstances	   (where	   it	   could	   be	   uttered)	  while	   a	   circumstantially	  
immune	   judgment	   is	   only	   immune	   in	   some	   but	   not	   in	   all	   circumstances.	  Accordingly,	   if	  Fa	   is	   absolutely	   immune	   then	   it	   is	   immune	  on	  all	  bases.	  Basis-­‐relativity	  (as	  I	  construe	  it)	  entails	  that	  the	  thought	  (B)	  is	  immune	  on	  B	  but	  it	  is	  
not	  immune	  on	  all	  bases.	  Shoemaker	  denies	  that	  absolute	  IEM	  is	  basis-­‐relative.	  	  I	   will	   argue	   that	   a	   judgment	   is	   not	   IEM	   per	   se	   (basis-­‐independently),	   but	  immune	  relative	   to	  a	  certain	  basis.	   It	   is	   immune	  relative	   to	  certain	  but	  not	  all	  bases.	  This	  idea	  –	  basis-­‐relativity	  –	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Evans,	  but	  he	  only	  uses	  an	  example	   to	  demonstrate	   the	  point.	   I	  am	  obliged	   to	  argue	   for	   it,	   for	   the	  reason	  that	  this	  point	  is	  crucial	  for	  working	  out	  the	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  (chapter	  7)	   and	   the	   Simple	   View,	   where	   the	   reference	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	   through	   some	  distinctive	  bases:	  internal	  ways	  of	  knowing	  (chapters	  8-­‐10).	  	  IEM	  could	  only	  be	  a	  basic	  explanandum	  if	   it	   is	  not	  a	  mere	  consequence	  of	  another	   feature,	   like	   infallibility.	   A	   judgment	   is	   infallible	   if	   whenever	   it	   is	  uttered	  it	  is	  true.	  If	  a	  judgment	  ‘I	  am	  F’	  is	  infallible	  it	  follows	  from	  its	  infallibility	  that	   it	   is	   immune.	   This	   would	   not	   be	   a	   paradigmatic	   case	   of	   IEM	   but	   a	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	   infallibility.5	  We	  have	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  correct	  explanatory	  target:	  IEM.	  To	   get	   the	   explanatory	   target	   right,	   I	   will	   work	   out	   the	   self-­‐sufficiency	  
principle.	  According	   to	   this	  principle,	   IEM	  cannot	  simply	   follow	  from	  another	  feature	   like	   infallibility	   or	   self-­‐intimacy.	   A	   state,	   like	   being	   in	   pain,	   is	   self-­‐
intimating	   if	  whenever	   the	  subject	   is	   in	  pain,	   she	  knows	   that	  she	   is	   in	  pain.	   I	  will	  argue	  that	  if	  we	  accept	  the	  self-­‐sufficiency	  principle	  then	  we	  have	  to	  accept	  basis-­‐relativity.	  If	  we	  deny	  the	  self-­‐sufficiency	  principle	  then	  we	  have	  to	  change	  the	  explanatory	  target	  from	  IEM	  to	  something	  else,	  like	  infallibility,	  from	  which	  basis-­‐independence	  follows.	  	  	  
                                                5	  “I	   am	   thinking	   that	   p”	   based	   on	   introspection	   is	   infallible.	   For	   this	   reason,	   it	   cannot	   be	   a	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	  immune	  self-­‐ascription.	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Chapter	   5.	   Is	   immunity	   to	   error	   through	   misidentification	   immune	   to	  
empirical	  counterexamples?	  In	  chapter	  5,	  I	  will	  defuse	  some	  empirical	  cases	  which	  have	  been	  claimed	  to	  be	  putative	   counterexamples	   against	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   the	   IEM	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions.	   I	   will	   focus	   on	   three	   cases:	   thought	   insertion	   (Campbell	   1999b),	  somatoparaphrenia,	   and	   the	   body	   swap	   illusion	   (both	   discussed	   in	   Lane	   and	  Liang	  2011).	  	  	  
Chapter	  6.	  On	  the	  Identification-­‐freedom	  Explanation	  of	  IEM	  In	  chapter	  6,	  I	  examine	  the	  standard	  understanding	  of	  IEM	  due	  to	  Evans.	  Evans	  proposes	   to	   explain	   IEM	   in	   terms	   of	   Identification-­‐freedom.	   I	   will	   show	   that	  Evans’s	  picture	  is	  far	  from	  being	  as	  simple	  and	  uniform	  as	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be.	  I	  will	  make	  an	  important	  distinction	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  Identification-­‐freedom	  found	  in	  Evans’s	  work:	  Factual	  and	  Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	  (Evans	  1982).	  Factual	  Identification-­‐freedom	  requires	  only	  that	  the	  thought,	  Fa,	   is	  not	   in	  fact	  grounded	   on	   an	   identification	   (a=b),	   while	   Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom	  requires	  that	  on	  the	  basis,	  B,	  on	  which	  the	  thought,	  Fa,	   is	  based,	  Fa	  cannot	  be	  grounded	  on	  an	  identification	  (a=b).	  	  Why	  would	  Evans	  work	  out	   two	  different	  explanations,	   factual	  and	  strong	  identification-­‐freedom,	   for	   immunity?	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   immunity	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  immunity	  of	  perceptual	  demonstratives.	  In	  Evans,	  we	  find	  that	  one	  explanation	  is	  for	  explaining	  the	  IEM	  of	   self-­‐ascriptions	   (strong	   identification-­‐freedom)	   and	   another	   explanation	   is	  designed	   for	   explaining	   the	   IEM	   of	   demonstrative	   thoughts	   (factual	  identification-­‐freedom).	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  explanation	  occurs	  because	   there	   are	   two	   different	   kinds	   of	   IEM	   (first-­‐person	   IEM	   and	  demonstrative	  IEM).	  	  In	   the	   second	   part	   of	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   show	   that	   the	   notion	   of	  identification	   is	   not	   univocal.	   I	   will	   differentiate	   two	   different	   notions	   of	  ‘identification’	  and	  argue	  that	  what	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification	  for	  perceptual	   demonstrative	   thought	   does	   not	   open	   this	   for	   self-­‐ascription	   and	  vice	  versa.	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Chapter	   7.	   The	   General	   Explanation	   of	   IEM	   and	   the	   Reference-­‐fixing	  
Relation	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  and	  perceptual	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  different	  and	  in	  some	  sense	  similar.	  In	  chapter	  7,	  I	  will	   look	  into	  what	   is	  shared	  between	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	   IEM.	  The	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  –	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  –	  will	  rely	  on	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  relation.	  According	  to	  the	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  a	  judgement	  Fa	  (B)	  is	  immune	  iff	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘a’	  is	  fixed	   through	   B.	   The	   reason	   why	   we	   have	   two	   kinds	   of	   IEM	   derives	   from	  differences	   on	  how	   the	   referent	   of	   the	   first	   person	  pronoun	   and	   a	   perceptual	  demonstrative	  is	  fixed.	  	  	  
Chapter	  8.	  The	  Simple	  View:	  Fixing	  the	  Reference	  of	  ‘I’	  In	  chapter	  8,	   I	  will	   investigate	  how	  the	  reference	  of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  the	   subject	   knows	   of	   the	   object	   which	   she	   is	   through	   distinctive	   ways	   of	  knowing	  which	  are	  such	  that	  only	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  known	  through	  such	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Proprioception	  and	  introspection	  are	  the	  most	  obvious	  examples	  of	  such	   special	  ways	   of	   knowing	   through	  which	   only	   the	   subject	   and	   her	   states,	  events	   and	   processes	   can	   be	   known.	   Through	   such	   special	   ways	   of	   knowing,	  from	  the	  inside,	  the	  subject	  cannot	  be	  mistaken	  about	  which	  object	  she	  knows	  of.	  	   The	   subject	   simply	   uses	   ‘I’	   for	   the	   object	   of	   which	   she	   knows	   from	   the	  inside.	  The	  subject	  cannot	  be	  mistaken	  about	  which	  object	  this	  is	  because	  she	  is	  directly	  acquainted	  with	  it	  and	  it	  is	  the	  only	  object	  which	  she	  can	  know	  from	  the	  inside.	  	  GRR	  is	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  uses	  of	   ‘I’.	  We	  try	  to	  understand	  how	  GRR	  is	  possible.	   What	   are	   the	   necessary	   constraints	   for	   making	   a	   guarantee	   against	  incorrect	  reference	  possible?	  My	  task	   is	   to	   find	  some	  special	  ways	  of	  knowing	  which	   allow	   the	   subject	   to	   know	   of	   the	   object	   which	   she	   is	   in	   a	   way	   that	  excludes	  the	  subject	  from	  using	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  wrong	  object.	  I	  discuss	  which	  features	  of	   proprioception	   and	   introspection	   make	   the	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	  reference	  possible.	  	  According	  to	  my	  proposal,	  the	  Simple	  View,	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  by	  the	  subject’s	  use	  of	   ‘I’	   for	   this	  object	  which	   she	   is	  directly	  acquainted	  with	  and	  of	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which	   she	   cannot	   be	  mistaken	   about	   which	   one	   it	   is.	   This	   is	   the	   object	   with	  which	   the	  subject	   is	  acquainted	  with	   through	  special	  ways	  of	  knowing	  –	   from	  the	  inside.	  For	  the	  subject,	  four	  constraints	  will	  be	  specified	  as	  jointly	  necessary	  and	   sufficient	   for	   providing	   direct	   acquaintance	   with	   the	   object	   which	   is	   the	  subject.	   The	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	   reference	   is	   possible	   because	   of	   the	  distinctive	  features	  of	  the	  ways	  of	  knowing	  through	  which	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘I’	   is	  fixed.	  	  	  
Chapter	  9.	  The	  Simple	  View:	  The	  Test	  In	  chapter	  9,	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  essential	  features	  of	  uses	  of	   ‘I’.	  We	  have	  learnt	  from	  Peacocke	  and	  Campbell	  that	  the	  test	  for	  the	  Simple	  View	  is	  whether	  it	  can	  explain	  the	  essential	  features	  of	  the	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	  (GRR	  and	  IEM).	  I	  use	  GRR2	  as	  a	  guide	   in	   isolating	   the	  constraints	  on	  what	  makes	   the	  ways	  of	  knowing	  special	  (chapter	  8).	  Thus,	  unsurprisingly,	  the	  Simple	  View	  explains	  GRR2	  very	  well.	  My	  strategy	  will	  be	  to	  show	  that	  unless	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  as	  the	  Simple	  View	  suggests,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  can	  account	  for	  first	  person	  IEM	  and	  GRR.	  	  	  
Chapter	  10.	  Objections	  to	  the	  Simple	  View	  	  I	  will	  consider	  several	  objections	  to	  the	  Simple	  View	  and	  answer	  them.	  I	  hope	  at	  the	   end	   of	   the	   thesis	   the	   Simple	   View	   will	   not	   only	   provide	   a	   suitable	  explanation	  of	  why	  all	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  have	  GRR	  and	  why	  some	  uses	  are	  immune,	  but	  it	  will	  also	  show	  why	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  is	  special	  and	  different	  from	  any	  other	  singular	  referring	  term.	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Chapter	  1	  
Wittgenstein	  on	  Immunity: 
How	  does	  the	  Subject	  Know	  of	  the	  Referent	  of	  ‘I’?	  
 	  
Abstract	  Wittgenstein	   provided	   the	   first	   characterisation	   of	   the	   IEM	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions.	   For	   Wittgenstein,	   recognition-­‐freedom	   is	   necessary	   and	  sufficient	  for	  IEM	  of	  a	  self-­‐ascription.	  Furthermore,	  he	  holds	  that	  a	  self-­‐ascription	   is	   immune	   simpliciter.	  Against	  Wittgenstein,	   I	  will	   argue	   (i)	  that	   recognition-­‐freedom	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	   IEM	   and	   (ii)	   that	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   not	   immune	   simpliciter.	   I	   will	   use	   Evans’s	   criticism	   of	  Wittgenstein	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  IEM	  is	  basis-­‐relative.	  (My	  argument	  will	  continue	  in	  chapters	  3-­‐4.)	  	  To	   understand	   why	   IEM	   can	   teach	   us	   something	   about	   the	   first-­‐person	  pronoun,	  I	  have	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  question:	   	  Why	  would	  recognition	  tell	  us	  anything	  about	  the	  referentiality	  of	  ‘I’?	  Wittgenstein,	  it	   appears,	  was	   puzzled	   about	   how	   the	   subject	   knows	   of	   the	   physical	  object	  which	  is	  herself	  without	  recognising	  that	  object.	  We	  will	  find	  that	  the	   subject	   has	   a	   special	   way	   of	   knowing	   of	   herself	   which	   does	   not	  require	  recognition	  (in	   the	  sense	   that	   I	  need	  not	  single	   the	  object,	   the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’,	  out	  from	  among	  many).	  	  	  
1.	  Preliminaries	  Immunity	   to	   error	   through	   misidentification	   is	   always	   related	   to	   the	  understanding	   of	   the	   first	   person	   pronoun	   and	   self-­‐knowledge.	   I	   will	   try	   to	  show	  why	  IEM	  is	  indispensible	  for	  understanding	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  The	  best	   place	   to	   start	   our	   discussion	   is	   where	   the	   debate	   starts	   historically:	  Wittgenstein’s	   treatment	   of	   IEM.	  Wittgenstein	   is	   only	   interested	   in	   immunity	  because	  it	  apparently	  provides	  support	  for	  thinking	  that	  we	  are	  Cartesian	  Egos	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–	  he	  wants	  to	  deny	  this.	  What	  motivates	  Wittgenstein’s	  discussion	  is	  his	  desire	  to	   show	   that	   we	   have	   no	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   we	   are	   Cartesian	   Egos.	   His	  surprising	   solution	   is	   this:	   in	   immune	   self-­‐ascriptions,	   where	   ‘I’	   used	   as	   a	  subject,	   ‘I’	   does	   not	   refer.	   After	   two	   pages	   describing	   the	   phenomenon	   of	  immunity,	  such	  a	  radical	  conclusion	  does	  not	  sound	  very	  plausible.	  	  I	   am	   not	   interested	   in	   arguing	   for	   the	   referentiality	   of	   the	   first	   person	  pronoun	   against	   Wittgenstein,	   who	   wished	   to	   deny	   it.	   Pace	   Wittgenstein	   I	  simply	   assume	   that	   the	   subject	   by	   using	   ‘I’,	   without	   exception,	   refers	   and	  intends	   to	   refer	  herself.6	  I	   assume	   that	   all	   uses	  of	   ‘I’	   refer	   to	   a	  material	  object	  with	   both	   mental	   and	   physical	   qualities	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   Cartesian	   Ego	  (Strawson	   1959,	   Shoemaker	   1968,	   Burge	   2010,	   Peacocke	   2014,	   Snowdon	  2014).	  This	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  exciting	  question,	  which	  is	  how	  IEM	  is	  possible,	  if	  ‘I’	  refers.	  Is	  there	  something	  about	  how	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  which	  makes	  self-­‐ascriptions	  less	  vulnerable	  to	  certain	  kind	  of	  mistakes	  –	  such	  as	  misidentification?	  	  
2.	  Immunity	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification	  The	   label	   immunity	   to	   error	   through	  misidentification	  was	   introduced	   by	  Shoemaker	  in	  ‘Self-­‐Reference	  and	  Self-­‐Awareness’,	  but	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  IEM	  was	  known	  before.	  Though	  the	  phenomenon	  only	  came	  to	  general	  philosophical	  attention	  with	  Shoemaker’s	  article,	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  is	  credited	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  because	  of	  his	  discussion	  in	  the	  Blue	  and	  Brown	  Books.	  The	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  IEM	  is	  the	  self-­‐attribution	  of	  pain.	  For	  ‘I	  am	  in	  pain’,	   based	   on	   feeling,	   the	   subject	   cannot	   be	   wrong	   about	  who	   is	   in	   pain.	   In	  contrast,	  based	  on	  vision,	  looking	  at	  the	  mirror,	  the	  subject	  can	  misidentify	  who	  
has	  messy	  hair	  when	  she	  judges	  that	  ‘I	  have	  messy	  hair’.	  	  	  
                                                6	  By	  ‘use	  of	  ‘I’’,	  I	  will	  always	  mean	  a	  literal	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  where	  the	  speaker/thinker	  intends	  to	  refer	  to	  herself.	  For	  example,	   in	  the	  following	  sentence	  the	  first	  occurrence	  of	   ‘I’	   is	  a	  non-­‐literal	  use	  while	  the	  second	  occurrence	  is	  a	  literal	  use	  of	  ‘I’.	  If	  I	  were	  you	  then	  I	  would	  be	  where	  I	  am	  not.	  This	  could	  not	  make	  any	  sense	  if	  there	  were	  not	  two	  different	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  in	  it;	  but	  it	  makes	  sense.	  A	   subject	   cannot	   use	   ‘I’	   unless	   she	   knowingly	   and	   intentionally	   refers	   to	   herself	   (Anscombe	  1963,	  Castaneda	  1966,	  Evans	  1982,	  O'Brien	  2007,	  Peacocke	  2008,	  2014).	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3.	  Wittgenstein’s	  two	  theses	  concerning	  IEM	  
3.1.	  The	  first	  thesis	  	  To	  introduce	  the	  phenomenon	  Wittgenstein	  presents	  us	  with	  two	  separate	  sets	  of	   self-­‐ascriptions.	   The	   first	   set	   contains	   the	   paradigmatic	   cases	   of	   ‘I’	   used	   as	  subject,	   while	   the	   second	   set	   provides	   the	   paradigmatic	   cases	   of	   ‘I’	   used	   as	  object.	  	  	  Now	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  real	  I	  lives	  in	  my	  body	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  peculiar	  grammar	  of	  the	  word	  “I”,	  and	  the	  misunderstandings	  this	  grammar	  is	  liable	  to	  give	  rise	  to.	  There	  are	  two	  different	  cases	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “I”	  (or	  “my”)	   which	   I	   might	   call	   “the	   use	   as	   object”	   and	   “the	   use	   as	   subject”.	  Examples	   of	   the	   first	   kind	   of	   use	   are	   these:	   “My	   arm	   is	   broken”,	   “I	   have	  grown	  six	   inches”,	   “I	   have	  a	  bump	  on	  my	   forehead”,	   “The	  wind	  blows	  my	  hair	  about”.	  Examples	  of	  the	  second	  kind	  are:	  “I	  see	  so-­‐and-­‐so”,	  “I	  hear	  so-­‐and-­‐so”,	   “I	   try	   to	   lift	  my	  arm”,	   “I	   think	   it	  will	   rain”,	   “I	  have	   [a]	   toothache”.	  (Wittgenstein	  1958:	  66-­‐67)	  	  	  I	  will	   distinguish	   between	   two	   theses	  Wittgenstein	   advanced.	   The	   first	   thesis	  demarcates	  the	  two	  uses	  of	  ‘I’.	  The	  object	  use	  of	  ‘I’,	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  is	  different	   from	   the	   subject	   use	   of	   ‘I’	   as	   it	   involves	   recognition	   of	   a	   particular	  person	  by	  his	  bodily	  characteristics.7	  	  	  One	   can	   point	   to	   the	   difference	   between	   those	   two	   categories	   by	   saying:	  The	  cases	  of	  the	  first	  category	  [the	  object	  use	  of	  ‘I’]	  involve	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  particular	  person	  (…).	  (Wittgenstein	  1958:	  66-­‐67)	  	  We	  feel	  then	  in	  the	  case	  in	  which	  “I”	  is	  used	  as	  a	  subject,	  we	  don’t	  recognize	  a	   particular	   person	   by	   his	   bodily	   characteristics	   (…).	   (Wittgenstein	   1958:	  69).	  
                                                7	  Wittgenstein’s	  notion	  of	  ‘use	  of	  ‘I’	  as	  subject’	  is	  different	  from	  Kant’s	  notion	  of	  ‘consciousness	  of	   oneself’	   as	   subject.	   In	   the	  Kantian	   tradition,	   the	   self	   can	   be	   presented	   as	   an	   object	   or	   as	   a	  subject.	  Wittgenstein	  only	  demarcates	  two	  sets	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  from	  each	  other.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Kantian	  notion	  (e.g.	  Cassam	  1997)	  applies	  not	  only	  to	  self-­‐ascriptions,	  but	  to	  all	  thoughts	  of	  the	  subject.	  (‘I	  think…’	  can	  be	  attached	  to	  all	  thoughts	  of	  the	  subject.)	  In	  chapter	  10	  I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  question.	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  We	  can	  formulate	  Wittgenstein’s	  idea	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
WT1.	  The	  object	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  involves	  recognition	  of	  a	  particular	  person,	  while	  the	  subject	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  does	  not	  involve	  recognition	  of	  this	  kind.	  	  We	  turn	  to	  the	  second	  thesis.	  	  
3.2.	  The	  second	  thesis:	  subject	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  are	  immune	  According	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  subject	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	  are	  immune	  and	  object	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	  are	  not	   immune.	  The	  reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	  subject	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	  are	  recognition-­‐free,	  while	  object	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	  are	  recognition	  dependent.	   ‘Recognition’	   is	  always	  used	  for	  singling	  the	  object,	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’,	  out	  from	  among	  many	  objects	  in	  some	  way	  (e.g.	  by	  bodily	  characteristics).	  	  One	   can	   point	   to	   the	   difference	   between	   those	   two	   categories	   by	   saying:	  The	   cases	   of	   the	   first	   category	   [i.e.	   the	   object	   use	   of	   ‘I’]	   involve	   the	  recognition	  of	  a	  particular	  person,	  and	  there	  is	  in	  these	  cases	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  error,	  or	  as	  I	  should	  rather	  put	  it:	  The	  possibility	  of	  an	  error	  has	  been	  provided	  for.	   (…)	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   there	   is	  no	  question	  of	  recognizing	  a	  person	  when	  I	  say	  I	  have	  [a]	  toothache.	  (Wittgenstein	  1958:	  66-­‐67).	  
	  	  Once	  again,	  we	  can	  formulate	  Wittgenstein’s	  idea	  as	  a	  thesis:	  	  
	  
WT2.	  A	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  immune	  iff	  it	  only	  involves	  subject	  uses	  of	  ‘I’.	  	  For	  Wittgenstein,	  just	  and	  only	  recognition	  of	  an	  object	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	   Recognition-­‐freedom	   is	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   for	   IEM.	  Wittgenstein	   holds	   that	   the	   subject	   use	   of	   ‘I’	   does	   not	   refer	   because	   it	   is	  recognition-­‐free.	  This	  presupposes	  that	  one	  cannot	  know	  of	  a	  present	  physical	  object,	  if	  that	  object	  was	  encountered	  before,	  unless	  one	  recognises	  that	  object.	  Against	  Wittgenstein,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  recognition-­‐freedom	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  
 24	  
IEM	   and	   that	   the	   subject	   can	   know	   of	   a	   present	   physical	   object	   without	  recognising	  it.	  I	  start	  with	  the	  first	  claim.	  	  
4.	  Recognition-­‐freedom	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  IEM	  
4.1.	  The	  Mistaken	  Identity	  Example	  Consider	  the	  following	  example.	  Suppose	  that	  in	  1949	  I	  have	  amnesia	  and	  have	  forgotten	  who	  I	  am.	  But	  I	  am	  deceived	  by	  my	  friends	  and	  made	  to	  believe	  that	  I	  
am	  Anscombe.	   I	   know	   that	  Anscombe	  was	   a	   student	  of	  Wittgenstein	   and	   I	   am	  sure	  of	  this.	  But	  I	  know	  that	  like	  me	  my	  friends	  like	  to	  play	  tricks	  –	  even	  so	  this	  happens	  only	  occasionally,	  and	  I	  usually	  trust	  them.	  In	  this	  case	  my	  friends	  have	  managed	   to	   convince	   me	   that	   I	   am	   Anscombe,	   and	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  presuppositions	  above,	  I	  judge	  based	  on	  testimony	  and	  inference:	  	   J1)	  I	  was	  Wittgenstein’s	  student.	  
 I	  might	  meet	  with	  Wittgenstein	  who	   insists	   that	  he	  has	  never	  seen	  me	  before.	  He	   looks	   surprised	   by	   my	   suggestion	   that	   I	   was	   his	   student.	   I	   ask	   whether	  Anscombe	  was	   his	   student.	   He	   agrees	   with	   a	   cheerful,	   if	   not	   an	   ironic	   smile.	  Consequently,	   I	   conclude	   that	   I	   cannot	   be	   his	   former	   student;	   I	   cannot	   be	  Anscombe.	   There	   is	   no	   recognition	   involved.	   I	   do	   not	   recognise	   myself	   as	  Anscombe,	   I	  only	  believe	   that	   I	   am	  Anscombe.	  Still	   I	   can	  misidentify	  who	  was	  Wittgenstein’s	   student,	   so	   J1	   (B=testimony,	   inference)	   is	  not	   immune.	  We	   can	  see	  that	  misidentification	  is	  involved	  because	  if	  I	  doubt	  that	  I	  am	  Anscombe	  and	  that	   I	   am	  Wittgenstein’s	   student,	   then	   I	   should	   believe	   that	   Anscombe	   is	   his	  student	  and	  not	  me.	  	  Here	   is	   another	   case.	  During	   the	   socialist	   period	  of	  Hungary,	   I	  was	   in	   the	  underground.	   I	   seem	   to	   remember	   that	   I	   came	   up	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   holding	   a	  peace	   demonstration	   on	   the	   theme	   of	   “The	   funeral	   of	   the	   known	   soldier”	   (as	  opposed	   to	   the	   usual	   commemoration	   of	   unknown	   soldiers).	   There	   were	  several	  other	  small	  group	  demonstrations	  at	  this	  event.	  All	  the	  evidence	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  my	  friend	  who	  came	  up	  with	  this	  scheme	  to	  put	  a	  straw	  man	  in	  military	  uniform	  and	  I	  did	  not	  add	  any	   ideas	  to	  the	  scheme.	   It	  seems	  I	  misidentified	   who	   came	   up	   with	   that	   splendid	   scheme	   which	   was	   the	   most	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successful	  of	  all	  small	  group	  demonstrations	  at	  that	  time.	  But	  recognition	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  involved.	  I	  still	  seem	  to	  remember	  that	  I	  came	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  –	  but	  I	  am	  wrong	  about	  who	  came	  up	  with	  the	  idea.	  	  I	  have	  only	  tried	  to	  give	  a	  flavour	  of	  how	  misidentification	  of	  who	  is	  F	  seems	  to	  be	  possible	  without	  recognition.	  For	  Wittgenstein,	   just	  and	  only	  recognition	  of	  an	  object	   should	  open	   the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  cannot	  be	  correct.	  	  
4.2.	  The	  head-­‐knocking	  example	  Let	  me	  examine	  whether	  Wittgenstein’s	  examples	  of	  subject	  and	  object	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	   provide	   us	   with	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   what	   could	   be	   considered	   as	  immune.	  	  Let	  us	  look	  at	  Wittgenstein’s	  example	  of	  an	  object	  use	  of	  ‘I’.	  	  
	   J2)	  I	  have	  grown	  six	  inches.	  	  According	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  J2	  is	  not	  immune.	  But	  J2	  can	  be	  immune	  even	  on	  an	  observational	  basis,	   as	  we	  will	   see.	   Suppose	   I	   knock	  my	  head	  on	  a	  doorframe	  which	  I	  know	  is	  six	  inches	  taller	  than	  me.	  If	   I	  assert	  J2	  just	  and	  only	  because	  I	  knocked	   my	   head	   to	   the	   believed-­‐to-­‐be-­‐six-­‐inches-­‐taller-­‐than-­‐me	   doorframe,	  then	  on	  this	  ground	  there	  is	  no	  room	  to	  think	  that	   if	   I	  did	  not	  grow	  six	   inches	  then	   someone	   else	   did.	   Thus,	   contrary	   to	   Wittgenstein,	   on	   this	   particular	  ground,	   J2	   is	   immune	   relative	   to	   ‘I’.	   According	   to	   Wittgenstein,	   J2	   requires	  recognition	  and	  recognition	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	  But	  in	  our	  example	  J2,	  so	  judged	  in	  the	  situation,	  does	  not	  and	  cannot	  involve	  recognition	  in	  its	  ground.	  	  One	  might	  think	  that	  the	  door	  might	  shrink	  six	  inches.	  This	  might	  happen,	  for	   example,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   an	  earthquake.	  But	   still	   nothing	  but	   I	   can	  grow	  six	  inches	  –	  if	  anyone	  has	  grown.	  We	  have	  to	  specify	  the	  basis	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  the	  judgement	  is	  immune.	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5.	  Basis	  matters	  –	  the	  leading	  theme	  There	   are	   in	   fact	   two	   different	  ways	   that	  Wittgenstein	   differentiated	   the	   two	  uses	   of	   ‘I’	   from	   each	   other.	   The	   first	   introduction	   was	   through	   listing	  paradigmatic	  examples	  and	  the	  second	  introduction	  was	  by	  answering	  whether	  the	   judgements	   are	   based	   on	   recognition.	   Neither	   of	   them	   allows	   that	   a	  judgment	  might	  be	  immune	  on	  one	  but	  not	  immune	  on	  another	  basis.	  This	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  correct,	  as	  Evans	  observed:	  	  	   Wittgenstein’s	   discussion	   does	   not	   take	   sufficient	   account	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  the	   property	   of	   immunity	   to	   error	   through	   misidentification	   is	   not	   one	  which	   applies	   to	   propositions	   simpliciter,	   but	   one	   which	   applies	   only	   to	  judgments	  made	  upon	  this	  or	  that	  basis.	  (Evans	  1982:	  218-­‐219).	  
 Evans	   pointed	   out	   what	   is	   lacking	   in	   Wittgenstein’s	   account	   of	   IEM.	   Evans	  argues	  that	  a	  judgment	  like	  ‘I	  have	  my	  legs	  crossed’	  is	  only	  immune	  relativized	  to	  its	  basis.	  Suppose	  I	  judge	  based	  only	  on	  proprioception:	  	  	   J3)	  I	  have	  my	  legs	  crossed.	  	  Proprioception	   is	   a	   perceptual	  modality	   that	   provides	  me	  with	   a	   sense	   of	   the	  position	  of	  my	  body	  parts	  relative	  to	  one	  another	  from	  the	  inside.	  When	  it	  turns	  out	   that	   my	   legs	   are	   not	   crossed,	   then,	   on	   this	   basis,	   I	   cannot	   judge	   that	  someone	  else’s	  legs	  are	  crossed.	  On	  this	  basis,	  I	  cannot	  misidentify	  who	  has	  her	  legs	   crossed,	   thus	   J3,	   based	   on	   proprioception,	   is	   immune.	   However,	   when	   I	  judge	  J3	  based	  on	  vision,	   then	  the	  case	   is	  different.	   If	   it	   turns	  out	  that	  my	  legs	  are	  not	  crossed	  then	  I	  can	  judge	  on	  the	  same	  basis	  that	  ‘this	  person’s	  (whom	  I	  see	   in	   the	  mirror)	   legs	   are	   crossed’	   (Evans	   1982:	   218-­‐224).	  We	  might	  worry	  that	  if	  J3	  is	  based	  both	  on	  proprioception	  and	  vision,	  then	  the	  one	  who	  has	  her	  legs	   crossed	   can	   be	   misidentified.	   Thus	   we	   suggest	   that	   J3	   solely	   based	   on	  proprioception	  is	  immune.	  This	  can	  be	  repeated	  for	  other	  judgements	  like	  	   J4)	  My	  arm	  is	  broken.	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or	  	  	   J5)	  I	  have	  a	  bump	  on	  my	  forehead.	  	  	  If	  I	  judge	  J4	  based	  solely	  on	  feeling	  pain	  without	  exploiting	  vision,	  then	  I	  cannot	  misidentify	  whose	  arm	  is	  broken.	  Similarly,	  if	  I	  feel	  a	  stretching	  feeling	  from	  the	  inside	   –	  what	   I	   feel	  when	  my	   bump	   due	   to	   knocking	  my	   head	   is	   swelling	   –	   I	  might	  judge,	  based	  only	  on	  this,	  that	  I	  have	  a	  bump	  on	  my	  forehead.	  If	  my	  basis	  for	  J5	  is	  only	  what	  I	  know	  from	  the	  inside	  then	  I	  cannot	  go	  wrong	  about	  who	  has	  a	  bump	  on	  her	  forehead.	  One	  might	  worry	   that	   this	   is	  only	  restricted	  to	  some	  examples	  so	   it	  might	  not	  be	  legitimate	  to	  generalise	  from	  them.	  This	  is	  correct,	  so	  we	  only	  conclude	  that	   at	   least	   some	   self-­‐ascriptions	   are	   such	   that	   the	   self-­‐ascription	  made	  on	   a	  certain	   basis	   is	   immune.	   I	   will	   argue	   in	   the	   following	   chapters	   for	   the	  generalisation	  of	  this	  claim.	  It	  seems	  that	  contrary	  to	  what	  Wittgenstein	  claims,	  the	  judgment	  has	  to	  be	  relativized	  to	  its	  basis	  for	  deciding	  whether	  it	  is	  immune.	  For	  IEM,	  basis	  seems	  to	  matter.	  The	   subject	  use	  of	   ‘I’	   is	   supposed	   to	  mark	  out	   the	   class	  of	   self-­‐ascriptions	  which	  are	   immune.	  Recognition-­‐freedom	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  delineate	  this	  class	  very	  well.	  But	  what	  is	  the	  big	  picture	  behind	  Wittgenstein’s	  investigation?	  How	  does	  Wittgenstein	  arrive	  at	   the	  conclusion	   that	   subject	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	  do	  not	   refer	  from	  their	  lack	  of	  recognition	  of	  an	  object?	  	  IEM	   is	   always	   considered	   essential	   for	   understanding	   the	   first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  But	  it	  has	  never	  been	  made	  clear	  why	  IEM	  matters	  for	  understanding	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  Let	  me	  elaborate	  on	  the	  background	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  argument	  so	  as	  to	  see	  what	  IEM	  can	  teach	  us	  about	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  	  
6.	  How	  does	  the	  subject	  know	  of	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’?	  	  Wittgenstein’s	  second	  thesis	  characterises	  IEM:	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  immune	  iff	  it	  only	  involves	  a	  recognition-­‐free	  subject	  use	  of	  ‘I’.	  But	  what	  is	  recognition?	  On	  a	  plausible	  reading	  of	  Wittgenstein,	  recognition	  of	  somebody	  (a	  physical	  object)	  happens	   by	   identifying	   an	   object	   by	   its	   bodily	   characteristics	   (Wittgenstein	  1958:	   69).	   Ordinary	   instances	   of	   identifying	   an	   object	   by	   its	   bodily	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characteristics	  would	  include	  cases	  of	  recognising	  someone	  by	  some	  relatively	  permanent	   bodily	   characteristics,	   like	   a	   birthmark,	   an	   unusual	   smile,	   always	  having	  a	  strange	  posture,	  or	  something	  more	  holistic,	  such	  as	  having	  a	  ‘Johnny-­‐like	   look’.	  What	  enables	  me	   to	   recognise	   someone	   is	   the	   comparison	  between	  how	  she	  usually	  looks	  and	  how	  a	  person	  looks	  now.	  	  However	  we	  have	  to	  realise	  that	  it	  is	  not	  these	  relatively	  permanent	  bodily	  characteristics	  which	  enable	  the	  subject	  to	  recognise	  herself.	  I	  want	  to	  note	  that	  even	   though	   we	   see	   others	   and	   we	   might	   recognise	   them	   by	   their	   bodily	  characteristics,	   we	   do	   not	   see	   our	   face	   except	   with	   the	   aid	   of	   mirrors	   or	  reflecting	  surfaces	  like	  lakes.	  We	  know	  our	  bodily	  characteristics	  by	  looking	  at	  mirrors.	   Accordingly,	   I	   cannot	   identify	   myself	   by	   my	   typical	   bodily	  characteristics	  –	  e.g.	  how	  my	  face	  or	  I	  would	  look	  –	  unless	  I	  learn	  them	  through	  looking	  at	  mirrors.	  But	  I	   first	  have	  to	  know	  that	   it	   is	   I	  who	  I	  see	   in	  the	  mirror	  before	   I	   can	   learn	   what	   my	   bodily	   characteristics	   are.	   So	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  recognition	   approach	   cannot	   provide	   us	   with	   the	   correct	   direction	   for	  uncovering	  how	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’.	  	  
6.1.	  The	  big	  picture:	  	  
The	  non-­‐referentiality	  argument	  and	  its	  presuppositions	  There	   is	   a	  big	  picture	  behind	  Wittgenstein’s	  discussion	  about	   IEM	  concerning	  whether	   ‘I’	   refers	   and,	   if	   it	   refers,	   how	   it	   can	   refer	   to	   a	   physical	   object.	  Wittgenstein	   uses	   IEM	   to	   argue	   that,	   in	   some	   uses	   of	   ‘I’	   (the	   subject	   uses),	   ‘I’	  does	  not	  refer.	  Let	  me	  call	  this	  the	  non-­‐referentiality	  argument.	  	  The	   argument	   is	   as	   follows.	   For	  Wittgenstein,	   if	   ‘I’	   refers,	   it	   refers	   to	   the	  physical	  object	  which	  always	  has	   to	  be	  present	   to	   the	  subject,	  and	   the	  subject	  has	   to	  know	  of	   that	  object	  when	  she	  uses	   ‘I’.	  Let	  us	  accept	   this	   for	   the	  sake	  of	  argument.8	  However	  Wittgenstein	   claims	   that	  without	   recognition	   one	   cannot	  know	  of	  a	  present	  physical	  object	  and	  its	  contingent	  properties.	  Subject	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	   lack	   recognition,	   so	   in	   such	  uses	   the	   subject	   cannot	   refer	   intentionally	   to	   a	  present	  physical	  object.	  	  	  
                                                8	  I	  will	  provide	  some	  reasons	  for	  holding	  this	  claim	  in	  chapter	  2.	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6.2.	   Can	   I	   be	   aware	   of	   a	   physical	   object	  which	   is	   present	   to	  me	  without	  
recognising	  it?	  	  Our	  question	   is	   the	   following.	   Suppose	  we	  are	  physical	   objects	  with	   cognitive	  capacities.	  Is	  it	  true	  that	  I	  have	  to	  recognise	  an	  object	  which	  is	  present	  to	  me	  in	  order	  to	  know	  directly	  of	  that	  physical	  object?	  Could	  I	  be	  perceptually	  aware	  of	  a	  physical	  object	  without	  recognising	  it?	  	  The	  head-­‐knocking	  example	  shows	  that	  one	  can	  know	  of	  a	  present	  physical	  object	   without	   recognition.	   I	   can	   know	   of	   the	   object	   which	   is	   me	   without	  recognising	  it.	  Thus,	  Wittgenstein’s	  presupposition	  that	  recognition	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  physical	  object	  by	  using	  ‘I’	  was	  a	  mistaken	  one.	  I	  can	  know	  of	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   (even	   if	   it	   is	   a	   material	   object)	   without	   recognising	   this	  body.	  This	  seems	  plausible,	  but	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  that	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  object	  which	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’?	  	  
6.3.	  A	  mistaken	  assumption	  For	   Wittgenstein	   recognition	   is	   necessary	   for	   knowing	   of	   a	   physical	   object	  which	   is	   present	   to	  me.	  When,	   based	   solely	   on	   proprioception,	   I	   judge	   that	   ‘I	  have	   my	   legs	   crossed’,	   then	   I	   cannot	   misidentify	   who	   has	   her	   legs	   crossed.	  Accordingly,	  my	  judgment	  on	  this	  basis	   is	   immune.	  Proprioception	  is	  a	  special	  way	  of	  knowing.	  Through	  proprioception	  the	  subject	  cannot	  know	  anything	  but	  the	  object	  which	  is	  the	  subject.	  Thus	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  recognising	  or	  singling	  out	  the	  relevant	  object	  when	  an	  object	   is	  known	  through	  such	  special	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Thus	  the	  lack	  of	  recognition	  in	  the	  subject	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  cannot	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  ‘I’	  is	  not	  a	  referring	  expression.	  Wittgenstein’s	  line	  of	  thought	  relies	  on	  not	  realising	  that	  proprioception	  is	  a	  way	   of	   knowing.	   There	   are	   questions	   about	   whether	   proprioception	   is	  perceptual,	   but	   there	   is	   no	   question	   whether	   it	   is	   a	   way	   of	   knowing.	  Proprioception	   and	   nociception	   (for	   pain)	   are	   best	   understood	   as	   perceptual	  faculties	  which	   are	   directed	   toward	   one’s	   own	  body	   and	   its	   states,	  which	   are	  then	  present	  through	  these	  perceptual	  faculties	  to	  the	  subject	  (Martin	  1993	  and	  1995).	   Proprioception	   is	   a	   way	   of	   knowing	   even	   for	   a	   Wittgensteinian.	  According	  to	  Anscombe	  (1972),	  proprioception	  is	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  even	  if	  it	  is	  non-­‐observational	  and	  non-­‐perceptual.	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I	  analysed	  why	  Wittgenstein	   thought	   that	   recognition	   is	  necessary	   for	   the	  referring	  use	  of	  ‘I’.	  I	  concluded	  that	  I	  can	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  physical	  object	  which	  is	  me	  without	  recognising	  that	  object	  or	  singling	  it	  out	  from	  among	  many	  (the	  head-­‐knocking	  case).	  Thus	  ‘I’	  can	  refer	  to	  a	  physical	  object	  (if	  this	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’)	  without	  that	  requiring	  that	  the	  subject	  recognises	  that	  object.	  This	  is	  good	  news.	  But	  we	  face	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’.	  	  	  




Guaranteed	  Right	  Reference	  	  	  
 
Abstract	  In	   this	   chapter,	   my	   target	   is	   to	   understand	   what	   guaranteed	   right	  reference	   is.	   Guaranteed	   right	   reference	   (hence	   GRR)	   is	   a	   double	  guarantee:	   (i)	   against	   reference	   failure	   and	   (ii)	   against	   incorrect	  reference.	   Anscombe	   argues	   that	   although	   in	   the	   sensory	   deprivation	  tank	  the	  subject	  is	  able	  to	  use	  ‘I’,	  the	  essential	  feature	  of	  referential	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  cannot	  be	  met.	  The	  essential	  feature	  is	  guaranteed	  right	  reference.	  	  According	  to	  Anscombe’s	  presence	  constraint,	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  has	  to	   be	   perceptually	   present	   to	   the	   subject	   when	   she	   uses	   ‘I’	   and	   this	  makes	  GRR	  possible.	  I	  understand	  this	  as	  requiring	  that	  the	  subject	  has	  to	   be	   acquainted	   with	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’.	   However,	   in	   the	   sensory	  deprivation	   tank,	   the	  subject	   is	  able	   to	  use	   ‘I’,	   she	  argues,	  even	  though	  the	  essential	  feature	  of	  referential	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  (GRR)	  cannot	  be	  satisfied.	  I	  will	   try	   to	   work	   out	   what	   the	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	   reference	  amounts	  to	  and	  motivate	  and	  reconstruct	  the	  presence	  constraint.	  This	  will	  enable	  me	  to	  pose	  Anscombe’s	  challenge	  to	  the	  Simple	  View.	  If	  the	  subject	  has	  to	  be	  acquainted	  with	  herself	  whenever	  she	  uses	  ‘I’,	  then	  the	  question	   arises	   as	   to	   how	   this	   is	   possible	   in	   the	   sensory	   deprivation	  tank.	  	  	  
1.	  Preliminaries	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   consider	   a	   challenge	   concerning	   how	   the	   subject	   knows	   the	  referent	  of	  her	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  and	  develop	  a	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  GRR	  inspired	  by	  Anscombe.	  Both	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Anscombe	  assume	   that,	   for	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	   to	  refer,	   the	   subject	   has	   to	   know	   of	   the	   object	   which	   is	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’.	  Anscombe,	   like	   Wittgenstein,	   argues	   against	   the	   referentiality	   of	   ‘I’	   from	   the	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premise	  that	  the	  user	  of	  ‘I’	  cannot	  know	  of	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘I’	  when	  she	  uses	  ‘I’.	  Certain	   features	  –	  GRR,	   for	  Anscombe,	  and	   the	  recognition	  of	   the	   referent,	   for	  Wittgenstein	  –	  would	  be	  necessary	  for	  referential	  uses	  of	  ‘I’.	  They	  conclude	  that	  uses	   of	   ‘I’	   do	   not	   refer	   because	   the	   relevant	   conditions	   cannot	   be	   always	  satisfied.	  There	   are	   interesting	   questions	   that	   might	   be	   raised	   concerning	   why	  Anscombe	  thinks	  that	  ‘I’	  is	  not	  a	  referring	  term,	  particularly	  why	  she	  thinks	  that	  the	   first	  person	  pronoun	   in	  general	   fails	   to	  qualify	  as	  a	  referring	   term	  despite	  passing	   standard	   tests	   for	   referentiality.	   For	   example,	   from	   the	   first	   person	  statement	  ‘I	  am	  in	  pain’,	  we	  can	  infer	  an	  existential	  claim	  ‘someone	  is	  in	  pain’.	  In	  extensional	   contexts,	   we	   can	   substitute	   'I'	   in	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   with	   an	  appropriate	   proper	   name	   without	   changing	   the	   truth-­‐value	   of	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   and	   so	   on.9	  But	   I	   shall	   not	   be	   engaging	   Anscombe	   on	   these	   points.	  Instead,	   I	   find	   it	   plausible	   that	   the	   first	   person	   pronoun	   refers	   and	   that	   its	  passing	  these	  referentiality	  tests	  provides	  sufficient	  reason	  for	  holding	  this.	  	  For	  Anscombe,	  GRR	  is	  the	  key	  for	  understanding	  how	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  –	  if	  ‘I’	  refers.	  GRR	  is	  one	  of	  the	  essential	  features	  of	  the	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  in	  the	  Reference-­‐fixing	  Test;	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  understand	  GRR	  and	  reconstruct	  Anscombe’s	  challenge.	  	  	  
2.	  Guaranteed	  Right	  Reference	  
Guaranteed	   right	   reference	   is	  a	  double	  guarantee	   for	  a	  referring	  expression	  type.	  Whenever	  a	  token	  of	  this	  type	  is	  used	  (i)	  it	  cannot	  lack	  reference	  and	  (ii)	  
it	  cannot	  be	  used	  incorrectly	  or	  have	  mistaken	  reference.	   In	  the	  literature	  on	  first-­‐person	  reference,	  GRR	  is	  generally	  assumed	  to	  be	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  all	   uses	   of	   ‘I’	   (e.g.	   Strawson	   1994,	   O'Brien	   2007,	   Peacocke	   2008,	   Campbell	  2012).10	  Anscombe	  describes	  the	  phenomenon:	  	   It	  seems	  clear	  that	  if	  “I”	  is	  a	  ‘referring	  expression’	  at	  all,	  it	  has	  both	  kinds	  of	  guaranteed	  reference.	  The	  object	  an	  “I”-­‐user	  means	  by	   it	  must	  exist	  so	   long	  
                                                9	  See	  Harcourt	  (2000)	  and	  Campbell	  (2004)	  for	  further	  discussion.	  10	  Evans	   (1982)	  argues	   that	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	   lack	   reference	   in	  brain-­‐in-­‐the-­‐vat	   scenarios.	   Let	  me	   set	  aside	  this	  issue.	  Evans	  also	  argues	  that	  ‘I’	  has	  GRR	  in	  the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank	  (Evans	  1982:	  215).	  This	  is	  all	  I	  need.	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as	  he	  is	  using	  “I”,	  nor	  can	  he	  take	  the	  wrong	  object	  to	  be	  the	  object	  he	  means	  by	  "I".	  (Anscombe	  1975:	  151-­‐152).  	  A	  guarantee	  against	  lack	  of	  reference	  excludes	  the	  possibilities	  that	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  empty	  or	  missing.	  For	  all	  tokens	  of	  ‘I’,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  referent	  in	  the	  present	  is	  guaranteed.	  Accordingly,	  GRR	  ensures	  that	  	  	   GRR1. A	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  cannot	  lack	  reference.	  	  
	  It	  cannot	  happen	  that	  one	  uses	  ‘I’	  without	  successfully	  referring	  to	  an	  object.	  Let	  us	  call	  this	  a	  guarantee	  against	  lack	  of	  reference.11	  Consider,	   by	   way	   of	   contrast,	   a	   term	   such	   as	   ‘Homer’.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	  ‘Homer’	   was	   not	   a	   name	   that	   anybody	   ever	   had.	   It,	   supposedly,	   refers	   to	   a	  person.	   Based	   on	   received	   knowledge,	   several	   hundred	   years	   ago,	   tradition	  might	  have	  constructed	  him	  from	  several	  existing	  bards	  and	  their	  stories.	   It	   is	  possible	  that	  ‘Homer’	  lacks	  reference.	  We	  can	  try	  to	  use	  a	  proper	  name	  when	  it	  lacks	  reference.	  In	  this	  case,	  nobody	  stands	  in	  the	  appropriate	  (causal)	  relation	  to	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term.	   Similarly,	   one	   might	   attempt	   to	   use	   a	   demonstrative	  singular	   term	  unsuccessfully	   if	   there	   is	  nothing	   to	  be	  demonstrated	  or	  singled	  out.	   This	   cannot	   happen	  with	   ‘I’	  when	   one	   uses	   it.	   One	   cannot	   use	   ‘I’	  without	  succeeding	  in	  referring	  to	  its	  referent	  (on	  the	  condition	  that	  one	  is	  not	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat).	  Moreover	  a	  proper	  name	  can	  be	  used	  for	  an	  object	  which	  does	  not	  exist	  any	  more,	  like	  Cicero.	  But	  whenever	  one	  uses	  ‘I’,	  the	  referent	  exists	  at	  the	  time	  of	  use.	  	  There	   is	   a	   second	   guarantee	   in	   GRR,	   the	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	  reference.	   But	   it	   is	   much	   less	   clear	   what	   a	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	   or	  mistaken	   reference	  means.	   In	  Anscombe’s	   paper,	  we	   can	   find	   two	  versions	   of	  the	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference:	  	  	  A)	  A	  guarantee	  against	  referring	  to	  the	  incorrect	  essential	  kind	  of	  thing:	  
                                                11	  “But	  ‘I’	  –	  if	  it	  makes	  a	  reference,	  if,	  that	  is	  its	  mode	  of	  meaning	  is	  that	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  make	  a	  reference	  –	  is	  secure	  against	  reference-­‐failure.”	  (Anscombe	  1975:	  149).	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From	  Augustine:	  "The	  mind	  knows	  itself	  to	  think",	  and	  "it	  knows	  its	  own	  substance".	  (Anscombe	  1975:	  140).	  	  	  B)	  A	  guarantee	  against	  referring	  to	  the	  wrong	  object:	  The	  object	  an	   "I"-­‐user	  means	  by	   it	  must	  exist	   so	   long	  as	  he	   is	  using	   "I"	  
nor	  can	  he	   [the	  subject]	   take	   the	  wrong	  object	   to	  be	   the	  object	  he	  
means	  by	  "I".	  (Anscombe	  1975:	  151-­‐152,	  with	  my	  emphasis).	  	  	  The	   first	   version	   (A)	   seems	   to	   be	   implausible.	   Descartes	   thinks	   that	   we	   are	  essentially	  Cartesian	  egos,	  Locke	  assumes	   that	  we	  are	  essentially	  persons	  and	  Olson	   holds	   that	   we	   are	   essentially	   human	   animals.	   One	   particular	   cannot	  belong	  to	  more	  than	  one	  fundamental,	  determinate	  essential	  kind	  (e.g.	  lion	  and	  human)	  and	  has	  to	  remain	  a	  particular	  of	  that	  same	  kind	  until	  it	  ceases	  to	  exist	  (Wiggins	   1980	   and	   2001,	   Snowdon	   2014).	   Accordingly,	   we	   have	   to	   have	   one	  fundamental	   essential	   kind.	   The	   three	   options	   canvassed	   are	   mutually	  incompatible	  (supposing	  that	  our	  three	  philosophers	  are	  not	  angels	  –	  an	  angel	  is	   its	  own	  idiosyncratic	  kind).	  Thus,	  at	   least	  two	  of	  them	  are	  wrong.	  Descartes	  might	  respond	  that	  an	  ideal	  thinker	  has	  to	  know	  which	  kind	  of	  thing	  she	  is.	  But,	  then,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  guarantee	  at	  all	  for	  us	  in	  knowing	  which	  kind	  we	  are,	  because	  nothing	  guarantees	  that	  we	  are	  ideal	  thinkers.	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  wrong	  about	  which	  essential	  kind	  she	  falls	  under.12	  So	  if	  GRR	  is	  supposed	  to	  hold,	  then	  the	  claim	  has	  to	  be	  that	  the	  subject	  cannot	  try	  to	  refer	  to	   the	  wrong	  object	  by	  using	   ‘I’.	  Consequently,	   the	  second	  version	   looks	  more	  promising.	   This	   ensures	   that	   the	   subject	   always	   uses	   ‘I’	   for	   the	   right	   object,	  which	  is	  its	  referent.	  The	  subject	  cannot	  mean	  to	  pick	  out	  another	  object	  or	  try	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  for	  an	  object	  other	  than	  its	  referent.	  We	  may	  conclude	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  the	  second	  guarantee	  as	  follows:	  	  GRR2. The	  subject	  cannot	  intend	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  wrong	  object.	  	  	  
                                                12	  For	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  see	  O’Brien	  (1994	  and	  2007).	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I	  cannot	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  any	  other	  object	  but	  the	  one	  which	  is	  me	  by	  using	  ‘I’;	  thus	   I	   always	   intend	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   right	   object.	   Let	   us	   call	   this	   a	   guarantee	  
against	  incorrect	  reference.	  	  In	  contrast	  I	  can	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  wrong	  object	  by	  using	  ‘KO’.	  Even	  if	  I	  am	   KO,	   I	   might	   not	   know	   this,	   and,	   by	   using	   ‘KO’,	   I	   may	   intend	   to	   refer	   to	  someone	  other	   than	  me.	   I	  simply	   think	   it	   is	  someone	  else’s	  name.	  This	  cannot	  happen	  when	  I	  use	  ‘I’.	  	  
3.	  Guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference	  (GRR2)	  Let	   me	   elaborate	   what	   kind	   of	   mistake	   the	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	  reference	  excludes.	  I	  cannot	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  wrong	  object,	  if	  'I'	  refers.	  This	  should	   be	   understood	   as	   claiming	   that	   the	   intended	   referent	   (what	   the	   user	  intends	  to	  refer	  to)	  and	  the	  semantic	  referent	  (what	  the	  semantic	  referent	  of	  the	  referring	   term	   in	   public	   language	   is)	   cannot	   come	   apart	   for	   the	   first	   person	  pronoun.	   I	   will	   draw	   on	   Kripke’s	   (1977)	   distinction	   between	   speaker’s	  reference	  and	  semantic	  reference	  to	  explicate	  Anscombe’s	  notion.13	  	  	  
3.1.	  Speaker’s	  reference	  and	  semantic	  reference	  Kripke	  (1977)	  differentiates	  between	  speaker’s	  reference	  (which	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  speaker)	  and	  semantic	  reference	  (which	  is	  dependent	  on	  whatever	   semantic	   rule	   we	   have	   for	   determining	   the	   referent).14	  The	   subject	  might	   intend	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  object	  by	  using	  a	  singular	  term	  when	  the	  semantic	  referent	  of	  this	  term	  is	  different	  from	  the	  intended	  one.	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  between	   the	  speaker’s	   referent	  and	   the	  semantic	   referent	  of	   the	  referring	  expression;	   they	   are	   different.	   The	   speaker	   takes	   an	   object	   which	   is	   not	   the	  referent	  to	  be	  the	  referent	  of	  the	  referring	  expression.	  An	  example	  will	  help	  us	  to	  see	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  notions	  of	  reference.	  	  
                                                13	  Strawson	  pushes	  a	  similar	  thought:	  “I	  begin	  with	  a	  point	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  generally	  agreed.	  If	   someone	  has	   and	   formulates	   to	  himself	   or	  herself,	   such	   a	   thought	   as	   ‘I	   am	   feeling	   terrible’,	  then	  his	  or	  her	  use	  of	   'I'	   is	  guaranteed	  against	   two	  kinds	  of	   failure	   to	  which	   the	  uses	  of	   some	  other	   definite	   referring	   expressions	   are	   sometimes	   exposed:	   it	   is	   guaranteed	   against	   lack	   of	  reference,	   and	   it	   is	   guaranteed	   against	   mistaken	   or	   incorrect	   reference	   (i.e.	   against	   lack	   of	  coincidence	   between	   the	   intended	   reference	   and	   the	   reference	   conventionally	   carried,	   in	   the	  circumstances,	  by	  the	  expression	  used).”	  (Strawson	  1980/1994:	  210).	  14	  Kripke	   is	   responding	   to	   Donnellan	   (1966)	   and	   both	   restrict	   their	   discussion	   to	   definite	  descriptions.	  I	  try	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  a	  more	  general	  phenomenon.	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Call	  the	  following	  case	  the	  coffee	  affair.	  Suppose	  we	  are	  busy	  waiters	  and	  waitresses.	  There	  is	  a	  man	  who	  has	  not	  yet	  paid	  for	  his	  coffee	  but	  is	  preparing	  to	   leave.	  He	   looks	   just	   like	   John.	   I	   remark	   to	   you:	   ‘John	   has	   not	   paid	   yet.’	  My	  judgement	   is	  based	  on	  evidence	   that	   someone	  has	  not	  paid	  yet	   and	  my	  belief	  that	  he	  is	  John.	  I	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  one	  who	  has	  not	  paid	  yet.	  If	  he	  is	  not	  John,	  I	  do	  not	  want	  John	  to	  pay	  for	  that	  man’s	  coffee.	  I	  want	  to	  convey	  a	  thought	  about	  the	  one	  whom	  I	  see	  and	  whom	  I	  think	  is	  John.	  If	  you	  know	  he	  is	  not	  John	  and	  do	  not	   recognise	   the	   similarity,	   then	   I	   fail	   to	   convey	   my	   thought.	   The	   speaker’s	  reference	   is	   what	   the	   speaker	   intends	   to	   refer	   to,	   that	   object	   for	   which	   the	  referring	  expression	  is	  used.	  In	  our	  case	  it	  is	  the	  man	  who	  has	  not	  yet	  paid	  for	  his	   coffee,	   but	   the	   semantic	   reference	   is	   John.	   So	   speaker’s	   reference	   and	  semantic	  reference	  can	  come	  apart	  for	  proper	  names	  like	  ‘John’.	  	  	  
3.2.	  No	  gap	  between	  speaker’s	  reference	  and	  semantic	  reference	  I	  will	  now	  apply	  Kripke’s	  distinction	  to	  explicate	  the	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference.	  When	   the	   speaker’s	   reference	   differs	   from	   the	   semantic	   reference,	  then	  the	  user	  intends	  to	  refer	  to	  something	  other	  (that	  man)	  than	  the	  referent	  of	  the	  referring	  term	  (John).	  And	  when	  the	  speaker’s	  reference	  and	  the	  semantic	  reference	   cannot	   come	   apart,	   then	   the	   user	   cannot	   be	  mistaken	   about	  which	  object	  she	  refers	  to.15	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  user	  (speaker)	  cannot	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  wrong	   object	   (i.e.	   something	   other	   than	   the	   semantic	   reference)	   by	   using	  the	  referring	  expression.	  When	  the	  speaker	  cannot	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  wrong	  object	  by	  using	   'I',	   then	  the	  user	  (speaker)	  cannot	  take	  the	  wrong	  object	  to	  be	  the	  object	  he	  means	  by	  'I'	  –	  as	  Anscombe	  noted.	  This	  is	  not	  possible	  unless	  the	  user	   knows	   which	   object	   is	   the	   referent	   of	   'I'	   in	   a	   way	   that	   he	   cannot	   be	  mistaken	   about	   it.	   This	   excludes	   the	   gap	   between	   speaker’s	   and	   semantic	  referent.	  By	  using	  ‘I’,	  the	  user	  will	  always	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  right	  object.	  Drawing	   on	   Kripke’s	   distinction,	   we	   can	   say	   that	   the	   best	   way	   to	  understand	  Anscombe’s	  notion	  of	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference	  is	  that	  the	  speaker’s	  reference	  and	  the	  semantic	  reference	  of	  'I'	  cannot	  be	  different.	  	  	  
                                                15	  Kripke	  noted	   that	   ‘speaker’	   is	  not	   the	  best	  word	   to	  use,	  because	   it	   can	  be	   the	  writer	  or	   the	  thinker	  as	  well	  whose	  intentions	  matter	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  speaker’s	  referent.	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3.3.	  Aboutness	  error	  Let	   me	   call	   the	   mistake	   when	   the	   intended	   and	   the	   semantic	   reference	   is	  different	  aboutness	  error.	  To	  be	  certain	  that	  aboutness	  error	  is	  different	  from	  misidentification,	  we	  need	   a	   clear	   example	   involving	   aboutness	   error	  without	  misidentification.	  	  Let	   us	   consider	   an	   example	   where	   aboutness	   error	   is	   involved	   but	  misidentification	   is	   not	   possible.	   Suppose	   I	   know	   Tony	   is	   very	   clumsy	   and	  reliably	   treads	   on	   the	   toes	   of	   people	   around	   him.	   I	   see	   a	  man	  who	   I	   think	   is	  Tony,	  and	  say	  ‘he	  will	  tread	  on	  your	  toes’	  based	  on	  memory	  and	  vision.	  (‘He’	  is	  used	   as	   a	   demonstrative	  here.)	  That	  man	   is	   the	   only	  man	   around	  besides	   the	  two	  of	  us.	  I	  want	  to	  say	  something	  about	  Tony	  in	  this	  situation	  based	  on	  what	  I	  know	  about	  Tony,	  so	  I	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  him.	  But	  the	  one	  who	  I	  think	  is	  Tony	  is	  not	   Tony.	   The	   semantic	   referent	   of	   ‘he’	   and	   the	   intended	   referent	   (Tony)	   are	  different.	   Is	   the	   judgement	   immune	  relative	   to	   ‘he’?	   It	   cannot	  be	  misidentified	  
who	   is	   going	   to	   tread	   on	   your	   toes	   on	   this	   basis,	   yet	   it	   is	   grounded	   on	   an	  aboutness	  error.	  This	  is	  because	  I	  only	  have	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  Tony,	  but	  not	  anyone	  else,	  would	  tread	  on	  your	  toes	  if	  he	  were	  around	  you.	  But	  the	  one	  who	  is	  around	  you	  is	  not	  Tony,	  so	  nobody	  presents	  the	  danger	  of	  treading	  on	  your	  toes.	  I	  am	  mistaken	  about	  whom	  I	  see	  but	  I	  cannot	  misidentify	  who	  will	  tread	  on	  your	  toes.	  This	  case	  shows	  that	  aboutness	  error	  does	  not	  always	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	   misidentification.	   Consequently,	   aboutness	   error	   is	   a	   mistake	   that	   is	  independent	  from	  misidentification.	  To	   sum	   up,	   it	   seems	   aboutness-­‐error	   freedom	   is	   behind	   the	   guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference.	  I	  cannot	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  wrong	  object	  by	  using	  ‘I’	   because	   aboutness	   error	   is	   not	   possible	   for	   uses	   of	   ‘I’.	   Aboutness-­‐error	  freedom	   excludes	   incongruence	   between	   the	   speaker’s	   referent	   and	   the	  semantic	  referent.	  	  	  
3.4.	  Misidentification	  objection	  Perhaps	   someone	   might	   want	   to	   challenge	   my	   claim	   that	   the	   semantic	   and	  intended	  referent	  cannot	  come	  apart	  for	  ‘I’	  with	  the	  following	  case.	  I	  can	  look	  at	  a	   picture	   and	   say	   ‘I	   was	   10	   years	   old	   here’.	   But	   the	   picture	   is	   a	   picture	   of	  someone	   else	   and	   I	   am	   mistaken.	   Call	   this	   the	   photograph	   case.	   Here	   one	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might	   say	   that	   I	   intend	   to	   refer	   to	   someone	   else.	   It	   seems	   that	   the	   speaker’s	  reference,	   the	  person	  whom	  the	  speaker	   is	  speaking	  of,	   is	   the	  person	  pictured	  on	  the	  photograph.	  However,	  the	  semantic	  reference	  of	  my	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  me.	  So	  it	  seems	   that	  we	  have	   a	   counterexample	   to	  my	   claim	  about	   a	   guarantee	   against	  incorrect	  reference.	  How	   should	   I	   respond	   to	   this?	   The	   speaker’s	   referent	   is	   the	   person	   the	  speaker	  intends	  to	  refer	  to.	  The	  question	  is:	  which	  person	  do	  I	  intend	  to	  refer	  to,	  which	   person	   do	   I	   mean	   when	   I	   use	   ‘I’?	   About	   whom	   do	   I	   intend	   to	   say	  something?	   It	   seems	   that	   I	   intend	   to	   refer	   to	  myself,	   and	   I	   do	   say	   something	  about	  myself.	  But	   I	  was	  mistaken	  about	  who	   is	  on	   the	  picture.	   It	   is	  not	  a	  case	  where	  I	   intended	  to	  refer	  to	  someone	  other	  than	  me.	  So	  it	   is	  not	  a	  case	  where	  the	  semantic	  referent	  and	  intended	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  come	  apart.	  	  
3.5.	  Objection	  	  	  	  There	  is	  a	  trickier	  case	  which	  might	  be	  used	  against	  my	  proposal.	  Suppose	  we	  are	   searching	   for	   someone	   with	   messy	   hair.	   We	   are	   at	   a	   super	   advanced	  hairdressing	   class	   where	   we	   try	   to	   replicate	   the	  messiest	   hair	   which	  we	   can	  find.	   I	   look	   at	   the	  mirror	   and	   say	   happily	   ‘I	   have	   the	  messiest	   hair’.	   It	  might	  seem	   that	   when	   the	   reflection	   I	   see	   in	   the	   mirror	   is	   not	   mine,	   then	   I	   would	  search	  for	  someone	  else.	  	  Does	  this	  give	  us	  a	  case	  where	  the	  intended	  referent	  and	  semantic	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  come	  apart?	  No,	  it	  does	  not.	  I	  use	  'I'	  because	  I	  want	  to	  say	  something	  about	  myself.	  I	  say,	  and	  mean	  to	  say,	  something	  about	  me.	  I	  am	  not	  thinking	  about	  that	  person	   in	   the	   mirror	   independently	   of	   whether	   that	   one	   is	   me.	   Although	   I	  misidentify	  who	  is	  F,	  I	  do	  not	  misidentify	  of	  whom	  I	  am	  thinking	  about,	  to	  whom	  I	  intend	  to	  refer	  to.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  coffee	  affair	  I	  want	  to	  say	  something	  about	  that	  man	  who	  has	  not	  yet	  paid,	  independently	  of	  whether	  he	  is	  John.	  I	  want	  to	  say	   something	   about	   him,	   the	   one	  who	   has	   forgotten	   to	   pay.	  However,	   in	   the	  messy	  hair	  case,	  I	  cannot	  mean	  that	  her	  hair	  is	  messy	  by	  saying	  ‘my	  hair	  is	  
messy’.	   I	   can	   use	   ‘John’	   for	   someone	   other	   than	   John,	   but	   I	   cannot	   use	   ‘I’	   for	  someone	  else	  than	  me.	  	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  Anscombe	  is	  correct	  in	  thinking	  that	  I	  need	  not	  know	  which	  particular	  object	  is	  the	  referent	  for	  using	  a	  proper	  name,	  but,	  for	  using	  ‘I’,	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I	  have	  to	  know	  which	  particular	  object	  is	  the	  referent	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistake.	  In	  contrast,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  condition	  on	  using	  ‘John’	  that	  I	  am	  not	  mistaken	  completely	   about	   who	   I	   use	   it	   for	   on	   a	   particular	   occasion	   (when	   I	   seem	   to	  recognise	  him).	  	  It	   is	   not	   possible	   that	   the	   intended	   referent	   is	   something	   other	   than	   the	  semantic	  referent.	  What	  is	  excluded	  is	  only	  this:	  that	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  object	  which	  I	  am.	  There	  is	  an	  epistemic	  contrast	  between	  how	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  and	  other	  singular	  referring	  terms	  –	  I	  suggest	  the	  asymmetry	  lies	  in	  the	  impossibility	  of	  aboutness	  error.	  	  
3.6.	  No	  worry,	  doppelgangers	  are	  safe	  	  We	  can	  bring	  out	  this	  epistemic	  contrast	  between	  how	  the	  subject	  uses	   ‘I’	  and	  other	   singular	   referring	   terms	   by	   considering	   the	   following	   scenario.	   A	  doppelganger,	   an	   impostor	   or	   an	   indistinguishable	   twin	   of	   John’s	  would	   look	  just	   like	   John.	  And	  even	   if	   John	  were	  present,	   I	  would	  not	  know	  which	  one	   is	  John.	   I	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   tell.	   If	   I	   had	   an	   indistinguishable	   twin	   or	   an	  impostor	  duplicate	  or	  a	  doppelganger,	  I	  would	  have	  no	  problem	  knowing	  which	  one	   I	   am.16	  I	   would	   never	   try	   to	   use	   'I'	   to	   intend	   to	   refer	   to	  my	   impostor	   or	  doppelganger.	  In	  contrast,	  I	  can	  use	  ‘John’	  when	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  speak	  about	  John	  but	  his	  doppelganger,	  but	  I	  cannot	  use	  'I'	  when	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  speak	  about	  myself.	  If	  I	  use	  'I',	  then	  I	  mean	  to	  say	  something	  about	  that	  object	  which	  is	  me	  and	  I	  use	  'I'	  for	  this	  particular	  purpose.	  	  The	  explanation	   for	   this	   is	   that	   I	   know	  what	   is	   the	   referent	  of	   'I'	   in	   a	  way	  where	   I	   cannot	   be	  mistaken	   about	   it,	   but	   I	   never	   know	   the	   referent	   of	   other	  referring	  terms,	  e.g.	  ‘John’,	  in	  such	  a	  secure	  way.	  	  	  	  
4.	  The	  Sensory	  Deprivation	  Tank	  Argument	  and	  the	  Presence	  Constraint	  Anscombe’s	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  object	  always	  has	  to	  be	  present	  to	  the	  subject	  whenever	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’.	  Call	  this	  the	  presence	  constraint.	  This	  may	  well	  be	   right.	   Let	   me	   proceed	   by	   trying	   to	   understand	   what	   Anscombe	  means	   by	  
                                                16	  This	  argument	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  German	  romantic	  literature	  which	  finds	  doppelgangers	  a	  threat	  to	  identity.	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‘presence’.	   According	   to	   Anscombe,	   GRR	   requires	   that	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	  perceptually	  present	  to	  the	  subject.	  For	  Anscombe	  this	  means	  that,	  whenever	  I	  use	   ‘I’,	   I	   am	  perceptually	   aware	  of	   the	  physical	   object	  which	   I	   am.	   I	   intend	   to	  refer	  to	  that	  object.	  Just	  thinking	  about	  myself	  would	  not	  guarantee	  that	  I	  intend	  to	   refer	   to	   the	   right	   object.	   I	   have	   to	   know	   of	   that	   object	   and	   the	   perceptual	  presence	   of	   that	   object	   enables	   me	   to	   have	   this	   knowledge.17	  This	   obviously	  cannot	   be	   met	   in	   the	   sensory	   deprivation	   tank.	   My	   living	   body	   is	   not	  perceptually	  present	  to	  me.	  Let	  me	   go	   back	   for	   a	  moment	   to	   our	   discussion	   of	  Wittgenstein.	   It	   seems	  that	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   (a	   physical	   object)	   has	   to	   be	  perceptually	  present	  to	  the	  user	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  shared	  between	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Anscombe.	  Recall	  that	   recognition	   in	   Wittgenstein’s	   non-­‐referentiality	   argument	   provides	   the	  object	  which	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  and	  enables	  the	  subject	  to	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  it.	  Both	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Anscombe	  use	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  the	  referential	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  to	  show	  that	  this	  cannot	  be	  satisfied	  for	  all	  uses	  of	  ‘I’.	  The	  only	  difference	  is	  this:	  Wittgenstein	  uses	  recognition	  and	  Anscombe	  uses	  GRR.	   It	   is	  not	  possible	  that	   they	  mean	   the	  same	   thing;	   recognition-­‐freedom	   is	  a	   feature	  of	  only	  some	  uses	   of	   ‘I’,	  while	  GRR	   is	   a	   feature	  of	   all	   uses	   of	   ‘I’.	   Accordingly,	  Wittgenstein’s	  conclusion	   is	   only	   that	   some	   uses	   of	   ‘I’	   do	   not	   refer,	   while	   Anscombe’s	  conclusion	  is	  that	  no	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  refers.	  	  Let	   me	   reconstruct	   Anscombe’s	   non-­‐referentiality	   argument.	   This	   will	  enable	  me	  to	  arrive	  to	  an	  account	  of	  the	  presence	  condition	  and,	  based	  on	  that,	  I	  can	  set	  up	  Anscombe’s	  challenge.	  	  
4.1.	  The	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank	  argument	  My	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   sensory	   deprivation	   tank	   argument	   is	   indebted	   to	  O’Brien’s	  (2007)	  reconstruction.	  The	  major	  difference	  is	  that	  I	   try	  to	  work	  out	  how	   the	  presence	   constrain	   relates	   to	  GRR	   in	  more	  detail.18	  However	  my	   aim	  
                                                17	  “Just	   thinking	   ‘I…’	   guarantees	   not	   only	   the	   existence	   but	   the	   presence	   of	   its	   referent.	   It	  guarantees	   the	   existence	   because	   it	   guarantees	   the	   presence,	   which	   is	   presence	   to	  consciousness.	  But	  NB,	  here	   ‘presence	   to	   consciousness’	  means	  physical	  or	   real	  presence,	  not	  just	   that	   one	   is	   thinking	   of	   the	   thing.	   For,	   if	   the	   thinking	   did	   not	   guarantee	   the	   presence,	   the	  existence	  of	  the	  referent	  could	  be	  doubted.”	  (Anscombe	  1975:	  149).	  18	  O’Brien’s	  reconstruction	  is	  as	  follows:	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with	  the	  reconstruction	  is	  different.	  I	  try	  to	  work	  out	  Anscombe’s	  challenge,	  on	  the	   assumption	   that	   GRR	   and	   our	   presence	   condition	   hold	   for	   all	   uses	   of	   ‘I’,	  while	   assuming	   that	   uses	   of	   ‘I’	   refer,	   contrary	   to	   Anscombe.	   I	   start	   with	   the	  argument	  and	  will	  gradually	  refine	  it.	  Here	  is	  Anscombe’s	  non-­‐referentiality	  argument:	  	  AP1)	  If	  ‘I’	  is	  a	  referring	  expression,	  then	  every	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  has	  to	  have	  GRR.	  	  AP2)	  If	  ‘I’	  refers,	  then	  it	  refers	  to	  a	  material	  object:	  a	  living	  body.	  AP3)	  The	  subject	  has	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  for	  this	  object	  (the	  living	  body)	  if	  ‘I’	  refers.	  AP4)	  For	   the	   subject,	   the	   only	  way	   to	   know	   of	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   if	   it	   is	   a	  material	   object	   without	   the	   possibility	   of	   mistake	   (satisfying	   GRR)	   is	  that	   this	   object	   is	   physically	   present	   to	   the	   subject	   (in	   a	   way	   that	  requires	  direct	  acquaintance)	  whenever	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  for	  it.	  AP5)	  In	  the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank	  the	  subject	  can	  use	  ‘I’.	  AP6)	  In	  the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank,	  the	  living	  body,	  which	  is	  the	  subject,	  cannot	   be	   physically	   present	   to	   the	   subject	   (direct	   acquaintance	   is	  missing).19	  Thus,	  ‘I’	  is	  not	  a	  referring	  term.	  	   Anscombe	   supposes	   that	   every	   use	   of	   ‘I’	   has	   GRR	   if	   ‘I’	   refers	   (AP1).	   For	  Anscombe,	   GRR	   is	   only	   possible	   because	   the	   object	   which	   is	   the	   subject	   is	  physically	  present	  to	  the	  subject	  –	  when	  the	  subject	  uses	   ‘I’	  (AP2-­‐AP4).	  But,	   in	  the	   sensory	   deprivation	   tank,	   the	   subject	   can	   use	   ‘I’	   (AP5),	   yet	   the	   subject	  cannot	  be	  acquainted	  with	   the	  object	  which	  she	   is	   (AP6).	  AP4	   looks	   to	  be	   the	  crucial	  premise.	  Is	  there	  any	  reason	  to	  hold	  it?	  
                                                                                                                                     1.	  If	  ‘I’	  is	  a	  referring	  term,	  it	  has	  guaranteed	  reference.	  2.	  If	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  were	  not	  ‘physically	  or	  really	  present’	  to	  my	  consciousness,	  ‘I’	  would	  not	  be	  guaranteed	  to	  refer.	  3.	  ‘I’	  is	  a	  referring	  term.	  4.	  So,	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  physically	  or	  really	  present	  to	  me.	  5.	   In	  a	   sensory	  deprivation	   tank	   I	   am	  still	   capable	  of	   self-­‐conscious	   thought,	   i.e.	   if	   ‘I’	   refers,	   ‘I’	  refers	  in	  a	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank.	  6.	  In	  a	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank	  the	  object	  meant	  by	  ‘this	  body,	  this	  human	  being’	  is	  not	  really	  present	  to	  me.	  The	  only	  thing	  that	  could	  be	  really	  present	  to	  me	  is	  a	  Cartesian	  Ego	  or	  a	  stretch	  of	  one.	  7.	  So,	  ‘I’	  refers	  to	  a	  Cartesian	  Ego,	  or	  a	  stretch	  of	  one.	  (O’Brien	  2007:	  19).	  	  19	  “If	  I	  were	  in	  that	  condition	  of	  'sensory	  deprivation',	  I	  could	  not	  have	  the	  thought	  "this	  object",	  "this	  body"	  –	  there	  would	  be	  nothing	  for	  "this"	  to	  latch	  on	  to.”	  (Anscombe	  1975:	  156).	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One	   might	   find	   the	   presence	   condition	   unmotivated,	   but	   at	   least	   some	  versions	  of	  it	  seem	  to	  be	  shared	  by	  others.	  A	  version	  of	  the	  presence	  condition	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Wright’s	  work,	  which	  I	  turn	  to	  discuss	  now.	  	  	  
4.2.	  Crispin	  Wright	  and	  the	  Presence	  thesis	  Crispin	  Wright	  claims	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  always	  present	  to	  herself	  (when	  she	  is	  conscious	   and	   awake),	   and	   this	  makes	   the	   subject	   special	   in	   the	   full	   range	   of	  perceivable	  objects:	  	  	  It	   is	  (merely)	  that	  our	  own	  presence	  is,	   for	  each	  of	  us,	  a	  constant	  factor	  in	  the	  kind	  of	   situation,	  usually	  but	  not	   always	   social,	   in	  which	   the	  evidence	  emerges	  which	   bears	   on	   various	   of	   our	   psychological	   characteristics.	   No-­‐one	  else	  is	  so	  constantly	  around	  us.	  So	  no-­‐one	  else	  observes	  as	  much	  of	  us	  or	   is	   as	   much	   observed	   by	   us.	   Selves	   have	   the	   best	   evidence	   about	  themselves.	  (Wright	  1998:	  101-­‐102).	  	  The	   quote	   suggests	   that	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   always	   present	   to	   the	   conscious	  subject	   and	   therefore	   its	   qualities	   are	   present	   to	   the	   subject.	   Wright	   speaks	  about	   our	   own	   presence,	   and	   thus	   everyone’s	   continuous	   presence	   to	   herself	  when	  she	  is	  awake.	  	  But	  even	  if	  I	  am	  always	  present	  in	  some	  way	  to	  myself,	  why	  should	  the	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  be	  anchored	  in	  that	  presence?	  I	  will	  suggest	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  	  	  
4.3.	  Acquaintance	  I	  suggest	  that	  presence	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  direct	  acquaintance	  a	  la	  Russell.	   Russell	   introduced	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘acquaintance’	   for	   cases	  when	   the	  subject	   knows	   of	   an	   object	   in	   a	   direct	   manner.	   Russell	   thought	   that	   we	   are	  always	   acquainted	   with	   ourselves. 20 	  Acquaintance	   is	   used	   by	   Russell	   for	  acquaintance	  with	  sense	  data.	  However,	  Russell	  (1912)	  can	  be	  read	  as	  claiming	  that	  ‘I’	  is	  an	  exception;	  we	  are	  directly	  acquainted	  with	  ourselves.	  Accordingly,	  our	   knowledge	   of	   the	   object	   which	   is	   the	   subject	   is	   special	   because	   it	   is	  
                                                20	  In	  contrast	  to	  his	  view	  we	  only	  use	  acquaintance	  for	  acquaintance	  with	  a	  physical	  object	  that	  cannot	  be	  a	  sense-­‐datum.	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immediate	  and	  direct,	  deriving	  from	  some	  kind	  of	  direct	  acquaintance	  with	  the	  object	  which	   is	   the	   subject.	   Similarly,	  Kripke	   assumes	   that	  we	   are	   acquainted	  with	  ourselves	  by	  self-­‐acquaintance	  (2011a:	  301).	  	  Campbell	   characterises	   acquaintance	  by	   epistemic	   contact	  with	   the	  world	  and	   with	   properties	   in	   the	   world	   which	   are	   not	   mediated	   by	   propositional	  knowledge.	  	  	   The	  idea	  of	   ‘acquaintance’	   is	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  contact	  with	  a	  thing	  or	  property.	  (…)	  Minimally,	  you	  might	  say	  that	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  have	  epistemic	   contact	   with	   b	   is	   this:	   you	   must	   have	   a	   piece	   of	   propositional	  knowledge	  whose	  content	  can	  be	  specified	  using	  a	  term	  referring	  to	  b,	  such	  as	  ‘b’.	  (…)	  Russell	  argued	  that	  our	  knowledge	  of	  things	  cannot,	  in	  general,	  be	  explained	   in	   terms	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	   truths.	  Russell	   thought	   that	   there	  were	   two	   sorts	   of	   knowledge:	   knowledge	   of	   truths,	   and	   knowledge	   of	  things.	  (…)	  Knowledge	  of	  truths	  depends	  on	  acquaintance	  with	  objects.	  For	  it	  is	  acquaintance	  with	  objects	  or	  properties	  that	  provides	  our	  knowledge	  of	  reference[.]	  	  (Campbell	  2009:	  1-­‐3).	  	  	  Campbell	  uses	  Russell	  to	  point	  out	  that	  acquaintance	  with	  objects	  enables	  us	  to	  think	   about	   and	  make	   judgements	   concerning	   the	   objects	   we	   are	   acquainted	  with.	  	  I	  want	   to	   distinguish	   acquaintance	   from	  direct	   acquaintance.	   I	   use	  direct	  
acquaintance	  for	  such	  cases	  when	  the	  subject	  directly	  knows	  of	  an	  object	  (or	  a	  property).	  We	  can	  find	  two	  types	  of	  acquaintance	  in	  Evans’s	  discussion.	  One	  is	  indirect	   and	   involves	   reliable	   causal	   chains	  which	   are	  preserved	   in	   testimony	  and	   provides	   a	   relation	   between	   the	   subject	   and	   the	   referent	   of	   the	   term.	   A	  reliable	  causal	  relation	  (like	  a	  causal	  chain	  through	  testimony)	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  the	  subject	  to	  be	  directly	  acquainted	  with	  the	  relevant	  object.	  The	  object	  has	  to	  be	  present	  to	  the	  subject;	   this	  requires	  a	  direct	  relation	  such	  as	  perception.	  The	  object	  has	  to	  be	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  the	  subject	  and	  the	  subject	  has	  to	  have	  a	  basic	   way	   of	   knowing	   of	   that	   object	   providing	   the	   direct	   epistemologically	  useful	  relation	  to	  the	  object.	  Such	  a	  direct	  relation	  is	  called	  direct	  acquaintance.	  	  A	   basic	   way	   of	   knowing	   –	   like	   seeing	   –	   is	   such	   that	   it	   does	   not	   require	  
 44	  
another	  way	  of	  knowing.	  When	  one	  sees	  an	  object	  then	  one	  knows	  of	  that	  object	  directly.	  When	   I	   see	   an	   object,	   then	   I	   am	   aware	   of	   it	   through	   a	   basic	   way	   of	  knowing,	  but	  when	  I	  remember	  seeing	   that	  object	   then	  my	  way	  of	  knowing	   is	  not	  basic.	  When	  one	  informs	  me	  that	  there	  is	  a	  red	  top	  hat	  in	  this	  room	  where	  we	  are,	  but	  I	  neither	  see	  nor	  touch	  it	  (nor	  know	  about	  it	  in	  another	  way)	  then	  I	  am	   not	   directly	   acquainted	   with	   the	   red	   top	   hat.	   Memory,	   inference	   or	  testimony	  are	  such	  that	  they	  require	  other	  ways	  of	  knowing	  (by	  the	  subject	  or	  by	   others).	   They	   cannot	   be	   the	   original	   source	   of	   knowledge	   except	   in	   rare	  cases.	   In	   contrast,	   introspection,	   proprioception,	   audition	   and	   smell	   are	   basic	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  They	  do	  not	  require	  as	  preconditions	  other	  ways	  of	  knowing	  to	   provide	   the	   content	   known	   through	   them.	   Direct	   acquaintance	   requires	   a	  basic	  way	  of	  knowing	  through	  which	  the	  object	  or	  the	  property	  can	  be	  known	  for	   the	   subject.	   I	   propose	   that	   the	   subject	   has	   to	   be	   directly	   acquainted	  with	  herself	  whenever	  she	  uses	  ‘I’.	  	  	  
4.4.	  Is	  Anscombe’s	  argument	  is	  any	  good	  at	  all?	  –	  O’Brien’s	  criticism	  I	   have	   followed	   O’Brien’s	   reconstruction	   of	   Anscombe’s	   argument	   in	   broad	  stroke.	   O’Brien	   thinks	   that	   the	   argument	   is	   flawed.	   Anscombe	   holds	   that	   the	  only	   thing	  which	   can	  be	   known	   in	   the	   sensory	  deprivation	   tank	   as	   the	   object	  which	   is	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   a	   thinking	   thing	   like	   a	   Cartesian	   Ego.	   O’Brien’s	  response	  is	  the	  following:	  “[…]	  while	  it	  may	  be	  admitted	  that	  what	   ‘I’	  refers	  to	  must	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  thinking	  thing,	  that	  admission	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  what	  ‘I’	  refers	  to	  is	  also	  a	  bodily	  thing.	  For	  we	  can	  say	  that	  I	  do	  identify	  a	  body	  when	  I	  use	  ‘I’	  it	  is	  just	  that	  I	  do	  not	  realise	  that	  that	  is	  what	  I	  am	  doing.	  This	  point	  strikes	  me	  as	   fatal	   to	  the	  argument	  as	   it	  stands.”(O’Brien	  2007:	  26).	  So,	  according	  to	  O’Brien,	  even	  if	  I	  think	  of	  myself	  as	  a	  thinking	  thing	  this	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  what	  I	  think	  about	  as	  a	  thinking	  thing	  is	  a	  physical	  object	  as	  well.	  O’Brien’s	   idea	   is	   this:	   I	   can	   identify	  or	  know	  of	  an	  object	   without	   knowing	   that	   it	   is	   a	   physical	   body.	   I	   may	   know	   of	   an	   object	  without	   knowing	   which	   kind	   it	   is.	   Thus,	   the	   argument	   is	   flawed.	   It	   does	   not	  follow	  that	  ‘I’	  does	  not	  refer.	  Despite	  this,	  we	  still	  can	  learn	  something	  from	  it.	  My	  suggestion,	  following	  Anscombe,	   is	   this.	   Direct	   acquaintance	   with	   the	   object	   which	   is	   the	   subject	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should	  be	   sufficient	   to	  make	  a	   guarantee	  against	   incorrect	   reference	  possible.	  Uses	   of	   ‘I’	   could	   have	   a	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	   reference	   because	   the	  subject,	   whenever	   she	   uses	   ‘I’,	   has	   to	   be	   directly	   acquainted	   with	   the	   object	  which	  she	  is	  (in	  a	  way	  that	  excludes	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistake).	  This	  presents	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  view	  which	  I	  will	  propose.	  	  
5.	  Anscombe’s	  challenge	  Anscombe	  poses	  a	  challenge	  for	  views	  such	  as	  the	  Simple	  View,	  where	  I	  have	  to	  be	  directly	  aware	  of	  the	  object	  which	  is	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘I’	  whenever	  I	  use	   ‘I’.	   If	  direct	   acquaintance	   (which	   need	   not	   be	   perceptual)	   of	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	  necessary	   for	   using	   ‘I’	   referentially,	   then	   how	   can	   the	   subject	   use	   ‘I’	   in	   the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank	  without	  direct	  acquaintance	  with	  its	  referent?	  	  Accordingly,	   the	  sensory	  deprivation	   tank	  seems	   to	  pose	  a	  challenge	   if	  we	  
assume	  that	  the	  presence	  constraint	  is	  correct.	  In	  the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank,	  a	  subject	   can	  use	   ‘I’	   but	   the	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	   cannot	  have	   the	   essential	   features	  of	   the	  referential	   uses	   of	   ‘I’.	   If	   uses	   of	   ‘I’	   refer	   then	   the	   subject	   has	   to	   be	   directly	  acquainted	  with	  its	  referent	  for	  all	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  and	  ‘I’	  has	  to	  have	  guaranteed	  right	  reference.	  But	  in	  the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  directly	  acquainted	  with	  the	  object	  which	  she	  is,	  although	  she	  is	  able	  to	  use	  ‘I’.	  This	  is	  Anscombe’s	  challenge.	  Anscombe’s	   challenge	   should	   be	   answered.	   I	   will	   answer	   it	   in	   the	   last	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis,	  when	  I	  will	  consider	  objections	  to	  the	  Simple	  View.	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Chapter	  3	  
The	  Basic	  Characterisation	  of	  IEM	  	  
 	  
Abstract	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   characterise	   the	   basic	   notion	   of	   IEM	   through	  explicating	   the	  notion	  of	  misidentification	   that	   is	   involved	   in	   IEM.	  As	   I	  will	   argue,	   a	   judgment,	  Fa,	   based	  on	  basis	  B,	   is	   immune	   iff	   the	   subject	  cannot	  misidentify,	  on	  this	  basis,	  B,	  that,	  this	  object,	  a,	  is	  F.	  Accordingly,	  misidentification	   happens	   when	   the	   subject	   thinks	   Fa	   on	   a	   basis,	   B,	  which	   is	   for	   thinking	   Fb.	   Pryor	   (1999)	   offers	   an	   alternative	   to	   this	  standard	   notion	   of	   misidentification:	   which	   object	   misidentification.	   I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  standard	  notion	  of	  misidentification	  does	  a	  better	  job	  at	  characterising	  IEM.	  	  	  	  
1.	  Outline	  The	   plan	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   as	   follows.	   First,	   I	   start	   with	   basic	   examples	   of	  misidentification,	   and,	   from	   that,	   I	   will	   explicate	   the	   standard	   notion	   of	  misidentification	   involved	   in	   understanding	   IEM.	   Second,	   I	   will	   discuss	   an	  alternative	   to	   this	   standard	   notion	   of	   misidentification	   from	   Pryor:	   which-­‐	  objective	   misidentification.	   Pryor	   argues	   that	   which-­‐object	   misidentification	  should	   replace	   standard	   misidentification	   in	   our	   account	   of	   IEM.	   Third,	   I	  disagree	  with	  Pryor	  on	  this	  point	  and	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  this	  replacement	  for	  understanding	  IEM	  present	  tense	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  	  	  	  
2.	  Examples	  of	  standard	  misidentification	  Let	  me	  turn	  to	  my	  first	  example	  of	  misidentification.	  Wittgenstein’s	  (1958:	  66-­‐67)	  example	  of	  misidentification	  is	  as	  follows:	  I	  am	  wrestling	  with	  someone	  and	  I	  see	  a	  hand	  covered	  with	  blood,	  so	  I	  judge	  that	  ‘I	  am	  bleeding’	  based	  on	  vision.	  This	   judgement	   is	   open	   to	   misidentification	   on	   this	   basis.	   The	   one	   who	   is	  bleeding	   might	   be	   the	   one	   with	   whom	   I	   am	   wrestling.	   In	   this	   case	   my	   basis	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could	  have	  been	  for	  the	   judgement	   ‘He	  is	  bleeding’,	  but	  I	   judge	   ‘I	  am	  bleeding’	  mistakenly,	  assuming	  that	  I	  see	  myself.	  	  Let	   me	   change	   the	   basis	   and	   test	   whether	   misidentification	   is	   possible.	  Suppose	  I	  am	  chopping	  onions	  and	  accidentally	  cut	  my	  finger.	   I	  close	  my	  eyes	  but	  I	  feel	  that	  I	  am	  bleeding.	  Only	  based	  on	  feeling,	  judging	  ‘I	  am	  bleeding’	  will	  not	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	   misidentification.	   On	   this	   basis	   I	   cannot	   think	   of	  anybody	  but	  me.	  	  Consider	   a	   different	   case.	   I	   bleed	   very	   easily	   and	   I	   accidentally	   knock	  my	  knee	   into	   some	   sharp	   furniture.	   Only	   based	   on	   feeling,	   I	   judge	   that	   I	   am	  bleeding.	  Here	  again	  misidentification	  is	  not	  possible.	  But	  if	  I	  were	  looking	  at	  a	  mirror	  and	  see	  that	  my	  knee	  is	  bleeding,	  I	  might	  judge	  on	  this	  basis,	  vision,	  that	  I	   am	   bleeding.	   But	   in	   this	   case,	   on	   this	   basis,	   misidentification	   would	   be	  possible.	  Another	  standard	  example	  is	  the	  mirror	  case.	  I	  might	  look	  at	  the	  mirror	  and	  judge,	   based	   on	   vision	   involving	   the	   mirror,	   that	   ‘I	   have	   messy	   hair’,	   even	  though	  the	  one	  whom	  I	  see	   in	  the	  mirror	   is	  not	  me.	  On	  this	  basis,	  vision,	   I	  am	  justified	  in	  judging	  that	  ‘She	  has	  messy	  hair’.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  different	  question	  if	  my	  friend	  says	  to	  me	  that	  I	  have	  messy	  hair	  and	  based	  on	  testimony	  I	   judge	   ‘I	  have	  messy	  hair’.	  Then	  the	  question	  would	  be	  whether	  based	  on	  testimony	  I	  can	  misidentify	   who	   has	   messy	   hair.	   When	   I	   hear	   "you	   have	   messy	   hair",	   or	  "Krisztina	   has	   messy	   hair"	   then	   it	   could	   be	   that	   ‘you’	   or	   ‘Krisztina’	   refer	   to	  somebody	  other	  than	  me.	  Nothing	  excludes	  this	  possibility	  so	  misidentification	  is	  possible.	  	  In	  yet	  another	  situation,	  the	  basis	  can	  be	  vision	  without	  involving	  a	  mirror.	  If	  I	  have	  long	  hair	  and	  I	  see	  my	  hair	  all	  over	  messed	  around,	  and	  judge	  based	  on	  vision	  that	  I	  have	  messy	  hair,	   then,	  based	  on	  vision,	   I	  can	  misidentify	  who	  has	  messy	   hair.	   It	   seems	   the	   basis	   has	   to	   be	   specified	   and	   we	   have	   to	   decide	  whether	  on	  this	  basis	  misidentification	  is	  possible.	  	  Consequently,	  misidentification	  happens	  when	  a	  subject	  on	  basis	  B	   judges	  
Fb	  when	  this	  basis	  B	  is	  for	  judging	  Fa.21	  	  
                                                21	  Pryor	  only	  discusses	  circumstantial	  immunity	  which	  is	  basis-­‐relative.	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2.1.	  Do	  we	  have	  to	  accept	  Basis-­‐relativity?	  Basis-­‐relativity	  is	  widely	  accepted	  in	  the	  IEM	  literature	  (Evans	  198222,	  Peacocke	  2008,	  2012,	  Recanati	  2007,	  2012,	  O’Brien	  2007,	  2012,	  etc.).	   I	  have	  given	  some	  sense	  of	  its	  plausibility	  above.	  It	  would	  seem	  plausible	  to	  accept	  that	  we	  have	  to	  relativise	  the	  judgment	  to	  its	  basis,	  Fa	  (B)	  and	  allow	  that	  the	  same	  judgment	  is	  immune	  on	  one	  basis	  but	  not	  on	  another	  basis.	  Thus,	  IEM	  is	  plausibly	  thought	  to	  be	  basis-­‐relative.	  There	   is	   good	   reason	   to	   agree	   with	   this	   point.	   When	   I	   judge,	   based	   on	  proprioception,	  that	  ‘I	  have	  my	  legs	  crossed’	  I	  cannot	  test	  whether	  it	  is	  immune	  based	   on	   proprioception	   and	   vision.	   I	   cannot	   test	   the	   judgement	   in	   this	  way,	  because	  based	  on	  proprioception	  and	  vision	  the	  same	  judgment	  would	  be	  not	  IEM.	   I	  would	  be	  able	   to	  misidentify	  whose	   legs	  are	   crossed	  –	   the	  one	  whom	   I	  see.	  Accordingly,	  what	  matters	   for	   IEM	   is	  what	   is	  not	  possible	  on	  a	  particular	  basis,	  a	  way	  of	  knowing.	  This	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  accept	  basis-­‐relativity.23	  	  	  
3.	  The	  standard	  notion	  of	  misidentification	  	  Misidentification	  happens	  when	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  I	  have	  a	  basis	  for	  judging	  Fa	  based	  on	  basis	  B,	  but,	  actually,	  the	  basis	  B	  is	  for	  judging	  Fb.	  I	  call	  cases	  when	  the	  subject	  attributes	  something	  to	  a	  when	  her	  basis	  is	  actually	  for	  attributing	  to	  b,	  cases	   of	   ill-­‐grounded	   singular	   thought	   (hence	   ILL).	   (If	   there	   is	   no	   object	  which	   the	   subject	   is	   thinking	   of	   when	   the	   subject	   tries	   to	   form	   a	   singular	  thought,	   then	   there	   is	   no	   singular	   thought.	   It	   is	   not	   a	   case	   of	   ill-­‐grounded	  singular	   thought	   in	  my	  terminology.)	  And	  I	  call	  cases	  when	  the	  subject	   judges	  and	  is	  justified	  in	  judging	  something	  about	  a,	  cases	  of	  well-­‐grounded	  singular	  
thought	   (hence	   WELL).	   WELL	   does	   not	   exclude	   that	   the	   predication	   is	  mistaken.	  WELL	  only	  excludes	  that	  the	  thought	  is	  of	  the	  wrong	  object.	  	  In	   a	   case	   of	   standard	   misidentification,	   Fa	   is	   an	   ill-­‐grounded	   singular	  thought	   (ILL)	   on	   a	   particular	   basis	   B1,	   while	   Fb	   is	   well-­‐grounded	   singular	  thought	  (WELL)	  on	  this	  very	  basis	  B1.	  	  
                                                22	  Evans	  claims	  that	  the	  judgment	  ‘I	  have	  my	  legs	  crossed’	  which	  is	  based	  on	  proprioception	  is	  immune	  but	  the	  same	  judgement	  based	  on	  vision	  is	  not	  IEM	  (Evans	  1982:	  220).	  23	  I	  will	  argue	  for	  basis-­‐relativity	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  But	  one	  could	  accept	  basis-­‐relativity	  only	  for	   the	   sake	   of	   argument	   here	   if	   the	   reasons	   above	   do	   not	   yet	   seem	   sufficient.	   Pryor	   has	   to	  accept	   it	   because	   he	   denies	   absolute	   IEM;	   believing	   in	   absolute	   IEM	   requires	   the	   rejection	   of	  basis-­‐relativity.	  
 49	  
Pryor	  (1999)	  developed	  an	  account	  of	  IEM	  which	  departs	  from	  the	  standard	  account	   of	  misidentification	   sketched	   above.	   He	   claimed	   that	   there	   is	   a	  more	  basic	   notion	   of	   misidentification:	   which	   object-­‐misidentification.	   He	   contends	  that	   which	   object-­‐misidentification	   should	   replace	   the	   standard	   notion	   of	  misidentification.	   I	   now	   turn	   to	   Pryor’s	   distinction	   between	   the	   two	   kinds	   of	  misidentification.	  	  	  
4.	  Pryor’s	  de	  re	  misidentification	  	  	  Pryor	  distinguishes	  between	   two	  kinds	  of	   IEM	  by	  distinguishing	  between	   two	  different	  kinds	  of	  misidentification.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  de	  re	  misidentification:	  	  	   (i)	  There	  is	  some	  singular	  proposition	  about	  x,	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is	  F,	  that	  a	  subject	  believes	  or	  attempts	  to	  express.	  [Fx	  =	  ILL]	  (ii)	   The	   subject’s	   justification	   for	   believing	   this	   singular	   proposition	   rests	  on	  his	  justification	  for	  believing,	  of	  some	  y	  and	  of	  x,	  that	  y	  is	  F	  and	  that	  y	  is	  identical	  to	  x.	  [Fy	  =	  WELL]	  (iii)	   However,	   unbeknownst	   to	   the	   subject,	   x	  ≠	   y.	   	   (Pryor	   1999:	   274-­‐275;	  with	  my	  parenthetical	  remarks).	  
	  
Fx	   is	   a	   singular	   proposition,	   thus	   ‘x’	   is	   not	   an	   open	   variable	   requiring	  quantification	   (existential/universal)	   but	   refers	   to	   a	   particular	   object.	   It	  functions	  like	  Fa	  in	  our	  formulation	  of	  the	  standard	  view.	  	  So	   it	  seems	  that	  Pryor’s	  notion	  of	  de	  re	  misidentification	  requires	   that	   the	  subject	  judge	  Fa	  (B),	  ILL,	  when	  the	  subject’s	  basis	  is	  actually	  for	  judging	  Fb	  (B),	  WELL.	   This	   is	   exactly	   the	   standard	   notion	   of	   misidentification	   which	   I	   have	  introduced	  above.	  	  
5.	  Pryor’s	  which	  object	  misidentification	  Let	   me	   turn	   to	   the	   second	   kind	   of	   misidentification	   which	   Pryor	   discusses:	  which	  object-­‐misidentification	  (hence	  wh-­‐misidentification).	  Pryor	  introduces	  wh-­‐misidentification	  by	  an	  example:	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I	   smell	   a	   skunky	   odor,	   and	   see	   several	   animals	   rummaging	   around	   in	  my	  garden.	  None	  of	  them	  has	  the	  characteristic	  white	  stripes	  of	  a	  skunk,	  but	  I	  believe	   that	   some	   skunks	   lack	   these	   stripes.	   Approaching	   closer	   and	  sniffing,	  I	  form	  the	  belief,	  of	  the	  smallest	  of	  these	  animals,	  that	  it	  is	  a	  skunk	  in	   my	   garden.	   This	   belief	   is	   mistaken.	   There	   are	   several	   skunks	   in	   my	  garden,	  but	  none	  of	  them	  is	  the	  small	  animal	  I	  see.	  (Pryor	  1999:	  281)	  	  How	  is	  Pryor’s	  example	  supposed	  to	  work?	  First,	  I	  have	  a	  basis	  to	  believe	  that	  ‘One	  or	  more	  animals	  are	  skunks	  in	  my	  garden’	  based	  on	  smell	  –	  an	  existential	  thought.	  I	  might	  not	  form	  this	  thought	  but	  I	  am	  at	  least	  in	  a	  position	  to	  form	  this	  thought.	  Second,	  I	  believe	  that	  ‘that	  one	  is	  one	  of	  the	  skunks/is	  the	  skunk	  in	  my	  garden’	  based	  on	  vision	  and	  smell	  –	  a	  singular	  thought.	  But	  this	  is	  mistaken;	  this	  is	  not	  one	  of	  the	  several	  skunks	  in	  my	  garden.	  Thus	  I	  misidentify	  which	  object	  is	  one	   of	   the	   skunks	   in	   my	   garden.	   Pryor	   dubs	   this	   kind	   of	   misidentification:	  
Which	  object-­‐misidentification	  (wh-­‐misidentification).	  	  	  Here	  we	  have	  an	  existential	  and	  a	  singular	  thought.	  An	  existential	  thought,	  something	  is	  F,	  requires	  only	  that	  one	  or	  another	  object	  is	  F;	  the	  object	  which	  is	  
F	   need	   not	   be	   specified,	   discriminated	   or	   identified.	   I	   might	   see	   a	   crowd	   of	  animals	  and	  think	  about	  them	  without	  identifying	  or	  singling	  out	  one	  of	  them.	  The	  existential	  thought	  is	  a	  well-­‐grounded	  existential	  thought,	  but	  in	  this	  case	  (when	  I	  see	  a	  crowd	  of	  animals)	  it	  is	  not	  a	  well-­‐grounded	  singular	  thought.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  singular	  thought	  at	  all.	  	  Let	  me	   elaborate	   the	  difference	   in	   the	   ground	   for	   an	   existential	   and	   for	   a	  singular	   thought.	   I	   cannot	   think	  a	  singular	   thought,	  Fa,	  unless	   I	   think	  about	  a.	  Singular	   thought	  requires	   thinking	  about	  a	  particular	  object.	   In	  contrast,	   I	   can	  think	  an	  existential	  thought	  about	  a	  mob	  without	  thinking	  or	  being	  in	  a	  position	  to	  think	  of	  one	  particular	  person	  in	  the	  mob.	  	  Note	   that	  wh-­‐misidentification	   is	   different	   from	  de	  re	  misidentification	   in	  several	  respects.	   	  Wh-­‐misidentification	  does	  not	  involve	  two	  singular	  thoughts	  and	  it	   is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  one	  thinks	  Fa	  (B)	  instead	  of	  Fb	  on	  the	  same	  basis	  B.	  The	  subject,	  S,	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  form	  a	  singular	  thought	  about	  y.	  S	  can	  only	  form	   an	   existential	   thought	   about	   some	   objects.	   But	   the	   subject	   is	   not	   in	   a	  position	   to	   know	   of	   the	   particular	   object,	   y,	   which	   would	   be	   necessary	   for	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forming	  a	  singular	  thought	  about	  y	  (Pryor	  1999:	  282).	  This	  is	  the	  key	  difference	  between	  de	  re	  misidentification	  and	  wh-­‐misidentification.	  	  
5.1.	  Wh-­‐misidentification	  should	  replace	  de	  re	  misidentification	  Pryor	   (1999:	   285)	  writes	   that:	   “Wh-­‐misidentification	   can	   occur	  without	  de	  re	  misidentification	  [as	  the	  skunk	  case	  shows].”	  I	  agree	  with	  this.	  However,	  Pryor	  holds	   that	   from	   immunity	   to	  wh-­‐misidentification	   (hence	  wh-­‐IEM),	  de	  re	   IEM	  follows,	  thus	  wh-­‐IEM	  is	  more	  basic	  and	  more	  fundamental	  than	  standard	  de	  re	  IEM	  (Pryor	  1999:	  285-­‐286).	   I	  disagree.	   I	  will	  argue	  that	  a	   logical	  entailment	  is	  neither	   sufficient	   to	  make	   it	  more	   fundamental	  nor	   to	  make	   it	  more	  basic	   for	  understanding	  IEM.	  Pryor	  points	  out	   that	   ‘I	  have	  a	  pain’	  based	  on	   introspection	  and	   ‘I	   think	   it	  will	  rain’	  based	  on	  introspection	  are	  plausibly	  immune	  to	  wh-­‐misidentification	  (Pryor	  1999:	  283,	  287).	   So	   if	  wh-­‐IEM	   is	  more	  basic	   (i.e.	   standard	   IEM	   follows	  from	   it)	   then	  we	   have	   to	   understand	   IEM	   by	   employing	  wh-­‐misidentification	  instead	  of	  standard	  misidentification.	  	  
5.2.	  Why	  does	  Pryor	  think	  that	  wh-­‐misidentification	  should	  replace	  de	  re	  
misidentification?	  	  Pryor	  argues	  that	  immunity	  from	  wh-­‐misidentification	  is	  what	  should	  figure	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  IEM	  and	  not	  immunity	  from	  standard	  
de	   re	   misidentification.	   “[I]f	   a	   belief	   is	   immune	   to	   wh-­‐misidentification	   when	  justified	   by	   certain	   grounds,	   that	   entails	   that	   it	   is	   also	   immune	   to	   de	   re	  misidentification	   when	   justified	   by	   those	   grounds.	   (…)	   [I]mmunity	   to	   wh-­‐misidentification	   entails,	   but	   is	   not	   entailed	   by,	   immunity	   to	   de	   re	  misidentification.	   In	   that	   sense,	   immunity	   to	   wh-­‐misidentification	   is	   a	   more	  basic	  and	  more	  rare	  epistemic	  status.”	  (Pryor	  1999:	  285-­‐286).	  	  Let	  me	  examine	  the	  argument	  for	  thinking	  that	  wh-­‐immunity	  is	  more	  basic	  than	  de	  re	   immunity.	  Pryor	  argues	  as	   follows:	   (i)	   from	  wh-­‐immunity	  standard	  
de	   re	   immunity	   follows,	   but	   not	   vice	   versa	   and	   (ii)	   paradigmatic	   examples	   of	  IEM	   (like	   ‘I	   have	   a	   pain’	   judged	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   introspection)	   have	   wh-­‐immunity.	  Thus,	  wh-­‐IEM	  is	  the	  more	  basic	  notion.	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6.	  Why	  wh-­‐IEM	  instead	  of	  de	  re	  IEM?	  To	   understand	   Pryor	   we	   need	   to	   understand	   why	   he	   would	   hold	   that	   wh-­‐misidentification	   is	   the	  most	   basic	   and	   strongest	   kind	   of	  misidentification	   for	  understanding	  IEM.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  from	  wh-­‐IEM	  de	  re	  IEM	  follows	  (Pryor	  1999:	  285).	  I	  will	  show	  that	  this	  is	  trivially	  true	  and	  cannot	  be	  the	  real	  reason.	  	  Wh-­‐misidentification	  happens	  when	  S	  judges	  Fa	  when	  S	  is	  actually	  only	  in	  a	  position	   to	   judge	   ‘Something	   is	  F’.	   If	   the	   judgment	  Fa	   is	  wh-­‐immune	   then	   it	   is	  not	  possible	  that	  S	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  judge	  ‘Something	  is	  F’	  when	  Fa	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  false.	   ‘Something	  is	  F’	  simply	  follows	  from	  Fa.	  What	  enables	  me	  to	  judge	  Fa	  enables	  me	  to	  judge	  ‘Something	  is	  F’.	  This	  is	  true;	  but	  this	  is	  trivial.	  So	  it	  is	  trivial	  that	  S	  cannot	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  judge	  Fa	  when	  S	  cannot	  judge	  ‘Something	  is	  F’.	  Consequently,	   this	   alone	   cannot	   suffice	   to	   show	   that	   it	   provides	   a	   more	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	   IEM.	  The	  subject	  matter	  of	   IEM	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  epistemological	  one	  (the	  subject’s	  immunity	  to	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  error)	  and	  not	  a	  logical	  one.	  From	  ‘This	  is	  a	  chair’	  it	  follows	  ‘The	  world	  exists’.	  This	  is	  a	  chair	  cannot	  be	  true	   unless	   the	   world	   exists,	   and	   presuppositions	   follow	   from	   what	  presupposes	  them.	  ‘This	  is	  a	  chair’	  is	  immune	  relative	  to	  ‘this’.	  But	  does	  it	  follow	  that	   ‘The	  world	  exists’	   is	  more	  basic	  or	  more	   fundamental	   for	   the	  question	  of	  immunity	  of	  this	  judgement?	  Is	  it	  true	  for	  all	  presuppositions	  that	  they	  are	  more	  basic?	  Even	  if	  this	  were	  true,	  they	  are	  not	  more	  fundamental	  in	  understanding	  IEM.	   The	   question	   whether	   the	   world	   exists	   is	   usually	   thought	   to	   be	   more	  fundamental	  than	  whether	  this	  is	  a	  chair,	  but	  this	  question	  is	  orthogonal	  to	  the	  question	  of	  IEM	  of	  ‘this	  is	  a	  chair’	  relative	  to	  ‘this’.	  Similarly,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  ‘p’	  is	  more	  basic	  or	  more	  fundamental	  than	  ‘p	  and	  q’	  because	  the	  former	  follows	  from	  the	  latter.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  ‘p	  and	  q’,	  ‘p’	  is	  a	  component	  of	  the	  former;	  perhaps	  this	  makes	  it	  more	  basic.	  But	  ‘Something	  is	  F’	  is	  only	  a	  presupposition	  of	  Fa,	  and	  is	  not	  a	  component	  of	  it,	  so	  this	  reason	  is	  unavailable.	  Pryor	  might	   argue	   that	  when	   I	   cannot	   judge	   that	   a	   particular	   object	  a	   or	  another	  particular	  object	  b	  is	  F,	  then	  I	  might	  still	  be	  able	  to	  judge	  ‘something	  is	  
F’.	   His	   thought	   is	   that	   when	   I	   cannot	   judge	   the	   existential	   thought	   then	   this	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provides	   a	   stronger	   kind	  of	   immunity	   than	  de	  re	   IEM.	  But	   there	   is	   a	   question	  whether	  this	  gets	  the	  subject	  matter	  right.	  	  Immunity	   was	   introduced	   in	   understanding	   singular	   thought	   about	   a	  particular	   object.	   A	   singular	   thought	   is	   about	   a	   particular	   object	   which	   the	  subject	  knows	  of	  in	  one	  or	  another	  way.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  thought	  about	  one	  or	  another	  object	   or	   many	   objects,	   like	   existential	   thought.	   In	   contrast,	   an	   existential	  thought	   is	   about	   one	   or	   another	   object	   or	  many	   objects.	   It	   could	   be	   about	   an	  object	   of	  which	   the	   subject	   is	   acquainted	  with,	   but	   this	   need	   not	   be	   the	   case.	  From	  ‘Fa’	  it	  follows	  that	  ‘Something	  is	  F’.	  But	  without	  being	  able	  to	  think	  about	  a	  particular	  object,	  one	  can	  have	  grounds	  to	  think	  about	  many	  objects.	  When	  I	  see	  a	  crowd	  then	  I	  see	  that	  crowd	  even	   if	   I	  cannot	   identify	  or	  reidentify	  any	  of	   its	  members.	   To	   think	   of	   a	   particular	   object	   is	   a	   different	   phenomenon	   from	  thinking	   of	   many	   objects	   without	   any	   one	   in	   particular.	   Thus,	   whether	   I	   can	  think	  an	  existential	  thought	  without	  a	  singular	  thought	  (There	  are	  skunks	  in	  my	  garden)	  or	  whether	  I	  can	  think	  a	  singular	  thought	  about	  an	  object	  (This	  is	  one	  of	  the	   skunks	   in	  my	  garden/	   I	  have	  messy	  hair)	  would	   seem	   to	  be	   two	  different	  questions.	  Pryor	  wants	  to	  rule	  out	  wh-­‐misidentification,	  the	  ability	  to	  think	  ‘Something	  is	  F’	  after	  being	  defeated	  in	  thinking	  of	  a	  that	  it	  is	  F.	  The	  thought	  that	  we	  should	  rule	   out	   the	   possibility	   that	   I	   can	   think	   an	   existential	   thought	   after	   being	  defeated	  in	  thinking	  a	  singular	  thought	  is	  not	  a	  very	  natural	  one.	  If	  one	  wants	  to	  argue	   that	   existential	   thoughts	   are	  more	   fundamental	   than	   singular	   thoughts	  then	  one	  should	  argue	  for	  this	  claim	  directly.	  In	  that	  case,	  one	  should	  argue	  that	  one	   has	   to	   either	   have	   a	   ground	   to	   think	   an	   existential	   thought	   and,	   derived	  from	   this,	   a	   ground	   to	   think	   a	   singular	   thought,	   or	   that	   for	   every	   singular	  thought,	   the	   subject	   has	   to	   have	   a	   general	   ground	   as	   well.	   Neither	   of	   these	  options	  seems	  plausible.	  Thus	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  why	  an	  existential	  thought	  must	  be	  relevant	   in	   thinking	   a	   singular	   thought.	   So	   before	   one	   argues	   for	   the	  fundamentality	   of	   existential	   thought	   over	   singular	   thought,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  question	  whether	  an	  existential	  thought	  is	  possible	  is	  orthogonal	  to	  whether	  a	  mistake	  with	  a	  singular	   thought	   is	  possible.	  Unless	  one	  argues	   that	  existential	  thoughts	   are	   more	   fundamental,	   the	   default	   position	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   that	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existential	  and	  singular	  thoughts	  are	  simply	  different,	  and	  questions	  about	  one	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  question	  about	  the	  other.24	  	  Suppose	  I	  think	  I	  am	  in	  a	  position	  to	  think	  Fa,	  but	  if	  I	  am	  only	  in	  a	  position	  to	  think	  ‘Something	  is	  F’,	  then	  I	  was	  mistaken	  in	  thinking	  that	  I	  have	  a	  ground	  to	  think	   a	   singular	   thought.	   But	   this	   mistake	   is	   a	   different	   mistake	   from	  misidentification.	  It	   is	  a	  mistake	  about	  which	  kind	  of	  ground	  I	  have,	  whether	  I	  have	  grounds	  to	  think	  a	  singular	  thought	  or	  only	  an	  existential	  thought	  (without	  a	  singular	   thought).	  When	  I	  see	  someone	  as	  a	  person	  or	  recognise	  him,	   then	   I	  have	  a	  singular	  ground	  to	  think	  about	  him.	  When	  I	  see	  a	  crowd	  of	  people	  and	  hear	   loud	   voices,	   I	   have	   grounds	   to	   think	   existential	   thoughts	   about	   people	  exemplifying	  certain	  qualities.	  When	  I	  cannot	  discriminate	  anybody	  (neither	  by	  vision	  nor	  by	  audition	  or	  by	  touch)	  in	  the	  crowd	  then	  I	  cannot	  form	  a	  singular	  thought	  about	  a	  member	  of	  the	  crowd.	  	  It	   is	   not	   clear	  why	  we	   need	   an	   existential	   ground	   for	   a	   singular	   thought.	  When	   the	  ground	   for	   the	   singular	   thought	   is	  defeated,	   it	   is	  unclear	  why	   there	  must	   be	   an	   existential	   ground	   that	   would	   remain	   untouched.	   An	   existential	  thought	  ‘Something	  is	  F’	  follows	  from	  Fa/Fb.	  So	  if	  my	  singular	  ground	  for	  Fa/Fb	  is	   defeated,	   then	   the	   existential	   ground	   which	   follows	   from	   it	   is	   thereby	  defeated	   as	   well.	   So	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   how	   an	   existential	   ground	   would	   remain	  untouched	   after	   the	   singular	   ground	   is	   defeated.	   A	   case	   when	   an	   existential	  ground	  could	  be	  undefeated	  by	   the	  defeat	  of	   the	  singular	  ground	   is	  when	  one	  has	  an	  independent	  existential	  ground.	  If	  there	  is	  an	  existential	  ground	  it	  should	  be	  completely	  independent	  from	  the	  singular	  ground,	  like	  in	  the	  skunk	  example.	  I	   have	   a	   vision-­‐based	   singular	   ground	   to	   think	   about	   the	   animal,	  which	   I	   see,	  and	  a	  vision	  and	  smell-­‐based	  general	  ground	  to	  think	  about	  the	  animals	  in	  my	  garden.	   My	   ground	   for	   thinking	   about	   a	   particular	   animal	   cannot	   be	   derived	  from	   a	   ground	   for	   thinking	   about	   many	   animals.	   They	   are	   different	   kinds	   of	  grounds.	  But	  if	  a	  subject,	  S,	  has	  a	  singular	  ground	  to	  think	  a	  singular	  thought	  Fb,	  
                                                24	  It	   seems	   that	   a	   Russellian	   analysis	   of	   singular	   thought	   requires	   the	   reduction	   of	   a	   singular	  thought	  to	  an	  existential	  thought.	  So,	  for	  Russell,	  there	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  existential	  thought	  is	  more	  basic	  and	  more	  fundamental	  than	  singular	  thought.	  But	  the	  project	  of	  understanding	  singular	  thoughts	  (from	  Evans	  and	  others)	  was	  initiated	  to	  overcome	  this.	  The	  IEM	  literature	  tries	  to	  answer	  how	  singular	  thought	  is	  possible	  without	  reducing	  it	  to	  existential	  thought.	   So	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   if	   singular	   thought	   is	   reducible	   to	   existential	   thought	   in	   a	  Russellian	   manner	   then	   we	   would	   not	   have	   genuine	   singular	   thought.	   IEM	   is	   about	   how	  genuinely	  singular	  thoughts	  are	  possible.	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but	  S	  thinks	  Fa,	  then	  this	  is	  a	  case	  of	  standard	  de	  re	  misidentification.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  reason	  there	  could	  be	  for	  thinking	  that	  wh-­‐misidentification	  is	  more	  basic	  and	  more	  fundamental.	  To	  repeat,	  the	  main	  objection	  against	  wh-­‐misidentification	  is	  this:	  if	  I	  have	  no	   reason	   to	   think	   about	   many	   objects,	   then	   the	   fact	   that	   I	   cannot	   think	  ‘Something	   is	   F’	   is	   not	   surprising.	   But	   if	   I	   have	   reason	   to	   think	   about	   many	  objects	  without	   having	   reason	   to	   think	   about	   a	   singular	   object,	   then	   it	   is	   not	  clear	  why	  I	  would	  think	  a	  singular	  thought	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  
6.1.	  Does	  Pryor’s	  skunk	  example	  satisfy	  basis-­‐relativity?	  I	   return	   now	   to	   Pryor’s	   key	   example	   concerning	   skunks.	   Does	   Pryor’s	   skunk	  example	  satisfy	  basis-­‐relativity?	  For	  misidentification	  when	  I	  think	  Fa	  based	  on	  B	  then	  on	  this	  basis	  I	  can	  misidentify	  which	  object	  (from	  many)	  is	  F.	  Recall,	  first	  I	  have	  a	  basis	   to	  believe	   that	   ‘One	  or	  more	  animals	  are	  skunks	   in	  my	  garden’.	  The	  basis	   is	   smell.	   Second,	   I	   believe	   that	   ‘that	  one	   is	  one	  of	   the	   skunks/is	   the	  skunk	   in	  my	   garden’	   based	   on	   vision	   and	   smell.	   This	   has	   an	   additional	   basis:	  vision.	  But	   that	  one	   is	  not	  one	  of	   the	  skunks	   in	  my	  garden.	  Thus	   I	  misidentify	  which	  object	  is	  one	  of	  the	  skunks	  in	  my	  garden.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  example	  cannot	  work	  for	  a	  judgment	  relativized	  to	  a	  basis	  like	   vision	   and	   smell.	   But	   this	   might	   mean	   only	   that	   the	   example	   has	   some	  problem	  that	  can	  be	  easily	   fixed.	  Do	  we	   face	  a	  deep	  or	  a	  superficial	  difficulty?	  The	  example	  can	  probably	  be	  reconstructed	  in	  a	  way	  where	  both	  the	  existential	  thought	  and	  the	  singular	  thought	  are	  based	  on	  vision	  and	  smell.	  	  I	  think	  the	  real	  difficulty	  comes	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  an	  independent	  existential	  ground	  which	  remains	  untouched	  by	  the	  defeating	  evidence	  against	  the	   singular	   thought.	   And	   whether	   or	   not	   there	   is	   such	   an	   independent	  existential	   ground	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   challenge	   whether	   misidentification	   is	  possible.	  It	  seems	  that	  we	  do	  not	  find	  any	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  an	  existential	  ground	  which	   is	   independent	   from	   the	   singular	   ground	   should	   play	   any	   role	   in	   the	  characterisation	  of	  IEM.	  There	  might	  be	  wh-­‐IEM	  and	  it	  could	  be	  interesting	  with	  respect	   to	   another	   epistemological	   question,	   but	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	  characterise	  IEM	  with	  wh-­‐misidentification.	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7.	  Summary	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   provided	   the	   basic	   characterisation	   of	   IEM.	   I	   proceeded	   by	  explicating	  the	  notion	  of	  misidentification	  that	  is	  involved	  in	  IEM.	  According	  to	  this,	   a	   judgment	  Fa	   based	   on	  basis	  B1	   is	   immune	   relative	   to	   ‘a’	   iff	   the	   subject	  cannot	   misidentify	   on	   this	   basis	   B1	   which	   particular	   object	   is	   F.	   Hence,	  misidentification	  happens	  when	  the	  subject	  thinks	  Fa	  on	  a	  basis,	  B1,	  which	  is	  for	  thinking	   Fb.	   Pryor	   (1999)	   offers	   an	   alternative	   to	   this	   standard	   notion	   of	  misidentification:	   which	   object	   misidentification.	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   standard	  notion	  of	  misidentification	  does	  a	  better	  job	  at	  characterising	  IEM.	  	  	  	  
Appendix:	  Departing	  from	  Pryor	  
	  Pryor	  could	  have	  another	  reason	  for	  using	  wh-­‐IEM:	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  IEM	  of	   memory	   judgements	   may	   require	   wh-­‐misidentification.	   This	   reading	   is	  supported	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   Pryor	   concentrates	   on	  memory-­‐based	   judgements,	  and	   wh-­‐misidentification	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   introduced	   for	   answering	   the	  question	   whether	   quasi-­‐memory	   judgements	   are	   immune.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	  memory-­‐judgements	  are	  different	   from	  present	  tense	  self-­‐ascriptions.	   It	   is	  not	  clear	  that	  whatever	  is	  true	  of	  memory-­‐based	  judgements	  will	  be	  true	  of	  present	  tense	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  But	  first	  I	  have	  to	  discuss	  quasi-­‐memory.	  	  
Quasi-­‐memory	  Shoemaker	   introduced	   quasi-­‐memory	   judgments	   for	   cases	   involving	   fission.	  Suppose	  Tweedle	  undergoes	  fission,	  so	  two	  people	  after	  fission,	  Dum	  and	  Dee,	  quasi-­‐remember	  what	  happened	  with	  Tweedle	  prior	   to	   fission.	   (Dum	  and	  Dee	  have	   the	   same	   ‘memories’	   –	   which	   originated	   from	   Tweedle.)	   Dum	   quasi-­‐remembers	  that	  he	  pulled	  a	  cat's	  tail.	  But,	  for	  Shoemaker,	  judgements	  based	  on	  quasi-­‐memory	  will	   not	  be	   immune	   to	   standard	  de	  re	  misidentification.	  This	   is	  because	  it	  can	  turn	  out	  that	  what	  Dum	  quasi-­‐remembers,	  pulling	  the	  cat's	  tail,	  is	  someone	   else's	   memory.	   In	   our	   case	   it	   is	   Tweedle's	   memory	   and	   not	   Dum's.	  Pryor	   attempts	   to	   show	   that	  Dum’s	   and	  Dee’s	   quasi-­‐remembering	  will	   not	   be	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immune	   to	   wh-­‐misidentification,	   but	   will	   be	   immune	   to	   standard	   de	   re	  misidentification.	   For	   Pryor,	   quasi-­‐memory	   is	   not	   immune	   to	   wh-­‐misidentification.	  	  	  
Memory-­‐based	  judgements	  are	  not	  the	  basic	  case	  for	  IEM	  I	  will	  argue	   that	  memory-­‐based	   judgements	  cannot	  be	  paradigmatic	  examples	  of	   IEM.	  Memory-­‐based	   self-­‐ascriptions	   have	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   IEM	   from	   the	  IEM	   of	   present-­‐tense	   self-­‐ascriptions.	   I	   will	   list	   some	   obvious	   reasons	   for	  accepting	  this	  difference.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  IEM	  of	  present	  tense	  self-­‐ascription	  made	  on	  a	  certain	  basis	  is	   such	   that	   misidentification	   is	   excluded	   only	   for	   the	   subject	   and	   from	   the	  subject’s	  point	  of	  view.	  (When	  I	  say	  ‘I	  am	  in	  pain’	  you	  can	  misidentify	  who	  is	  in	  pain	   if	   you	   think	   someone	  else	   is	   speaking.)	  Memory-­‐based	   judgements	   could	  be	   immune	  only	   if	  memory	   is	   factive.	  Memory	   is	   factive	   if	   I	   cannot	   remember	  something	  unless	  it	  happened.	  However,	  I	  can	  seem	  to	  remember	  that	  I	  was	  in	  Paris	   because	   your	   description	   of	   your	   Paris	   trip	  was	   so	   vivid	   that	   I	   seem	   to	  remember	   that	   it	   happened	   with	   me.	   Even	   if	   it	   is	   true	   that	   I	   only	   seem	   to	  remember,	   from	  the	  subject’s	  point	  of	  view	  misidentification	  can	  happen.	  The	  question	  for	  ‘I	  am	  in	  pain’	  based	  on	  feeling,	  is	  whether	  misidentification	  can	  or	  cannot	  happen	  from	  the	  first	  person	  point	  of	  view.	  So	  if	  memory	  is	  factive	  but	  I	  might	  not	  know	  whether	  it	  counts	  as	  a	  memory	  when	  I	  seem	  to	  remember,	  then	  memory-­‐based	   self-­‐ascriptions	   are	   very	   different	   from	   present	   tense	   self-­‐ascriptions	  in	  this	  respect.	  I	  seem	  to	  remember	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  there.	  So	  even	  if	  memory-­‐based	  judgements	  can	  be	  immune,	  they	  cannot	  be	  so	  from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective.	  In	  contrast,	  IEM	  of	  present	  tense	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  only	  from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective.	  Second,	  memory	  is	  not	  a	  basic	  way	  of	  knowing.	  My	  memory	  only	  preserves	  the	  content	  which	  I	  have	  gained	  through	  another	  way	  of	  knowing	  like	  vision	  or	  touch.	  When	  I	  remember	  seeing	  or	  touching	  something	  then	  the	  original	  way	  of	  knowing	   is	   vision	   or	   touch.	   A	   basic	   way	   of	   knowing	   cannot	   require	   another	  basic	  way	  of	  knowing	  as	  the	  original	  source.	  Vision	  or	  touch	  are	  basic	  ways	  of	  knowing;	  they	  do	  not	  require	  other	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  They	  alone	  could	  put	  the	  subject	   in	   a	   position	   to	   know	   something	   when	   one	   perceives	   something.	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Testimony	   (similarly	   to	   inference25)	   requires	   another	  way	  of	   knowing	   so	   it	   is	  not	  a	  basic	  way	  of	  knowing.	  	  We	  might	   have	   to	   decide	   case	   by	   case.	   Remembering	   that	   I	   was	   in	   Paris	  requires	  other	  ways	  of	  knowing	  which	  were	  employed	  in	  gaining	  the	  experience	  which	   I	   remember.	  When	  only	  visual	  experience	   is	   involved	   then	  vision	   is	   the	  prior	  source.	  If	  food	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  in	  Paris	  then	  vision,	  smell	  and	  taste	  are	  the	  prior	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  	  The	  IEM	  of	  present	  tense	  self-­‐ascriptions	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  basic	  way	  of	   knowing	   seems	   to	   be	   different	   from	  memory-­‐based	   self-­‐ascriptions	  where	  content	  from	  a	  basic	  way	  of	  knowing	  may	  be	  preserved	  or	  distorted	  in	  memory.	  Thus	  we	  have	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  basic	  case.	  	   	  
                                                25	  Inference	   usually	   requires	   premises,	   and	   premises	   require	   further	   ways	   of	   knowing,	   or	   at	  least	  in	  most	  cases.	  Inference	  might	  be	  a	  basic	  way	  of	  knowing	  in	  some	  special	  cases,	  when	  all	  premises	  are	  presuppositions	  of	  everything	  what	  we	  know.	  E.g.	  I	  implicitly	  take	  it	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  world	  around	  me	  exists.	  What	  follows	  from	  this	  does	  not	  rest	  on	  any	  other	  basic	  way	  of	  knowing.	  In	  this	  case	  inference	  could	  count	  as	  a	  basic	  way	  of	  knowing.	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Chapter	  4	  
The	  Myth	  of	  Absolute	  Immunity	  	  	  
Abstract	  I	   will	   argue	   against	   Shoemaker’s	   distinction	   between	   absolute	   and	  circumstantial	   IEM.	   In	   particular,	   I	   will	   question	   the	   possibility	   of	  absolute	   IEM.	   For	   Shoemaker,	   absolute	   IEM	   is	   different	   from	  circumstantial	   IEM,	   because	   an	   absolutely	   immune	   self-­‐ascription	   is	  immune	   in	   all	   circumstances,	   while	   a	   circumstantially	   immune	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   immune	   in	   at	   least	   one	   circumstance,	   but	   not	   in	   all	  circumstances.	   An	   absolutely	   immune	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   immune	   on	   all	  bases.	   Accordingly,	   absolute	   IEM	   is	   basis-­‐independent.	   This	   denies	  basis-­‐relativity,	   where	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   only	   immune	   relativized	   to	  certain	   bases,	   but	   not	   to	   all	   bases.	   I	   will	   argue	   for	   basis-­‐relativity	   by	  using	   counter-­‐examples	   and	   by	   providing	   a	   general	   argument	   why	  absolute	  IEM	  (basis-­‐independence)	  is	  unattainable.	  	  
	  	  
1.	  Preliminaries	  In	   ‘Self-­‐Reference	   and	   Self-­‐Awareness’	   (1968),	   Shoemaker	   identified	   a	   special	  class	   of	   first	   person	   judgments	   that	   exhibit	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   property.	   He	  labelled	   this	   class	   as	   the	   class	   of	   judgments	   that	   are	   immune	  to	  error	  through	  
misidentification	   relative	   to	   'I'	   and	  discussed	   it	  extensively.	  Shoemaker	  credits	  Wittgenstein	   with	   first	   introducing	   the	   phenomenon.	   Like	   Wittgenstein,	  Shoemaker	   concentrates	   on	   understanding	   the	   IEM	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions.	  However,	   his	   account	   differs	   from	   Wittgenstein’s.	   Shoemaker	   differentiates	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  IEM	  –	  absolute	  and	  circumstantial	  IEM	  –	  and	  accepts	  that	  ‘I’	  is	  a	  singular	  referring	  term	  that	  picks	  out	  a	  material	  object.	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  for	   understanding	   immunity	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   reconstruct	   Shoemaker’s	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treatment	   of	   IEM	   and	   critically	   engage	   with	   it.26 	  Consequently,	   I	   need	   to	  examine	  whether	  there	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  IEM	  as	  Shoemaker	  suggests.	  	  My	   strategy	   will	   be	   to	   argue	   against	   the	   possibility	   of	   absolute	   IEM.	   An	  absolutely	   immune	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   immune	   on	   all	   bases.	   So	   absolute	   IEM	  denies	   basis-­‐relativity	   (where	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   only	   immune	   relativized	   to	  certain	  bases	  but	  not	   to	  all	  bases).	  My	  main	  aim	   is	   to	  argue	   that	   IEM	   is	  basis-­‐relative;	   this	  means	   that	   all	   kinds	   of	   IEM	  are	   basis-­‐relative.	   This	   excludes	   the	  possibility	   of	   absolute	   IEM.	   In	   order	   to	   show	   this,	   I	   will	   first	   provide	   some	  counterexamples	   against	   absolute	   IEM	   and	   then	   offer	   a	   general	   argument	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  absolute	  IEM.	  Although	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  consensus	  in	  the	  immunity	  literature	  that	  IEM	  is	  basis-­‐relative	  there	  is	  no	  argument	  presented	  directly	  for	  this	  claim.27	  Evans,	  for	  example,	  claims	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  one	  example	  that	  a	  judgment	  is	  immune	  on	  one	  basis,	  but	  not	  immune	  on	  another	  basis	  (1982:	  218-­‐224).	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  sufficient	  reason	  for	  believing	  that	  IEM	  is	  basis-­‐relative	  for	  all	  self-­‐ascriptions.	   I	   find	   this	   plausible,	   but	   from	  a	   small	   set	   of	   examples	   a	   universal	  generalisation	  does	  not	  follow.	  The	  universal	  generalisation	  is	  that	  all	  cases	  of	  immune	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	  basis-­‐relative.	  The	   truth	  of	   this	   claim	   is	   crucial	   in	  my	  argument	  for	  the	  Simple	  View,	  so	  I	  have	  to	  argue	  for	  this	  conclusion.	  In	   this	  chapter,	   let	  me	  restrict	   the	   target	  notion	  of	   IEM	  to	   the	   IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	   Whenever	   I	   talk	   of	   IEM,	   I	   mean	   the	   IEM	   we	   find	   in	   putatively	  immune	  self-­‐ascription.	  	  	  
2.	  Shoemaker’s	  Picture	  of	  Immunity	  	  It	  is	  only	  natural	  to	  start	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  Shoemaker’s	  picture	  of	  immunity.	  Shoemaker	   holds	   that	   a	   judgment	   like	   ‘I	   am	   in	   pain’	   is	   immune	   relative	   to	   ‘I’	  because	   it	   cannot	  be	   the	  case	   that	   I	  am	  wrong	  about	  who	   is	   in	  pain,	  but	   right	  that	  someone	  else	  is	  in	  pain:	  	  	  
                                                26	  Even	  though	  Shoemaker	  holds	  that	  demonstrative	  judgments	  can	  be	  immune,	  he	  thinks	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  immunity	  is	  different	  from	  the	  immunity	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  558-­‐559).	  I	  agree,	  and	  will	  argue	  for	  this	  claim	  in	  chapter	  6.	  27	  Higginbotham	   (2012)	  might	   be	   an	   exception	   if	   we	   read	   his	   notion	   of	   ‘logical	   immunity’	   as	  absolute	  immunity.	  Settling	  this	  issue	  is	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  discussion.	  Another	  exception	  is	  Longuenesse	  (2012);	  I	  will	  discuss	  her	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  in	  chapter	  10.	  
 61	  
The	  statement	  "I	  feel	  pain"	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification	  relative	   to	   'I':	   it	   cannot	   happen	   that	   I	   am	  mistaken	   in	   saying	   "I	   feel	   pain"	  because,	  although	   I	  do	  know	  of	  someone	   that	   feels	  pain,	   I	  am	  mistaken	   in	  thinking	  that	  person	  [who	  feels	  pain]	  to	  be	  myself.”	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  557).	  	  If	  I	  say	  "I	  am	  bleeding,"	  it	  can	  happen	  that	  what	  I	  say	  is	  false	  even	  though	  I	  am	  giving	  expression	  to	  the	  knowledge	  that	  a	  certain	  person	  is	  bleeding;	  it	  may	   be	   that	   I	   do	   see	   a	   bleeding	   arm	   or	   leg,	   but	   that	   because	  my	   body	   is	  tangled	  up	  with	   that	  of	   someone	  else	   (e.g.,	  we	  are	  wrestling)	  or	  because	   I	  am	   seeing	   my	   identical	   twin	   or	   double	   in	   a	   mirror,	   I	   am	   mistaken	   in	  thinking	  the	  person	  who	  is	  bleeding	  to	  be	  myself.	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  556).	  	  	  This	   is	   in	   perfect	   accordance	   with	   the	   basic	   notion	   of	   misidentification	   (as	  described	  in	  the	  last	  chapter)	  except	  that	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  being	  in	  pain	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  immune	  on	  all	  bases.	  	  Shoemaker	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  IEM.	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  examine	  what	  marks	  their	  difference.	  	  
3.	  Absolute	  and	  Circumstantial	  Immunity	  We	   need	   a	   preliminary	   grasp	   of	   the	   two	   notions:	   ‘absolute	   immunity’	   and	  ‘circumstantial	   immunity’.28	  An	   ‘a’-­‐judgment	   (a	   judgment	   concerning	   ‘a’,	   like	  
Fa),	  Fa,	  is	  absolutely	  immune	  relative	  to	  ‘a’	  iff	  who	  is	  F	  cannot	  be	  misidentified	  in	  any	   circumstance.	  This	   requires	   that	  no	   change	  even	   in	   the	  basis	  of	  Fa	   can	  affect	  its	  immunity.	  Thus,	  it	  follows	  from	  being	  absolutely	  immune	  that	  it	  has	  to	  be	   immune	   on	   all	   bases.	   In	   contrast,	   a	   ‘b’-­‐judgment,	   Fb,	   is	   circumstantially	  
immune	   iff	  who	  is	  F	  cannot	  be	  misidentified	   in	  at	   least	  one	  circumstance,	  but	  not	   all	   circumstances	   are	   like	   that.	   The	   relevant	   feature	   individuating	   the	  circumstance	  might	  be	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  the	  ‘b’-­‐judgment	  is	  made.	  	  Shoemaker	  introduces	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘circumstance’	  through	  contrasting	  two	  cases.	  In	  the	  first	  circumstance,	  based	  on	  seeing	  a	  table,	  I	  judge	  that	  I	  am	  facing	  
                                                28	  Shoemaker	   distinguishes	   between	   two	   further	   kinds	   of	   immune	   judgements:	   logical	   and	  factual	  immunity	  (Shoemaker	  1984b).	  These	  differ	  from	  absolute	  and	  circumstantial	  immunity	  and	  pertain	  primarily	   to	  memory	  and	  quasi-­‐memory	   judgments.	   I	  will	  not	  discuss	   them	  here,	  since	  my	  focus	  is	  present	  tense	  self-­‐ascription.	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a	  table.	  In	  the	  second	  circumstance,	  based	  on	  seeing	  myself	  in	  the	  mirror	  facing	  a	  table,	  I	  judge	  that	  I	  am	  facing	  a	  table	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  557).	  I	  only	  take	  it	  that	  if	   the	   basis	   (in	   Shoemaker’s	   sense)	   is	   different,	   then	   the	   circumstance	   is	  different	   –	   which	   would	   be	   true	   on	   all	   readings	   of	   ‘circumstance’	   (even	   if	  something	  else	  could	  also	  make	  a	  difference	  on	  some	  readings	  of	  it).29	  In	  order	  to	   argue	   against	   absolute	   IEM	   it	   is	   sufficient	   to	   show	   that,	   for	   a	   supposedly	  absolutely	  immune	  self-­‐ascription,	  misidentification	  is	  possible	  on	  one	  basis.	  Absolute	   IEM	   requires	   that	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   which	   is	   absolutely	   immune	  cannot	  be	  misidentified	   relative	   to	   ‘I’	  on	  any	  basis	   in	  all	   circumstances.	   In	   the	  previous	   chapters,	   we	   have	   found	   some	   reasons	   to	   believe	   that	   immunity	   is	  basis-­‐relative.	   Absolute	   IEM	   and	   basis-­‐relativity	   are	   incompatible;	   the	   former	  denies	  that	  one	  kind	  of	  IEM	  (absolute	  IEM)	  is	  basis-­‐relative.	  	  	  
3.1.	  Shoemaker’s	  Two	  Theses	  	  I	  will	  reconstruct	  the	  basic	  idea	  behind	  absolute	  and	  circumstantial	  IEM	  in	  the	  form	  of	  two	  theses,	  based	  on	  quotes	  from	  ‘Self-­‐reference	  and	  Self-­‐awareness’.	  	  	  
3.1.1.	  The	  Circumstance-­‐independence	  Thesis	  According	   to	   the	   first	   thesis	  an	  absolutely	   immune	   judgment	   is	   immune	   in	  all	  circumstances,	   so	   there	   can	   be	   no	   circumstance	   where	   the	   subject	   can	  misidentify	  who	  is	  F:	  	  First-­‐person	  statements	  that	  are	  immune	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification	  in	  the	  sense	  just	  defined,	  those	  in	  which	  'I'	  is	  used	  "as	  subject,"	  could	  be	  said	  to	   have	   "absolute	   immunity"	   to	   error	   through	   misidentification.	   A	  statement	  like	  "I	  am	  facing	  a	  table"	  does	  not	  have	  this	  sort	  of	  immunity,	  for	  we	   can	   imagine	   circumstances	   in	   which	   someone	   might	   make	   this	  statement	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   having	   misidentified	   someone	   else	   (e.g.,	   the	  person	  he	   sees	   in	   a	  mirror)	   as	  himself.	  But	   there	  will	   be	  no	  possibility	   of	  
                                                29	  Peacocke	  (2008:	  92-­‐103)	  uses	  the	  notion	  of	  circumstance	  for	  differentiating	  between	  normal	  and	  abnormal	  circumstances.	  Similarly,	  Evans	  (1982:	  186)	  speaks	  about	  normal	  ways	  of	  gaining	  knowledge.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  Shoemaker’s	  point	  in	  keeping	  the	  notion	  of	  circumstance	  in	  play;	  he	  never	  contrasts	  normal	  with	  abnormal	  circumstance.	   ‘Circumstance’	  could	  mean	  circumstance	  of	  evaluation	  (Kaplan	  1989)	  but	  nothing	  seems	  to	  support	  this	  claim	  either.	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such	  a	  misidentification	  if	  one	  makes	  this	  statement	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  seeing	  a	  table	  in	  front	  of	  one	  in	  the	  ordinary	  way	  (without	  aid	  of	  mirrors,	  etc.);	  let	  us	  say	   that	   when	   made	   in	   this	   way	   the	   statement	   has	   "circumstantial	  immunity"	   to	   error	   through	   misidentification	   relative	   to	   'I'.	   (Shoemaker	  1968:	  557	  with	  my	  emphases)	  	  
	  Accordingly,	  the	  first	  thesis	  ensures	  that	  absolutely	  immune	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	  immune	  independently	  of	  the	  circumstance	  in	  which	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  made.	  Call	  this	  the	  circumstance-­‐independence	  thesis:	  	  
Circumstance-­‐independence	   Thesis:	   A	   self-­‐ascription,	   Fi,	   is	   absolutely	  
immune	  iff	  the	  subject	  cannot	  misidentify	  who	  is	  F	  in	  any	  circumstance.	  
	  Correlatively	  we	  can	  introduce	  the	  notion	  of	  circumstantial	  immunity:	  
	  
Circumstantial	   IEM:	  A	  self-­‐ascription,	  Fi,	   is	  circumstantially	  immune	  iff	  the	  
subject	  cannot	  misidentify	  who	   is	  F	   in	  at	   least	  one	  circumstance,	  but	  not	  all	  
circumstances	  are	  such.	  	  If,	   for	  Fi	   on	  one	  basis,	   the	   subject	   can	  misidentify	  who	   is	  F,	   then	  Fi	   cannot	  be	  absolutely	   immune.	   To	   understand	   what	   is	   required	   we	   have	   to	   know	   what	  differentiates	   one	   circumstance	   from	   the	   other.	   In	   the	   text	   it	   seems	   that,	   for	  circumstantial	   immunity,	   who	   is	   F	   can	   be	   misidentified	   on	   one	   basis	  (misidentification	  in	  the	  mirror),	  but	  on	  another	  basis	  (direct	  vision),	  it	  cannot	  be	  misidentified.	  	  	  
3.1.2.	  The	  Basis-­‐independence	  Thesis	  It	   is	   an	   interesting	   question	   how	   a	   circumstance	   is	   individuated.	   As	   I	   noted	  earlier,	   Shoemaker	   only	   provides	   a	   contrast	   between	   two	   cases.	   However	  circumstance	  should	  be	  individuated	  at	  least	  by	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  self-­‐ascription.	   This	  much	   is	   clear.	   Absolutely	   immune	   self-­‐ascriptions	  will	   be	  immune	   to	   error	   through	  misidentification	   relative	   to	   ‘I’	   in	   all	   circumstances.	  Therefore	  they	  are	  immune	  on	  all	  possible	  bases.	  If	  I	  deny	  basis-­‐independence	  I	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would	   thereby	   deny	   circumstance-­‐independence.	   Therefore	   the	   claim	   I	   target	  is:	  	  
Basis-­‐independence	   Thesis:	   For	   an	   absolutely	   immune	   self-­‐ascription,	   Fi	  
(B),	  the	  subject	  cannot	  misidentify	  who	  is	  F,	  whatever	  the	  basis.	  	  
	  On	  all	   bases	   on	  which	   a	   self-­‐ascription	  Fi	  can	  be	   asserted,	  Fi	  will	   be	   immune.	  Absolute	   immunity	  makes	   the	   basis	   irrelevant	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   status	   of	  being	  absolutely	  immune	  does	  not	  vary	  depending	  on	  which	  basis	  the	  judgment	  is	  made.	  	  If	  absolute	   IEM	  is	  basis-­‐dependent,	   then	   it	  cannot	  be	  true	  that	  all	  kinds	  of	  IEM	   are	   basis-­‐relative.	   Thus,	   the	   basis-­‐independence	   of	   absolute	   IEM	   denies	  that	  all	  kinds	  of	   IEM	  are	  basis-­‐relative.	   In	  contrast,	  circumstantial	   immunity	   is	  basis-­‐dependent.	  A	  circumstantially	  immune	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  immune	  only	  on	  some	   but	   not	   on	   all	   bases	   (circumstances).	   A	   change	   in	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   self-­‐ascription	  can	  affect	  its	  immunity.	  Thus	  Shoemaker	  accepts	  that	  circumstantial	  IEM	  is	  basis-­‐dependent,	  but	  denies	  that	  absolute	  IEM	  is	  basis-­‐dependent.	  	  We	  now	  have	  a	  basic	  understanding	  of	  absolute	  and	  circumstantial	  IEM.	  So	  I	   will	   turn	   to	   argue	   for	   basis-­‐relativity	   by	   denying	   the	   possibility	   of	   absolute	  IEM.	  For	  an	  absolutely	  immune	  self-­‐ascription	  based	  on	  basis	  B1	  a	  change	  in	  the	  basis	   (B2)	   of	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   cannot	   affect	   its	   immunity.	   If	   absolute	   IEM	  requires	  that	  a	  change	  in	  the	  basis	  cannot	  affect	  its	  IEM,	  then	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  counterexamples	   I	  need	  cases	  where	  changing	  the	  basis	  affects	   the	   IEM	  of	   the	  putatively	   absolutely	   immune	   self-­‐ascription.	   Now	   I	   turn	   to	   discuss	   such	  counterexamples.	  	  
	  
4.	  The	  First	  Counterexample	  to	  Absolute	  Immunity:	  	  
The	  Mirror	  Pain	  Case	  Suppose	  I	  am	  usually	  good	  at	  knowing	  that	  I	  am	  in	  pain;	  my	  experience	  of	  pain	  reliably	  correlates	  with	  my	  pain.	  Still,	  it	  might	  not	  be	  easy	  to	  decide	  that	  one	  has	  an	  itch	  or	  pain	  for	  some	  cases.	  I	  can	  recognise	  the	  look	  of	  being	  in	  pain	  in	  other	  people	  and	  I	  can	  see	  that	  they	  are	  in	  pain.	  So	  when	  I	  cannot	  decide	  whether	  I	  am	  in	  pain	  or	  just	  have	  an	  itch	  I	  might	  turn	  to	  the	  mirror	  and	  see	  whether	  I	  have	  the	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look	  of	   someone	   in	  pain.	  But	   in	   that	   case	  my	  self-­‐ascription	  will	  not	  be	   solely	  based	   on	   knowing	   from	   the	   inside:	   on	   feeling	   it.	   It	  will	   be	   based	   on	   vision	   as	  well.	   I	   can	   have	   evidence	   for	   thinking	   that	  what	   I	   feel	   is	   pain	   if	   I	   look	   in	   the	  mirror	  like	  someone	  who	  is	  in	  pain.	  Or	  else,	  I	  can	  ask	  someone	  whether	  I	  look	  like	  someone	  who	  is	  in	  pain	  and	  thereby	  come	  to	  know	  that	  what	  I	  feel	  is	  pain.	  Call	  this	  the	  Mirror	  Pain	  Case.	  I	  can	  misidentify	  who	  is	  in	  pain	  whenever	  my	  judgment	  is	  based	  on	  vision.	  In	  such	  cases	  what	  I	  feel	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  decide	  whether	  I	  am	  in	  pain.	  I	  might	  ask	  my	  friend	  whether	  my	  C-­‐fibres	  are	  firing	  (if	  pain	  is	  C-­‐fibre	  firing)	  and	  this	  would	  be	   another	  way	   to	   come	   to	  know	   that	   I	   am	   in	  pain	   and	  not	   in	   another	  state.	   Thus	   it	   seems	   I	   can	   self-­‐ascribe	   pain	   based	   on	   non-­‐private	   ways	   of	  knowing	  like	  vision	  or	  testimony.	  	  In	  such	  circumstances	  I	  can	  misidentify	  who	  is	  in	  pain.	  If	  ‘I	  am	  in	  pain’	  were	  absolutely	  immune	  this	  would	  be	  excluded.	  ‘I	  am	  in	  pain’	  is	  one	  of	  the	  classical	  examples	   of	   an	   absolutely	   immune	   judgment.	   Consequently,	   if	   I	   am	   right	   that	  my	   being	   in	   pain	   can	   be	   known	   by	   me	   both	   from	   the	   inside	   and	   from	   the	  outside,	   then	  we	  have	   to	   give	  up	   the	  possibility	  of	   absolute	   immunity	   for	   this	  predicate.	  	  To	  object	   that	   I	   cannot	   come	   to	  know	   that	   I	   am	   in	  pain	   in	   the	   same	  ways	  that	  other	  people	  might	  come	  to	  know	  that	  I	  am	  in	  pain	  would	  be	  unwise.	  And	  it	  seems	   that	  nobody	  holds	   this.	  Even	  Shoemaker	  allows	   that	  knowing	   from	   the	  outside	  can	  put	  me	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  I	  am	  in	  pain,	  but	  I	  have	  to	  know	  this	  from	  the	  inside	  in	  order	  to	  self-­‐ascribe	  it.30	  Unless	  we	  think	  that	  nothing	  is	  objective	  about	  pain	  we	  have	  to	  admit	  the	  possibility	  of	  knowing	  from	  the	  outside.	  If	  there	  is	  nothing	  objective	  about	  pain	  then	  I	  worry	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  be	  mistaken	  about	  or	  to	  know	  about	  it.	  In	  that	  case,	  pain	  cannot	  be	  an	  objective	  feature	  of	  the	  subject	  which	  is	  part	  of	  the	  world.	  Pain	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  objective	  feature	  and	  in	  most	  cases	  –	  evolutionarily	  speaking	  –	  a	  very	  useful	  one.	  (Think	  of	  pain	  avoidance	  behaviours	  which	  enable	  organisms	  to	  avoid	  danger,	  e.g.	  fire.)	  
                                                30	  “[I]t	  is	  necessarily	  the	  case	  that	  if	  a	  person	  knows	  that	  a	  P*-­‐predicate	  applies	  to	  him	  he	  knows	  that	   it	   applies	   to	   him	   in	   the	   "special	   way"	   appropriate	   to	   that	   predicate	   (which	   does	   not	  preclude	  that	  he	  should	  also	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	   it	  applies	  to	  him	  in	  other	  ways,	   i.e.,	  ways	  in	  which	  others	  might	  know	  that	  it	  applies	  to	  him)”	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  565).	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To	   sum	   up,	   it	   seems	   that	   we	   have	   found	   circumstances	   where	   a	   self-­‐ascription	  ‘I	  am	  in	  pain’	  –	  which	  is	  the	  classic	  example	  of	  an	  absolutely	  immune	  judgment	   –	   can	   be	   misidentified	   relative	   to	   ‘I’.	   This	   poses	   a	   challenge	   to	  Shoemaker	  who	  holds	   that	   there	  can	  be	  no	  circumstance	  where	  an	  absolutely	  immune	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  open	  to	  misidentification.	  Thus,	  I	  propose	  abandoning	  the	  Basis-­‐independence	  thesis.	  But	  let	  me	  consider	  an	  objection	  to	  my	  strategy.	  
	  
4.1.	  An	  Objection	  to	  our	  Strategy	  	  Showing	   that	  one	  example	  of	   a	  putatively	  absolutely	   immune	   judgment	   is	  not	  actually	  absolutely	  immune	  does	  not	  show	  that	  we	  should	  abandon	  the	  notion	  of	   absolute	   immunity.	   We	   have	   seen	   that	   ‘I	   am	   in	   pain’	   is	   not	   absolutely	  immune.	  This	  is	  the	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  absolute	  immunity,	  so	  we,	  at	  least,	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  doubt	  that	  there	  is	  any	  self-­‐ascription	  which	  is	  absolutely	  immune.	  But	  it	  would	  be	  advisable	  to	  consider	  more	  examples.	  	  
4.2.	  Some	  Other	  Counterexamples	  Let	  me	  consider	  some	  other	  examples.	  Being	  out	  of	  balance	  or	  being	  afraid	  seem	  to	   be	   cases	  where	   if	   I	   can	   self-­‐ascribe	   them,	   then	   I	   cannot	  misidentify	  whom	  they	  concern.	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  cases.	  I	  am	  on	  a	  ship	  and	  I	  am	  overly	  self-­‐confident.	  The	   captain	   is	   shouting	   orders	   to	   us	   to	   save	   ourselves	   from	   a	   terrible	   storm	  where	  the	  ship	  is	  in	  danger.	  I	  think	  I	  am	  doing	  fine.	  But	  the	  captain	  shouts	  at	  me	  through	  an	  earphone:	  ‘I	  can	  see	  that	  you	  are	  out	  of	  balance.	  You	  have	  to	  go	  into	  the	  cabin	  or	  your	   life	   is	   in	  danger.’	   I	   self-­‐ascribe	  being	  out	  of	  balance.	  But	   the	  captain	  might	  have	  seen	  someone	  else	  who	  is	  less	  fit	  for	  the	  task	  than	  me,	  while	  I	   am	   actually	   doing	   fine.	   Based	   on	   testimony,	   I	   can	   self-­‐ascribe	  who	   is	   out	   of	  balance,	  but	  I	  may	  misidentify	  who	  is	  out	  of	  balance.	  	  Imagine	  that	  I	  am	  climbing	  on	  a	  sharp	  stone	  ridge	  where	  nobody	  dares	  to	  go.	  I	  think	  I	  am	  doing	  fine.	  My	  friends	  take	  a	  Polaroid	  picture	  of	  me	  to	  prove	  that	  it	   is	   better	   for	  me	  not	   to	   climb	   it,	   because	   I	   am	   terribly	   afraid.	   I	   look	   terribly	  afraid	   indeed.	   So	   I	   self-­‐ascribe	   being	   afraid	   based	   on	   my	   behaviour	   and	  appearance.	  But	  based	  on	  seeing	  an	  image	  on	  the	  picture	  I	  can	  misidentify	  who	  is	  afraid.	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It	   is	   not	   very	   promising	   strategy	   to	   rule	   out	   the	   putatively	   absolutely	  immune	   self-­‐ascriptions	   one	   by	   one.	   A	   generalised	   objection	   would	   be	   much	  more	  effective	   in	  arguing	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  basis-­‐independent	  absolute	  IEM.	   To	   present	   such	   an	   argument	   I	  will	   need	   to	   rely	   on	  what	   I	   call	   the	   Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle.	  This	  principle	   is	   implicitly	  assumed	  by	  almost	  everybody	  in	   the	   literature,	   including	   Shoemaker.	   I	   turn	   to	   discuss	   the	   Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle.	  	  
5.	  The	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  Principle	  Immunity	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification	  does	  not	  mean	  we	  have	  immunity	  from	   all	   mistakes.	   IEM	   is	   claimed	   to	   be	   a	   feature	   that	   is	   independent	   from	  infallibility,	  incorrigibility,	  self-­‐intimation,	  and	  other	  special	  epistemic	  features,	  so	  it	  cannot	  require	  any	  of	  them	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  556-­‐558,	  565	  fn.	  7,	  Wright	  1998,	  O’Brien	  2007,	  Peacocke	  2008).	  The	  primary	  explanatory	  target	  should	  be	  IEM.	   Thus	   paradigm	   cases	   of	   IEM	   cannot	   be	   a	   mere	   consequence	   of	   another	  stronger	   epistemic	   feature,	   such	   as	   self-­‐intimation	   or	   infallibility.	   Let	  me	   call	  this	  requirement	  of	  independence:	  the	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle.31	  	  IEM	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   a	   distinct	   and	   independent	   epistemic	   feature	   –	   and	  labelled	   as	   such.	   Let	  me	  examine	   the	   features	  which	  have	   to	  be	  distinguished	  from	   IEM.	   Infallibility	  means	   that	  when	   the	   subject	   judges	  p	   then	   the	   subject	  cannot	  be	  wrong	  about	  p.	  Incorrigibility	  requires	  that	  when	  the	  subject	  judges	  p,	  then	   nobody	   else	   can	   correct	   this	   thought	   besides	   the	   subject.	   This	   can	   be	  considered	  a	  form	  of	  first	  person	  authority.	  A	  state	  F	  (or	  the	  proposition	  ‘I	  am	  F’)	  is	   self-­‐intimating	   just	   in	   case	  whenever	   the	   subject	   is	   in	   a	  mental	   state	  F	   (e.g.	  being	  in	  pain)	  then	  she	  knows	  that	  she	  herself	  is	  F.32	  	  Consider	  infallibility.	  According	  to	  Shoemaker,	  one	  might	  be	  mistaken	  about	  the	  predication,	  being	  in	  pain.	  But	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  this	  predicate	  is	  supposed	  
                                                31	  “Wittgenstein's	  point	  is	  not	  that	  these	  statements	  are	  totally	  immune	  to	  error,	  though	  he	  may	  have	  believed	  this	  to	  be	  true	  of	  some	  of	   them,	  but	   is	  rather	  that	  they	  are	   immune	  to	  a	  certain	  sort	  of	  error:	  they	  are	  immune	  to	  error	  due	  to	  a	  misrecognition	  of	  a	  person,	  or,	  as	  I	  shall	  put	  it,	  they	   are	   immune	   to	   error	   through	   misidentification	   relative	   to	   the	   first-­‐person	  pronouns.”(Shoemaker	  1968:	  556).	  32	  Self-­‐intimation	   as	   discussed	   is	   related	   to	   self-­‐knowledge	   and	   is	   not	   restricted	   to	   self-­‐ascriptions.	  But	  our	  discussion	  requires	  us	  to	  discuss	   it	  only	  relative	  to	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  There	  are	  weaker	  and	  stronger	  versions	  of	   these	  notions	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  feature	  being	  IEM.	  For	  further	  discussion	  see	  Alston	  1971	  and	  Tye	  2009.	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to	  be	  immune	  on	  all	  bases.	  Thus	  IEM	  is	  distinct	  from	  and	  cannot	  simply	  follow	  from	  infallibility.	  	  IEM	   is	   different	   from	   incorrigibility.	   When	   I	   say	   ‘I	   see	   a	   canary’	   then	  someone	   else	   can	   correct	   me	   that	   it	   is	   actually	   a	   bird	   of	   paradise.	   This	   is	   a	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  absolute	  IEM	  for	  Shoemaker,	  so	  incorrigibility	  cannot	  be	  assumed.	  	  I	  might	  think	  I	  feel	  an	  itch	  when	  I	  feel	  an	  ache,	  thus	  it	  seems	  that	  being	  in	  pain	   need	   not	   be	   self-­‐intimating,	   but	   the	   judgment	   can	   still	   be	   immune.	   If	  whenever	  I	  am	  in	  a	  state	  I	  have	  to	  know	  that	  I	  am	  in	  this	  state	  (i.e.	  the	  state	  is	  self-­‐intimating),	   this	   suffices	   to	  ensure	   that	   its	   self-­‐ascription	  will	  be	   immune.	  However,	   if	   all	   paradigmatic	   cases	   of	   IEM	   require	   self-­‐intimation	   then	   the	  primary	   explanandum	  would	   no	   longer	   be	   IEM,	   but	  would	   be	   self-­‐intimation.	  Furthermore,	  according	  to	  Shoemaker,	  P*-­‐predicates	  are	  those	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  which	   is	   absolutely	   immune.	   However,	   Shoemaker	   explicitly	   denies	   that	   P*-­‐predicates	   are	   self-­‐intimating	   and	   this,	   as	   I	   have	   argued,	   seems	   to	   be	   correct.	  Thus	   paradigmatic	   examples	   of	   IEM	   cannot	   be	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   of	   features	  which	  are	  self-­‐intimating.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle	  ensures	  that	  IEM	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  derivative	  feature	  –	  a	  consequence	  of	  another	  more	  fundamental	  feature	  of	  the	  use	   of	   ‘I’.	   The	   Self-­‐sufficiency	   principle	   is	   a	   point	   of	   common	   agreement	   even	  though	   it	  has	  never	  been	  explicitly	   stated	   in	   the	   literature,	   and	   it	  will	  play	  an	  important	  role	   in	   the	  discussion	  below.33	  With	   this	   in	  place,	   I	   can	  now	  turn	   to	  the	   generalised	   objection	   against	   basis-­‐independence,	   which	   undermines	   the	  possibility	  of	  absolute	  IEM.	  	  
6.	  Generalised	  Objection	  to	  Absolute	  Immunity:	  	  
What	  is	  Implausible	  in	  the	  Idea	  of	  Absolute	  Immunity?	  I	   will	   argue	   that	   unless	   P*-­‐predicates	   are	   self-­‐intimating,	   their	   self-­‐ascription	  cannot	   be	   immune	   on	   all	   possible	   bases.	   (In	   Shoemaker’s	   framework,	   P*	  
                                                33	  Dialectically	   note	   that	   these	   features	   cannot	   be	   required	   by	   IEM	   if	   IEM	   is	   the	   primary	  explanandum.	  If,	  in	  a	  paradigmatic	  case,	  an	  immune	  judgment	  (Fi)	  required	  that	  Fi	  is	  infallible,	  incorrigible	  or	  self-­‐intimating,	  then	  the	  primary	  explanandum	  would	  not	  be	  IEM	  but	  these	  other	  features.	  IEM	  follows	  from	  infallibility;	  if	  a	  judgment	  is	  infallible	  it	  follows	  that	  it	  is	  immune.	  But	  if	   IEM	  would	   require	   infallibility	   then	   infallibility	  would	  be	   the	  primary	  explanandum.	  This	   is	  also	  the	  case	  with	  self-­‐intimation	  and	  incorrigibility.	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predicates	  are	  a	  subclass	  of	  psychological	  predicates	  and	  their	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  absolutely	   immune.)	   Before	   presenting	   my	   argument,	   let	   me	   emphasise	   that	  Shoemaker	  endorses	  the	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  556-­‐558)	  and	  does	  not	   require	   that	  P*-­‐predicates	   are	   self-­‐intimating:	   “[S]elf-­‐ascriptions	  of	  P*-­‐predicates	  need	  not	  be	   incorrigible	  and	  (…)	  it	   is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  that	   if	   a	  P*-­‐predicate	  applies	   to	   a	  person	   that	  person	  knows	   that	   it	   applies	   to	  him	  [i.e.	  P*-­‐predicates	  need	  not	  be	  self-­‐intimating].”	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  565).	  	  	  The	   general	   problem	   that	   makes	   absolute	   immunity	   unattainable	   is	   as	  follows.	   On	   the	   supposition	   that	   absolute	   immunity	   is	   Self-­‐sufficient	   (that	   it	  neither	   requires	   infallibility	   nor	   self-­‐intimation)	   we	   cannot	   exclude	   the	  possibility	   that	   I	   can	   self-­‐ascribe	   F-­‐ness	   (for	   all	   predicates)	   based	   on	   a	   non-­‐private	  way	  of	  knowing.	  Based	  on	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing	  like	  introspection,	  my	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   immune.	   Based	   on	   a	   non-­‐private	   way	   of	   knowing	   (e.g.	  vision)	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   not	   immune.	   But	   basing	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   on	   a	  non-­‐private	  way	  of	  knowing	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  unless	  we	  require	  that	  F-­‐ness	  is	   self-­‐intimating.	   This,	   however,	   is	   ruled	   out	   by	   the	   Self-­‐sufficiency	   principle.	  For	   example,	   being	   in	   pain	   cannot	   be	   self-­‐intimating	   if	   its	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   a	  paradigmatic	   example	   of	   absolute	   immunity	   according	   to	   the	   Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle.	  	  	  Take	  any	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	  absolute	  IEM,	  Fi	  (B).	  Properties	  of	  mine	  can	  be	  self-­‐attributed	  from	  the	  inside	  or	  from	  the	  outside	  according	  to	  Shoemaker.	  It	  is	  not	  only	  other	  people	  who	  can	  attribute	  that	  I	  am	  F	  from	  the	  outside;	  I	  too	  can	  believe	  that	  I	  am	  F	  from	  evidence	  from	  the	  outside.	  Only	  self-­‐intimation	  of	  
F-­‐ness	  ensures	  that	  I	  know	  that	  I	  am	  F	  whenever	  I	  am	  F.	  So	  if	  F-­‐ness	  is	  not	  self-­‐intimating	  (as	  it	  has	  to	  be	  for	  a	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	  immunity)	  then	  I	  might	  not	  believe	  that	  I	  am	  F	  when	  I	  am	  F.	  But	  in	  such	  a	  case	  I	  might	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  I	  am	  F	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  others	  believe	  that	  I	  am	  F	  –	  from	  the	  outside.	  Anyhow,	  if	  others	  can	  believe	   ‘I	  am	  F’	   through	  a	  non-­‐private	  way	  of	  knowing	  (from	  the	  outside)	  then	  nothing	  can	  rule	  out	  that	  I	  can	  know	  (or	  at	  least	  believe)	  through	  such	  ways	  that	   ‘I	  am	  F’.	  And	  even	  Shoemaker	  allows	  that	  I	  can	  know	  from	  the	  outside	  that	  I	  am	  F	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  565).	  	  Let	  me	  run	  through	  this	  reasoning	  for	  the	  judgement	  ‘I	  am	  in	  pain’,	  which	  is	  the	  paradigm	  case	  of	  an	  absolutely	  immune	  judgement:	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  1. I	  can	  think	  that	  I	  am	  in	  pain	  based	  on	  feeling	  this	  from	  the	  inside.	  	  2. Others	  can	  think	  that	  I	  am	  in	  pain	  based	  on	  vision	  (from	  the	  outside).	  3. If	   others	   can	   think	   that	   I	   am	   in	   pain	   based	   on	   vision,	   then	   I	   can	   also	  believe	  this	  based	  on	  vision	  (e.g.	  looking	  at	  my	  reflection	  or	  image)	  4. If	  I	  think	  that	  I	  am	  in	  pain	  based	  on	  vision	  then	  I	  can	  be	  mistaken	  about	  who	  is	  in	  pain.	  	  5. When	  I	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  what	  I	  feel	  is	  pain	  I	  can	  come	  to	  think	  that	  I	  am	  in	  pain	  based	  on	  vision.	  	  But	  then	  I	  can	  misidentify	  who	  is	  in	  pain	  based	  on	  vision	  in	  such	  cases.	  	  Often	  we	  are	  not	  sure	  what	  state	  we	  are	  in	  and	  we	  need	  further	  evidence	  to	  decide.	   I	   might	   feel	   something	   but	   I	   do	   not	   know	   whether	   I	   am	   in	   pain	   as	  opposed	  to	  some	  other	  kind	  of	  discomfort.	  One	  could	  think	  that	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  pain	   is	  necessarily	   from	  the	   inside.	  But	  when	   I	   think	  based	  both	  on	  private	  and	  non-­‐private	  ways	  of	  knowing	  that	  I	  am	  in	  pain	  then	  I	  can	  misidentify	  who	  is	  in	  pain.	  At	  least	  when	  my	  judgement	  is	  based	  both	  from	  inside	  and	  outside	  then	  it	  can	  turn	  out	  that	  what	  I	  feel	  is	  not	  pain	  but	  the	  one	  whom	  I	  look	  at	  is	  in	  pain.	  In	  this	  case	  I	  can	  misidentify	  who	  is	  in	  pain.	  But,	  if	  I	  do	  not	  know	  that	  I	  am	  F	  when	  I	  am	  F	  (F-­‐ness	  is	  not	  self-­‐intimating),	  then	   I	   might	   come	   to	   believe	   from	   the	   outside	   and	   the	   inside.	   Thus,	   for	   a	  putatively	   absolutely	   immune	   self-­‐ascription,	   which	   is	   not	   self-­‐intimating,	   I	  might	   come	   to	   believe	   that	   I	   am	   F	   from	   the	   outside	   and	   the	   inside.	   If	   I	   can	  believe	   that	   I	   am	   in	   pain	   based	   on	   evidence	   from	   the	   outside,	   then	   I	   might	  misidentify	  who	  is	  in	  pain.	  I	  might	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  I	  am	  F	  from	  the	  outside	  when	  someone	  else	   is	  F,	  but	   I	  am	  not	   (feeling	  something	  else).	  But	   then	   I	   can	  misidentify	  who	  is	  F,	  when	  I	  come	  to	  believe	   it	   from	  the	  outside	  and	  from	  the	  inside.	  The	  counter-­‐examples	  to	  absolute	  IEM	  demonstrate	  this	  possibility.	  Consequently,	  either	  there	  is	  no	  absolute	  immunity	  or	  we	  have	  to	  reject	  the	  Self-­‐sufficiency	   principle.	   Rejecting	   the	   Self-­‐sufficiency	   principle	   is	   not	   yet	  sufficient	   for	   defending	   absolute	   immunity,	   because	   one	   would	   also	   have	   to	  argue	   that	   P*-­‐predicates	   are	   self-­‐intimating.	   I	   do	   not	   see	   enough	   reason	   to	  accept	   this;	   my	   pain	   might	   be	   in	   the	   background	   of	   my	   attention	   and	   I	   only	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come	  to	  realise	  it	  later.	  For	  example,	  I	  might	  remember	  later	  that	  I	  already	  had	  a	  headache	  when	  I	  was	  so	  angry	  with	  someone	  –	  but	  I	  did	  not	  realise	  it	  then.	  This	  is	  possible	  even	  if	  pain	  requires	  pain	  phenomenology.	  One	  may	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  only	   confabulation	   for	   unjustified	   anger.	   However,	   I	   might	   not	   pay	   sufficient	  attention	  to	  my	  headache.	  I	  might	  have	  a	  headache	  but	  I	  am	  not	  fully	  aware	  of	  it	  because	   I	   am,	   for	   example,	   trying	   to	   finish	   my	   argument.	   I	   can	   redirect	   my	  attentional	  resources	  to	  something	  else	  than	  the	  headache.	  	  
7.	  The	  Fall	  of	  Basis-­‐independence	  	  According	   to	   the	   basis-­‐independence	   thesis,	   an	   absolutely	   immune	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   immune	   in	   all	   circumstances,	   so	   it	   should	   be	   immune	   on	   all	  possible	   bases.	   Basis-­‐independence	   follows	   from	   circumstance-­‐independence.	  Thus	   to	   deny	   the	   basis-­‐independence	   thesis	   is	   to	   deny	   the	   circumstance-­‐independence	  thesis	  and	  thereby	  to	  deny	  absolute	  immunity.	  	  According	   to	   the	   basis-­‐independence	   thesis,	   a	   supposedly	   absolutely	  immune	  self-­‐ascription,	  Fi,	   cannot	  be	  misidentified	  on	  any	  basis.	   So	   if	  we	   find	  that	  there	  are	  always	  such	  bases	  on	  which	  who	  is	  F	  can	  be	  misidentified,	  then	  we	   should	   deny	   the	   basis-­‐independence	   thesis	   and	   thereby	   deny	   absolute	  immunity.	   This	   is	   what	   we	   have	   seen.	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   self-­‐ascription	  might	  be	  based	  only	  on	  non-­‐private,	  or	  jointly	  on	  private	  and	  non-­‐private	  ways	  of	   knowing	   –	   unless	  we	   presuppose	   that	   all	   P*-­‐predicates	   are	   self-­‐intimating.	  But	   we	   have	   no	   reason	   to	   assume	   this.	   If	   P*-­‐predicates	   should	   be	   self-­‐intimating,	   this	   would	   violate	   the	   Self-­‐sufficiency	   principle.	   Thus	   we	   have	   no	  reason	  to	  believe	   in	  absolute	   IEM,	  unless	  we	  are	  prepared	  to	  give	  up	   the	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle.	  But	  to	  give	  up	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  is	  to	  give	  up	  IEM	  as	  we	  have	  conceived	  it.	  Let	  me	  summarise	  my	  main	  argument	  against	  absolute	  IEM.	  Suppose	  P*i	  is	  a	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	  absolute	  IEM.	  Nothing	  excludes	  that	  I	  know	  that	  ‘I	  am	  P*’	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  others	  may	  know	  it	  –	  from	  the	  outside,	  because	  (i)	  for	  any	  predicate	   being	   instantiated	   by	   me,	   it	   can,	   in	   principle,	   be	   known	   from	   the	  outside	  and	  (ii)	  such	  predicates	  (P*)	  cannot	  be	  restricted	  to	  those	  where	  being	  P*	  is	  self-­‐intimating	  (by	  the	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle).	  Whenever	  Fi	  is	  based	  on	  knowing	   from	   the	   outside,	   the	   subject	   can	   misidentify	  who	   is	   F.	   I	   might	   not	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know	  that	  I	  am	  F.	  This	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  unless	  we	  give	  up	  the	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle	  and	  provide	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  P*-­‐predicates	  are	  self-­‐intimating	  or	  their	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   infallible.	   But	   we	   have	   no	   reason	   to	   give	   up	   Self-­‐sufficiency	  and	  believe	  P*-­‐predicates	  are	  self-­‐intimating	  or	  their	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  infallible.	  This	  provides	  compelling	  reason	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  basis-­‐relativity	  of	  all	  kinds	  of	  immunity.	  	  
8.	  The	  Special	  Basis	  Explanation	  	  	  Let	   me	   take	   a	   step	   back	   and	   try	   to	   reconstruct	   Shoemaker’s	   explanation	   of	  absolute	  IEM.	  Surprisingly,	  this	  will	  enable	  me	  to	  find	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  IEM	  of	   self-­‐ascriptions	   which	   accommodates	   basis-­‐relativity.	   For	   the	   sake	   of	  reconstructing	   Shoemaker’s	   explanation	   of	   absolute	   IEM,	   let	   us	   forget	   that	  absolute	  IEM	  is	  not	  possible.	  How	  does	  Shoemaker	  try	  to	  explain	  absolute	  IEM?	  If	  absolutely	  immune	  Fi	  is	   immune	  on	  all	  bases,	   then	  how	  might	   the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification	  be	  ruled	  out	  for	  Fi?	  To	  think	  that	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  is,	  on	  all	  possible	  bases,	  immune	  to	   error	   through	   misidentification	   requires	   an	   explanation	   of	   how	   this	   is	  possible.	   Shoemaker’s	   thought	   is	   that	   this	   is	   possible	   because	   the	   basis	   is	  special.	  Such	  kinds	  of	  bases	  should	  be	  such	  that	  they	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	   Furthermore,	   it	   requires	   an	   explanation	  which	   excludes	   the	  possibility	   that	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   can	   be	   made	   on	   a	   basis	   which	   allows	  misidentification.	   So	   there	   should	   be	   a	   special	   basis	   which	   excludes	   the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification	  and	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  should	  be	  made	  only	  on	  such	  a	  basis.	  Call	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  that	  Shoemaker	  seems	  to	  be	  relying	  on	  the	  
maximal	  special	  basis	  explanation.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  this	  explanation	  has	  a	  grain	  of	  truth	  in	  it	  and	  guides	  us	  in	  the	  good	  direction.	  What	   makes	   it	   possible	   that	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   of	   some	   predicates	   (P*-­‐predicates)	   is	  –	  apparently	  –	  absolutely	   immune?	  Absolute	   immunity	  requires	  that	  such	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	  made	  on	  a	  special	  basis	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  565).	  The	  basis	  is,	  minimally,	  the	  relevant	  way	  of	  knowing	  on	  which	  the	  judgment	  is	  based,	   like	   proprioception,	   introspection,	   vision,	   and	   testimony.	   What	   makes	  the	  basis	  special?	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Shoemaker	   is	   continuing	   the	   discussion	   begun	   by	   Wittgenstein	   and	  Anscombe	  of	  how	  the	  subject	  might	  come	  to	  know	  of	  the	  material	  object	  which	  she	  is.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  there	  are	  special	  bases	  through	  which	  the	  subject	  can	  know	  only	  of	  herself	  (or	  at	  least	  introspection	  is	  such).	  If,	  for	  the	  subject,	  there	  are	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing	  of	  the	  subject	  (which	  cannot	  be	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  of	   anything	   but	   the	   subject)	   and	   self-­‐ascription	   of	   P*-­‐predicates	   requires	   that	  the	   subject	   can	   self-­‐ascribe	   a	   P*-­‐predicate	   only	   based	   on	   a	   private	   way	   of	  knowing,	  then	  this	  can	  explain	  how	  absolute	   immunity	   is	  possible.	  Shoemaker	  expresses	  this	  idea	  in	  the	  following	  passages:	  	  	  And	   even	   if	   my	   "self"	   is	   a	   flesh-­‐and-­‐blood	   person,	   why	   shouldn't	   it	   be	  accessible	  to	  me	  (itself)	   in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  it	   is	  not	  accessible	  to	  others,	  so	  that	   in	   knowing	   that	  what	   is	   presented	   to	  me	   is	   presented	   in	   this	   special	  way	  –	  from	  the	  inside,	  as	  it	  were	  –	  I	  would	  know	  that	  it	  can	  be	  nothing	  other	  than	  myself?	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  562).34	  	  It	  has	  often	  been	  held	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  defining	  features	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  mental,	  or	  the	  psychological,	  that	  each	  person	  knows	  of	  his	  own	  mental	  or	  psychological	  states	  in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  no	  other	  person	  could	  know	  of	  them.	  We	   can	   put	  what	   is	   true	   in	   this	   by	   saying	   that	   there	   is	   an	   important	   and	  central	   class	   of	   psychological	   predicates,	   let	   us	   call	   them	   "P*-­‐predicates",	  each	  of	  which	  can	  be	  known	  to	  be	  instantiated	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  knowing	  it	  to	  be	  instantiated	  in	  that	  way	  is	  equivalent	  to	  knowing	  it	  to	  be	  instantiated	  in	  oneself.	  	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  565,	  my	  underlining).	  	  For	   Shoemaker,	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   of	   P*-­‐predicates	   is	   absolutely	   immune.	   P*-­‐predicates	   cannot	   be	   self-­‐ascribed	   unless	   they	   are	   self-­‐ascribed	   based	   on	   a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing.	  This	  explains	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions:	  	  
                                                34	  “Now	  there	  is	  a	  perfectly	  good	  sense	  in	  which	  my	  self	  is	  accessible	  to	  me	  in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  not	  to	  others.	  There	  are	  predicates	  which	  I	  apply	  to	  others,	  and	  which	  others	  apply	  to	  me,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  observations	  of	  behaviour,	  but	  which	  I	  do	  not	  ascribe	  to	  myself	  on	  this	  basis,	  and	  these	   predicates	   are	   precisely	   those	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   of	  which	   is	   immune	   to	   error	   through	  misidentification.”	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  562,	  my	  underlining).	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Maximal	  special	  basis	  explanation:	  Self-­‐ascription	  of	  F	  is	  absolutely	  
immune	  iff	  F	  cannot	  be	  self-­‐ascribed	  unless	  it	  is	  self-­‐ascribed	  based	  on	  a	  
private	  way	  of	  knowing.	  	  A	  special	  way	  of	  knowing	  is	  private.	  Private	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  such	  that	  only	  the	   subject	   can	   employ	   them	   to	  know	  of	   the	   subject.	   Proprioception	  provides	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  position	  of	  one’s	  limbs	  relative	  to	  one’s	  other	  limbs	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  one’s	  own	  body.35	  That	  my	  legs	  are	  crossed	  is	  something	  that	  might	  be	  known	   solely	   based	   on	   proprioception.	   Proprioception	   is	   private;	   nobody	  except	  me	  can	  know	  of	   that	  object	  which	   is	  me	   through	   it.	  Kinaesthetic	   sense	  provides	  awareness	  of	   the	  movement	  of	   the	   subject’s	  body.36	  Only	   the	   subject	  can	  employ	  it	  to	  gain	  knowledge	  of	  the	  subject.	  Accordingly,	  examples	  of	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  proprioception,	  kinaesthesia,	   introspection	  and	  channels	  for	  pain/balance/heat.	  In	  contrast,	  vision,	  audition,	  testimony	  and	  inference	  are	  non-­‐private	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  because	  other	  people	  can	  also	  employ	   them	   for	  knowing	  about	  the	  object	  which	  is	  me.37	  	  The	   suggestion	   is	   that	   self-­‐ascriptions	   based	   only	   on	   a	   private	   way	   of	  knowing	  will	  be	  immune.	  According	  to	  Shoemaker,	  absolute	  IEM	  occurs	  because	  some	   predicates	   can	   only	   be	   known	   for	   the	   subject	   through	   a	   private	  way	   of	  knowing.	   On	   this	   picture,	   private	  ways	   of	   knowing	   and	   their	   features	   explain	  why	  certain	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	  absolutely	  immune.	  Interestingly,	  giving	  up	  the	  possibility	   of	   absolute	   IEM	   leaves	   a	   weaker	   version	   of	   the	   special	   basis	  explanation	  untouched.	  	  
	  
                                                35	  A	   private	   way	   of	   knowing	   need	   not	   be	   a	   non-­‐perceptual	   way	   of	   knowing.	   Let	   me	   allow,	  contrary	   to	   Shoemaker,	   that	   proprioception	   and	   channels	   of	   pain	   are	   not	   just	   examples	   of	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  but	  are	  genuine	  perceptual	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  36	  Evans	   criticized	   Shoemaker	   for	   assuming	   that	   only	   self-­‐ascription	   of	   some	   psychological	  predicates	  (P*-­‐predicates)	  are	  immune,	  but	  there	  are	  no	  immune	  bodily	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  Evans	  correctly	  observed	  that	  based	  (only)	  on	  proprioception	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	  immune.	  The	  special	  basis	   explanation	   allows	   Shoemaker	   to	   answer	   Evans.	   Such	   bodily	   ways	   of	   knowing	  (proprioception,	   kinaesthesia)	   are	   special	   private	  ways	   of	   knowing;	   thus	   based	   only	   on	   them	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	  immune.	  	  37	  I	   take	   ‘object’	  as	  a	  primitive	   for	  things	  which	  have	  a	  certain	  unity	  and	  boundary,	  endures	   in	  time,	  possess	  ‘certain	  features,	  and	  may	  have	  parts.	  	  
 75	  
8.1.	  Knowing	  from	  the	  Inside	  and	  Private	  Way	  of	  Knowing	  	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  Shoemaker	  is	  correct	  in	  some	  aspects	  of	  his	  Special	  Basis	  explanation,	  but	  wrong	  about	  denying	  basis-­‐relativity.	  A	  weaker	  version	  of	  the	  Special	  Basis	  explanation	  does	  not	  exclude	  basis-­‐relativity.	  According	  to	  this,	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  (B)	   is	   immune	  (in	  a	  circumstance)	   if	   it	   is	  only	  based	  on	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing	  (in	  this	  circumstance).	  But	  it	  is	  not	  immune	  if	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  non-­‐private	   way	   of	   knowing.	   I	   simply	   call	   this	   minimal	   special	   basis	  explanation:	  the	  special	  basis	  explanation.	  	  
The	  special	  basis	  explanation:	  The	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  F	  (B)	  is	  immune	  iff	  B	  is	  
a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing.	  	  According	   to	   the	   special	   basis	   explanation,	   when	   the	   subject	   only	  knows/believes	  from	  the	  inside	  Fi	  (B),	  then	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  on	  this	  basis,	  B,	  is	  immune.	  38	  We	  expect	   ‘I	  have	  my	  legs	  crossed’	  will	  be	  immune	  based	  solely	  on	  proprioception,	  but	  based	  on	  vision	  it	  will	  not	  be	  immune.	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  we	   find.	  When	   a	   subject	   knows	   something	   through	   a	   private	  way	   of	   knowing	  then	   the	   subject	   knows	   it	   from	   the	   inside.	  At	   this	   point,	   I	   only	   find	   this	   claim	  very	  plausible.	  I	  will	  develop	  it	  further	  in	  chapter	  8.	  	  
9.	  Summary	  IEM	   is	   agreed	   to	   be	   Self-­‐sufficient;	   paradigmatic	   cases	   of	   it	   cannot	   require	  infallibility	   or	   self-­‐intimation.	   I	   called	   this	   the	   Self-­‐sufficiency	   principle.	  According	   to	   Shoemaker,	   absolutely	   immune	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   immune	   in	   all	  circumstances.	   Absolute	   IEM	   of	   Fi	   requires	   that	   Fi	   in	   all	   circumstances,	  accordingly	  on	  all	  bases,	  has	  to	  be	  immune	  relative	  to	  ‘I’.	  I	  argued	  that	  unless	  Fi	  is	   self-­‐intimating	   (or	   infallible)	   this	   could	   not	   be	   secured.	   But	   being	   self-­‐intimating	  (or	  infallible)	  is	  excluded	  by	  the	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle.	  Either	  one	  has	   to	  give	  up	   the	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  principle	  or	   the	  possibility	  of	   absolute	   IEM.	  The	   Self-­‐sufficiency	   principle	   is	   the	   only	   way	   to	   secure	   that	   IEM	   is	   an	  independent	  and	  not	  merely	  a	  derivative	  feature	  of	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	   for	  which	  it	  was	  
                                                38	  There	   are	   potential	   counterexamples:	   ‘I	   see	   a	   canary’,	   based	   on	   vision,	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	  immune	   and	   ‘I	   face	   the	   table’,	   based	   on	   vision,	   could	   be	   immune.	   See	   chapter	   10	   (Proffitt-­‐
Shoemaker	  objection)	  for	  my	  response.	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introduced.	   Moreover	   self-­‐intimation	   (or	   infallibility)	   of	   immune	   self-­‐ascriptions	  has	  not	  been	  established	  and	  does	  not	  seem	  likely.	  This	  provides	  a	  general	  argument	  for	  the	  basis-­‐relativity	  of	  the	  immune	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  	  Toward	   the	   end	   of	   the	   chapter,	   I	   discussed	   Shoemaker’s	   special	   basis	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  I	  suggested	  that	  Shoemaker	  is	  correct	  about	  some	  aspects	  of	  his	   Special	   Basis	   explanation,	   but	   wrong	   to	   deny	   basis-­‐relativity.	   There	   is	   a	  weaker	  version	  of	  his	  special	  basis	  explanation	  which	  I	  find	  powerful.	  According	  to	  this	  weak	  version,	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  F	  (B)	  is	  immune	  if	  B	  is	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing.	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Chapter	  5	  
Is	  immunity	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification	  immune	  
to	  empirical	  counterexamples?	  
	  
	  
Abstract	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   consider	   three	   putative	   counterexamples	   to	  immunity	   to	   error	   through	  misidentification	  and	  argue	   that	   they	   fail.	  The	  counterexamples	  are	  intended	  against	  the	  phenomenon	  described	  by	   Shoemaker	   (1968),	   but	   I	   argue	   that	   they	   only	   work	   against	   a	  particular	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  The	   first	   putative	   empirical	   counterexample	   is	   due	   to	   Campbell	  (1999b)	   and	   the	   second	   and	   the	   third	   are	   due	   to	   Lane	   and	   Liang	  (2011).	  I	  will	  show	  that	  none	  of	  the	  empirical	  counterexamples	  work,	  though	   they	   fail	   for	   different	   reasons.	   Obviously	   this	   does	   not	  mean	  that	   there	   can	   be	   no	   counterexamples	   to	   immunity.	   The	   aim	   of	   this	  chapter	   is	   not	   just	   to	   argue	   against	   the	   putative	   counterexamples	   to	  IEM	  but	  also	  to	  isolate	  the	  real	  issue	  behind	  them.	  In	  answering	  these	  challenges	  we	  will	  achieve	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  IEM.	  	  
	  
1.	  The	  first	  putative	  counterexample	  against	  immunity	  	  John	   Campbell	   argued	   that	   inserted	   thought	   is	   a	   counterexample	   against	   the	  phenomenon	   of	   IEM	   in	   his	   paper	   ‘Schizophrenia,	   the	   Space	   of	   Reasons	   and	  Thinking	   as	   a	   Motor	   Process’	   (1999b).	   Schizophrenic	   patients	   suffering	   from	  inserted	   thoughts	   think	   that	   someone	   inserts	   thoughts	   into	   their	   head.	  Campbell	  argues	  that	  inserted	  thought	  is	  a	  counterexample	  to	  IEM:	  	  	   What	   is	   so	   striking	   about	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   thought	   insertion	   as	  described	  by	  schizophrenic	  patients	   is	   that	   it	  seems	  to	   involve	  an	  error	  of	  identification.	   	   The	   patient	   might	   say,	   ‘Thoughts	   come	   into	   my	   head	   like	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“Kill	  God”.	  	  It’s	  just	  like	  my	  mind	  working,	  but	  it	  isn’t.	  	  They	  come	  from	  this	  chap,	   Chris.	   	   They’re	   his	   thoughts.’	   (Frith	   1992,	   66).	   	   A	   patient	   who	  supposes	  that	  thoughts	  have	  been	  inserted	  into	  his	  mind	  by	  someone	  else	  is	  right	  about	  which	  thoughts	  they	  are,	  but	  wrong	  about	  whose	  thoughts	  they	  are.	  (Campbell	  1999b:	  609).	  	  Campbell	   claims	   that	   the	   difficulty	   for	   IEM	   arises	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   patients	  with	  inserted	  thought	  are	  sometimes	  wrong	  about	  who	  is	  the	  agent,	  the	  thinker	  of	   their	   thought.	   They	   think	   the	   thinker	   of	   their	   thought	   is	   someone	   else.	  Campbell’s	  conclusion	  is	  that	  we	  have	  to	  recognise	  that	  immunity	  has	  enabling	  conditions.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   Campbell	   is	   mistaken:	   it	   is	   the	   capacity	   to	   self-­‐ascribe	  based	  on	  knowing	  from	  the	  inside	  that	  has	  enabling	  conditions,	  and	  not	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  There	   are	   four	   problems	   with	   Campbell’s	   argument.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   the	  argument	  which	   is	  supposed	   to	  be	  against	  Shoemaker	   is	  not	  even	  spelled	  out.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  we	  need	  a	  putative	  counterexample	  against	  the	  immunity	  of	  a	  
self-­‐ascription;	   in	  Campbell’s	  paper	   the	  relevant	  self-­‐ascription	   is	  missing.	   ‘Kill	  God’,	  his	  example,	  cannot	  play	  that	  role.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  self-­‐ascription.	  In	  a	  way,	  the	  first	  and	   the	   second	  problems	  are	   superficial.	   I	  will	   answer	   them	  on	  behalf	  of	  Campbell.	  But	  there	  are	  two	  other	  worries,	  and	  they	  will	  disqualify	  the	  putative	  counterexample	   against	   IEM.39	  Let	   me	   proceed	   by	   reconstructing	   Campbell’s	  argument.	  	  
1.1.	  The	  Reconstruction	  of	  Campbell’s	  argument	  Shoemaker	   claims	   that,	   for	  an	   immune	  self-­‐ascription,	   ‘I	   am	   in	  pain’	  based	  on	  introspection,40	  it	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  that	  when	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  I	  am	  not	  in	  pain,	  then,	  on	  the	  same	  basis,	  I	  can	  think	  that	  someone	  else	  is	  in	  pain.	  	  
                                                39	  Gallagher	  (2000)	  and	  Coliva	  (2000)	  have	  responded	  to	  Campbell	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  assuming	  a	  particular	  explanation	  of	  IEM,	  the	  subject	  use	  of	  ‘I’,	  which,	  on	  my	  view,	  is	  about	  the	  ownership	  but	   not	   about	   the	   agency	   of	   thought.	   However,	   Campbell	   is	   discussing	   agency	   and	   not	  ownership.	  My	  response	  does	  not	  assume	  any	  particular	  interpretation	  or	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  I	  show	   that	   there	   is	   a	   structure	   necessary	   for	  misidentification	  which	   is	   lacking	   in	   Campbell’s	  counterexample.	  40	  The	   self-­‐ascription	   of	   pain	   seems	   to	   be	   based	   on	   perception	   and	   not	   on	   introspection.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  matter	  for	  my	  discussion	  in	  this	  chapter.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  let	  me	  stay	  with	  Shoemaker’s	  original	  idea.	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For	  a	  counterexample	  against	  the	  immunity	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions,	  we	  need	  at	  least	  to	  have	  a	  self-­‐ascription.	  However,	  this	  is	  missing	  in	  Campbell’s	  paper.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  a	  counterexample	  against	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascription	  that	  one	  provides	  a	  relevant	  self-­‐ascription,	  with	  its	  basis,	  which	  will	  turn	  out	  not	  to	  be	   immune	   on	   that	   basis.	   The	   best	   candidate	   for	   Campbell’s	   required	   self-­‐ascription	  is	  ‘I	  think	  that	  p’.	  This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  my	  believing	  that	  p	  or	  that	  I	  am	  the	   thinker	  of	  p	   (Crane	  2011).	   I	  only	  mean	   the	   latter:	  being	   the	   thinker	  of	   the	  thought/agent	  of	  the	  thinking.	  What	   is	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   self-­‐ascription?	   Campbell’s	   answer	   is	   this:	   “the	  schizophrenic	  has	   introspective	  knowledge	  of	   a	   thought	  of	  which	  he	  does	  not	  recognise	  himself	  to	  be	  the	  agent”	  (Campbell	  1999b;	  my	  emphasis).	  The	  basis	  is	  introspection.	  But	  what	  can	  be	  misidentified?	  Campbell’s	  idea	  is	  perhaps	  that	  an	  inserted-­‐thought	   patient	   can	   misidentify	   who	   thinks	   that	   p	   based	   on	  introspection.	   This	   is	   because	   an	   inserted-­‐thought	   patient	   sometimes	   thinks	  that	   he	   is	   not	   the	   thinker	   of	   his	   thought.	   Accordingly,	   ‘I	   think	   that	   p’	   is	   not	  immune	  relative	  to	  ‘I’	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  inserted-­‐thought	  patient.	  Thus	  it	  seems	  that	   we	   have	   a	   counterexample	   to	   the	   IEM	   of	   ‘I	   think	   that	   p’	   based	   on	  introspection.	  	  	  
1.2.	  Criticism	  of	  Campbell	  Suppose	  that	  an	  inserted-­‐thought	  patient	  says	  ‘I	  think	  that	  marmalade	  is	  bad’	  –	  based	   on	   introspection,	   and	   the	   patient	   continues:	   ‘But	   Chris	   inserted	   this	  thought	   into	   my	   head’.41	  Thus	   such	   a	   patient	   misidentifies	   who	   thinks	   the	  
thought	  marmalade	   is	   bad.	   For	   an	   immune	   self-­‐ascription,	   like	   ‘I	   am	   in	   pain’	  based	  on	  introspection	  it	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  that	  when	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  I	  am	  not	  in	  pain,	   then,	  on	   the	   same	  basis,	   I	   can	   think	   that	   someone	  else	   is	   in	  pain.	  The	  structure	   of	   a	   counterexample	   has	   to	   look	   like	   this:	   there	   is	   a	   self-­‐ascription	  made	   on	   a	   basis	   B,	   but	   it	   involves	   a	   misidentification	   because	   the	   subject	  believes	   that	   b	   (which	   is	   F	   and	   which	   is	   in	   fact	   a	   distinct	   individual)	   is	   she	  herself.	  Immunity	  excludes	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  based	  on	  basis	  B	  
                                                41	  It	  is	  not	  important	  whether	  something	  was	  ever	  self-­‐attributed	  in	  exactly	  this	  manner	  by	  an	  inserted-­‐thought	  patient.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  such	  a	  self-­‐attribution	  and	  a	  denial	  is	  possible	  for	  an	   inserted-­‐thought	   patient	   while	   IEM	   is	   supposed	   to	   exclude	   this	   possibility,	   according	   to	  Campbell.	  
 80	  
involves	  a	  misidentification	  of	  ‘who	  is	  F’.	  So	  for	  a	  counterexample	  to	  a	  claim	  that	  a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   not	   immune,	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   has	   to	   be	   based	   on	   an	  identification	   of	   ‘who	   is	   F’	   in	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   misidentification	   is	  possible.	  	  In	   the	  case	  of	  misidentification,	   I	   judge	  Fa	   (B)	  on	   the	  basis	  B	  which	   is	   for	  judging	  Fb.	  In	  chapter	  3,	  when	  I	  explicated	  the	  basic	  notion	  of	  misidentification,	  I	  called	  Fa	  (B)	  ILL,	  because	  thinking	  Fa	  involves	  the	  subject	  presupposing	  that	  a	  refers	  to	  b	  (which	  is	  F)	  when	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  I	  called	  Fb	  WELL,	  because	  it	  is	  of	  b	  and	  there	  is	  no	  mistake	  of	  identification	  involved	  in	  this.	  (It	  is	  allowed	  that	  
b	  is	  not	  F.)	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  chapter	  3,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  misidentification	  is	  this:	  I	  have	  an	  ill-­‐grounded	  thought	  involving	  a	  misidentification	  Fa	  (B)	  when	  I	  am	  in	  a	  position	  to	  form	  a	  well-­‐grounded	  thought	  about	  b,	  Fb	  (B).	  Now	   let	   us	   see	   whether	   this	   structure	   of	   misidentification	   is	   present	   in	  Campbell’s	  putative	   counterexample.	   In	  our	   reconstruction	  of	  Campbell’s	   case	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  ‘I	  think	  that	  marmalade	  is	  bad’	  is	  well-­‐grounded;	  it	  correctly	  concerns	   me.	   As	   I	   have	   noted,	   for	   a	   counterexample	   to	   a	   claim	   that	   a	   self-­‐ascription	  is	  not	  immune	  –	  i.e.	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  case	  of	  misidentification	  –	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  has	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  misidentification	  of	  who	  is	  F.	  	  The	  revision,	  ‘Chris	   thinks	   that	   marmalade	   is	   bad’,	   is	   the	   one	   which	   is	   ill-­‐grounded	   and	  involves	  a	  misidentification	  (if	  any	  judgement	  here	  involves	  misidentification	  at	  all).	  But	  in	  that	  case	  Campbell’s	  case	  has	  the	  wrong	  structure.	  	  The	   self-­‐ascription	   should	   involve	   a	   misidentification.	   But	   the	   self-­‐ascription	  in	  Campbell’s	  case	  does	  not	  involve	  misidentification.	  If	  anything,	  the	  judgement	  ‘Chris	  thinks	  that	  marmalade	  is	  bad’	  involves	  a	  misidentification.	  But	  IEM	  excludes	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  on	  a	  particular	  basis	  could	  involve	  a	  misidentification.	  The	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  about	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  excluding	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   mistake	   –	   misidentification	   –	   in	   the	   self-­‐ascription.	  IEM	  is	  not	  about	  ascriptions	  to	  others,	   like	  ascriptions	  to	  Chris,	  but	  only	   about	   self-­‐ascriptions.	   To	   sum	   up,	   a	   counterexample	   would	   require	   the	  opposite	   structure.	  The	   self-­‐ascription	   should	   involve	   a	  misidentification	  on	   a	  particular	  basis	  B	  (ILL)	  and	  the	  revised	  judgment	  should	  not	  (WELL).42	  	  
                                                42	  Evans	   (1982)	   and	   Pryor’s	   de	   re	   IEM	   have	   similar	   structure:	   there	   is	   an	   ill-­‐grounded	   self-­‐ascription	  and	  a	  well-­‐grounded	  thought	  of	  something	  other	  than	  the	  subject.	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The	   counterexample	   doesn’t	   work	   even	   if	   we	   analyse	   it	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  dominant	   account	   from	  Evans	   in	   terms	  of	   identification-­‐freedom	   (see	   chapter	  6).	   For	   Evans,	   misidentification	   requires	   thinking	   Fa	   because	   the	   subject	  presupposes	   an	   identification	   component	   with	   the	   logical	   form	   a=b	   (Evans	  1982:	   180-­‐181).	   An	   ‘a’-­‐thought	   (Fa)	   will	   be	   immune	   relative	   to	   a	   if	   the	  knowledge	  of	  Fa	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  an	   identification	  component	  (with	   the	   logical	   form:	  a=b).	   In	   contrast,	  misidentification	  happens	  where	   the	  identification	   component	   is	   false	   (a	   is	   not	   identical	   with	   b).	   On	   Evans’s	  characterisation	   the	   inserted-­‐thought	   patient	   should	   think	   that	   he	   is	   Chris	   if	  ‘Chris	  thinks	  that	  marmalade	  is	  bad’	  is	  based	  on	  a	  misidentification.	  But	  this	  is	  not	   the	   case.	   Thus	   no	   thought	   involves	   a	   misidentification	   a	   la	   Evans.	   But	  Campbell’s	  target	  is	  Shoemaker,	  so	  I	  can	  put	  aside	  this	  issue.	  	  
1.3.	  The	  main	  criticism	  	  The	  main	  difficulty	  is	  that	  in	  the	  counterexample	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  not	  based	  on	  a	  misidentification	  –	  as	  it	  is	  required	  for	  a	  counterexample	  to	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  Immunity	  excludes	  the	  possibility	  that	  on	  the	  relevant	  basis	  it	  might	  not	  be	  me,	  but	  someone	  else	  who	  is	  F	  (has	  messy	  hair).	  I	  judge	  Fa	  (B)	  when	  B	  is	  for	   judging	   Fb.	   Thus	   for	   a	   counterexample	   to	   an	   immune	   self-­‐ascription	   the	  relevant	  basis	  has	   to	  be	  such	   that	   I	   can	  know	  of	  another	  object	  and	   its	  F-­‐ness	  (messy	  hair)	  through	  it.	  Shoemaker	  puts	  this	  point	  as	  follows:	  “…	  this	  is	  perhaps	  the	   most	   important	   point,	   the	   identification	   of	   a	   presented	   object	   as	   oneself	  would	   have	   to	   go	   together	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   misidentification,	   and	   it	   is	  precisely	   the	   absence	   of	   this	   possibility	   that	   characterizes	   the	   use	   of	   'I'	   that	  concerns	   us”	   (Shoemaker	   1968:	   561).	   Thus	   according	   to	   Shoemaker,	   for	   the	  possibility	   of	   misidentification,	   there	   should	   be	   an	   object	   other	   than	   myself	  which	  is	  present	  to	  me,	  and	  I	  have	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  me.	  No	  other	  object	  but	  myself	  can	  be	  presented	  to	  me	  through	  introspection.	  Accordingly,	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  counterexample	  should	  be	  this:	  there	  is	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  made	  on	  a	  basis	  B,	  and	  this	  involves	  a	  misidentification	  because	  the	  subject	  believes	  that	  b	  (which	  is	   F)	   is	   she	   herself.	   But	   this	   cannot	   happen	   if	   the	   judgment	   is	   based	   only	   on	  introspection	  according	  to	  Shoemaker.	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Is	   it	   the	   case	   that	   for	  misidentification,	   the	  other	  object	   (which	   is	  not	  me,	  but	  is	  F),	  b,	  has	  to	  be	  present	  to	  the	  subject?	  Yes!	  According	  to	  Shoemaker:	  for	  
Fa,	  based	  on	  a	  special	  way	  of	  knowing,	  W,	  there	  cannot	  be	  an	  object	  other	  than	  myself,	  b,	  which	  is	  present	  to	  me	  through	  the	  same	  private	  way	  of	  knowing,	  W,	  through	  which	   I	  am	  presented	  to	  myself	   (Shoemaker	  1968:	   565).	   Thus	   if	  Fa	   is	  based	  only	  on	  a	  special	  private	  way	  of	  knowing	  then	  I	  cannot	  misidentify	  which	  object	  is	  F.	  To	  make	  it	  simple,	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  immune	  iff	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  W	   is	   such	   that	   if	   the	   subject	   knows	   through	  W	   that	  F	   is	   instantiated	   then	   the	  subject	  knows	  that	  she	  herself	  is	  F.	  This	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  unless	  nothing	  but	  one	  object	  can	  be	  known	  through	  W.	  As	  Shoemaker	  writes:	  “We	  can	  put	  what	  is	  true	   in	   this	   by	   saying	   that	   there	   is	   an	   important	   and	   central	   class	   of	  psychological	   predicates,	   let	   us	   call	   them	   "P*-­‐predicates,"	   [a	   subset	   of	  psychological	   predicates	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   of	   which	   is	   or	  might	   be	   immune]	  each	  of	  which	  can	  be	  known	  to	  be	  instantiated	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  knowing	  it	  to	  be	   instantiated	   in	   that	   way	   is	   equivalent	   to	   knowing	   it	   to	   be	   instantiated	   in	  oneself”	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  565).	  The	  subject	  knows	  that	  it	  is	  of	  herself	  because	  knowing	   that	  F	   is	   instantiated	   through	  such	  special	  ways	  of	  knowing	   involves	  knowing	   that	   it	   is	   instantiated	   in	   herself.	   Thus	   no	   other	   object	   can	   be	   known	  through	  such	  a	  way	  of	  knowing,	  otherwise	   it	  would	  not	   be	  excluded	   that	  one	  knows	  of	  another	  object	  through	  W.	  	  In	   sum,	   what	   we	   need	   for	   misidentification	   in	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   the	  following.	   An	   object	   mistakenly	   has	   to	   be	   presented	   under	   the	   first	   person	  mode	  of	  presentation,	  as	  me,	  even	  though	  she	  is	  not	  me.	  Chris	  in	  the	  example	  is	  not	  presented	  to	  the	  schizophrenic	  from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective	  “as	  me”	  in	  ‘I	   think	   that	   marmalade	   is	   bad’.	   Therefore,	   there	   is	   no	   misidentification	   on	  which	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  based.	  The	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  (B)	  concerns	  only	  self-­‐ascriptions	  (B).	  Whatever	  mistake	  we	  have	  been	  considering	  here	  happens	  in	  the	  other-­‐ascription	  (an	  ascription	  to	  someone	  other	  than	  myself).	  However,	  the	   IEM	  of	   self-­‐ascription	  does	  not	   predict	   anything	   about	   other-­‐ascription	   of	  the	  relevant	  property.	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1.4.	  Why	  does	  inserted	  thought	  matter	  if	  it	  is	  not	  a	  counterexample	  to	  the	  
immunity	  of	  certain	  self-­‐ascriptions?	  Still,	  there	  is	  a	  grain	  of	  truth	  in	  the	  putative	  counterexample.	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	   instead	  of	  being	  a	  counterexample	  against	   immunity,	  Campbell’s	  example	  might	  work	  against	  a	  particular	  explanation	  of	   immunity.	  The	  counterexample	  might	   be	  directed	   against	   the	   thought	   that	   known	   through	   introspection,	   it	   is	  necessary	   that	   the	  subject	   self-­‐ascribes	  what	   is	  known	   through	   it	   (Shoemaker	  1968:	  565).	  This	  is	  a	  possible	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  Call	  internal	  ways	  of	  knowing	  (though	  which	  the	  subject	  knows	  only	  of	  the	  subject	  herself	  –	  like	  proprioception	  or	  introspection)	  ways	  of	  knowing	   from	  
the	  inside.	  When	  I	  know	  from	  the	  inside,	  then	  I	  cannot	  be	  wrong	  about	  who	  is	  F.	  Against	   this	   explanation	   of	   IEM,	   ‘Chris	   thinks	   that	   Marmalade	   is	   bad’	  (B=introspection),	  is	  a	  counterexample.	  It	  is	  a	  counterexample	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  knowing	  something	  from	  the	  inside	  ensures	  that	  one	  knows	  it	  of	  oneself.	  It	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  know	  from	  the	  	  inside	  in	  order	  to	  self-­‐ascribe	  it.	  There	  should	  be	   a	   mechanism	   which	   enables	   me	   to	   self-­‐ascribe	   it.	   This	   mechanism	   –	   an	  enabling	   condition	   of	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   capacity	   for	   self-­‐ascription	   –	   can	  malfunction.43	  This	   suggestion	  of	  Campbell’s	   is	   correct	   and	   insightful,	   but	   it	   is	  not	   about	   IEM.	   Rather	   it	   is	   about	   whether	   one	   necessarily	   self-­‐ascribes	  whatever	   one	   knows	   from	   the	   inside.	   This	   is	   not	   IEM.	   It	   could	   only	   be	   an	  explanation	  of	   it.	  Thus	   it	   is	  only	  a	   counterexample	  against	  an	   explanation	   of	  
immunity	   and	   not	   against	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   the	   immunity	   of	   certain	   self-­‐ascriptions.	  	  Shoemaker	   seems	   to	   claim	   that	   when	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   based	   on	  introspection	  then	  one	  necessarily	  knows	  who	  is	  F	  and	  necessarily	  self-­‐ascribes	  
F	   (Shoemaker	   1968:	   563-­‐564).	   This	   requires	   that	   being	   F	   known	   though	  introspection	  is	  self-­‐intimating;	  whenever	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  F-­‐ness	  through	  introspection	   then	   she	   knows	   that	   she	   herself	   is	   F.	   But	   then	   we	   have	   a	  counterexample	  against	  this	  explanation	  of	  immunity	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  but	  not	  against	  the	  phenomenon	  itself.	  (If	   there	  were	  no	  other	  possible	  explanation	  of	  immunity	  except	  this	  one	  then	  perhaps	  we	  would	  accept	  inserted	  thought	  as	  a	  
                                                43	  See	  McDowell	   1994	   and	   Burge	   2010	   for	   discussions	   of	   the	   contrast	   between	   enabling	   and	  constitutive	  conditions.	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counterexample	   to	   IEM.	   However,	   there	   are	   other	   explanations.)	   Campbell	   is	  correct	  that	  there	  are	  enabling	  conditions	  for	  self-­‐ascription,	  and,	  for	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  self-­‐ascription,	  the	  mechanism	  enabling	  it	  has	  to	  work	  properly.	  What	  makes	  Campbell’s	  worry	  really	  interesting	  is	  that	  inserted	  thought	  is	  a	  counterexample	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  one	  cannot	  be	  wrong	  about	  who	  is	  the	  thinker	  of	  his	  own	  thought.	  All	  the	  same,	  this	  is	  an	  independent	  question	  from	  the	  IEM	  of	  certain	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  The	  complexities	  here	  have	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  elsewhere.44	  The	  main	  issue	  behind	  Campbell’s	  worry	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  mechanism	  that	  enables	   self-­‐ascription	   of	   properties	   known	   from	   the	   inside.	   This	   can	  malfunction.	   The	   subject	   can	   know	   something	   from	   the	   inside	   without	   self-­‐ascribing	   it.	  Thus	   it	   is	   the	  capacity	   to	  self-­‐ascribe	   that	  has	  enabling	  conditions	  and	   not	   the	   IEM	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions.	   This	   is	   a	   lesson	   to	   take	   on	   board	   even	   if	  inserted	  thought	  is	  not	  a	  counterexample	  against	  the	  immunity	  of	  ‘I	  think	  that	  p’	  based	  on	  introspection.	  	  
2.	  The	  second	  putative	  counterexample	  to	  immunity	  Lane	   and	   Liang	   (2011)	   provide	   the	   remaining	   two	   putative	   empirical	  counterexamples	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  immunity.	  They	  claim	  that:	  “[a]lthough	  some	  aspects	  of	  Shoemaker’	  s	  views	  on	  immunity	  have	  been	  disputed,	  IEM	  itself	  has	   never	   been	   severely	   threatened	   by	   any	   empirical	   challenge”	   (Lane	   and	  Liang	   2011:	   78).	   Thus	   the	   target	   is	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   IEM	   and	   not	   an	  explanation	  of	   IEM.	  As	   I	  will	  argue,	   IEM	  is	  not	  yet	  challenged	  by	  the	  empirical	  counterexamples.	  I	  turn	  to	  discuss	  the	  two	  putative	  empirical	  counterexamples.	  	  The	  first	  putative	  counterexample	  against	  IEM	  consists	  of	  judgments	  made	  by	  a	  somatoparaphrenic	  patient	  FB.	  Patients	  with	  somatoparaphrenia	  think	  that	  one	  of	   their	   hands	   (usually	   the	   left	   hand)	  belongs	   to	   someone	   else.	   FB	   thinks	  that	  her	   left	  hand	   is	  her	  niece’s	  hand	  even	  when	  she	  sees	   it.	   In	  an	  experiment	  (Bottini	  et	  al.	  2002)	  the	  patient	  FB	  always	  claimed	  that	  her	  niece	  was	  touched	  when	   she	   was	   touched	   on	   her	   affected,	   somatoparaphrenic	   hand	   based	   on	  
                                                44	  Roessler’s	  essay	  ‘Thought	  insertion,	  self-­‐awareness,	  and	  rationality’	  (2014)	  tries	  to	  find	  what	  makes	   thought	   insertion	   so	   surprising.	  We	   seem	   to	   presuppose	   that	   S	   cannot	   think	   unless	   S	  knows	  under	  the	  first	  person	  mode	  of	  presentation	  that	  S	  is	  thinking,	  at	  least	  implicitly.	  My	  only	  disagreement	  with	  his	  claims	  in	  this	  essay	  is	  that	  thought	  insertion	  is	  a	  counterexample	  to	  IEM.	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somatosensory	  stimulation.	  Bottini	  and	  colleagues	  observed	  that	  FB	  was	  never	  able	   to	   report	   that	   she	   was	   touched	   on	   her	   left,	   affected	   hand	   based	   on	  somatosensory	   stimulation	   (Bottini	   et	   al.	   2002:	   251).	   However,	   they	   also	  conducted	   trials	   on	   which	   they	   warned	   FB	   that	   her	   niece’s	   hand	   would	   be	  touched	   and	   after	   that	   they	   asked	   her	   whether	   her	   niece	   was	   touched.	  Throughout	  all	  the	  testing	  conditions,	  FB	  was	  blindfolded,	  so	  she	  could	  not	  see	  but	   only	   feel	   her	   hand.	   On	   the	   occasions	   when	   FB	   was	   forewarned	   that	   her	  niece’s	   hand	   would	   be	   touched,	   FB	   always	   reported	   correctly	   that	   the	   hand	  which	   she	   claimed	   to	   belong	   to	   her	   niece	   (but	   was	   actually	   FB’s	   hand)	   was	  touched.	   As	   a	   control,	   catch	   trials	   were	   introduced	   where	   the	   experimenter	  claimed	   that	   she	  would	   touch	  FB’s	  niece,	   but	   there	  was	  no	   tactile	   stimulation	  whatsoever.	  In	  such	  cases	  FB	  reported	  that	  her	  niece	  was	  not	  touched.	  Thus,	  as	  I	  understand	  it,	  FB	  knows	  de	  re	  of	  a	  particular	  thing	  that	  is	  being	  touched,	  but	  under	   the	  wrong	  mode	  of	  presentation:	   ‘my	  niece’.	  She	  de	  re	  knows	  of	  herself	  but	  under	  the	  wrong	  mode	  of	  presentation	  –	  not	  as	  herself.	  According	  to	  Lane	  and	  Liang	  this	  is	  a	  counterexample	  against	  immunity	  or,	  at	  least,	  Shoemaker’s	  version	  of	  immunity.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  “…	  FB	  commits	  an	  error	   through	   misidentification	   regarding	   just	   who	   is	   the	   subject	   of	   the	  sensation”	   (Lane	   and	   Liang	   2011:	   86).	   It	   is	   not	   yet	   clear	   how	   ‘my	   niece	   was	  touched’	   is	   a	   counterexample	   to	   immunity.	   Lane	   and	   Liang	   (2011:	   87)	  emphasise	  that	  Shoemaker’s	  holds	  that: “in	  being	  aware	  that	  one	  feels	  pain	  one	  is,	  tautologically,	  aware,	  not	  simply	  that	  the	  attribute	  feel(s)	  pain	  is	  instantiated,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  instantiated	  in	  oneself”	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  563-­‐564).	  	  It	   is	   true	   that	   Shoemaker	   holds	   that	   knowing	   from	   the	   inside	   necessarily	  means	   knowing	   of	   myself.	   I	   discussed	   this	   above.	   However,	   this	   is	   only	   an	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  This	  explanation	  could	  be	  revised	  to	  deal	  with	  worries	  like	  that.	  But	  more	  importantly	  these	  quotes	  do	  not	  support	  Lane	  and	  Liang’s	  claim	  that	  being	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  experience	  explains	  IEM.	  	  	  
2.1.	  Objections	  against	  Lane	  and	  Liang	  	  Lane	   and	   Liang	   hold	   a	   specific	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   and	   they	   assume	   that	  Shoemaker	  shares	  their	  view.	  There	  are	  three	  points	  against	  them.	  First,	  there	  are	   several	   irresolvable	   difficulties	   in	   thinking	   that	   being	   the	   subject	   of	   the	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experience	   explains	   immunity.	   I	   am	   always	   the	   subject	   of	  my	   experience,	  my	  perceiving,	  my	  imagining,	  and	  my	  thinking,	  but	  not	  all	  self-­‐ascriptions	  based	  on	  these	  are	  immune.	  If	  I	  look	  at	  the	  mirror	  and,	  based	  on	  this	  perception,	  I	  judge	  that	  my	  legs	  are	  crossed,	   the	   judgment	  will	  not	  be	   immune	  –	  but	   I	  remain	  the	  subject	  of	  my	  perception.	  	  They	  could	  suggest	  that	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  the	  property	  of	  being	  the	  subject	  is	   immune.	  However,	  I	  need	  not	  self-­‐ascribe	  being	  the	  subject	  of	  experience	  in	  order	   to	   get	   IEM.	   The	   judgement	   ‘I	   have	   my	   legs	   crossed’	   based	   on	  proprioception	  is	  immune	  but	  based	  on	  vision	  is	  not	  IEM.	  The	  difference	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  saying	  that	  I	  am	  the	  subject	  of	  experience	  in	  one	  case,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  other	  case.	  Similarly,	  it	  cannot	  be	  that	  in	  one	  case	  I	  self-­‐ascribe	  being	  the	  subject	  of	  experience	  but	  not	  in	  the	  other	  case.45	  	  Second,	   they	   do	   not	   attempt	   to	   show	   that	   Shoemaker	   shares	   this	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  	  Third,	   there	   is	   no	   self-­‐ascription	  which	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   immune	   but	   as	  they	   argue,	   turns	   out	   not	   to	   be	   immune.	   The	   putative	   counterexample	   is	  supposed	   to	  be	   against	   IEM	  and	  not	   against	   an	   explanation	  of	   IEM	   (Lane	   and	  Liang	  2011:	  78).	  The	  difficulty	  is	  that	  immunity	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  Fi	  (B),	   so	   the	   counterexample	   to	   IEM	   should	   have	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   and	   a	   basis.	  When	  one	  argues	  against	  the	  immunity	  of	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  then	  one	  first	  needs	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  and	  its	  basis	  on	  which	   it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	   immune,	  but	  which	  on	  this	  basis	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  not	  immune.	  	  Thus	  we	  need	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  (B)	   in	  which	  who	   is	  F	   can	  be	  misidentified	  but	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   immune.	  However,	   ‘My	   niece’s	   hand	  was	  touched’	  is	  not	  a	  self-­‐ascription.	  Moreover,	  FB	  is	  completely	  unable	  to	  make	  self-­‐ascriptions	   about	   herself	   being	   touched	   when	   her	   left	   hand	   is	   being	  touched.	   FB	   was	   never	   able	   to	   report	   herself	   being	   touched	   based	   on	  somatosensory	  stimulation	  of	  the	  affected	  somatoparaphrenic	  hand	  (Bottini	  et	  al.	  2002:	  251).	  Thus	  we	  do	  not	  have	  a	  counterexample	  against	  the	  immunity	  of	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  (B).	  There	  is	  no	  self-­‐ascription	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  immune	  on	   a	   basis,	   but	   turns	   out	   not	   to	   be	   immune.	   Consequently,	   we	   have	   no	  counterexample	  to	  IEM.	  
                                                45	  Liang	  is	  working	  on	  this	  explanation	  in	  his	  forthcoming	  paper.	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2.2.	  Suggestion	  to	  Lane	  and	  Liang	  Lane	  and	  Liang	  offer	  putative	  empirical	  counterexamples	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  immunity.	   Instead,	   I	   suggest	   the	   counterexample	   should	  be	  offered	  against	  an	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	   	   	  Shoemaker’s	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  would	  be	  a	  better	  target	  to	   criticize	   than	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   IEM.	   For	   Shoemaker,	   knowing	   from	   the	  inside	  necessarily	  means	  knowing	  of	  myself.46	  	  Shoemaker	  –	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  –	  holds	   the	   Special-­‐basis	   explanation,	   and	   this	   explanation	   would	   be	   a	   much	  better	  target	  for	  them	  to	  attack.	  FB	  knows	  through	  internal	  ways	  of	  knowing	  of	  the	  object	  which	  is	  her	  (de	  re)	  that	  it	  is	  touched	  –	  but	  she	  ascribes	  being	  touched	  to	   her	   niece.	   So	   let	   me	   stick	   to	   what	   Shoemaker	   holds,	   to	   see	   what	   can	   be	  criticised	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  discussed	  empirical	  experiment.	  	  	  When	   one	   argues	   against	   the	   immunity	   of	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   then	   one	   first	  needs	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  and	   its	  basis	  on	  which	   it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	   immune,	  but	  which	  on	  this	  basis	  turns	  out	  not	  to	  be	  immune.	  This	  will	  be	  a	  challenge	  for	  all	  explanations	   of	   IEM	   since	   it	   is	   a	   counterexample	   to	   the	   phenomena	   itself.	   In	  contrast,	  when	   one	   argues	   against	   an	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   then	   the	   strategy	   is	  different.	  One	  needs	  to	  provide	  a	  counterexample	  to	  the	  explanation.	  But	  we	  are	  supposed	  to	  have	  a	  counterexample	  against	  the	  phenomena	  and	  not	  against	  an	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  This	  cannot	  be	  done	  unless	  we	  have	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  immune	  but,	  as	  they	  argue,	  turns	  out	  not	  to	  be	  immune.	  The	   mistake	   might	   be	   that	   one	   firmly	   believes	   in	   an	   explanation	   of	  immunity	  and	  disbelieves	  other	  possible	  explanations.	  But	  if	  one	  argues	  against	  an	  explanation	  of	   immunity	  the	  explanation	  could	  be	  simply	  revised.	  To	  argue	  against	   immunity	   we	   need	   a	   counterexample	   which	   is	   independent	   from	  whatever	  explanation	  of	  immunity	  one	  adores.	  	  Lane	  and	  Liang	  could	  have	  been	  taking	  themselves	  to	  be	  arguing	  against	  an	  explanation	   of	   IEM	   and	   not	   against	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   IEM.	   In	   this	   case	  my	  objection	   would	   not	   apply.	   But	   they	   make	   it	   clear	   that	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case:	  “Although	   some	   aspects	   of	   Shoemaker’	   s	   views	   on	   immunity	   have	   been	  disputed,	   IEM	   itself	   has	   never	   been	   severely	   threatened	   by	   any	   empirical	  
                                                46	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  I	  will	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  Shoemaker	  requires	  that	  the	  subject	  has	  to	  know	  in	  which	  way	  (e.g.	  introspection/from	  the	  inside)	  she	  knows	  of	  F-­‐ness.	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challenge”	  (Lane	  and	  Liang	  2011:	  78).	  For	  this	  they	  need	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  (B)	  as	  a	  counterexample.	  To	  sum	  up,	  to	  find	  a	  counterexample	  of	  immune	  self-­‐ascription,	  we	  at	  least	  need	  a	  self-­‐ascription.	  To	  have	  a	  counterexample	  against	  an	  explanation	  (which	  can	  be	  revised	  or	  abandoned)	  of	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  is	  different	  from	  having	  a	  counterexample	  against	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  	  	  
3.	  The	  third	  putative	  counterexample	  to	  immunity	  The	  third	  putative	  counterexample	  against	  immunity	  is	  a	  judgment	  made	  after	  experiencing	  the	  body	  swap	  illusion.	  Let	  me	  describe	  this	  illusion	  first.	  The	  body	  swap	   illusion	   (Petkova	   and	   Ehrsson	   2008)	   is	   based	   on	   using	   virtual	   reality	  techniques	   in	   exchanging	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   experimenter	   and	   the	  participant.	   A	   video	   camera	   on	   the	   head	   of	   the	   experimenter	   records	  what	   is	  seen	   from	   his	   perspective	   and	   a	   head	   mounted	   display	   (HMD)	   presents	   the	  participant	  with	  what	   the	  camera	  projects	   from	  the	  head	  of	   the	  experimenter.	  The	   hand	   which	   the	   participant	   sees	   through	   his	   HMD	   is	   anatomically	  congruent	  with	  his	  own	  hand,	  a	  condition	  which	  is	  known	  to	  be	  a	  requirement	  on	  such	   illusions	  (Tsakiris	  2010),	  but	   this	   is	  actually	   the	  experimenter’s	  hand.	  The	   participant	   sees	   the	   experimenter’s	   body	   from	   a	   first-­‐person,	   egocentric	  point	   of	   view	   as	   when	   one	   looks	   down	   on	   his	   or	   her	   own	   body.	   During	   the	  course	  of	  experiment	  the	  participant	  and	  the	  experimenter	  either	  squeeze	  one	  another’s	  hand	  synchronously	  or,	  in	  the	  control	  condition,	  asynchronously.	  The	  illusion	   –	   feeling	   the	   body	   seen	   from	   the	   egocentric	   point	   of	   view	   to	   be	   the	  subject’s	  own	  body	  –	  appears	  in	  the	  synchronous	  condition.	  	  Some	   participants	   spontaneously	  mentioned	   after	   the	   experiment:	   ‘I	   was	  shaking	   hands	  with	  myself.’	   The	   judgment	   ‘I	   was	   shaking	   hands	  with	  myself’	  was	  reported	  after	  the	  experiment	  not	  as	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  and	  merely	  an	  anecdotal	  remark;	  as	  such,	   it	  might	  be	  metaphorical	  or	  a	   joke.	  Speaking	  about	  ‘shaking	  hands’	   is	  already	  pretty	  metaphorical.	   It	   is	  actually	  just	  squeezing	  the	  hand.	  But	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  let	  us	  take	  the	  report	  at	  face	  value	  and	  see	  if	  it	  can	  work.	  The	   putative	   counterexample	   is	   the	   following	   ‘I	   was	   shaking	   hands	   with	  myself’,	  with	  vision	  as	   its	  basis.	  Finally,	  we	  have	  a	  case	   that	  satisfies	   the	  basic	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formal	  requirement	  for	  a	  counterexample:	  there	  is	  at	  least	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  (B).	  	  According	   to	   Lane	   and	   Liang	   there	   is	   a	   difficulty	   for	   IEM:	   “This	   poses	   a	  problem	  for Shoemaker’s	  IEM.	  From	  the	  subjects’	  first	  person	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  handshaking	   experience	   involves	   the	   awareness	   that	   I	   am	   the	   agent	   of	   this	  action.	   This	   recently	   has	   been	   called	   “agentive	   experience”	   or	   “	   agentive	   self-­‐awareness”	  –	  I	  experience	  myself	  as	  someone	  who	  is	  doing	  something.	  What	  is	  distinctive	   about	   the	   Body	   Swap	   Illusion	   is	   that	   the	   subjects’	   agentive	  experience	   is	   mistaken.	   Although	   it	   was	   really	   the	   experimenter	   who	   was	  shaking	  their	  hands,	  the	  subjects	  misrepresented	  themselves	  as	  the	  agent	  of	  the	  action.”	  (Lane	  and	  Liang	  2011:	  92).47	  The	  most	   important	   objection	   to	   Lane	   and	   Liang	   is	   that	   if	   they	   are	   right,	  then	  according	  to	  Shoemaker	  ‘I	  was	  shaking	  hands	  with	  myself’	  based	  on	  vision	  should	  be	  immune.	  For	  an	  immune	  judgment	  ‘I	  am	  F’,	  based	  on	  B,	  it	  cannot	  be	  misidentified	  who	  is	  F.	  This	  means	  that	  Shoemaker	  has	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  subject	  cannot	   misidentify	   who	   was	   shaking	   hands	   with	   him	   based	   on	   vision.	   But	  Shoemaker	  holds	  the	  opposite	  view.	  	  What	   is	   Shoemaker’s	   view	   on	  misidentification	   based	   on	   vision?	   Recall	   ‘I	  have	  messy	  hair’	  based	  on	  vision	  is	  not	  IEM	  for	  Shoemaker.	  Wittgenstein	  has	  an	  example	   where	   judging	   ‘I	   am	   bleeding’	   or	   ‘I	   have	   my	   arm	   broken’	   based	   on	  vision	   of	   a	   hand	   is	   not	   IEM	   because	   it	   might	   be	   someone	   else’s	   hand	  (Wittgenstein	   1958:	   66-­‐67).	   Shoemaker	   repeats	   Wittgenstein’s	   example.	   So	  neither	   Wittgenstein	   nor	   Shoemaker	   thinks	   that	   based	   on	   vision	   I	   cannot	  misidentify	   myself.	   These	   are	   the	   paradigmatic	   cases	   when	   I	   can	  misidentify	  myself.	  	  Let	  us	   try	   to	  amend	  Lane	  and	  Liang’s	  example	  against	   this	  worry.	  What	   is	  the	  basis	  and	  what	  is	  the	  self-­‐ascription?	  “When	  they	  experience	  the	  illusion	  of	  shaking	  hands	  with	  themselves,	  their	  experiences	  involve	  misrepresentation	  of	  action	  awareness	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  misrepresentation	  concerns	  “who”	  shakes	  their	  hands.	  This	  poses	  a	  problem	  for	  Shoemaker’s	  IEM.”	  (Lane	  and	  Liang	  2011:	  92).	  
                                                47	  The	  body-­‐swap	  illusion	  seems	  to	  work	  against	  an	  example	  of	  an	  immune	  self-­‐ascription	  from	  Peacocke	   (2012:	   145).	   According	   to	   him,	   ‘My	   arm	   is	   broken’	   is	   immune	   based	   on	   “visual	  experience	  of	  [an]	  arm,	  seen	  as	  attached	  to	  one’s	  own	  body”.	  In	  the	  body-­‐swap	  illusion	  setup,	  I	  see	  the	  experimenter’s	  arm	  as	  attached	  to	  my	  own	  body.	   Imagine	  seeing	  a	  broken	  arm	  in	  this	  setup	  and	  forgetting	  that	  one	  is	  in	  a	  virtual	  reality	  setup.	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So	   they	  might	   think	   ‘I	  was	   shaking	  hand	  with	  myself’	  means	   I	  did	   it	  based	  on	  agent	   awareness,	   and	   this	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   immune	   relative	   to	   ‘I’.	   (Let	   us	  bracket	   that	   the	   judgment	   is	   based	   on	   vision	   as	   well.48)	   But	   indeed	   the	  participant	   did	   it.	   More	   importantly	   the	   participant	   squeezed	   the	  experimenter’s	   hand	   and	   supposedly	   has	   agent	   awareness	   for	   it.	   Recall,	   the	  body	   swap	   illusion	   was	   only	   present	   in	   the	   synchronous	   condition.	   In	   the	  asynchronous	  condition	  they	  squeeze	  at	  different	  times	  and	  there	  was	  no	  body-­‐swap	   illusion	   present.	   This	   means	   that	   there	   was	   no	   case	   when	   the	  experimenter	  performed	  an	  action,	  but	  where	  the	  participant	  did	  not	  perform	  a	  similar	  action	  and	  the	  body-­‐swap	   illusion	  was	  experienced.	  The	  asynchronous	  squeezing	   condition	   is	   the	   control	   condition	   for	   showing	   that	   the	   body-­‐swap	  illusion	   only	   comes	  with	   the	   synchronous	   condition.49	  In	   this	   case	   there	   is	   no	  misidentification,	  because	  there	  is	  a	  squeezing	  which	  the	  subject	  does,	  but	  not	  the	  one	  which	  she	  sees	  the	  anatomically	  congruent	  hand	  doing.	  Each	  participant	  sees	   the	   experimenter’s	   hand	   where	   hers	   is	   supposed	   to	   be.	   (Probably	   the	  participant	  can	  misidentify	  who	  acted	  in	  the	  ‘I’-­‐thought	  ‘I	  performed	  this	  action	  which	   I	   am	  paying	   attention	   to’.	   But	   this	  would	  be	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   visually	  identified	   event	   of	   squeezing	   is	  my	   squeezing.	   Again,	   the	   identification	   of	   the	  event	   is	  based	  on	  vision.)	  The	  participant	  knows	  of	   the	   squeezing	   event	   from	  the	  inside	  and	  in	  this	  event	  who	  is	  acting	  cannot	  be	  misidentified.	  Still	  Lane	  and	  Liang	  might	  think	  the	  ‘I’-­‐thought	  ‘I	  did	  it’	  is	  not	  IEM	  relative	  to	  ‘I’	  in	  the	  body-­‐swap	  illusion.	  But	  Shoemaker	  did	  not	  have	  a	  stance	  on	  this.	  If	  this	  is	   their	   target	   then	   there	   is	   another	   illusion	  which	  might	   serve	   their	   purpose	  better:	   the	  pantomime	   illusion	  (Wegner	  2005).	  One	  subject,	  A,	  puts	  her	  hands	  where	  a	  different	  subject	  B’s	  arms	  usually	  are.	  B	  does	  not	  see	  his	  own	  arms,	  just	  A’s	  arms	  straight	  ahead.	  The	  experimenter	  gives	  an	  order	  “Flex	  your	  wrist!”	  A’s	  wrist	  flexes	  where	  B’s	  wrist	  usually	  is	  and	  participant	  B	  reports	  that	  he	  felt	  that	  he	  did	  it.	  B’s	  hand	  was	  not	  even	  there	  and	  he	  was	  instructed	  not	  to	  flex	  it!	  A	  case	  like	   this	  might	   be	  more	   appropriate	   for	   arguing	   that	   a	   claim	   such	   as	   ‘I	   did	   it’	  
                                                48	  One	  might	  think	  that	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  agency	  can	  be	  based	  on	  vision,	  but	  nobody	  would	  think	  that	  such	  a	  judgment	  is	  immune	  relative	  to	  the	  action	  which	  is	  individuated	  by	  what	  one	  sees.	  	  49	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  standard	  setup	  in	  the	  Rubber	  Hand	  illusion.	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based	  on	  agent	  awareness	   is	  not	   immune.50	  But	   it	   is	  not	  clear	   that	  Shoemaker	  holds	  this	  view.	  	  	  
4.	  Summary	  We	  have	   seen	   that	   the	   three	   empirical	   counterexamples	   against	   immunity	   do	  not	  seem	  to	  work.	  At	  best	  they	  can	  aspire	  to	  be	  effective	  against	  one	  or	  another	  explanation	  of	  IEM,	  but	  not	  against	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  IEM.	  	  	   	  
                                                50	  For	   this	   argument	   to	  work	   one	  has	   to	   argue	   that	   vision	   can	  be	   a	   constitutive	   part	   of	   agent	  awareness	  and	  that	  all	  self-­‐attribution	  of	  agency	  has	  to	  be	  based	  on	  agent-­‐awareness.	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Part	  I	  
The	  Two	  Kinds	  of	  IEM: 
Evans’s	  Identification-­‐freedoms	  	  
	  
	  
1.	  Preliminaries	  One	   of	   the	   most	   worked	   out	   theories	   of	   immunity	   to	   error	   through	  misidentification	   comes	   from	   Evans’s	   groundbreaking	   work	   The	   Varieties	   of	  
Reference	  (1982).	  Evans’s	  basic	   idea	  is	  that	  an	  immune	  judgment	  Fa	  (B)	  is	  not	  grounded	   on	   an	   identification	   a=b;	   in	   that	   case	   there	   is	   no	   possibility	   of	  misidentification.	   Call	   this	   the	   Identification-­‐freedom	   explanation.	   This	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  questioned.	  	  As	   we	   will	   see,	   Evans’s	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   is	   not	   as	   simple	   and	  straightforward	  as	  it	  seems	  at	  first	  and	  as	  it	  is	  assumed	  to	  be.	  There	  are	  several	  difficulties	   which	   we	   have	   to	   face	   in	   trying	   to	   understand	   his	   explanation	   of	  immunity	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification.	  	  The	   first	   difficulty	   arises	   from	   trying	   to	   understand	   what	   Evans’s	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  is.	  While	  Evans’s	  work	  is	  widely	  assumed	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  
the	  explanation	  of	   immunity,	   I	  will	  argue	   that	   it	  actually	  presents	  us	  with	   two	  different	   putative	   explanations	   of	   IEM.	   Evans	   works	   out	   the	   Identification-­‐freedom	   explanation	   for	   explaining	   the	   immunity	   of	   demonstrative-­‐thoughts,	  but	   he	   generalizes	   the	   explanation	   to	   cover	   the	   immunity	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions.	  The	  second	  difficulty	  concerns	  this	  generalization.	  The	   second	   difficulty	   threatens	   most	   existing	   theories	   of	   immunity	  including	   Evans’s.	   It	   is	   supposed	   that	   certain	   self-­‐ascriptions,	   demonstrative-­‐thoughts,	  and	  ‘here’-­‐thoughts	  are	  immune.	  So	  different	  kinds	  of	  thoughts	  can	  be	  immune.	  Although	  this	  claim	  that	  more	  than	  one	  kind	  of	  thought	  can	  be	  immune	  is	  widely	  accepted,	   the	   focus	  of	  explanations	  of	   IEM	   is	  always	  on	   the	   IEM	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  thought.51	  For	  example,	  Shoemaker	  (1968),	  Peacocke	  (2008),	  Recanati	  (1993,	  2007b,	  2012,	  2013),	  Higginbotham	  (2012),	  and	  O’Brien	  (2007,	  2012)	  in	  working	  out	  their	  notion	  of	  IEM	  concentrate	  solely	  on	  self-­‐ascriptions,	  
                                                51	  Wittgenstein	  only	  discusses	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	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but	  they	  also	  accept	  that	  at	  least	  one	  other	  kind	  of	  thought	  is	  immune.52	  Evans	  (1982)	   primarily	   focuses	   on	   demonstrative	   thoughts	   and	   ‘here’/‘now’-­‐thoughts,53	  and	  simply	  assumes	  that	  his	  explanation	  also	  works	  for	  immune	  ‘I’-­‐thoughts.	   Campbell	   (2002)	   is	   interested	   in	   the	   IEM	   of	   demonstrative	   thought	  and	   self-­‐ascription,	   but	   his	   treatment	   of	   the	   immunity	   of	   demonstrative	  thoughts	  cannot	  be	  easily	  extended	  to	  explain	  the	  immunity	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  	  Something	   is	   missing.	   What	   is	   lacking	   is	   support	   for	   generalizing	   the	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  of	  one	  kind	  of	  thought	  to	  all	  kinds	  of	  cases	  (‘I’/‘that’/‘here’-­‐thoughts).	  These	  philosophers	  might	  suppose	  that	  working	  out	  the	  explanation	  of	  immunity	  for	  one	  kind	  of	  thought	  is	  the	  way	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  generalized	  theory	  of	   IEM.	  This	  would	  be	  a	  good	  strategy	   if	   there	  were	  only	  one	  kind	  of	   IEM.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  –	  as	  I	  will	  argue.	  	  I	   turn	   to	   discuss	   Evans’s	   putatively	   general	   explanation	   of	   immunity:	   the	  Identification-­‐freedom	   explanation.	   A	   general	   explanation	   should	   cover	   all	  kinds	  of	  IEM,	  i.e.	  both	  first-­‐person	  and	  demonstrative	  IEM.	  	  	  
2.	  Identification-­‐freedom	  explanation	  
2.1.	  The	  first	  version:	  Factual	  Identification-­‐freedom	  (Factual	  IF)	  Evans	  writes:	  	  When	  knowledge	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  singular	  proposition	  ‘a	  is	  F’	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	   result	   of	   knowledge	  of	   the	   truth	  of	   a	  pair	  of	  propositions,	   ‘b	   is	   F’	   (for	  some	   distinct	   Idea,	   b)	   and	   ‘a=b’,	   I	   shall	   say	   that	   the	   knowledge	   is	  
identification-­‐dependent:	   it	   depends	   (in	   part)	   on	   the	   second	   basis	  proposition	  [a=b],	  which	  I	  shall	  call	  the	  identification	  component.	  We	  might	  
                                                52	  Shoemaker	   has	   IEM	   for	   demonstrative-­‐	   and	   ‘I’-­‐thoughts	   (Shoemaker	   1968:	   558).	   Peacocke	  speaks	  about	  IEM	  of	  demonstrative-­‐,	  ‘here’/‘now’-­‐,	  and	  ‘I’-­‐thoughts.	  Recanati	  considers	  the	  IEM	  of	  demonstrative-­‐	  and	  ‘I’-­‐thoughts.	  	  53	  Evans	  was	  the	  first	  theorist	  to	  introduce	  IEM	  for	  ‘here’-­‐thoughts.	  I	  will	  not	  discuss	  this	  issue.	  First	  of	  all,	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  that	  ‘here’-­‐thoughts	  can	  be	  immune.	  If	  they	  were	  IEM,	  then	  they	  might	  not	  exhibit	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  immunity	  as	  what	  I	  discuss	  here.	  Second,	  a	  use	  of	  ‘here’	  refers	  to	  a	  location	  and	  not	   to	  an	  object	   in	   the	  sense	  that	   ‘object’	   is	  used	  to	  mean	  proper	  object.	  Another	  difficulty	  is	  that	  the	  location	  might	  be	  our	  solar	  system,	  the	  Earth,	  a	  country,	  a	  city,	  or	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  tree	  on	  which	  I	  am	  sitting.	  It	  is	  like	  Proteus.	  So	  when	  I	  call	  it	  a	  location	  I	  just	  try	  to	  give	  a	  name	   to	   something	  which	   is	   defined	   by	   the	   context	   of	   utterance	   and	   other	   indexical	   factors.	  Thus	  ‘here’	  is	  very	  different	  from	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  and	  from	  demonstratives.	  A	  possible	  treatment	  of	  ‘here’	  takes	  ‘here’	  to	  be	  a	  contrast	  with	  ‘there’,	  where	  both	  terms	  are	  determined	  in	  the	  context.	  In	  this	  contrastive	  understanding	  misidentification	  might	  be	  possible.	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say	   that	  knowledge	  of	   the	   truth	  of	  a	   singular	  proposition	   is	   identification-­‐
free	  if	  it	  is	  not	  identification-­‐dependent.	  (Evans	  1982:	  180;	  my	  emphasis).	  	  On	  this	  picture,	  a	  thought	  Fa	  is	  identification-­‐dependent	  when	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	   proposition	   depends	   on	   the	   truth	   (correctness)	   of	   an	   identification-­‐component	   (a=b).	   A	   thought	   is	   immune	   iff	   it	   is,	   in	   fact,	   not	   identification-­‐dependent.	  An	  ‘a’-­‐thought	  (Fa)	  will	  be	  immune	  relative	  to	  a	  if	  the	  knowledge	  of	  
Fa	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  an	  identification	  component	  (with	  the	  logical	  form:	  a=b).	  This	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  first	  approximation	  of	  the	  Identification-­‐freedom	  explanation	  of	  immunity.54	  	  According	  to	  this	  weak	  Identification-­‐freedom	  explanation:	  	  	  (IF	   factual)	   An	   ‘a’-­‐thought	   Fa	   is	   immune	   relative	   to	   a	   iff	   Fa	   is	   such	   that	   the	  
attribution	  of	  F-­‐ness	  in	   fact,	   is	  not	  dependent	  on	  an	  identification	  component	  (a=b).	  	  I	   dub	   this	   version	   of	   the	   Identification-­‐freedom	   explanation	   Factual	  
Identification-­‐freedom.55	  According	  to	  this	  explanation,	   if	  a	  thought	  Fa	   is	  not	  grounded	   on	   identification	   then	  what	   (who)	   is	   F	   cannot	   be	   misidentified.	   To	  make	   it	   simple,	   Fa	   is	   grounded	   on	   an	   identification-­‐component	   (a=b)	   iff	   the	  correctness	  of	  the	  subject’s	  attribution	  of	  F-­‐ness	  to	  a	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  identification.	  As	  Evans	  puts	  this	  point:	  	  If	  he	  knows,	  or	  takes	  himself	  to	  know,	  upon	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  channel,	   that	   the	  property	  of	  being	   red	   is	   instantiated,	   then	  he	  may	   judge	  ‘This	   is	   red’,	   and	   such	  a	   judgment	   is	   identification-­‐free.	   (…)	   Since	   they	  do	  not	   [note:	   here	   we	   would	   have	   expected	   ‘cannot’]	   rest	   upon	   an	  identification,	   they	   are	   immune	   to	   error	   through	  misidentification.	   (Evans	  1982:	  182;	  with	  my	  emphasis	  and	  parenthetical	  remark)	  	  
                                                54	  One	  might	  hold	  that	  Identification-­‐freedom	  is	  the	  basic	  characterisation	  of	  IEM	  and	  it	  is	  not	  an	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  This	  would	  not	  affect	  my	  argument.	  Identification-­‐freedom	  seems	  to	  explain	  what	   opens	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification	   (being	   grounded	   on	   an	   identification),	   thus	   it	  better	  fits	  the	  job	  description	  of	  being	  an	  explanation	  than	  of	  being	  a	  characterisation.	  55	  The	   label	   ‘factual	   immunity’	   comes	   from	  Shoemaker.	  But	   Shoemaker	  uses	   it	   only	   for	  quasi-­‐memory/memory	  judgments.	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  For	  Factual	  Identification-­‐freedom,	  what	  matters	  is	  that	  the	  thought	  does	  not	  
rest	   upon	   an	   identification,	   and	   this	   alone	   makes	   the	   thought	   (factually)	  immune	  for	  Evans.56	  	  When	   my	   thought	   ‘I	   have	   my	   legs	   crossed’	   is	   based	   solely	   on	  proprioception,	   then	   it	   is	   not	   dependent	   on	   an	   identification	   component.	   I	  cannot	  misidentify	  whose	   legs	  are	  crossed,	   thus	  my	  thought	   is	   immune.	  When	  my	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  ‘having	  my	  legs	  crossed’	  is	  based	  on	  vision,	  looking	  at	  my	  legs	  (or	  in	  the	  mirror),	  then	  my	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  dependent	  on	  an	  identification	  component.	  I	  take	  my	  leg	  to	  be	  the	  one	  which	  I	  see.	  I	  take	  it	  that	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  myself.	   In	   this	   second	   situation	   my	   thought	   is	   based	   on	   an	   identification-­‐component.57	  	  However,	   being	   or	   not	   being	   grounded	   on	   an	   identification-­‐component	  could	   be	   contingent.	   The	   key	   question	   for	   factual	   immunity	   is	   whether	   a	  judgment	   in	   fact	   is	  grounded	  on	  an	   identification-­‐component	  which	  may	  vary	  from	  situation	  to	  situation.	  	  	  
3.	  Special-­‐basis	  Explanation	  of	  IEM	  Surprisingly,	  Evans	  has	   a	  different	   explanation	   for	   the	   IEM	  of	   self-­‐ascriptions.	  Evans	  seems	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  dedicated	  ways	  of	  knowing	  (e.g.	  kinaesthesia	  and	   proprioception)	   play	   a	   constitutive	   role	   in	   the	   explanation	   of	   the	   IEM	   of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  (1982:	  216,	  221).	  Evans	  writes:	  “[E]ach	  of	  these	  ways	  of	  gaining	  knowledge	   of	   ourselves	   [e.g.	   proprioception,	   kinaesthesia]	   give	   rise	   to	  
                                                56	  To	  take	  an	  example,	  Morgan	  (2012)	  holds	  that	  this	  explanation	  (which	  I	  call	  Factual	  IF)	  is	  the	  standard	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   and	   by	   far	   the	   best	   and	  most	   powerful	   one.	  Morgan,	   like	  many	  others,	   does	   not	   realise	   that	   in	   Evans	   there	   is	   another	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   (the	   Special	   basis	  explanation).	  57	  Peacocke	   (2012)	   seems	   to	   think	   that	   if	   I	   see	  my	   leg	   attached	   to	  my	   torso,	   then,	   based	   on	  vision,	  my	  self-­‐ascription	  cannot	  be	  misidentified.	   It	   is	  not	   likely	   that	   I	  will	  misidentify	  whose	  legs	  are	  crossed,	  but	  it	  is	  possible.	  It	  can	  seem	  to	  me	  that	  it	  is	  my	  leg	  when	  it	  is	  someone	  else’s	  leg.	   It	   can	  be	   an	   art	   (or	   philosophy)	   installation	   involving	   a	  mirror	  where	   someone	   else’s	   leg	  looks	   to	   be	   where	   mine	   is.	   Such	   cases	   of	   misleading	   appearances	   are	   very	   unlikely	   in	  ecologically	   valid	   situations.	   But	   it	   does	  not	  matter	   how	   likely	   it	   is	   that	   I	   actually	  misidentify	  whose	  legs	  I	  see.	  What	  matters	  is	  whether	  misidentification	  is	  excluded.	  In	  contrast,	  when	  I	  feel	  pain	   from	   the	   inside	   and,	  based	  on	   this,	   I	   think	   I	   am	   in	  pain	  misidentification	   is	  not	  possible.	  Experiments	  exploiting	   the	  Rubber	  Hand	   Illusion	  paradigm	  demonstrate	   that	   I	   can	   feel	   that	   a	  limb	   is	   mine	   when	   it	   is	   not	   attached	   to	   my	   torso	   (Knoblich	   et	   al.	   2005,	   Longo	   and	   Haggard	  2012).	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judgments	   which	   exhibit	   […]	   ‘immunity	   to	   error	   through	  misidentification’”(Evans	  1982:	  216).	  	  Evans	   seems	   to	   hold	   that	   there	   are	   certain	   special	   bases,	   like	  proprioception	  and	  kinaesthesia.	  Self-­‐ascriptions	  which	  are	  based	  only	  on	  such	  special	   bases	   are	   immune.	   This	   thought	   suggests	   another	   explanation	   of	   IEM,	  which	  only	  works	   for	  explaining	  the	   IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  made	  on	  a	  certain	  basis;	  this	  is	  the	  Special-­‐basis	  explanation	  (already	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4).	  Let	   me	   call	   a	   way	   of	   knowing	   of	   the	   subject	   which	   is	   dedicated	   only	   for	  knowing	  of	  herself	  a	  dedicated	  way	  of	  knowing.	  (I	  understand	  the	  ‘basis’	  of	  a	  judgement	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   relevant	  way	  of	   knowing,	  Evans	  uses	   the	  notion	  of	  ways	   of	   knowing	   as	   well.	   I	   use	   W	   for	   the	   relevant	   way	   of	   knowing	   through	  which	  the	  belief/knowledge	  is	  acquired;	  in	  my	  terminology	  B=W.)	  When	  a	  self-­‐ascription	   is	  based	  only	  on	  a	  dedicated	  way	  of	  knowing	  then	  this	   is	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  to	  be	  immune.	  Proprioception,	  nociception,	  sense	   of	   balance,	   and	   several	   other	  ways	   of	   knowing,	   including	   introspection,	  are	  dedicated	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  This	  explains	  why	  knowing	  that	  I	  have	  my	  legs	  crossed	  (W=proprioception),	  or	  I	  am	  in	  pain	  (W=feeling)	  is	  immune.	  58	  	  I	   called	   this	   the	   Special-­‐basis	   explanation.	   Evans	   seems	   to	   assume	   that	  this	  is	  only	  a	  version	  of	  the	  Identification-­‐freedom	  explanation.	  But	  I	  argue	  that	  this	   provides	   a	   different	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   from	   the	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   explanation.	   How	   are	   they	   different?	   First,	   according	   to	   the	   Special-­‐basis	   explanation,	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   a	   constitutive	   part	   of	   the	  explanation	   of	   IEM.	   Second,	   the	   Special-­‐basis	   explanation	   implies	   basis-­‐relativity.	   Third,	   since	   being	   based	   on	   a	   dedicated	   basis	   excludes	   the	  
possibility	  that	   the	   judgment	  could	   involve	   identification,	  this	  explanation	  is	  modally	  stronger.	  	  The	  Special-­‐basis	  explanation	  can	  already	  be	  found	  in	  Shoemaker	  (chapter	  4).	  However,	  Shoemaker	  does	  not	  discuss	  whether	  a	  judgment	  can	  be	  immune	  when	   it	   is	   based	   on	   certain	   forms	   of	   perception,	   like	   proprioception	   and	  kinaesthesia.	   But	   Evans	   tries	   to	   argue	   for	   this	   (Evans	   1982:	   220-­‐221).	   The	  
                                                58	  The	  basis	  is	  the	  way	  of	  knowing	  B=W	  according	  to	  my	  interpretation.	  Still	  using	  W	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  precise.	  For	  me	  basis-­‐relativity	  means	  relativizing	  the	  judgment	  to	  the	  way	  of	  knowing	  through	  which	  the	  knowledge	  is	  acquired.	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Special-­‐basis	   explanation	   allows	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   of	   not	   only	   psychological	  but	  physical	  predicates	  (e.g.	  having	  one’s	  legs	  crossed)	  to	  be	  immune.	  	  What	   enables	   the	   subject	   to	   systematically	   self-­‐ascribe	   properties	   known	  through	  dedicated	  ways	  of	  knowing?	  If	  the	  subject	  (tacitly)	  knows	  that	  nothing	  but	   herself	   can	   be	   known	   through	   a	   dedicated	   way	   of	   knowing,	   then	   it	   is	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	  self-­‐ascriptions	  based	  only	  on	  such	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  immune.59	  However,	   it	   seems	   hopeless	   to	   extend	   the	   Special-­‐basis	   explanation	   to	  explain	   the	   IEM	   of	   demonstrative	   thoughts.	   For	   demonstrative-­‐thoughts	   the	  way	   of	   knowing	   may	   be	   vision	   or	   touch	   or	   other	   perceptual	   faculties,	   but	  through	  all	   these	  ways	  we	  can	  know	  more	   than	  one	  object.	  This	  suggests	   that	  there	   might	   be	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   first-­‐person	   IEM	   which	   is	   different	   from	  demonstrative	  IEM.	  However,	  Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	  and	  the	  Special-­‐basis	  explanation	  might	   only	   be	   two	   different	   formulations	   of	   the	   same	   idea.	   To	   argue	   that	   the	  explanations	  are	  different	  and	  that	  one	  of	  them	  is	  stronger,	  I	  have	  to	  show	  that	  we	   can	   have	   one	   of	   them	   without	   the	   other.	   Could	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	  accommodate	  the	  Special-­‐basis	  explanation?	  	  
3.1.	   Could	   the	   Special-­‐basis	   explanation	   be	   a	   version	   of	   Factual	  
Identification-­‐freedom	  explanation?	  	  If	   the	  Special-­‐basis	  explanation	  could	  be	   translated	   into	  Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   explanation	   then	   they	   are	   basically	   the	   same	   explanation.	   Thus	   if	   I	  want	  to	  show	  that	  they	  are	  different	  I	  have	  to	  rule	  out	  that	  this	  can	  be	  done.	  	  The	   difficulty	   arises	   from	   the	   following	   fact.	   For	   the	   subject,	   knowing	   an	  object	   and	   a	   property	   through	   dedicated	   ways	   of	   knowing	   makes	  
misidentification	  impossible.	  For	  Factual	  IEM	  what	  excludes	  misidentification	  is	   that	   the	   subject’s	   knowledge	   of	   the	   judgement	   does	   not	   rely	   on	   an	  identification	   component	   –	   nothing	   else	   is	   required.	   In	   the	   Factual	  Identification-­‐freedom	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   the	   way	   of	   knowing	   is	   not	   even	  
                                                59	  How	  can	  we	  find	  evidence	  for	  such	  tacit	  knowledge?	  This	  might	  be	  inferred	  from	  considering	  the	  subject’s	  propensity	  and	  stability	  in	  following	  a	  norm.	  The	  norm	  is	  that	  whenever	  something	  is	  known	  from	  the	   inside	   then	   it	   is	  self-­‐ascribed	  by	   the	  subject.	  For	   further	  discussion	  of	   tacit	  knowledge	  see	  Peacocke	  (1983).	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marked.	  This	  would	  be	  required	  to	  accommodate	  the	  Special-­‐basis	  explanation	  of	   IEM.	   Thus	   I	   have	   found	   an	   unbridgeable	   difference	   between	   the	   two	  explanations	  of	  IEM.	  It	  could	  be	  suggested	  that	  we	  should	  put	  a	  variable	  for	  the	  relevant	  way	  of	  knowing	  into	  the	  formulation	  of	  Factual	  IF.	  But	  simply	  adding	  a	  variable	  would	  not	  make	  the	  variable	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  the	  explanation.	  And	  this	  is	  what	  we	  need	  when	  we	  ask	  for	  the	  basis.	  	  To	  show	  that	  this	  unbridgeable	  gap	  is	  real	  I	  have	  to	  try	  to	  show	  why	  Factual	  Identification-­‐freedom	   cannot	   accommodate	   the	   Special-­‐basis	   explanation.	  When	  I	  judge	  based	  on	  proprioception	  then	  my	  judgment	  in	  no	  condition	  can	  
be	  grounded	  on	  identification;	  and	  we	  might	  think	  that	  when	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  mirror	   then	   it	  has	   to	  be	  based	  on	  an	   identification	   component.	  Consequently,	  the	  real	  question	  is	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  that	  an	  immune	  self-­‐ascription	  cannot	  be	  dependent	  (as	  opposed	  to:	  is	  not	  dependent)	  on	  identification?	  	  My	  suggestion	  is	  that	  focusing	  on	  the	  distinctive	  way	  of	  knowing	  helps.	  The	  relevant	  way	  of	  knowing	  is	  such	  that	  on	  this	  way	  of	  knowing	  the	  immune	  self-­‐ascription	  cannot	   be	  dependent	   on	   identification.	  This	  might	   explain	  why	   for	  Evans	   the	   way	   of	   knowing	   matters	   for	   deciding	   whether	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	  immune.60	  Another	   point	   in	   favour	   of	   this	   suggestion	   is	   that	   in	   discussing	  immune	  ‘I’-­‐thoughts,	  Evans	  criticises	  Wittgenstein	  for	  neglecting	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  judgment:	  	  	  Wittgenstein’s	   discussion	   does	   not	   take	   sufficient	   account	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  the	   property	   of	   immunity	   to	   error	   through	   misidentification	   is	   not	   one	  which	   applies	   to	   propositions	   simpliciter,	   but	   one	   which	   applies	   only	   to	  judgments	  made	  upon	  this	  or	  that	  basis.	  (Evans	  1982:	  219).	  	  Why	  would	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  judgment	  be	  important	  for	  IEM?	  Evans	  holds	  that	  the	  subject’s	   ways	   of	   knowing	   (like	   proprioception)	   of	   herself	   have	   special	  properties	   which	   exclude	   that	   a	   thought	   based	   on	   them	   can	   be	   based	   on	   an	  identification-­‐component	   (Evans	   1982:	   180,	   220-­‐221).	   But	   this	   is	   more	   than	  
                                                60	  Evans	   uses	   ‘way	   of	   knowing’,	   ‘way	   of	   gaining	   knowledge’	   and	   ‘channels	   of	   information’	  interchangeably.	  	  
 100	  
what	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   can	   accommodate.	   Thus	   we	   need	   to	  introduce	   a	   new	   version	   of	   Identification-­‐freedom:	   Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom.	   To	   show	   the	   difference	   between	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   and	  the	   Special-­‐basis	   explanation,	   I	   will	   show	   that	   only	   a	   new	   version	   of	   the	  Identification-­‐freedom	   explanation	   can	   accommodate	   the	   Special-­‐basis	  explanation.	   This	   will	   allow	   us	   to	   clearly	   see	   what	   the	   relevant	   differences	  between	  the	  two	  explanations	  are.	  	  
4.	  Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	  For	  a	  judgment,	  Fa	  (W)	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  in	  one	  situation	  on	  the	  same	  basis,	  W,	  it	  is	  grounded	  on	  identification,	  while	  in	  another	  situation	  on	  the	  same	  basis,	  W,	  it	  is	  not	  grounded	  on	  identification.	  Accordingly,	  we	  have	  to	  ensure	  that	  Fa	  (W)	  cannot	  be	  grounded	  on	  an	  identification-­‐component	  if	   it	   is	  immune.	  To	  ensure	  that	  Fa	  cannot	  be	  grounded	  on	  identification	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  that	  it	  is,	  in	  fact,	  not	   grounded	   on	   identification	   –	  which	   is	   only	   contingent.	   Rather,	   something	  has	   to	   exclude	   the	   possibility	   that	   Fa	   can	   be	   grounded	   on	   identification.	   We	  need	   to	   specify	   that	   Fa	   (W)	   cannot	   be	   dependent	   on	   an	   identification-­‐component	  on	  this	  very	  basis,	  W.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  judgment	  has	  to	  be	  relativized	   to	   its	   basis	   for	   being	   immune;	   the	   basis	   guarantees	   that	   the	  judgment	  is	  immune	  on	  this	  particular	  basis.	  Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	  excludes	  that	  an	  immune	  judgment	  made	  on	  a	  particular	  basis	  (like	  proprioception)	  can	  be	  grounded	  on	  identification,	  in	  contrast	  with	  Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom.	  The	   latter	  only	  excludes	   that	   the	  judgment,	  Fa	  (W),	  is	  in	  fact	  grounded	  on	  identification.	  Let	  me	  introduce	  some	  notation.	   I	  will	   refer	   to	  a	   judgment	  Fa	  which	   is	  based	  on	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  W	  like	  this:	  Fa	  (W).	  What	  is	  absent	  from	  factual	  immunity	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  basis,	  W,	   on	   which	   the	   immune	   judgment	   is	   made	   cannot	   be	   dependent	   on	   an	  identification-­‐component	  (a=b).	  Let	  us	  recruit	  this	  idea.	  Let	   us	   dub	   this	   form	   of	   strong	   Identification-­‐freedom	   where	   the	   basis	  ensures	  that	  the	  thought	  cannot	  be	  misidentified	  Strong	  IF:	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(IF	  strong)	  An	  ‘a’-­‐thought	  based	  on	  W	  is	  immune	  iff	  the	  ascription	  of	  F	  based	  on	  W	  cannot	  be	  dependent	  on	  an	  identification	  component	  (a=b).61	  	  	  Recall:	   ‘I	   have	  my	   legs	   crossed’	   is	   immune	   in	   one	  but	  not	   immune	   in	   another	  situation.	   The	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   situations	   was	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  thought.	   In	   the	   first	  situation	  the	  thought	  was	  based	  on	  proprioception	  and	   in	  the	  second	  case	  it	  was	  based	  on	  vision.	  A	  suggestion	  is	  that,	  for	  Strong	  IEM,	  the	  basis	  makes	   it	   the	   case	   that	  on	   the	   relevant	   basis	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   be	  
grounded	   on	   an	   identification	   (a=b).	   When	   Fi	   is	   based	   only	   on	  proprioception,	   this	   indeed	   excludes	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   judgment	   could	  involve	   an	   identification	   (i=b).	   Only	   one	   object,	   the	   subject,	   can	   be	   known	  through	  a	  dedicated	  way	  of	  knowing	  according	  to	  the	  Special-­‐basis	  explanation.	  This	  makes	  the	  basis,	  the	  way	  of	  knowing,	  constitutive	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  And	  this	  provides	  good	  reason	  to	  include	  a	  variable	  for	  the	  basis,	   the	  way	  of	  knowing,	  of	   the	   thought	   in	   the	  explanation	  of	   the	   IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	   This	   suggests	   that	   there	   is	   a	   special	   form	   of	   first-­‐person	   IEM	  (strong	   IEM)	   which	   is	   different	   from	   factual	   IEM.	   Thus,	   we	   see	   that	   Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	   provides	   a	   way	   of	   accommodating	   the	   Special-­‐basis	  explanation.	  Let	   me	   make	   it	   clear	   how	   I	   use	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘basis’.	   I	   speak	   about	  relativizing	  the	  judgement	  to	  its	  basis.	  By	  using	  ‘basis’,	  I	  only	  mean	  the	  way	  of	  
knowing,	   like	   proprioception,	   introspection	   or	   vision,	   which	   is	   employed	   in	  forming	   the	   relevant	   judgement.	   But	   this	   is	   meant	   to	   be	   different	   from	   the	  ground	   of	   justification	   for	   the	   judgement.	   Shoemaker’s	   use	   is	   similar	   to	  mine	  when	   he	   discusses	   special	   way	   of	   knowing,	   and	   Evans	   seems	   to	   endorse	   a	  similar	   idea	   that	  only	   the	  way	  of	   knowing	  makes	   a	   difference	   for	   first	   person	  IEM.62	  Following	  them,	  I	  distinguish	  between	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘way	  of	  knowing’	  and	  
                                                61	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   ‘cannot	   be’	   denotes	   the	   denial	   of	   epistemological	   possibility.	  Epistemological	   possibility	   requires	   that	   something	   is	   possible,	   for	   all	   the	   subject	   knows	  (Edgington	  2004).	  My	  question	  is	  not	  whether	  the	  possibility	  under	  consideration	  is	  physically	  or	  logically	  possible	  but	  only	  whether	  it	  is	  epistemically	  possible.	  Given	  what	  the	  subject	  knows,	  it	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  dependent	  on	  an	  identification	  component.	  62	  “[I]t	  is	  necessarily	  the	  case	  that	  if	  a	  person	  knows	  that	  a	  P*-­‐predicate	  applies	  to	  him	  he	  knows	  that	   it	   applies	   to	   him	   in	   the	   “special	   way”	   appropriate	   to	   that	   predicate	   (which	   does	   not	  preclude	  that	  he	  should	  also	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	   it	  applies	  to	  him	  in	  other	  ways,	   i.e.,	  ways	  in	  which	  others	  might	  know	  that	  it	  applies	  to	  him).	  A	  more	  explicit	  formulation	  is	  this:	  φ	  is	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the	  notion	  of	   ‘ground	  of	  justification’.	   ‘Ground	  of	   justification’	  means	  whatever	  puts	  the	  subject	  in	  a	  position	  to	  make	  the	  judgement	  in	  question.	  The	  ground	  of	  justification	   involves	   more	   than	   the	   way	   in	   which	   knowledge	   is	   gained.	   It	  involves	  details	  of	  the	  situation	  which	  enable	  the	  subject	  to	  make	  the	  judgement	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  of	  knowing	  employed.	  	  Once	   I	   make	   this	   distinction,	   a	   difference	   between	   first-­‐person	   IEM	   and	  demonstrative	   IEM	  becomes	   clear.	  What	  matters	   for	   first	   person	   IEM	   (Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom)	   is	   only	   the	   way	   of	   knowing	   through	   which	   the	  knowledge	   (or	   belief)	   is	   gained.	   For	   demonstrative	   IEM	   (factual	   IEM)	   the	  ground	  of	   justification	  matters.	   It	   has	   to	   be	   settled	  whether	   is	   there	   is	   in	   fact	  identification	  involved,	  since	  this	  cannot	  be	  guaranteed	  just	  from	  examining	  the	  basis	   (way	   of	   knowing)	   of	   a	   judgement.	   For	   factual	   IEM	  what	  matters	   is	   only	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  judgement	  involves	  an	  identification.63	  One	  might	  worry	   that	   strong	   immunity	   is	  what	   Shoemaker	   calls	   absolute	  immunity.	  Absolutely	  immune	  self-­‐ascription	  cannot	  be	  misidentified	  relative	  to	  ‘I’	   in	   any	   circumstance	   and	   on	   all	   bases.	   In	   contrast,	   according	   to	   strong	  immunity	   the	   judgment	   is	   not	   immune	   per	   se,	   but	   is	   immune	   on	   a	   particular	  basis	  W,	  but	  not	  on	  all	  bases.	  Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	  presupposes	  basis-­‐relativity.	  Accordingly,	  Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	  is	  not	  absolute	  IEM.	  	  To	   sum	   up,	   according	   to	   Strong	   IF,	   an	   ‘a’-­‐thought	   (W)	   is	   immune	   iff	   the	  
ascription	  of	  F-­‐ness	  cannot	  be	  dependent	  on	  an	  identification	  component	  with	  the	  
logical	  form	  (a=b).	  The	  basis,	  W,	  is	  such	  that	  a	  judgment	  made	  on	  that	  basis,	  W,	  cannot	   be	   dependent	   on	   an	   identification	   component.	   In	   contrast,	   factual	  immunity	  merely	  requires	   that	   the	   thought,	  Fa,	   is	   in	  fact	  not	  dependent	  on	  an	  identification	  component	  (a=b).	  	  I	   want	   to	   suggest	   that	   Strong	   and	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   explain	  different	  kinds	  of	  IEM.	  First,	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	   the	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   in	   Strong	   but	   not	   in	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom.	  
                                                                                                                                     a	   P*-­‐predicate	   if	   and	   only	   if	   there	   is	   a	   way	   w	   of	   knowing	   φ	   to	   be	   instantiated	   such	   that,	  necessarily,	  S	  knows	  φ	   to	  be	  instantiated	  in	  way	  w	   if	  and	  only	  if	  S	  knows	  that	  he	  himself	   is	  φ.”	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  565).	   “[W]e	   cannot	   think	  of	   the	  kinaesthetic	   and	  proprioceptive	   system	  as	  gaining	   knowledge	   of	   truths	   about	   the	   condition	   of	   a	   body	   which	   leaves	   the	   question	   of	   the	  identity	  of	  the	  body	  open”	  (Evans	  1982:	  221).	  63	  Note	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ground	  of	  justification	  can	  only	  be	  assigned	  to	  a	  token	  judgement	  while	  if	  we	  consider	  a	   judgement	  relativized	  to	  the	  relevant	  way	  of	  knowing	  (e.g.:	  proprioception)	  we	  are	  picking	  out	  a	  type	  of	  judgement	  subsuming	  a	  range	  of	  tokens.	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Second,	   Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom	   implies	   basis-­‐relativity,	   but	   Factual	  Identification-­‐freedom	  does	  not	   (where	   ‘basis’	  means	  way	  of	  knowing).	  Third,	  Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom	   is	  modally	   stronger	   than	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom.	  A	  judgment	  can	  be	  factually	  immune	  when	  it	  is	  not	  strongly	  immune.	  Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom	  seems	   to	  work	  perfectly	  well	   for	   explaining	   the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  This	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  first-­‐person	  IEM.	   But	   could	   Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom	   work	   for	   explaining	  demonstrative	  IEM?	  	  
5.	  The	   Strong	   IF	   explanation	   is	  Hopeless	   for	   Explaining	   the	   Immunity	   of	  
Demonstrative	  Thoughts	  Consider	  a	  case	  when	  I	  look	  at	  a	  blue	  tit.	  Suppose	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  I	  have	  seen	  that	   blue	   tit	   before	   and	   I	   do	   not	   think	   of	   that	   bird	   in	   any	   other	  way	   besides	  looking	  at	   it.	   It	   is	   very	  busy	  eating.	   I	   judge:	   ‘That	  one	   is	   greedy.’	   Is	   it	  possible	  that	   I	  misidentify	  what	  is	  greedy?	   If	   I	  do	  not	   think	  or	  assume	   that	   I	  have	  seen	  this	   tit	   before,	   then,	   on	   this	   basis,	   which	   I	   have,	   I	   cannot	  misidentify	  what	   is	  greedy.	  In	  this	  case	  ‘That	  one	  is	  greedy’	  is	  immune	  relative	  to	  ‘that	  one’	  in	  it.64	  Does	  this	  basis,	  vision,	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification?	  It	   is	   possible	   to	  misidentify	  which	  particular	   one	   is	   greedy	  based	  only	   on	  vision.	  Suppose	  that	  I	  see	  a	  greedy	  tit	  at	  t0,	  turn	  my	  head	  away,	  and,	  when	  I	  turn	  my	  head	  back,	  I	  see	  a	  tit	  where	  the	  greedy	  tit	  was	  at	  t1.	  I	  can	  misidentify	  which	  particular	  tit	  is	  greedy.	  I	  may	  attribute	  being	  greedy	  to	  the	  tit	  which	  I	  see	  at	  t1	  because	  I	  assume	  or	  think	  it	  is	  the	  same	  one	  which	  I	  saw	  at	  t0.	  I	  might	  say	  of	  the	  tit	  I	  see	  at	  t1	  (which	  is	  not	  eating	  at	  the	  moment)	  that	  this	  one	  is	  greedy,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  a	  different	  tit	  from	  the	  one	  which	  I	  saw	  and	  was	  greedy	  at	  t0.	  	  
                                                64	  If	   there	  would	  be	   a	   sudden	   substitution	   of	   greedy	   tits,	   then	   according	   to	  Evans	   I	   could	  not	  refer	  to	  it.	  In	  order	  to	  refer	  by	  using	  a	  demonstrative,	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  there	  is	  one	  object	  to	  which	  I	  attend	  to	  and	  to	  which	  I	  intend	  to	  refer	  to.	  If	  I	  try	  to	  refer	  to	  two	  objects	  with	  a	  singular	  demonstrative	   referring	   expression,	   then	   I	   fail	   to	   refer	   in	   his	   view.	   Evans	   allows	   that	   I	  might	  have	   another	   kind	   of	   thought,	   like	   a	   general	   thought,	   in	   this	   situation,	   but	   I	   cannot	   have	   a	  demonstrative	   thought	   of	   a	   particular	   object.	   This	   is	   because	   there	   is	   no	   particular	   object	   to	  which	   I	   intend	   to	   refer	   to.	  Thus	  when	   I	   succeed	   in	   referring,	   it	   is	   guaranteed	   that	  whatever	   I	  know	   should	   be	   about	   that	   single	   object	   to	   which	   I	   intend	   to	   refer	   to.	   On	   other	   views	  demonstratives	   might	   fail	   to	   refer	   and	   successful	   reference	   has	   certain	   conditions.	   On	   such	  views	   IEM	   is	   only	   for	   such	   demonstrative	   thoughts	   which	   involve	   referring	   demonstrative	  terms.	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The	  Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	  explanation	  requires	  that	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  thought	   has	   to	   be	   such	   that	   if	   Fa	   is	   made	   on	   such	   basis,	   then	   Fa	   cannot	   be	  grounded	   on	   identification.	   But	   I	   would	   be	   in	   trouble	   if	   I	   have	   to	   find	   a	  demonstrative	   thought	   which	   is	   based	   on	   vision,	   and	   where	   it	   cannot	   be	  grounded	  on	  identification	  just	  because	  it	  is	  based	  on	  vision.	  	  Recall:	   if	  I	   judge	  that	  I	  have	  my	  legs	  crossed	  based	  only	  on	  proprioception	  then	  on	  this	  basis	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  that	  I	  misidentify	  who	  has	  her	  legs	  crossed.	  To	   use	   Evans’s	   words:	   “[W]e	   cannot	   think	   of	   the	   kinaesthetic	   and	  proprioceptive	  system	  as	  gaining	  knowledge	  of	   truths	  about	  the	  condition	  of	  a	  body	  which	  leaves	  the	  question	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  body	  open”	  (Evans	  1982:	  221).	  But	  vision	  is	  not	  like	  that;	  based	  on	  vision,	  nothing	  excludes	  the	  possibility	  that	  misidentification	  can	  happen.	  	  Surprisingly,	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   can	   explain	   the	   IEM	   of	  demonstrative	   thoughts	   perfectly.	   When	   a	   demonstrative	   thought	   based	   on	  vision	   is	   grounded	   on	   an	   identification	   component	   then	   it	   is	   open	   to	  misidentification.	   For	   ‘that	   is	   F’,	   when	   I	   have	   an	   earlier	   encounter	   through	  vision	  with	  the	  assumed-­‐to-­‐be-­‐identical	  object,	  and	  the	  attribution	  is	  based	  on	  this	  earlier	  encounter,	  then	  I	  can	  misidentify	  which	  object	  is	  F,	  since	  the	  object	  may	  look	  like	  another	  object.	  Thus	  being	  based	  on	  vision	  alone	  cannot	  exclude	  the	   possibility	   of	   misidentification,	   unlike	   being	   based	   on	   proprioception	   or	  introspection.	  This	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  IEM:	  demonstrative	  IEM.	  Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	  requires	  that	  the	  thought	  based	  on	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	   W	   cannot	   be	   grounded	   on	   identification.	   Consequently,	   Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	   cannot	   explain	   the	   IEM	   of	   demonstrative	   thoughts,	  although	  it	  seems	  to	  work	  nicely	  for	  explaining	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  The	  ways	  of	  knowing	  on	  which	  perceptual	  demonstratives	  can	  be	  based	  are	  not	  like	  proprioception.	  Vision	  or	  touch,	  on	  which	  demonstrative-­‐thought	  can	  be	  based,	  do	   not	   exclude	   the	   possibility	   of	   identification.	   Thus,	   Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom	  is	  hopeless	  to	  explain	  the	  immunity	  of	  demonstrative	  thoughts.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  we	  have	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  IEM	  explained	  in	  two	  different	  ways	  for	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	   judgements	  (self-­‐ascription	  and	  demonstrative	  judgement).	  There	  are	  different	  conditions	  for	  what	  excludes	  misidentification	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for	   self-­‐ascription	   and	   for	   demonstrative	   thought.	   These	   are	   the	   reasons	  why	  we	  have	  to	  distinguish	  first-­‐person	  IEM	  and	  demonstrative	  IEM.	  These	  are	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  IEM.	  	  
6.	  General	  Explanation	  of	  Immunity	  It	   is	   widely	   held	   that	   immunity	   is	   a	   unified	   feature	   because	   what	   explains	  immunity	  is	  supposed	  to	  explain	  all	  instances	  of	  it.	  This	  is	  unproblematic	  unless	  we	   face	  more	   than	   one	   kind	   of	   IEM.	  When	  we	   find	   an	   explanation	   of	  why	   all	  kinds	  of	  thought	  (first-­‐person,	  demonstrative),	  which	  are	  immune,	  are	  immune,	  then	   this	   provides	   a	   general	   explanation	   of	   immunity.	   But	   it	   will	   be	   much	  harder	  to	  provide	  a	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  if	  we	  find	  that	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  kind	  of	  IEM	  –	  as	  I	  showed.	  	  Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   only	   explains	   the	   IEM	   of	   perceptual	  demonstrative	   thoughts,	   while	   Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom	   seems	   to	   work	  only	   for	   immune	   self-­‐ascription.	   Thus	   neither	   explanation	   provides	   a	   general	  explanation	  of	  immunity	  of	  all	  kinds	  of	  thoughts.	  The	  conditions	  of	  first-­‐person	  and	  demonstrative	  IEM	  are	  different,	  so	  if	  there	  is	  a	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM,	  it	  needs	  to	  leave	  room	  for	  these	  differences.	  	  One	  might	   suggest	   that	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   is	   compatible	  with	  Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom.	   Thus	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   should	   be	  the	   general	   explanation	  of	   IEM.	  The	  problem	  with	   this	   suggestion	   is	   this.	   The	  condition	  which	  excludes	  misidentification	   is	  different	   for	   self-­‐ascriptions	  and	  for	   demonstrative	   thoughts.	   The	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   should	   explain	   what	  excludes	   the	   possibility	   of	   misidentification.	   However,	   Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   only	   explains	   this	   for	   immune	   demonstrative	   thoughts	   but	   not	   for	  immune	   self-­‐ascriptions.	   Conversely,	   Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom	   cannot	   be	  the	   general	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   because	   it	   cannot	   explain	   the	   immunity	   of	  demonstrative	  thoughts.	  It	  would	  appear	   that	  Evans	   is	   engaging	   in	   the	  project	  of	   finding	  a	  general	  explanation	   of	   IEM,	   but	   it	   seems	   that	   neither	   kind	   of	   Identification-­‐freedom	  works	  for	  that	  purpose.	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6.1.	  The	  Absent	  General	  Explanation	  of	  IEM	  We	  have	  not	  seen	  a	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  yet.	  I	  will	  turn	  to	  this	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  If	  an	  explanation	  explains	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  IEM	  but	  not	  all	  kinds	  of	  IEM	  then	   this	  would	   be	  a	   special	   explanation	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   IEM.	  We	   have	   only	  found	   in	  Evans	   two	   special	   explanations	  of	   IEM	   for	   the	   two	  different	  kinds	  of	  IEM.	  Factual	  Identification-­‐freedom	  is	  the	  special	  explanation	  for	  demonstrative	  IEM	  and	  Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	  (or	  the	  Special-­‐basis	  explanation)	  is	  the	  special	  explanation	  for	  first-­‐person	  thought.	  	  
7.	  Summary	  for	  Part	  I	  	  I	  distinguished	  two	  kinds	  of	  IEM:	  first-­‐person	  IEM	  and	  demonstrative	  IEM.	  The	  difference	  is	  cashed	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  Factual	  and	  Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom.	   According	   to	   the	   Strong	   IF	   explanation,	   Fa	   (W)	   is	  strongly	  immune	  iff	  the	  attribution	  of	  F-­‐ness	  based	  on	  W	  cannot	  be	  grounded	  on	  identification	  (a=b).	  The	  modally	  weaker	  version	  of	  Identification-­‐freedom	  is	  called	  Factual	   IF.	  According	   to	   the	  Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	  explanation,	  
Fb	   is	   factually	   immune	   iff	   the	   attribution	   of	   F,	   in	   fact,	   is	   not	   grounded	   on	  identification.	  	  
	  
	  
Part	  II	  	  
Varieties	  of	  identification:	  
Two	  kinds	  of	  identification 
 
	  
1.	  Preliminaries	  The	   consensus	   about	   IEM	   is	   that	   it	   just	   is	   identification-­‐freedom.	  65	  I	   have	  shown	  there	  are	  too	  many	  explanations	  in	  terms	  of	  Identification-­‐freedom,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  problem.	  I	  will	  try	  to	  show	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘identification’.	  	  
                                                65	  Recanati	   2007,	   2012,	   O’Brien	   2007,	   Peacocke	   2008:	   279-­‐280,	   2008/2009,	   Peacocke	   1983.	  Note	  that	  for	  Peacocke,	  immune	  introspection-­‐based	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  based	  on	  an	  a	  priori	  true	  identification	  ‘I	  =	  the	  thinker	  of	  this	  thought’.	  But	  otherwise	  identification-­‐freedom	  holds.	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Identification-­‐freedom	   is	   designed	   to	   explain	   IEM	   in	   general. 66	  Identification	  opens	   the	  possibility	   of	  misidentification.67	  According	   to	  Factual	  Identification-­‐freedom,	  an	  ‘a’-­‐judgment	  J	  based	  on	  W	  is	  immune	  relative	  to	  ‘a’	  iff	  
J	   based	   on	  W	   is	   in	   fact	   not	   grounded	   on	   an	   identification	   (a=b).	   To	   make	   it	  simple,	  a	  judgment	  (Fa)	  is	  grounded	  on	  an	  identification	  (a=b)	  or	  presupposes	  this	  identification	  if	  the	  subject’s	  knowledge	  of	  Fb	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  identification.	  	  
2.	  Constraints	  on	  the	  satisfactory	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  	  	  In	  the	  immunity	  literature	  there	  is	  an	  implicit	  supposition	  that	  there	  should	  be	  a	  general	   explanation	   of	   IEM.68	  Let	   me	   examine	   how	   one	   usually	   arrives	   at	   a	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  Consider	  Peacocke	  as	  an	  example.	  Peacocke	  (2008)	  introduces	  IEM	  with	  an	  example	   ‘This	   keyboard	   is	   black’,	   based	   on	   looking	   at	   a	   keyboard.	   Peacocke	  characterises	   IEM	   and	   generalises	   what	   he	   found	   about	   the	   IEM	   of	  demonstratives	  to	  ‘now’-­‐thoughts	  (e.g.	  ‘It	  is	  raining	  now’)	  and	  to	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	   (Peacocke	   2008:	   92-­‐93).	  69	  The	   strategy	   seems	   to	   be	   to	   explicate	  what	  IEM	  is	  for	  one	  kind	  of	  thought	  and	  generalise	  it	  to	  understand	  the	  IEM	  of	  other	  kinds	  of	  thoughts.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  strategy	  is	  widely	  accepted	  to	  be	  correct.	  Evans	  used	  the	  same	  strategy,	  starting	  with	  the	  IEM	  of	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  and	  generalising	  it	  to	  other	  kinds	  of	  thoughts	  (Evans	  1982:	  180).	  So	  it	  seems	   that	   there	   is	   a	   presumption	   that	   there	   is	   a	   general	   explanation	   of	   IEM	  
                                                66	  All	   the	  difficulties	   for	  Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	  apply	   to	  Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom,	  since	  the	  latter	  entails	  the	  former.	  So	  I	  will	  only	  discuss	  Factual	  Identification-­‐freedom	  here.	  67	  There	  is	  more	  than	  one	  kind	  of	  misidentification	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature.	  A	  careful	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Coliva	  2006.	  I	  restrict	  my	  discussion	  to	  present	  tense	  immune	  self-­‐ascriptions	  and	  perceptual	  demonstrative	  judgments;	  Coliva’s	  discussion	  is	  about	  self-­‐ascriptions	  based	  on	  memory.	  I	  do	  not	  discuss	  past	  tense	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  I	  take	  Evans	  to	  be	  discussing	  circumstantial	  IEM,	  although	  nothing	  hangs	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  this	  supposition.	  	  68	  This	   is	   presupposed	   in	   Shoemaker	   (1968),	   Evans	   (1982),	   Campbell	   (1999),	   Coliva	   (2006),	  O’Brien	  (2007),	  Peacocke	  (2008),	  and	  Recanati	  (2007,	  2013).	  69	  Peacocke	  assumes	  that	  the	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  for	  Fx	  has	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  fundamental	  reference	  rule	  of	  ‘x’	  (Peacocke	  2008:	  92).	  Interestingly,	  Peacocke	  explicitly	  mentions	  only	  that	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	   has	   to	   be	   explained	   by	   drawing	   upon	   the	   fundamental	   reference	   rule	   and	  assumes	  this	  for	  other	  kinds	  of	  immune	  thoughts,	  like	  immune	  demonstratives.	  But	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  different	  explanation	  from	  identification-­‐freedom	  which	  he	  endorses.	  If	  the	  fundamental	  reference	  rule	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  (with	  which	  we	  agree),	  then	  it	  is	  not	  clear	   that	   the	   explanation	   of	   ‘I’-­‐judgment	   and	   ‘that’-­‐judgment	  will	   be	   the	   same	   because	   their	  reference	   is	   fixed	  differently.	  Thus	  what	  excludes	   the	  possibility	  of	   IEM	  might	  be	  different	   for	  different	  kinds	  of	  judgments.	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that	  equally	  covers	  all	  kinds	  of	  IEM.	  Accordingly,	  one	  can	  arrive	  at	  this	  general	  understanding	  just	  by	  picking	  one’s	  favourite	  case	  of	  IEM	  and	  generalising	  the	  result	  to	  other	  cases.	  Both	  Evans	  and	  Peacocke	  employ	  this	  strategy,	  like	  many	  others.	  This	  would	  be	  justified	  if	  there	  would	  only	  be	  one	  kind	  of	  IEM	  and	  not	  two.	   But	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   there	   are	   two	   kinds	   of	   IEM	   (first-­‐person	   and	  demonstrative).	  A	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  has	  to	  explain	  the	  IEM	  of	  all	  kinds	  of	  immune	  judgements.	   Call	   this	   the	   Explanation-­‐generality	   Constraint.	   Identification-­‐freedom	   is	   designed	   to	   explain	   IEM	   in	   general,	   thus	   it	   should	   satisfy	   this	  Constraint.	  	  	  
3.	  The	  question	  When	  one	  starts	  to	  think	  about	  Identification-­‐freedom	  one	  of	  the	  first	  questions	  to	  come	  into	  one’s	  mind	  is:	  What	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘identification’	  involved	  in	  
identification-­‐freedom?	   This	   answer	   is	   necessary	   for	   understanding	  identification-­‐freedom	  properly.	  	  Initially,	  we	  might	  think	  ‘identification’	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  identity	   statement	   with	   the	   logical	   form:	   a=b.	   Evans	   clearly	   claims	   that	   the	  identification	   component	   has	   the	   logical	   form	   a=b	   –	   exactly	   what	   we	   would	  expect.	   I	  will	   first	   provide	   examples	   of	   two	   kinds	   of	   identification	   and	   then	   I	  turn	   to	   argue	   that	  we	   should	   treat	   them	   as	   different	   kinds	   of	   identification.	   I	  turn	  to	  discuss	  the	  first	  notion	  from	  Evans.	  	  
4.	  ‘Identification’	  means	  Frege-­‐identification	  When	   we	   consider	   an	   identification	   of	   the	   form	   a=b,	   it	   is	   best	   understood	  following	  Frege’s	  analysis.	  I	  have	  to	  give	  a	  quick	  and	  simplified	  recapitulation	  of	  Frege’s	   famous	   puzzle	   to	   set	   up	   our	   understanding	   of	   what	   we	   call	   Frege-­‐identification.	  Suppose	  ‘a’	  and	  ‘b’	  are	  singular	  terms	  referring	  to	  an	  object.	  Frege	  recognised	  a	  difference	  between	  (1)	  a=b	  and	  (2)	  a=a.	  	  	  
4.1.	  The	  Frege’s	  puzzle	  If	   two	   identifications	   have	   the	   same	   cognitive	   significance	   then	   the	   subject’s	  cognitive	   relation	   to	   those	   two	   relations	  will	   be	   the	   same.	   But	   a	   subject	  may	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doubt	  that	  a=b	  even	  if	  she	  would	  never	  doubt	  that	  a=a.	  The	  difference	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  for	  only	  by	  relying	  on	  what	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  the	  two	  relata.	  The	  two	  identity	  claims	  (a=a,	  a=b)	  mean	  the	  same	  in	  terms	  of	  reference:	  the	  referent	  is	  the	  same.	  However,	  the	  discovery	  that	  Hesperus	  is	  Phosphorus	  has	  shaken	  our	  common	   knowledge,	   but	   nobody	   can	   discover	   what	   everyone	   knows	   –	   that	  Hesperus	   is	   Hesperus.	   Frege	   observed	   a	   difference	   between	   a=a	   and	   a=b	   in	  their	  cognitive	  significance	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  explained.	  This	  is	  called	  Frege’s	  
puzzle.	  	  In	   “On	   Sense	   and	   Reference”,	   Frege	   introduces	   the	   notion	   of	   sense	   to	  explain	   the	   difference	   between	   a=b	   and	   a=a.	   The	   reason	   why	   a=b	   can	   be	   a	  discovery	   is	   because	   ‘a’	   and	   ‘b’	   have	   different	   senses,	   while	   ‘a’	   has	   only	   one	  sense	  in	  a=a.	  Frege	  understands	  sense	  in	  terms	  of	  modes	  of	  presentation	  (hence	  MPs)	   which	   account	   for	   the	   cognitive	   difference	   between	   aMP1=aMP1	   and	  
aMP1=bMP2.	  ‘Hesperus’	  and	  ‘Phosphorus’	  have	  different	  modes	  of	  presentation	  in	  the	   form	   of	   different	   definite	   descriptions.	   An	   MP	   might	   be	   a	   definite	  description	   like	   ‘the	   last	   visible	   heavenly	   body	   to	   disappear	   at	   dusk’	   for	  Phosphorus.	  But	  an	  MP	  need	  not	  be	  a	  definite	  description.	  The	  introduction	  of	  different	  modes	  of	  presentation	  (MPs)	  for	  a=b	  solves	  Frege’s	  puzzle.	  Frege	  is	  often	  taken	  as	  claiming	  that	  the	  sense	  (MP)	  of	  a	  singular	  term	  fixes	  what	  the	  referent	  of	   that	   term	  is.70	  According	  to	  Frege,	  given	  that	   the	  mode	  of	  presentation	  (the	  way	  that	  the	  reference	  is	  fixed)	  is	  the	  same,	  then	  the	  subject	  cannot	   doubt	   that	   aMP1=aMP1.	   Thus,	   self-­‐identification	   is	   not	   a	   Frege-­‐identification.	  Frege-­‐identification	  requires	  that	  the	  two	  singular	  terms	  have	  to	  have	  different	   senses	   –	  MPs	  –	  ways	  of	   fixing	   the	   referent.	   Consider	   the	   figure	  below	  illustrating	  the	  difference.	  	  
                                                70	  “The	  regular	  connection	  between	  a	  sign	  [=singular	  term],	  its	  sense,	  and	  its	  reference	  is	  of	  such	  a	  kind	  that	  to	  the	  sign	  there	  corresponds	  a	  definite	  sense	  and	  to	  that	  in	  turn	  a	  definite	  reference,	  while	   to	   a	   given	   referent	   (an	   object)	   there	   does	   not	   belong	   only	   a	   single	   sign.”	   (Frege	   1948:	  564).	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  aMP1	  	  =	  	  	  aMP1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  aMP1	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  bMP1	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  cMP1	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  dMP2	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  o	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  o	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  o	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  SELF-­‐IDENTIFICATION	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  FREGE-­‐IDENTIFICATION	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  cognitive	  significance	  (same	  MP)	  	  	  	  	  	  Cognitive	  significance	  (different	  MP)	  
Figure	  1.	  	  Self-­‐identification	  and	  Frege-­‐identification.	  	  Recapitulating,	   Frege-­‐identification	   (sometimes:	   FI)	   requires	   that	   there	  should	  be	   two	   referring	   terms	  and	   that	   the	  modes	  of	   presentation	  of	   the	   two	  different	  terms	  have	  to	  be	  different:	  ‘cMP1=dMP2’.	  	  For	   Evans,	   immunity	   consists	   in	   identification-­‐freedom.	   Accordingly,	  identification-­‐freedom	   states	   that	   if	   the	   subject’s	   knowledge	   of	   a	   judgment	  made	   on	   a	   certain	   basis	   B	   rests	   on	   a	   Frege-­‐identification	   then	   this	   judgment	  based	  on	  B	  is	  not	  immune.71	  	  
4.2.	   Evans	   uses	   Frege-­‐identification	   in	   the	   identification-­‐freedom	  
explanation	  of	  IEM	  	  Evans	   seems	   to	   be	   claiming	   that	   ‘identification’	   in	   identification-­‐freedom	   is	  simply	  Frege-­‐identification.	  An	  ‘a’-­‐judgment	  (B)	  is	  identification-­‐free	  relative	  to	  ‘a’	  iff,	  based	  on	  B,	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  not	  Frege-­‐identification	  dependent	  relative	  to	  ‘a’.	  In	  Evans’s	  account,	  a	  judgment	  ‘a	  is	  F’	  (B)	  is	  identification-­‐dependent	  when	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  pair	  of	  judgments	  	  (1)	  ‘b	  is	  F’	  	  (2)	  ‘aMP1=bMP2’	  (this	  component	  is	  called	  the	  ‘identification	  component’).72	  
                                                71	  Evans	  distinguishes	  between	  IEM	  in	  the	  narrow	  and	  in	  the	  broad	  sense.	  Here	  I	  only	  discuss	  IEM	   in	   the	   narrow	   sense,	   because	   IEM	   in	   the	   broad	   sense	  works	   only	   for	   descriptive	   names	  which	  are	  introduced	  into	  the	  language	  by	  a	  definite	  description	  (e.g.	  the	  ‘Julius’	  case).	  I	  discuss	  IEM	  in	  the	  board	  sense	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  72	  “When	  knowledge	  of	   the	   truth	  of	  a	   singular	  proposition	   ‘a	   is	  F’	   can	  be	  seen	  as	   the	   result	  of	  knowledge	  of	   the	   truth	  of	  a	  pair	  of	  proposition,	   ‘b	   is	  F’	   (for	   some	  distinct	   Idea,	  b)	  and	   ‘a=b’,	   I	  shall	   say	   that	   the	   knowledge	   is	   identification-­‐dependent:	   it	   depends	   (in	   part)	   on	   the	   second	  basis	  proposition,	  which	  I	  shall	  call	  the	  identification	  component.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  knowledge	  of	   the	   truth	  of	  a	  singular	  proposition	   is	   identification-­‐free	   if	   it	   is	  not	   identification-­‐dependent.	  (…)	   Since	   they	   do	   not	   rest	   upon	   an	   identification,	   they	   are	   immune	   to	   error	   through	  
misidentification.”	  (Evans	  1982:	  180-­‐182).	  
 111	  
An	  ‘a’-­‐judgment	  is	  identification-­‐free	  iff	  it	  is	  not	  Frege-­‐identification	  dependent.	  An	  immune	  judgment	  J	  (B)	  is	  identification-­‐free,	  because	  J	  (B)	  it	  is	  not	  grounded	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  on	  an	  identification	  component.	  When	  a	  judgment,	  Fb	  (B),	  is	  grounded	  implicitly	  on	  an	  identification	  component,	  then	  the	  presupposition	  of	   the	   judgment	   contains	   an	   identification	   component	   (aMP1=bMP2),	   and	   the	  attribution	  of	  F-­‐ness	  is	  based	  on	  aMP1=bMP2.73	  	  But	   is	   it	   the	   case	   for	   Evans	   that	   the	   mode	   of	   presentation	   has	   to	   be	  different?	  Evans	  requires	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘a’	  and	  the	  idea	  ‘b’	  have	  to	  be	  different	  in	  a=b	   (Evans	  1982:	   180-­‐182).	   For	  Evans,	   an	   ‘Idea’	   of	   a	   singular	   term	  means,	  roughly,	  the	  rule	  which	  fixes	  the	  referent	  of	  a	  singular	  term	  to	  a	  unique	  object.	  As	   Frege	   understood	   it	   ‘the	   sense/MP	   of	   a	   singular	   term’	   is	   what	   fixes	   the	  referent	  of	  that	  term	  to	  an	  object.	  Accordingly,	  for	  Evans,	  in	  a=b,	  the	  MPs	  (Ideas)	  of	  the	  two	  terms	  have	  to	  be	  different.	  Consequently,	  a=b	  is	  a	  Frege-­‐identification	  (aMP1=bMP2)	  for	  Evans.	  Shoemaker,	  in	  his	  book	  (1996),	  uses	  the	  notion	  of	  identification-­‐freedom	  so	  he	  seems	  to	  agree	  with	  Evans	  that	  IEM	  just	  is	  identification-­‐freedom.	  I	  will	  try	  to	  elaborate	  a	  point	  of	  disagreement	  which	  has	  not	  been	  realized	  by	  either	  of	  the	   two	   parties	   (Evans	   or	   Shoemaker).	   ‘Identification’	   has	   different	  meanings	  for	  them.	  74	  	  
5.	  ‘Identification’	  means	  object-­‐identification	  	  There	   is	   a	   second	   notion	   of	   identification:	   object-­‐identification.	   Object-­‐
identification	   (OI)	   involves	   automatic	   and	   involuntary	   recognition	   of	   a	  
                                                73	  Without	   the	   last	   clause,	   we	   can	   easily	   have	   a	   counterexample	   to	   identification-­‐freedom.	  Suppose	  a	  subject	  thinks	  1. I	   am	  Wittgenstein.	   (B=testimony,	   I	   had	  amnesia	   and	  my	   friends	  persuaded	  me	   that	   I	  am	  Wittgenstein.)	  2. Wittgenstein	  only	  has	  headaches	  before	  it	  rains.	  (I	  read	  this	  in	  a	  biography	  which	  ends	  before	  Wittgenstein	  passes	  away.)	  3. I	  have	  a	  headache.	  So	   I	   conclude	   that	   I	   think	   it	   is	   going	   to	   rain.	   Although	   my	   judgment	   is	   grounded	   on	   an	  identification,	  the	  attribution	  of	  the	  property	  ‘thinking	  that	  it	  is	  going	  to	  rain’	  is	  not	  grounded	  on	  the	   identification.	   So	   it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   whenever	   a	   judgment	   is	   grounded	   on	   an	  identification	  it	  loses	  its	  IEM.	  74	  Although	  Evans	  claims	  that	  Shoemaker	  does	  not	  realise	  that	   immunity	   just	   is	   identification-­‐freedom,	   Shoemaker	   disagrees.	   Shoemaker	   (1996)	   even	   switched	   from	   using	   the	   name	  
immunity	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification,	  which	  he	  coined	  for	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  question,	  to	  
identification-­‐freedom.	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perceptually	  observed	  object	  as	  a.75	  	  An	  example	  of	  object-­‐identification	  is	  when	  we	  see	  a	  friend	  on	  the	  street.	  I	  know	  Hildegard	  well	  and	  I	  see	  Hildegard	  pass	  by	  on	   a	   bicycle.	   Recognition	   of	   Hildegard	   can	   be	   very	   quick,	   involuntary	   and	  automatic.	   This	   is	   underpinned	   by	   a	   subpersonal	   mechanism	   enabling	  me	   to	  directly	  see	  an	  object	  as	  an	  individual	  like	  Hildegard	  (such	  as	  the	  posited	  face-­‐recognition	  module	  located	  at	  the	  fusiform	  face	  area	  of	  the	  brain;	  Kanwisher	  et	  al.	  1997).	  Similarly,	  I	  can	  see	  and	  automatically	  and	  involuntarily	  recognise	  my	  mother,	  or	  familiar	  objects	  like	  the	  sun	  or	  the	  moon.	  I	  call	  this	  kind	  of	  automatic	  and	  involuntary	  recognition	  of	  objects	  object-­‐recognition.	  The	  kind	  of	  recognition	  which	  is	  object-­‐recognition	  is	  similar	  to	  automatic	  and	   involuntary	   kind-­‐recognition.	   One	   way	   of	   automatically	   recognising	  redness,	  being	  a	  lion	  or	  being	  a	  pumpkin	  is	  just	  to	  see	  them	  directly	  as	  such.	  As	  one	  sees	  the	  redness	  of	  the	  object,	  one	  sees	  Hildegard	  as	  Hildegard	  directly.	  	  Object-­‐recognition	   happens	   at	   the	   level	   of	   perception.	   The	   perceptual	  system	   is	   different	   from	   the	   belief	   system.	   If	   I	   believe	   p	   and	   not	   p	   this	   is	   a	  contradiction.	  In	  contrast,	  I	  may	  experience	  that	  p	  while	  I	  know	  that	  p	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  This	   is	  not	   a	   contradiction.	  Contradiction	  would	   require	   that	  both	  p	   and	  not	   p	   are	   in	   the	   belief	   system.	   This	   kind	   of	   object-­‐recognition	   of	   individuals	  happens	  at	  the	  level	  of	  perception.	  One	  might	  lack	  this	  perceptual	  mechanism	  –	  in	   prosopagnosia	   –	   and	   have	   difficulty	   even	   in	   recognising	   one’s	   mother	   or	  brother.	  	  I	  may	  see	  a	   table	  as	  a	   table,	   just	  as	   I	   see	  Hildegard	  as	  Hildegard.	  Seeing	  a	  table	  as	  a	  table	  does	  not	  require	  that	  I	  presuppose	  that	  the	  thing	  over	  there	  is	  a	  table;	  it	  does	  not	  presuppose	  a	  background	  belief	  that	  this	  is	  a	  physical	  object.	  What	   is	  missing	   if	   I	   do	   not	   see	   a	   table	   as	   a	   table	   is	   not	   a	   presupposition	   but	  merely	   automatic	   recognition	   of	   its	   kind.	   Similarly,	   for	   individuals	   one	   is	  acquainted	   with,	   one	   simply	   recognises	   them	   automatically	   (in	   usual	  circumstances).	  I	  recognise	  Hildegard	  as	  Hildegard.	  I	  see	  Hildegard	  when	  I	  see	  her	   as	   falling	  under	   the	   individual	   concept	   ‘Hildegard’.	  Object-­‐recognition	   can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  capacity	  to	  automatically	  and	  involuntarily	  see	  something	  as	  something	  falling	  under	  an	  individual	  kind.	  My	  perception	  is	  different	  when	  I	  see	   Hildegard	   as	   Hildegard	   automatically.	   Seeing	   Hildegard	   automatically	   as	  
                                                75	  This	  is	  a	  different	  notion	  of	  recognition	  from	  Wittgenstein’s.	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Hildegard	   is	   a	  different	  experience	   than	  not	   seeing	  her	  as	  Hildegard,	   and	  also	  different	   when	   I	   am	   unsure	   whether	   the	   person	   I	   see	   is	   Hildegard.	   Object-­‐recognition	   is	   automatic,	   and	   as	   such	   does	   not	   require	   a	   demonstrative	  identification	  like	  ‘this	  one	  is	  Hildegard’	  or	  ‘this	  one	  is	  my	  mother’	  –	  neither	  as	  a	  thought	  nor	  as	  a	  presupposition.	  	  	  	  
5.1.	  ‘Identification’	  means	  object-­‐identification	  for	  Shoemaker	  For	  Shoemaker	  (and	  probably	  Wittgenstein)	  identification	  is	  identification	  of	  an	  object	   as	   a.	   I	   want	   to	   suggest	   that	   Shoemaker	   may	   have	   understood	   this	   as	  involving	  object-­‐recognition.	  If	  I	  think	  a	  is	  F,	  because	  I	  perceive	  the	  object	  which	  I	   know	   to	   be	   F	   as	   a,	   then	   my	   judgment	   Fa	   is	   open	   to	   misidentification.	   As	  Shoemaker	  puts	  this	  point:	  	  [T]his	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  point,	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  presented	  object	   as	   oneself	   would	   have	   to	   go	   together	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification,	   and	   it	   is	   precisely	   the	   absence	   of	   this	   possibility	   that	  characterizes	   the	   use	   of	   'I'	   that	   concerns	   us.	   (Shoemaker	   1968:	   561,	   my	  emphasis).	  	  If	  I	  say	  “I	  am	  bleeding,”	  it	  can	  happen	  that	  what	  I	  say	  is	  false	  even	  though	  I	  am	  giving	  expression	  to	  the	  knowledge	  that	  a	  certain	  person	  is	  bleeding;	  it	  may	  be	  that	  (…)	  I	  am	  mistaken	  in	  thinking	  the	  person	  who	  is	  bleeding	  to	  be	  myself.	   Such	   statements	   are	   subject	   to	   error	   through	   misidentification	  relative	  to	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronouns,	  where	  to	  say	  that	  a	  statement	  “a	  is	  Φ”	  is	  subject	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification	  relative	  to	  the	  term	  ‘a’	  means	  that	   the	   following	   is	  possible:	   the	  speaker	  knows	  some	  particular	   thing	   to	  be	  Φ,	  but	  makes	  the	  mistake	  of	  asserting	  “a	  is	  Φ”	  because,	  and	  only	  because,	  he	  mistakenly	  thinks	  that	  the	  thing	  he	  knows	  to	  be	  Φ	  is	  what	   ‘a’	  refers	  to.	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  556-­‐557,	  my	  emphasis).	  	  	  For	   Shoemaker,	   identification	   is	   when	   I	   see	   an	   object	   as	  myself	   (1968:	   561),	  which	  means,	  for	  the	  subject,	  that	  he	  “thinks	  that	  the	  thing	  he	  knows	  to	  be	  F	  is	  what	   ‘a’	   refers	   to”	   (557).	   Here	  we	   do	   not	   have	   an	   identification	   but	   rather	   a	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referring	  term	  ‘a’	  and	  its	  referent.	  This	  only	  requires	  automatic	  and	  involuntary	  recognition	   of	   a.	   Thus,	   Shoemaker	   means	   object-­‐identification	   by	  ‘identification’;	  he,	  at	  least,	  allows	  object-­‐identification	  to	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	  When	   I	   see	   my	   limbs	   then	   (usually)	   I	   automatically	   and	   involuntarily	  recognise	   myself.	   This	   opens	   the	   possibility	   of	   misidentification,	   because	   the	  one	  whom	  I	  observe	  (e.g.	  with	  a	  bleeding	  hand)	  might	  not	  be	  me	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	   556).	   But	   this	   does	   not	   necessarily	   presuppose	   an	   identification	  component:	  ‘that	  one	  is	  me’,	  or	  something	  similar.	  	  Frege-­‐identification	  has	  the	  logical	  form	  a=b,	  but	  in	  object-­‐identification	  the	  relation	   between	   the	   referent	   and	   the	   referring	   expression	   is	   not	   identity.	  Object-­‐identification	   requires	   an	   object	   to	   be	   perceptually	   present	   and	   a	  referring	  expression	  which	   the	  subject	  uses	   for	   that	  object	  as	   its	   referent.	  For	  object-­‐identification,	  an	  object	  has	  to	  be	  present	  to	  me	  through	  perception,	  but	  not	  by	  merely	  thinking	  about	  that	  object.76	  	  Object-­‐identification	   is	   neither	   an	   identification	   of	   a	   with	   b	   or	   a	  presupposition	   of	   it.	   Object-­‐identification	   involves	   automatically	   and	  involuntarily	  perceiving	  an	  object	  as	  a	   (seeing	  it	  as	  falling	  under	  an	  individual	  concept).	  For	  that	  we	  need	  not	  have	  two	  referring	  terms	  in	  mind	  as	  pointing	  to	  a	   single	   object	   or	   a	   presupposition	   of	   an	   identity	   statement.	   This	   seems	  different	   from	   Frege-­‐identification.	   (I	   will	   argue	   below	   that	   OI	   and	   FI	   are	  different	   kinds	   of	   identification.)	   Thus	   Shoemaker	   means	   at	   least	   object-­‐identification	   by	   identification	   and	   holds	   that	   object-­‐identification	   opens	   the	  possibility	   of	   misidentification,	   contrary	   to	   Evans. 77 	  Accordingly,	   Frege-­‐identification	  is	  not	  the	  only	  kind	  of	  identification	  which	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification,	  as	  Evans	  assumed.	  To	   recapitulate,	   I	   supposed	  with	   Evans	   that	   ‘identification’	   simply	  means	  Frege-­‐identification.	  But	  as	  Shoemaker	  observed,	  a	  non-­‐immune	  judgment	  can	  be	   based	   on	   object-­‐identification	  without	   being	   based	   on	   Frege-­‐identification.	  
                                                76	  By	   ‘object’,	   I	  mean	  something	   like	  an	  entity	  which	  has	  some	  kind	  of	  spatial	  boundary,	  unity	  (falling	  under	  a	  kind	  category	  like	  person,	  house	  or	  eggplant,	  etc.),	  persistence	  conditions,	  and	  which	  can	  be	  perceived.	  77	  This	   allows	   that	   both	   Frege-­‐identification	   and	   object-­‐identification	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification,	  since	  Shoemaker	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  Frege-­‐identification	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	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Thus,	   ‘identification’	   cannot	   simply	   mean	   Frege-­‐identification	   as	   Evans	  suggested.	  	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  do	  the	  following.	  First,	  I	  will	  present	  some	  examples	  for	  judgments	  involving	  object-­‐identification	  and	  Frege-­‐identification.	  Second,	   I	   will	   argue	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   object-­‐identification	   and	   Frege-­‐identification	  are	  different	  kind	  of	  identifications.	  Third,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  not	  all	  cases	  of	  object-­‐identification	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	  
	  
6.	  Frege-­‐identification	  and	  object-­‐identification	  
6.1.	  Examples	  for	  the	  difference	  between	  OI	  and	  FI	  	  	  	  The	   following	   judgments	   or	   descriptions	   of	   experiences	   presuppose	   object-­‐identification,	   or	  Frege-­‐identification.	  A	  diagram	  below	  charts	  which	   thoughts	  presuppose	   Frege-­‐identification	   and	   which	   thoughts	   presuppose	   object-­‐identification.	  A:	   I	   see	   Bob	   as	   Bob.	   (I	   see	   someone	   as	   Bob	   –	   falling	   under	   the	   individual	  concept	  ‘Bob’	  provided	  by	  my	  capacity	  of	  individual	  face-­‐recognition.)	  B:	  Tully	  wrote	  the	  Philippics.	  (I	  read	  this	  about	  Cicero	  and	  I	  know	  that	  Cicero	  is	  Tully.)	  C:	  I	  see	  that	  Big	  Ben	  is	  there.	  (I	  come	  to	  believe	  it	  after	  careful	  consideration	  about	  what	  this	  big	  clock	  tower	  could	  be.)	  D:	   I	   see	   Big	   Ben.	   (I	   am	   acquainted	   with	   it	   and	   am	   able	   to	   recognise	   it	  instantaneously.	  I	  see	  it	  as	  Big	  Ben	  –	  as	  falling	  under	  this	  individual	  concept.)	  E:	   We	   saw	   that	   bird	   (which	   we	   see	   now)	   in	   the	   morning	   and	   called	   it	  ‘Pavarotti’.	  (This	   is	  based	  on	  many	  independent	  clues:	   it	   looks	  the	  same	  and	  it	  sings	  and	  eats	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  This	  presupposes	  that	  the	  bird	  I	  see	  now	  is	  the	  same	  bird	  I	  saw	  before.)	  F:	  That	  necktie	  (which	  I	  touch	  but	  do	  not	  see)	  is	  red.	  (I	  remember	  putting	  a	  red	  one	  under	  the	  table	  yesterday.	  This	  is	  Shoemaker’s	  example.)	  G:	   That	   dog	   is	   barking.	   (This	   is	   based	   on	   hearing	   and	   seeing	   a	   dog	   which	  looks	  like	  it	  is	  barking.)	  	  H:	   I	   see	   my	   mother.	   (I	   recognise	   her	   without	   inference.	   I	   see	   her	   as	   my	  mother.)	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Figure	  2.	  	  Varieties	  of	  identifications:	  the	  examples.	  
 The	   diagram	   presents	   cases	   of	   two	   kinds	   of	   identification	   (FI,	   OI).	  We	   found	  cases	   where	   Frege-­‐identification	   is	   involved	   but	   object-­‐identification	   is	   not	  involved	   and	   vice	   versa.	   Thus,	   again	  we	   find	   additional	   support	   for	   the	   claim	  that	  being	  based	  on	  object-­‐identification	  is	  different	  from	  being	  based	  on	  Frege-­‐identification.	  One	  might	   still	  worry	   that	   there	   is	  no	   real	  difference	  between	  Frege-­‐	   and	  object-­‐identification.	  Either	  they	  are	  identical	  (FI=OI),	  or	  OI	  might	  be	  a	  subset	  of	  FI	   or	   FI	   is	   presupposed	   by	   OI.	   Another	   harmless	   option	   would	   be	   that	   both	  Frege-­‐identification	   and	   object-­‐identification	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification.	   In	   this	   case	   ‘identification’	   is	   a	  name	  covering	  both	  kinds	  of	  identification	   which	   I	   distinguished.	   I	   will	   argue	   for	   two	   claims,	   (i)	   object-­‐identification	  is	  different	  from	  Frege-­‐identification	  (aMP1=bMP2),	  and	  (ii)	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  both	  (OI,	  FI)	  always	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	  	  	  
6.2.	  The	  differences	  between	  Frege-­‐	  and	  object-­‐identification	  To	  make	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  identification	  clear,	  let	  us	  look	  at	  a	  schematic	  diagram.	  We	  simply	  can	  read	  off	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  identification.	  (In	  the	  diagram	  o	  stands	  for	  an	  object	  and	  not	  for	  the	  name	  of	  the	  object.)	  	  The	  schematic	  difference	  is	  the	  following:	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  bMP2	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  (perceives)	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  a	  and	  b.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  o	  	  
	  	  	  OBJECT-­‐IDENTIFICATION	   	  	  	  	  	  FREGE-­‐IDENTIFICATION	  
Figure	  3.	  Object-­‐identification	  and	  Frege-­‐identification.	  	  Frege-­‐identification	   is	   of	   the	   form	   a=b.	   (I	   will	   use	   the	   symbol	   ⇔	   for	   logical	  equivalence,	   and	   will	   use	   ⇒	   for	   logical	   implication.)	   Frege-­‐identification	   is	   a	  symmetric	   (a=b⇔b=a),	   transitive	   ((a=b),	   (b=c)⇒(a=c))	   and	   reflexive	   (a=a)	  relation.	  	  Object-­‐identification	   is	  a	  relation	  between	  a	  name/singular	  referring	   term	  ‘a’	  and	  an	  object	  when	  it	  is	  based	  on	  object-­‐recognition.	  One	  takes	  ‘a’	  to	  refer	  to	  that	  object.	  One	  sees	  the	  object	  automatically	  and	  involuntarily	  as	  a.	  When	  I	  use	  ‘a’	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  object,	  then	  I	  cannot	  use	  o	  (the	  referent)	  to	  refer	  to	  a.	  Why?	  It	  is	  because	  the	  object	  is	  in	  the	  world	  as	  an	  object	  and	  it	  is	  different	  from	  a	  singular	  referring	   term	   which	   is	   in	   the	   language.	   Thus	   they	   cannot	   take	   each	   other’s	  place.	  Consequently	  object-­‐identification	  is	  asymmetric.	  Object-­‐identification	  is	  not	   reflexive	   because	   I	   cannot	   take	   a	   to	   be	   the	   referent	   of	   a.	   Object-­‐identification	  is	  not	  a	  version	  or	  a	  subset	  of	  Frege-­‐identification	  because	  it	  is	  not	  symmetric,	   not	   reflexive	   and	   not	   transitive.	   Frege-­‐identification	   is	   an	  equivalence	  relation	  and	  object-­‐identification	  cannot	  be.	  If	  object-­‐identification	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  subclass	  of	  Frege-­‐identification,	  then	  it	  would	  have	  to	  specify	  an	  equivalence	  relation	  as	  well.	  But	  it	  cannot	  be	  an	  equivalence	  relation	  because	  it	  is	  neither	  symmetric	  nor	  reflexive.	  Thus,	  object-­‐identification	  can	  neither	  be	  a	  subclass	  of	  Frege-­‐identification	  nor	  can	  it	  be	  equivalent	  to	  Frege-­‐identification.	  	  An	  opponent	  might	  say,	  accepting	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  relations,	  that	  we	  do	  not	  need	  object-­‐identification	  because	  Frege-­‐identification	  is	  all	  we	  need	   for	   thinking	   about	   reference.	   My	   response	   is	   that	   this	   is	   implausible,	  because	   the	  ability	   to	  make	  a	  Frege-­‐identification	  presupposes	   the	  capacity	  of	  object-­‐identification:	  the	  capacity	  to	  see	  an	  object	  as	  falling	  under	  a	  concept	  or	  individual	  categorization.	   If	  one	  cannot	   track	  and	  recognise	  objects	  which	  one	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knows	  at	   all	   then	  one	   cannot	  use	  a	   singular	   term	   to	   refer	   to	   them.	  When	  one	  refers	  to	  an	  object,	  one	  uses	  a	  referring	  expression	  to	  refer	  to	  that	  object.	  If	  one	  cannot	   recognise	   (in	   experience)	   an	   object	   as	   the	   referent	   of	   a	   singular	   term	  then	   one	  does	   not	   understand	  what	   it	  means	   to	   refer	   to	   an	   object	   by	   using	   a	  singular	   term.	  The	   capacity	   of	   object-­‐recognition	   is	   required	   for	   the	   ability	   to	  refer.	  To	   conclude,	   Frege-­‐identification	   is	   different	   from	   object-­‐identification.	  Frege-­‐identification	  is	  a	  symmetric	  (a=b⇔b=a),	  transitive	  ((a=b),	  (b=c)⇒(a=c))	  	  and	   reflexive	   (a=a)	   relation	   but	   object-­‐identification	   is	   none	   of	   these.	   Thus,	  object-­‐identification	  can	  neither	  be	  a	  subclass	  of	  Frege-­‐identification	  nor	  can	  it	  be	  equivalent	  to	  Frege-­‐identification.	  	  	  
6.3.	  Object-­‐identification	  is	  possible	  without	  Frege-­‐identification	  We	  employ	  object-­‐identification	  (automatic	  categorisation	  under	  an	  individual	  concept)	  all	  the	  time.	  We	  simply	  see	  a	  flower	  as	  a	  flower,	  a	  top	  hat	  as	  a	  top	  hat,	  and	  a	  banana	  as	  a	  banana.	  I	  need	  not	  presuppose	  ‘that	  one	  is	  a	  flower/a	  top	  hat’	  and	   so	  on.	  When	  one	   looks	   at	  her	  mother,	   one	  does	  not	   think,	   presuppose	  or	  entertain	   ‘that	   one	   is	   my	   mother’.	   Usually	   we	   do	   not	   think,	   presuppose	   or	  entertain	  judgments	  like	  that.	  There	  would	  be	  too	  many	  judgments	  to	  entertain.	  	  Similarly,	  I	  can	  just	  simply	  see	  myself	  as	  myself.	  You	  may	  ask	  why?	  When	  I	  look	  at	  my	  hand,	  I	  need	  not	  think,	  presuppose	  or	  entertain	  ‘this	  is	  my	  hand’	  (a=b)	  in	  order	  to	  judge	  something	  about	  myself	  (e.g.	  ‘I	  have	  a	  bleeding	  hand’).	  	  In	  cases	  of	  hesitation,	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	  this	  requires	  presupposing	  and	   doubting	   a	   Frege-­‐identification.	   This	   is	   because	   if	   automatic	   object-­‐recognition	   is	  not	   in	  play,	   then	  one	  needs	   to	  demonstrate	   the	  object	  and	   then	  compare	   different	   putative	   identifications.	   For	   example,	   one	   might	   wonder	  whether	   the	  person	  whom	  one	   sees	   is	  Hildegard	  or	  Alexandra.	   Is	   that	  person	  Alexandra?	  This	  requires	  Frege-­‐identification.	  But	  in	  many	  everyday	  situations	  automatic	  object-­‐recognition	  does	  not	  require	  this.	  Evans	   and	   followers	   might	   think	   that	   I	   always	   have	   to	   entertain	   or	  presuppose	   an	   identification	   (a=b)	   in	   the	   ground	   of	   my	   thought	   Fa,	   if	  misidentification	  is	  possible.	  Their	  claim	  is	  that	  this	  is	  what	  underpins	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  conditional	  that	  if	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  a	  is	  not	  F,	  then	  I	  still	  can	  retreat	  to	  the	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claim	  that	  something	  else	  is	  F.	  But	  if	  the	  only	  reason	  is	  that	  a	  judgment	  (W)	  has	  to	   be	   based	   on	   an	   identification	   component	   whenever	   misidentification	   is	  possible,	  then	  this	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  reason	  as	  it	  begs	  the	  question.	  	  An	   opponent	   of	   mine	   would	   say	   that	   there	   are	   visual	  demonstratives/indices	  and	  that	  they	  are	  required	  when	  one	  sees	  x	  as	  x.	   I	  can	  reply	  as	  follows.	  First	  of	  all,	  if	  there	  is	  some	  demonstrative	  indexing	  like	  a	  visual	  demonstrative	   this	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   ensure	   that	   we	   have	   a	   Frege-­‐identification.	   Visual	   indices	   in	   this	   sense	   (Pylyshyn’s	   (2007)	   ‘fingers	   of	  attention’	  or	  Peacocke’s	   (2014)	  notion	  of	  visual	   index)	  are	  mechanisms	  which	  enable	   the	  subject	   to	   track	  an	  object	   in	   the	  visual	   field.	  They	  are	  categorically	  different	   from	   demonstratives	   or	   referring	   expressions.	   Visual	   indices	   are	   a	  basic	   feature	   of	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   visual	   system	   and	   independent	   of	  linguistic	   capacities.	  Visual	   indices	  enable	  us	   to	   track	  objects	  but	   they	  are	  not	  referring	   expressions	   in	   a	   language.	   Visual	   indices	   or	   demonstratives	   are	  language	  independent	  while	  Frege-­‐identification	  requires	  a	  particular	  language	  and	   not	   only	   the	   capacity	   to	   perceive.	   Furthermore,	   the	   mark	   of	   referring	  expressions	   is	   that	   the	   referent	   and	   its	   sense	   can	   be	   differentiated.	   But	   the	  mode	  of	  presentation	  and	  referent	  cannot	  be	  differentiated	  for	  visual	  indices.	  	  To	   sum	   up,	   there	   are	   no	   grounds	   for	   thinking	   that	   there	   must	   be	   a	  presupposition	  of	  the	  form	  a=b	  for	  object-­‐identification.	  	  	  
6.4.	  How	  is	  object-­‐identification	  possible	  without	  Frege-­‐identification?	  	  	  If	  I	  see	  that	  a	  lion	  is	  approaching	  or	  the	  apple	  is	  yellow,	  I,	  thereby,	  know	  that	  a	  lion	  is	  approaching	  or	  the	  apple	  is	  yellow	  (Cassam	  2007).	  Similarly,	  when	  I	  see	  Bob	  as	  Bob,	   I,	   thereby,	  know	  of	  Bob	  (Dretske	  1969).	  The	  experience	   is	  simply	  the	  experience	  of	  Bob.	  A	  key	  difference	  between	  object-­‐identification	  and	  Frege-­‐identification	  is	  that	  object-­‐identification	  is	  at	  the	  level	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  (which	   can	   be	   conceptually	   laden)	   and	   Frege-­‐identification	   is	   at	   the	   level	   of	  beliefs.	  	  A	   key	   difference	   between	   perceptual	   experience	   and	   belief	   is	   the	  following.	   Beliefs	   (as	   opposed	   to	   experiences)	   are	   always	   open	   to	   reason.	   In	  case	   one	   encounters	   evidence	   against	   a	   belief	   that	   one	   has,	   one	   is	   rationally	  obliged	   to	   alter	   the	   belief	   in	   response	   to	   the	   evidence	   against	   it.	   In	   contrast,	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experiences	  like	  visual	  experiences	  are	  belief	   independent.	  For	  example,	  when	  one	   experiences	   the	   Müller-­‐Lyer	   illusion,	   one	   will	   experience	   two	   lines	   of	  unequal	   length	   even	   though	   one	   knows	   that	   they	   are	   of	   the	   same	   length.	  Countervailing	  evidence	  would	  not	  affect	  one’s	  ability	  to	  see	  an	  object	  as	  falling	  under	  a	  kind.	  Even	  if	  I	  know	  that	  something	  is	  green	  I	  can	  still	  see	  it	  as	  red	  if	  the	  lighting	  is	  such	  as	  to	  make	  it	  look	  red.	  Seeing	  a	  trompe	  l’oeil	  does	  not	  make	  me	  think	  that	  it	  is	  three	  dimensional,	  and	  knowing	  that	  it	  is	  two	  dimensional	  does	  not	   make	   me	   see	   it	   as	   two	   dimensional.	   Perceptual	   experience	   can	   present	  things	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  even	  though	  we	  know	  that	  things	  are	  not	  that	  way.	  This	  cannot	  be	  with	  belief.	  When	  I	  presuppose	  something	   then	  when	  the	  presupposition	   turns	  out	   to	  be	  wrong	   I	   ought	   to	   revise	  my	   belief.	   But	   if	   I	   am	   experiencing	   an	   object	   as	   a	  house	  then	  it	  might	  turn	  out	  that	  even	  when	  I	  know	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  house	  I	  still	  experience	  it	  as	  a	  house.	  It	  seems	  belief	  independent	  to	  some	  degree.	  Similarly,	  seeing	  someone	  as	  Bob	  or	  only	  seeing	  someone	  without	  seeing	  him	  as	  Bob	  is	  a	  different	  experience.	  I	  might	  know	  that	  he	  is	  not	  Bob	  but	  I	  still	  can	  see	  him	  as	  Bob	   if	   the	   resemblance	   is	   overwhelming.	   It	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   it	   is	   a	   mere	  presupposition	  which	  I	  ought	  to	  revise	  if	  I	  am	  rational	  or	  that	  I	  am	  irrational	  in	  seeing	  him	  still	  as	  Bob.	  Consequently,	  recognition	  might	  only	  be	  the	  automatic	  perception	   of	   a	   particular	   object	   as	   a	   (falling	   under	   an	   individual	   concept)	  without	  relying	  on	  an	  identity	  presupposition.	  	  	  
6.5.	  Misidentification	  without	  Frege-­‐identification	  	  Recall,	   I	   argued	   that	   when	   one	   looks	   at	   her	   mother,	   one	   does	   not	   think,	  presuppose	  or	  entertain	  ‘that	  one	  is	  my	  mother’.	  How	  is	  that	  possible?	  	  Recognition	   as	   a	   capacity	   is	   acquired	   before	   the	   capacity	   to	   use	   or	  understand	   language.	   We	   recognize	   faces	   instantly	   early	   on.	   A	   child	   can	  recognise	   its	   mother	   without	   having	   demonstrative	   concepts	   and	   language.	  Face	   recognition	   is	   a	   pre-­‐linguistic	   capacity	   that	   enables	   us	   to	   use	   names	   for	  persons.	   This	   capacity	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   require	   that	   I	   can	   entertain	  demonstratives.	   The	   capacity	   to	   recognise	   people	   allows	   for	   the	  possibility	   of	  misrecognition	  even	  before	  language	  use.	  We	  can	  use	  names	  partly	  because	  we	  can	  recognise	  the	  bearer	  when	  we	  see	  him	  or	  her	  again.	  Recognition	  is	  required	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for	   naming	   an	   object	   or	   using	   a	   demonstrative	   for	   it.	   Object-­‐identification	  exploits	  this	  primitive	  capacity.	  	  There	  are	  people	  who	  cannot	   recognise	   faces,	  prosopagnosics.	  But	  object-­‐identification	  does	  not	  require	  face-­‐recognition;	  this	  is	  only	  one	  mechanism	  for	  it.	  Another	  capacity	  like	  voice	  recognition	  could	  enable	  the	  subject	  to	  recognise	  someone	   as	  n	   (where	   ‘n’	   is	   a	   proper	  name).	  But	   someone	  who	   lacks	  both	   the	  capacity	   of	   face	   and	   voice	   (or	   other	   forms	   of)	   recognition	   might	   require	  identification	  for	  being	  aware	  that	  someone	  observed	  falls	  under	  an	  individual	  concept.	   For	   example,	  Oliver	   Sacks	   (2010)	   cannot	   recognise	   even	  his	   brother.	  Sacks	   asks	   all	   of	   his	   acquaintances	   to	   introduce	   themselves	   to	   him	  whenever	  they	   meet	   with	   him.	   He	   always	   requires	   an	   identity	   presupposition	   to	   see	  someone	  as	  x.	  But	  we	  are	  not	  like	  him!	  This	  might	  be	  a	  possibility,	  but	  not	  for	  us	  and	  not	  for	  all	  cases.	  	  However,	   one	   could	   introduce	   a	   new	   notion	   of	   Identification-­‐freedom	   for	  accommodating	   OI	   in	   addition	   to	   FI.	   On	   this	   suggestion,	   when	   we	   say	   that	   a	  judgement	   is	   identification-­‐free,	   it	   should	   be	   free	   from	   both	   OI	   and	   FI.	   The	  question	  is	  whether	  this	  view	  is	  correct.	  	  
6.6.	  Object-­‐identification	  does	  not	  always	  exclude	  IEM	  Accepting	   object-­‐identification	   may	   be	   harmless.	   It	   might	   be	   the	   case	   that	  ‘identification’	   in	   identification-­‐freedom	   means	   both	   object-­‐identification	   and	  Frege-­‐identification,	  and	  IEM	  excludes	  both.	  Identification-­‐free	  judgment	  is	  free	  from	  both	   object	   and	   Frege-­‐identification	   on	   that	   view.	   If	   this	   is	   true	   then	   all	  cases	   of	   object-­‐identification	   have	   to	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification.	  The	   question	   arises	   whether	   all	   object-­‐identifications	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification.	  	  Unfortunately,	   there	   are	   judgments	   which	   are	   based	   on	   object-­‐identification	  and	  which	  are	  still	  immune.	  Thus,	  not	  every	  object-­‐identification	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	  	  For	  a	  perceptual	  demonstrative	   I	  have	   to	  have	  an	  object	  which	   I	  perceive	  and	   to	   which	   I	   refer	   by	   using	   a	   demonstrative,	   like	   ‘that	   one’.	   For	   using	   a	  perceptual	   demonstrative	   I	   have	   to	   perceive	   an	   object	   and	   take	   it	   to	   be	   the	  referent	  of	  that	  demonstrative.	  I	  cannot	  use	  the	  demonstrative	  for	  referring	  to	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that	   object	   unless	   I	   think	   that	   the	   object	   falls	   under	   the	   individual	  demonstrative	  concept.	  For	  this	  reason	  object-­‐identification	  is	  required	  for	  all	  uses	   of	   perceptual	   demonstratives.	   Object-­‐identification	   is	   a	   necessary	  prerequisite	  to	  use	  a	  demonstrative.	  	  On	  most	  accounts	  a	  demonstrative	  judgment	  like	  ‘That	  one	  is	  here’	  or	  ‘That	  one	  looks	  terrible’	  based	  on	  vision	  is	  immune	  relative	  to	  ‘that	  one’	  (Evans	  1982,	  Campbell	  2002).	  But	  identification	  of	  the	  object	  (OI)	  plays	  a	  constitutive	  role	  in	  fixing	   the	   referent	   of	   the	   perceptual	   demonstrative.	   The	   reference	   of	   the	  demonstrative	   is	   fixed	   via	   attention	   and	   the	   subject’s	   intention	   to	   fix	   the	  referent	   of	   the	   perceptual	   demonstrative	   to	   the	   object	   perceived	   (Campbell	  2002,	  2007).	  Thus,	  nothing	  but	  the	  referent	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  that	  way	  for	  a	  perceptual	  demonstrative	  as	  the	  referent.	  Object-­‐identification	  is	  the	  way	  to	  fix	  the	  referent	  of	  a	  demonstrative.	  So	  for	  a	  perceptual-­‐demonstrative	  judgement,	  
Fd	   (W),	   grounded	   on	   object-­‐identification,	   if	   this	   OI	   fixes	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘d’	  through	   W	   then	   such	   object-­‐identification	   does	   not	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification.	  Why	  do	  we	  find	  a	  difference	  between	  Evans’s	  and	  Shoemaker’s	  notions	  of	  IEM?	   In	   part	   I	   of	   this	   chapter,	   I	   mentioned	   that	   Evans	   developed	   the	  characterisation	  of	   IEM	   for	  understanding	   the	   IEM	  of	   demonstrative	   thoughts	  and	   generalised	   it	   to	   understand	   the	   IEM	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions.	   In	   contrast,	  Shoemaker	  worked	  out	  the	  characterisation	  of	  IEM	  primarily	  for	  immune	  self-­‐ascriptions.78	  So	  for	  Evans	  –	  as	  we	  might	  expect	  –	  object-­‐identification	  does	  not	  open	   the	  possibility	   of	  misidentification.	   This	   is	   because,	   for	   his	   paradigmatic	  case	   of	   IEM	   (the	   immune	   demonstrative	   thought),	   object-­‐identification	   is	  necessary	   for	   fixing	   the	   referent.	  But	   for	  Shoemaker	  who	   is	   interested	   in	   self-­‐ascriptions,	   object-­‐identification	   is	   important;	   it	   opens	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification.	  As	  I	  have	  shown	  object-­‐identification	  does	  not	  always	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	   misidentification.	   For	   perceptual	   demonstratives,	   object-­‐identification	   is	  involved	  in	  the	  reference	  fixing	  relation.	  It	  actually	  enables	  the	  subject	  to	  use	  a	  demonstrative	   term	   to	   an	   object.	   Thus	   ‘identification’	   in	   the	   Identification-­‐
                                                78	  Evans’s	  discussion	  of	  immune	  self-­‐ascriptions	  mentions	  identification-­‐freedom	  only	  twice.	  He	  does	  not	  try	  to	  show	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascription	  (Evans	  1982:	  221,	  223).	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freedom	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  cannot	  mean	  both	  object-­‐identification	  and	  Frege-­‐identification.	   Object-­‐identification	   does	   not	   always	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification.	  	  One	   might	   suggest	   that	   every	   object-­‐identification	   presupposes	   a	   Frege-­‐identification.	  But	  this	  response	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Identification-­‐freedom	  theorist	  would	   not	   work.	   There	   is	   a	   problem	   in	   thinking	   that	   object-­‐identification	  requires	  or	  presupposes	  an	  identification.	  Suppose	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  object-­‐identification	  presupposes	  Frege-­‐identification.	  Object-­‐identification	  is	  required	  for	  demonstrative	  thoughts.	  For	  the	  subject,	  to	  use	  a	  demonstrative	  requires	   thinking	   that	   a	   particular	   object	   falls	   under	   an	   individual	  demonstrative	   concept.	   Thus	   we	   have	   to	   have	   Frege-­‐identification,	   if	   object-­‐identification	   presupposes	   Frege-­‐identification,	   for	   all	   demonstratives.	  Following	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  if	  demonstrative	  thought	  can	  be	  immune,	  then	  for	  such	   thoughts	   Frege-­‐identification	   does	   not	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification.	   But	   this	   is	   worse	   for	   Evans,	   because	   then	   even	   Frege-­‐identification	  does	  not	  always	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	  	  
7.	  Summary	  for	  Part	  II	  The	   identification-­‐freedom	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   presumes	   that	   identification	  opens	   the	   possibility	   of	   misidentification.	   But	   there	   is	   an	   ambiguity	   in	   the	  notion	  of	  ‘identification’.	  Identification-­‐freedom	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  covering	  both	  first-­‐person	  and	  demonstrative	  IEM.	  	  	  The	  first	  reason	  is	  that	  what	  Shoemaker	  and	  Evans	  mean	  by	  ‘identification’	  in	   identification-­‐freedom	   is	   different.	   Shoemaker	   means	   object-­‐identification	  and	   Frege-­‐identification,	   while	   Evans	   means	   Frege-­‐identification	   only.	   I	   have	  argued	  that	  object-­‐identification	  is	  different	  from	  Frege-­‐identification.	  The	  second	  reason	  is	  that	  immune	  ‘I’-­‐judgments	  and	  ‘that’-­‐judgements	  are	  free	  from	  different	  kinds	  of	   identification.	  Identification-­‐freedom	  cannot	  be	  a	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  (for	  all	  kinds	  of	  IEM)	  if	  the	  notions	  of	  ‘identification’	  are	  different	  depending	  on	  which	  kind	  of	   judgment	   (‘I’,	   ‘that’)	   is	   immune.	  But	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  we	  found.	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Third,	   it	   seems	   what	   explains	   the	   immunity	   of	   demonstrative	   thoughts	  (‘that’-­‐thoughts)	   does	   not	   explain	   the	   immunity	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions	   and	   vice	  versa.	  Consequently,	   I	   have	   provided	   three	   reasons	   to	   think	   that	   identification-­‐freedom	  explanation	  cannot	  serve	  as	  a	  general	  explanation	  of	   immunity	  at	  all.	  Thus	  we	  need	  to	  find	  a	  general	  explanation	  for	  IEM.	  This	  is	  the	  task	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  	   	  	  
Appendix:	  Identification-­‐dependent	  Immunity?	  	  There	  are	  several	  dedicated	  ways	  of	  knowing	  like	  proprioception,	  introspection,	  interoceptive	  awareness	  (monitoring	  and	  registering	   the	   internal	  states	  of	   the	  body,	   like	   hunger),	   kinaesthesia,	   sense	   of	   balance,	   sense	   of	   pain,	   etc.	   Nothing	  excludes	  the	  possibility	  that	  I	  can	  use	  a	  demonstrative	  to	  the	  object	  of	  which	  I	  know	  through	  one	  of	  such	  way	  of	  knowing.	  If	  I	  use	  a	  demonstrative	  ‘that	  one’	  to	  the	  object	  which	  I	  know	  through	  a	  dedicated	  way	  of	  knowing,	  then	  I	  might	  think	  ‘that	  one	  is	  me’.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  construct	  a	  case	  when	  my	  judgment	  based	  on	  a	   dedicated	   way	   of	   knowing	   is	   grounded	   on	   an	   identification	   (Frege-­‐identification)	  but	  is	  still	  immune.	  	  	  
Identification-­‐dependent	  Immunity	   	  We	  can	  imagine	  a	  Buddhist	  monk	  who	  tries	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  self.	  The	  monk	  only	  concentrates	   on	   sensations	   and	   tries	   to	   lose	   everything	   over	   and	   above	   the	  experience.	   (A	   neo-­‐Humean	   might	   join	   in	   this	   exercise.)	   Suppose	   I	   am	   this	  monk.	  Consider	  a	  case	  in	  mediation	  when	  I	  know	  through	  proprioception	  that	  I	  have	  my	  legs	  crossed.	  I	  try	  to	  focus	  all	  my	  attention	  on	  feeling	  that;	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  grasp	  its	  phenomenology.	  I	  am	  forbidden	  to	  think	  about	  anything	  except	  my	  sensation.	  To	  develop	  such	  an	  exercise	  I	  will	  think	  of	  that	  object	  which	  I	  know	  through	  proprioception	  as	  ‘that	  one’.	  I	  am	  immersed	  in	  my	  investigation	  and	  am	  writing	  down	  what	   is	   true	  of	   ‘that	  one’.	   I	  do	  not	  pay	  attention	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  ‘that	  one	  is	  me’	  for	  a	  split	  second.	  So	  I	  think	  that	  ‘That	  one	  has	  her	  legs	  crossed’.	  I	  realize	  at	  once	  that	  I	  am	  that	  one,	  but	  my	  legs	  are	  not	  crossed	  any	  more.	  I	  think	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‘I	  had	  my	   legs	   crossed’	  based	  only	  on	  proprioception.	   (I	   am	  not	  a	  determined	  neo-­‐Humean	  monk	  after	   all.)	   First,	   I	   think	   ‘that	   one	  has	  her	   legs	   crossed’	   and	  second	   I	   think	   ‘I	   am	   that	   one’.	   Nobody	   except	  me	   can	   be	   the	   one	  whose	   legs	  were	   crossed.	   I	   knew	   it	   through	   proprioception	   a	   moment	   ago.79	  What	   I	   am	  trying	   to	   describe	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   possibility	   even	   if	   such	   a	   situation	   might	  never	  occur.	  	  This	   example	   could	   be	   developed	   differently	   using	   actual	   cases	   of	   such	  enterprises.	  A	  possibility	  would	  be	  using	  a	  believer	  in	  introspection	  as	  a	  method	  of	  empirical	  study	  in	  psychology.	  Members	  of	  the	  fin-­‐de-­‐siècle	  Würzburg	  School	  involved	  in	  the	  ‘introspectionist	  movement’	  in	  psychology	  would	  engage	  in	  such	  exercises	  of	   introspection,	  and	   it	   is	  quite	  possible	   that	   they	  concentrated	  only	  on	  the	  sensations	  and	  forgot	  the	  subject	  for	  a	  moment.	  This	  is	  possible	  because	  in	   some	   cases	   the	   knowledge	   I	   have	   that	   the	  pain	   is	  mine	   and	   that	   I	   know	  of	  myself	  may	  only	  be	  implicit.	  	  I	   do	   not	   see	   what	   would	   exclude	   the	   possibility	   that	   my	   judgment	   is	  grounded	   on	   thinking	   about	   myself	   through	   two	   different	   dedicated	   ways	   of	  knowing	   and	   identifying	   of	   whom	   I	   am	   thinking	   about.	   Introspection	   and	  proprioception	   seem	   to	   give	   me	   the	   same	   object	   in	   different	   ways,	   but	   the	  object	   is	  necessarily	  the	  same.	  Thus	  I	  can	   identify	  the	  two	  objects	  by	  realizing	  their	   identity,	   but	   I	   cannot	   be	  mistaken	   in	   realizing	   such	   identity.	   This	   is	   the	  case	  even	  when	  I	  employ	  a	  demonstrative	  concept	  like	  ‘that	  one’.	  ‘I	  had	  my	  legs	  crossed’	  is	   identification	  dependent	  because	  it	   is	  grounded	  on	  ‘that	  one	  is	  me’,	  and	   it	   is	   immune.	   If	   I	   am	   correct	   then	   I	   have	   found	   a	   case	   of	   identification-­‐dependent	   immunity.	   I	   cannot	  misidentify	  who	  has	   her	   legs	   crossed,	   thus	  my	  thought	   ‘I	   had	   my	   legs	   crossed’	   based	   on	   proprioception,	   introspection,	   and	  inference	   –	   including	   an	   identification	   component	   (a=b)	   –	   is	   immune.	   Here	  ‘Identification’	  means	  Frege-­‐identification.	  
                                                79	  Let	  me	  set	  aside	  rewiring	  cases	  and	  assume	  that	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  cases	  involving	  the	  kind	  of	   proprioception	   which	   we	   have	   and	   not	   a	   different,	   rewired	   kind.	   One	   might	   have	   her	  proprioception	   rewired	   to	   someone	   else	   and	   may	   be	   able	   to	   believe	   on	   this	   basis	   that	   that	  person’s	  legs	  are	  crossed.	  I	  discuss	  such	  cases	  in	  chapter	  10.	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On	  the	  face	  of	  it	  this	  case	  seems	  possible.80	  But	  it	  is	  excluded	  by	  any	  version	  of	  the	  Identification-­‐freedom	  explanation	  of	  immunity.	  So	  this	  casts	  some	  doubt	  on	  the	  Identification-­‐freedom	  explanation.	  	  Evans	  requires	  that	  the	  ‘Ideas’	  in	  a=b	  have	  to	  be	  different.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  concept	  or	  the	  mode	  of	  presentation	  have	  to	  be	  different	  for	  ‘a’	  and	  ‘b’.	  The	  modes	   of	   presentation	   (MP)	   seem	   to	   be	   different	   in	   our	   example	   (a	  demonstrative	   MP	   for	   ‘this	   one’,	   a	   first	   person	   MP	   for	   ‘me’).	   However,	   the	  thought	   ‘that	   oneknown	  through	  propioception	   is	  me’	   is	   necessarily	   true.	   The	  modes	   of	  presentation	  seem	  to	  be	  different	  but	  the	  ways	  the	  referent	  of	  the	  two	  terms	  are	  fixed,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  different,	  necessarily	  provide	  the	  same	  object	  as	  referent.	  If	  this	  possibility	  is	  open,	  then	  identification-­‐dependent	  immunity	  is	  possible.	  One	   might	   think	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   not	   to	   be	   aware	   that	   the	   object	  which	  I	  know	  of	  through	  proprioception	  is	  me.	  This	  is	  not	  so	  clear.	  Experiencing	  something	  involves	  attending	  to	  that	  thing.	  I	  can	  redirect	  my	  attention	  by	  will.	  I	  can	  attend	  to	  what	  my	  proprioceptive	  experience	  when	  I	  want	  to	  consider	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  me.	  The	  way	  that	  humans	  focus	  their	  attention	  allows	  that	  we	  screen	  out	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  experience,	  so	  one	  might	  screen	  out	  the	  ‘myness’	  in	   the	   experience	   for	   a	   split	   second	   when	   focusing	   one’s	   attention	   on	   the	  phenomenal	  qualities	  of	  one’s	  experience.	  Phenomenological	  speaking	  there	   is	  nothing	  which	  excludes	  this	  possibility.	  	  There	   are	   other	   reasons	   to	   support	   my	   claim.	   There	   are	   Frege-­‐identifications	  which	  are	  necessarily	  true.	  For	  a	  square	  the	  number	  of	  the	  sides	  and	  the	  number	  of	  the	  angles	  are	  necessarily	  the	  same.	  	  The	  number	  of	  sides	  is	  a	  different	   MP	   from	   the	   number	   of	   angles,	   thus	   this	   is	   an	   example	   of	   a	   Frege-­‐identification.	   It	   is	   possible	   in	   principle	   that	   for	   two	   referring	   expression,	   a’s	  and	   b’s	   reference	   is	   fixed	   differently	   but	   their	   reference	   is	  necessarily	   the	  
same.	  It	  is	  possible,	  like	  in	  this	  case,	  that	  the	  subject	  could	  not	  doubt	  the	  truth	  
                                                80	  One	  way	  to	  understand	  would	  be	  as	  follows.	  When	  I	  know	  of	  myself	  through	  proprioception	  the	  mode	  of	  presentation	  is	  a	  demonstrative	  mode	  of	  presentation:	  ‘this	  object’	  or	  a	  hybrid:	  ‘this	  object	  which	  is	  known	  through	  proprioception’	  (demonstrative-­‐descriptive).	  I	  realise	  that	  I	  am	  this	  object	  based	  on	  introspection.	  Thus	  I	  have	  a	  mode	  of	  presentation	  through	  proprioception	  and	  a	  demonstrative.	  The	  subject	  takes	  it	  that	  they	  are	  representations	  of	  the	  same	  object	  and	  they	  are	  necessarily	  representations	  of	  the	  same	  object.	  	  I	  try	  to	  show	  that	  if	  there	  is	  an	  identification	  in	  introspection	  then	  this	  identification	  would	  be	  harmless.	  The	  Identification-­‐freedom	  theorist	  has	  to	  respond	  either	  that	  such	  identification	  is	  not	  possible	  or	  that	  such	  identification	  is	  not	  the	  kind	  of	  identification	  which	  is	  excluded	  by	  Identification-­‐freedom.	  
 127	  
of	  a=b	  even	  though	  the	  MPs	  of	  the	  two	  terms	  are	  different.	  This	  means	  that	  here	  we	   have	   a	   case	   of	   Frege-­‐identification	   where	   its	   truth	   cannot	   be	   questioned	  (with	  intact	  cognitive	  capacities).	  However,	  Frege-­‐identification	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  such	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  subject	  doubts	  it.	  But	  one	  cannot	  doubt	  that	  the	  number	  of	   the	  sides	  and	  angles	  of	   the	  square	   is	   identical.	   Similarly,	   in	  my	  example	   the	   truth	   of	   ‘that	   oneknown	   through	   propioception	   is	   me’	   cannot	   be	   doubted	  without	   the	   subject	  having	  a	   cognitive	  deficit.	   ‘That	  oneknown	  through	  propioception	   is	  me’	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  Frege-­‐identification	  but	  its	  truth	  cannot	  be	  doubted	  without	  compromising	   the	   subject’s	   sanity.	   This	   is	   a	   Frege-­‐identification	   which	   is	  necessarily	   true.	   Because	   ‘I	   had	   my	   legs	   crossed’	   is	   based	   on	   a	   Frege-­‐identification	  which	  is	  necessarily	  true	  and	  which	  cannot	  be	  doubted,	  I	  cannot	  misidentify	  whose	  legs	  were	  crossed	  on	  this	  basis.	  Consequently,	  I	  have	  found	  a	  case	  of	  identification-­‐dependent	  IEM.	  	  A	   defender	   of	   Identification-­‐freedom	   will	   immediately	   reply	   with	   the	  following	   reformulation:	   identification-­‐free	   thought,	  Fa	   based	  on	  W	  cannot	  be	  grounded	  on	  an	  identity	  (a=b)	  based	  on	  W	  except	  where	  a=b	  is	  necessarily	  true.	  I	  do	  not	  object	  to	  this	  revision	  of	  Identification-­‐freedom	  because	  it	  shows	  that	  what	   matters	   is	   not	   Identification-­‐freedom,	   but	   how	   the	   reference	   is	   fixed.	  Moreover	   it	   directs	   our	   attention	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   knowing	   from	   the	   inside	  should	   figure	  should	   figure	   into	   the	  explanation	  of	   the	   IEM	  of	   self-­‐ascriptions.	  Thus,	   it	   seems	   that	  what	  bears	   the	  explanatory	  burden	   is	   the	  kind	  of	  way	   the	  subject	   knows	   of	   the	   object	   and	   its	   properties.	   I	  will	   develop	   this	   idea	   in	   the	  following	  chapters.	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Chapter	  7	  
The	  General	  Explanation	  of	  IEM	  and	  	  
the	  Reference-­‐fixing	  Relation	  	  
	  
 
Abstract	  I	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   general	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   has	   to	   employ	   the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  will	  show	  that,	  for	  a	  singular	  term	  ‘a’	  in	   a	   judgement	  Fa	  (W),	   only	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule	   can	   rule	   out	   the	  possibility	  that	  nothing	  but	  a	   is	  what	  the	  subject	  thinks	  about	  as	  F	   (on	  basis	  W).	  This	   general	   explanation	  of	   IEM	   is	   able	   to	   accommodate	   the	  difference	   between	   the	   two	   kinds	   of	   IEM,	   demonstrative	   and	   first-­‐person	   IEM.	   Their	   difference	   will	   be	   traced	   to	   a	   difference	   in	   the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rules	  involved	  in	  each	  kind	  of	  IEM.	  	  	  	  
1.	  The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Reference-­‐fixing	  Idea	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  should	  figure	  into	  the	  explanation	   of	   IEM.	   The	   idea	   that	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule	   should	   be	   a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  is	  not	  new.	  The	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  figures	   into	   the	   general	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   for	   Peacocke	   (2008:	   92)	   and	  Campbell	  (2013).	  But	  they	  suppose	  that	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  IEM	  of	   ‘I’-­‐thoughts	   and	   demonstrative	   thoughts.	   Peacocke,	   for	   example,	   uses	   the	  reference-­‐fixing	  relation	   in	  his	  explanation	  of	   IEM,	  but	   this	   is	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  general	  explanation	  of	  all	  kinds	  of	  IEM	  without	  allowing	  for	  a	  modal	  difference	  (Factual	   versus	   Strong	   Identification-­‐freedom).	   The	   difference	   between	   my	  view	  and	  their	  views	  is	  the	  following.	  I	  argued	  that	  there	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  IEM	  and	  I	  will	  offer	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  IEM,	  relying	   on	   the	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   and	   a	   singular	  demonstrative	  are	  fixed.	  On	  my	  proposal	  a	  judgement	  Fa	  (W)	  is	  immune	  iff	  the	  referent	   of	   ‘a’	   is	   fixed	   through	  W	   (with	   further	   constraints).	   If	   this	   is	   correct	  then	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  figures	  into	  the	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	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2.	  The	  Challenge	  of	  the	  Missing	  Unique	  Object	  In	   discussing	   Evans,	   I	   distinguished	   the	   Special-­‐basis	   explanation	   from	   the	  Factual	   Identification-­‐freedom	   explanation.	   A	   version	   of	   the	   former	   was	   first	  introduced	  by	  Shoemaker	  (see	  chapters	  4	  and	  6).	  According	  to	  the	  Special-­‐basis	  explanation,	   for	   the	   subject,	   there	   are	   certain	   special	  ways	   of	   knowing	  which	  are	  private,	  and	  only	  a	  unique	  object,	  the	  subject,	  can	  be	  known	  through	  them.	  I	  called	   such	   ways	   of	   knowing	  ways	   of	   knowing	   from	   the	   inside.	   When	   the	  subject	  knows	  from	  the	  inside	  that	  she	  is	  in	  pain,	  hungry	  or	  out	  of	  balance,	  then	  the	   subject	   cannot	   misidentify	   who	   is	   in	   pain/hungry/out	   of	   balance.	   This	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  nice	  and	  simple	  explanation	  of	   the	   immunity	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  But	   this	   cannot	   be	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	   immune	   of	   demonstrative	   thoughts	  based	  on	  multiple-­‐object	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  as	  I	  argued	  in	  chapter	  6.	  	  This	   raises	   the	   following	   question:	   What	   can	   ensure,	   for	   an	   IEM	  demonstrative	   thought,	  Fd	   (W),	   that	  nothing	  but	  d	   –	  only	   this	  unique	  object	  –	  can	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  F,	  on	  this	  basis	  W,	  if	  anything	  is	  F?	  To	  explain	  the	  IEM	  of	  an	  immune	  demonstrative	  thought,	  Fd	  (W),	  we	  have	  to	  explain	  why	  only	  a	  unique	  object	  and	  nothing	  else	  can	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  F	  (W).	  This	  is	  easy	  for	  immune	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  If,	  for	  Fi,	  knowing	  from	  the	  inside	  provides	  the	  subject	  only	  with	  a	  unique	   object,	   herself,	   then	   there	   is	   no	   problem	   explaining	  why,	   known	   only	  from	  the	  inside,	  nothing	  but	  the	  subject	  has	  to	  be	  F,	  if	  anything	  is	  F.	  	  For	   demonstrative	   thoughts,	   the	   way	   of	   knowing	   is	   typically	   a	   multiple-­‐	  object	  way	  of	  knowing.	  Through	  vision	  or	  touch,	  many	  different	  objects	  can	  be	  known.	  For	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  based	  on	  vision	  or	  touch,	  nothing	  ensures	  that	  only	  a	  unique	  object	   is	  known	  to	  be	  F.	  What	  would	  ensure	   that	   if	   I	  know	  that	  something	  is	  F	  through	  vision,	  or	  a	  multiple-­‐object	  perceptual	  faculty,	  then	  there	  can	  only	  be	  one	  object	  which	  I	  can	  think	  is	  F	  (W)?	  This	  poses	  a	  powerful	  challenge	  for	  understanding	  how	  IEM	  of	  demonstrative	  thought	  is	  possible.	  Call	  this	   challenge	   for	   an	   account	   of	   demonstrative	   IEM,	   the	   challenge	   of	   the	  
missing	  unique	  object.	  	  This	  challenge	  divides	  into	  two	  questions:	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1. How	  do	  we	  get	  the	  unique	  object	  for	  a	  demonstrative	  referring	  term	  in	  a	  demonstrative	  thought?	  2. What	  could	  ensure	  for	  a	  perceptual	  demonstrative	  Fd	  (W)	  that	  only	  the	  unique	  object	  d	  can	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  F	  (W)?	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  will	  answer	  the	  first	  question	  and	  how	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  figures	  into	  the	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  will	  answer	  the	  second	  question.	  	  
3.	  Reference	  and	  the	  Reference-­‐fixing	  Relation	  Let	  me	  start	  by	  discussing	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  relation	  and	  how	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  for	  different	  kinds	  of	  terms	  differs.	  We	  use	  singular	  terms	  like	  proper	  names,	  demonstratives	  and	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun;	  their	  function	  is	  to	  stand	  for	  objects	  in	  the	  world.	  This	  enables	  us	  to	  gain	  and	  store	  knowledge	  of	  objects	  in	   the	   world	   and	   revise	   our	   beliefs	   if	   they	   are	   wrong.	   A	   singular	   referring	  expression	   stands	   for	   a	   certain	   object	   and	   a	   singular	   thought	   contains	   such	  expressions.	  There	  are	  two	  questions	  related	  to	  reference	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  shortly:	  (i)	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  a	  singular	  term	  stands	  for	  an	  object?	  (ii)	   How	   is	   the	   referent	   of	   the	   singular	   term	   fixed	   to	   the	   object	   to	   which	   it	  refers?	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  first	  question.	  A	  singular	   term	  purports	   to	  refer	   to	  a	  particular	  object	   in	  a	   judgment,	  but	  not	  all	  singular	  terms	  succeed	  in	  referring.	  ‘Vulcan’	  is	  one	  of	  such	  example.	  But	  most	  of	  the	  singular	  terms	  are	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  existing	  objects	  in	  the	  world;	  we	  call	   this	   subclass	   referring	   singular	   terms.81	  Such	   a	   referring	   singular	   term	  succeeds	  in	  referring	  and	  standing	  for	  the	  referred	  object.	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  stand	  for	  an	  object?	  There	   is	  a	   referring	  singular	   term	  and	  an	  object	  which	   is	   its	   referent.	  The	  referring	   singular	   term	   makes	   this	   object	   available	   for	   the	   thinker	   to	   think	  about.	  We	   can	   think	   that	   the	   referring	   singular	   term	   is	   tagging	   the	   object.	   It	  makes	   communication	   about	   the	   object	   possible.	   This	   enables	   the	   subject,	   if	  
                                                81	  There	  are	  non-­‐referring	  singular	  terms.	  When	  such	  a	  term	  is	  used,	  it	  at	  least	  purports	  to	  refer	  (e.g.:	  Phoenix,	  Vulcan).	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certain	  further	  conditions	  are	  met,	  to	  acquire,	  store	  and	  integrate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  object	  and	  revise	  it.	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  thoughts:	  J1. Caligula	  was	  a	  roman	  emperor.	  J2. Caligula	  was	  mad.	  J3. This	  apple	  is	  green.	  J4. I	  am	  skinny.	  ‘Caligula’	   stands	   for	   an	   object,	   a	   certain	   person.	   J1	   is	   true	   in	   case	   that	   person	  was	  a	   roman	  emperor	  and	   J2	   is	   true	   if	  he	  was	  mad.	  When	  one	  uses	   ‘Caligula’,	  one	  uses	  it	  for	  that	  person,	  and	  may	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  that	  person.	  In	  order	  to	  decide	  whether	   J1	   is	   true	  we	   have	   to	   look	   at	  whether	   that	   person	   for	  whom	  ‘Caligula’	   stands	   was	   a	   roman	   emperor.	   Different	   occurrences	   of	   ‘Caligula’	   in	  different	  sentences	  in	  all	  counterfactual	  situations	  will	  stand	  for	  the	  same	  object	  (Kripke	  1980).	  Let	   me	   differentiate	   between	   the	   type	   and	   individual	   tokens	   of	   the	   first	  person	   pronoun.	   The	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   is	   a	   type,	   a	   token	   of	  which	   can	   be	  used	  on	  many	  occasions	  for	  different	  persons.	  Thus,	  when	  I	  use	  ‘I’,	  I	  use	  a	  token	  of	  it.	  When	  ‘I’	   is	  uttered,	  in	  a	  particular	  situation,	  by	  a	  particular	  speaker,	  then	  what	   is	   uttered	   is	   a	   token	   of	   the	   type	   ‘I’.	   A	   token	   of	   an	   indexical	   refers	   to	   an	  object,	   place	   or	   time	   depending	   on	   its	   type	   (‘that’	   –	   used	   for	   a	   perceptual	  demonstrative,	   ‘now’,	   ‘here’,	   ‘I’).	   The	   type	   ‘I’	   can	   be	   uttered	   in	   different	  situations,	  but	  its	  referent	  is	  different	  if	  the	  speaker	  is	  different.	  Thus	  different	  occurrences	   of	   indexicals	   in	   different	   counterfactual	   situations	   can	   stand	   for	  different	  objects.	  	  Similarly,	  different	   tokens	  of	   the	  same	  type	  of	  a	  perceptual	  demonstrative	  may	   stand	   for	   a	   different	   object.	   The	   token	   perceptual	   demonstrative:	   ‘this	  apple’	  in	  J3	  is	  uttered	  on	  a	  certain	  occasion;	  it	  stands	  for	  an	  object	  of	  which	  the	  speaker	  thinks	  about	  and	  intends	  to	  refer	  to	  in	  this	  situation.	  There	  is	  an	  object	  in	  experience	  which	  ‘this	  apple’	  stands	  for.	  The	  token	  ‘I’	  in	  the	  thought	  J4,	  in	  the	  situation	  when	  it	   is	  uttered,	   ‘I	  am	  skinny’,	  stands	  –	  as	   is	  commonly	  assumed	  –	  for	   the	   thinker/speaker.	   It	   is	   true	   iff	   the	   object	   which	   is	   me	   (if	   I	   am	   the	  thinker/speaker)	  is	  skinny	  at	  the	  time	  when	  this	  is	  uttered.	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To	  sum	  up,	  a	  referring	  singular	  term,	  like	  ‘Caligula’,	  ‘this	  apple’,	  or	  ‘I’,	  serves	  in	   a	   language	   to	   pick	   out	   an	   individual	   object	   and	   can	   be	   used	   to	   think	   or	  communicate	  something	  about	  that	  particular	  object.	  A	  referring	  singular	  term	  stands	  for	  an	  object.	  The	  question	  arises	  what	  a	  use	  of	  a	  referring	  singular	  term,	  a,	  involves.	  To	  use	   a	   referring	   expression,	  a,	  which	   stands	   for	   an	  object,	  o,	   involves,	   roughly,	  the	  following	  conditions.	  (About	  my	  notation:	  o	  is	  not	  a	  name	  for	  an	  object	  but	  it	  stands	  for	  the	  object	  itself.)	  The	  first	  is:	  	  C1. The	  subject	  thinks	  about	  o,	  the	  referent	  of	  a,	  in	  some	  way.	  	  	  It	  is	  not	  sufficient	  that	  ‘a’	  stands	  for	  an	  object.	  The	  subject	  has	  to	  use	  ‘a’	  for	  an	  object	   in	   order	   to	   use	   it	   as	   a	   referring	   term.	   This	   condition	   requires	   that	   the	  subject	  knows	  which	  object	  she	  is	  thinking	  about	  in	  one	  or	  another	  way.	  	  The	  second	  condition	  is	  this:	  	  C2. For	   a	   thought	   Fa,	   the	   truth	   of	   Fa	   depends	   on	   whether	   the	   particular	  object	  o	  which	  ‘a’	  refers	  to	  is	  F.	  	  	  We	  saw	   that	   the	   singular	   term	   ‘a’	   stands	   for	  an	  object.	  For	  Fa	   to	  be	   true,	   that	  object	  –	  which	  the	  singular	  term	  ‘a’	  stands	  for	  –	  has	  to	  be	  F.	  A	  question	  arises	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  referring	  singular	  term	  stands	  for	  an	   object.	   Why	   is	   it	   not	   standing	   for	   something	   other	   than	   its	   referent	   or	  nothing	  at	  all?	  For	  any	  use	  of	  the	  proper	  name,	  c,	  c	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  thing.82	  At	  least	  when	  we	  –	   in	  our	   linguistic	   community	  –	  do	  not	  know	  more	   than	  one	  person	  called	  Caligula,	   then	   ‘Caligula’	  always	  refers	   to	  Caligula	  whenever	   it	   is	  used	   in	  our	   community.	   Suppose	   I	   forget	   Nero’s	   name	   and	   use	   ‘Caligula’	   instead	   of	  ‘Nero’.	  Would	  it	  be	  the	  case	  that	  in	  J2	  ‘Caligula’	  refers	  to	  Nero?	  Obviously	  not!	  So	  
                                                82	  Let	  us	  avoid	  difficulties	  arising	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  two	  people	  can	  have	  the	  same	  name	  (Burge	  1973).	  Francis	  Bacon	  can	  be	  the	  philosopher	  or	  the	  painter	  and	  many	  other	  people	  can	  have	  the	  same	  name.	  Burge	  takes	  proper	  names	  to	  be	  indexical	  expressions.	  Proper	  names	  are	  types,	  so	  they	  have	  to	  be	  indexed	  and	  the	  context	  disambiguates	  which	  index	  we	  have	  to	  use	  for	  a	  token	  proper	  name.	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J2	   is	   true	   even	   if	   one	   utters	   it	   intending	   to	   say	   something	   about	   Nero.	  Consequently,	   there	  should	  be	   rules	  which	   fix	   their	   reference.	  Call	   these	   rules	  the	  rules	  of	  reference-­‐fixing.	  Similarly,	   I	   cannot	   use	   ‘I’	   for	   something	   other	   than	   myself,	   and	   I	   cannot	  succeed	  in	  using	  ‘here’	  for	  a	  place	  far	  away,	  or	  using	  ‘now’	  for	  another	  time	  than	  the	  time	  of	  utterance.	  I	  might	  think	  today	  is	  my	  birthday	  so	  I	  can	  hope	  to	  get	  a	  cake	  now	  even	  though	  it	  will	  be	  tomorrow.	  I	  might	  try	  to	  use	  ‘here’	  or	  ‘now’	  for	  the	  wrong	  place	  or	  time,	  but	  I	  will	  not	  succeed	  in	  referring	  to	  the	  wrong	  place	  or	  time.	  	  Demonstratives	  have	  a	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  as	  well.	  On	  different	  occasions	  of	   use,	   a	   singular	   demonstrative	   referring	   term	   type	   can	   refer	   to	   different	  objects.	   In	   the	  same	  situation	  where	   there	   is	  an	  apple	  on	   the	  right	  and	  on	   the	  left,	  I	  might	  refer	  to	  the	  right	  or	  to	  the	  left	  apple	  by	  using	  a	  token	  demonstrative	  term	  (‘that	  apple’).	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  subject’s	  intention	  determines	  which	  object	  the	   referent	   is	   in	   a	   particular	   situation.	   The	   subject	   intends	   to	   refer	   to	   this	  object	  and	  what	  makes	  this	  possible	   is	  the	  way	  of	  knowing	  through	  which	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  this	  object.83	  	  Thus	   we	   see	   that	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rules	   for	   the	   different	   kinds	   of	  referring	   singular	   terms	   are	   dissimilar.	   I	   will	   rely	   on	   these	   differences	   in	  accounting	  for	  different	  kinds	  of	  IEM.	  	  
4.	  Toward	  a	  Solution	  	  The	  first	  question	  of	  the	  challenge	  of	  the	  missing	  unique	  object	  was:	  How	  do	  we	  get	   the	   unique	   object	   for	   a	   demonstrative	   referring	   term	   in	   a	   demonstrative	  thought?	  I	  propose	  to	  answer	  the	  first	  question	  of	  the	  challenge	  of	  the	  missing	  unique	   object	   by	   considering	   how	   the	   reference	   of	   the	   perceptual	  demonstrative	   is	   fixed.	   Suppose	   a	   perceptual	   demonstrative	   judgement	   Fd	  based	  on	  vision	  is	   immune.	  For	  Fd,	   there	  is	  a	  unique	  object,	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘d’.	  Only	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule	   for	   the	   perceptual	   demonstrative	   ‘d’	   could	  
                                                83	  One	   might	   deny	   this,	   but	   agree	   that	   there	   should	   be	   something	   which	   determines	   which	  object	  the	  referent	  is	  in	  the	  relevant	  circumstance	  (where	  the	  token	  was	  uttered).	  It	  is	  possible	  to	   hold	   that	   demonstratives	   refer	   to	   the	   most	   salient	   object	   in	   the	   situation	   where	   they	   are	  uttered.	  Salience	  can	  be	  restricted	  to	  such	  objects	  which	  are	  visible	  or	  audible	  from	  the	  subject’s	  location.	   Even	   in	   that	   case,	   it	   cannot	   be	   arbitrary	   which	   object	   is	   the	   referent	   of	   a	   token	  demonstrative	  term.	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provide	   a	   unique	   object	   which	   is	   necessarily	   d	   and	   cannot	   be	   anything	   else.	  What	   else	   could	   provide,	   necessarily,	   the	   object	   which	   is	   the	   referent	   of	   the	  demonstrative	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistake?	  	  A	  token	  demonstrative,	  ‘d’,	  is	  used	  in	  a	  particular	  situation.	  There	  are	  other	  objects	  in	  the	  situation	  where	  ‘d’	  is	  used;	  thus	  something	  has	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  object	   is	   d	   and	   not	   something	   else.	   The	   subject	   attends	   to	   an	   object	   in	   this	  situation	  and	  intends	  to	  refer	  to	  it	  by	  using	  ‘d’.	  This	  fixes	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘d’.	  But	  one	  could	  have	  used	  ‘d’	  for	  another	  object.	  What	  ensures	  that	  the	  object	  which	  is	  F	  will	   be	   the	  object	   to	  which	   the	   referent	   of	   the	  demonstrative	   ‘d’	   is	   fixed?	  Nothing,	  unless	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	   is	  what	  determines	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘d’	  in	  this	  situation.	  Only	  this	  can	  provide	  the	  unique	  object	  which	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘d’	   and	  cannot	  offer	  another	  object.	  The	  General	  Explanation	  of	   IEM	  of	  Fx	  will	  provide	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  challenge	  by	  exploiting	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  of	  ‘x’,	  allowing	   for	   the	   differences	   for	   different	   kinds	   of	   terms.	   But	   before	   showing	  that	  I	  will	  first	  look	  at	  how	  we	  get	  the	  unique	  object	  for	  demonstratives	  into	  our	  picture.	  	  
4.1.	  Where	  does	  the	  Unique	  Object	  Come	  From?	  There	   are	   two	   options	   depending	   on	   the	   theory	   of	   how	   the	   reference	   of	   a	  (singular84)	   perceptual	   demonstrative	   is	   fixed.	   Evans	   supposes	   that	   without	  having	  a	  unique	  object	  to	  which	  the	  referent	  of	  the	  demonstrative	  is	  fixed	  one	  cannot	   have	   a	   demonstrative	   thought. 85 	  Accordingly,	   for	   a	   demonstrative	  thought,	  if	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  or	  less	  than	  one	  object	  which	  one	  intends	  to	  refer	   to	   by	   using	   the	   demonstrative,	   then	   there	   is	   no	   demonstrative	   thought	  (Evans	   1982:	   46).	   In	   Evans’s	   view,	  when	   there	   is	   a	   demonstrative	   term,	   then	  there	  is	  a	  unique	  referent.	  This	  is	  one	  possible	  way	  to	  provide	  a	  unique	  object.	  We	   need	   not	   accept	   Evans’s	   disjunctivism	   concerning	   demonstrative	  singular	  thought;	  I	  am	  neutral	  concerning	  this	  issue.	  I	  allow	  that	  one	  might	  hold	  
                                                84	  I	  only	  discuss	  singular	  perceptual	  demonstratives;	  for	  convenience	  I	  do	  not	  mark	  this.	  IEM	  is	  a	  feature	  only	  of	  singular	  thoughts	  –	  as	  I	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  3	  and	  4.	  85 	  Evans’s	   slogan	   ‘no	   referent	   -­‐	   no	   thought’	   means	   that	   if	   there	   is	   no	   referent	   of	   the	  demonstrative	   term	   then	   there	   is	   no	   demonstrative	   thought.	   There	  might	   be	   another	   kind	   of	  thought	   but	   not	   a	   demonstrative	   thought.	   In	   a	   descriptive	   thought	   a	   singular	   term	  might	   not	  have	  a	  referent	  but	  for	  a	  demonstrative	  thought	  the	  demonstrative	  term	  has	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  unique	  object.	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a	   different	   view.	   If	   the	   subject	   can	   purport	   to	   refer	   with	   a	   demonstrative	  without	  succeeding	  to	  refer,	  then	  IEM	  will	  only	  be	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  successfully	  referring	   demonstratives	   in	   demonstrative	   thoughts.	   This	   is	   another	   possible	  way	  to	  provide	  a	  unique	  object.	  	  On	  all	  views,	  for	  singular	  thought	  with	  a	  referring	  term,	  whatever	  fixes	  the	  reference	   provides	   a	   unique	   object,	   the	   referent.	   But	   are	   there	   independent	  grounds	  for	  our	  claim	  that	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  matters	  for	  IEM?	  There	  is	  a	  case	  when	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule	  plays	   a	   constitutive	   role	   in	  understanding	  IEM;	  I	  turn	  to	  this	  case	  now.	  	  
5.	  Julius	  –	  a	  Descriptive	  Name:	  ‘Julius’	  refers	  to	  whoever	  invented	  the	  zip	  I	  have	  discussed	  first-­‐person	  and	  demonstrative	  IEM.	  But	  our	  list	  is	  short	  of	  one	  other	  kind	  of	  thought	  which	  can	  be	  immune.	  For	  Evans,	  descriptive	  names	  can	  be	   immune	   as	   well.	   In	   discussing	   Evans,	   I	   have	   yet	   to	   mention	   a	   contrast	  between	  descriptive	  names	  and	  ‘I’/‘that’.	  The	  paradigmatic	  stipulation-­‐based	  descriptive	  name	  is	  Evans’s	  example	  of	  ‘Julius’.	  Consider	  the	  following	  situation	  of	  introducing	  a	  new	  proper	  name	  into	  our	  language.	  Let	  us	  use	  ‘Julius’	  for	  whoever	  invented	  the	  zip.	  We	  introduce	  this	  name	  to	  the	  language	  with	  this	  reference-­‐fixing	  stipulation.	  We	  assume	  ‘Julius’	  only	  refers	  if	  there	  was	  a	  unique	  inventor	  of	  the	  zip,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  thought	  even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  refer.	  Evans	  writes:	  	  And	   even	   if	   we	   follow	   Russell,	   (…)	   there	   still	   remain	   terms	  which	  would	  intuitively	  be	  regarded	  as	  singular	  terms,	  but	  for	  which	  the	  ‘no	  referent	  –	  no	  thought	   (sense)’	   position	   seems	   to	   be	   incorrect.	   A	   particularly	   clear	  example	  can	  be	  produced	  by	  introducing	  a	  name	  into	  the	  language	  by	  some	  such	  ‘reference-­‐fixing’	  stipulation	  as	  this:	  Let	  us	  call	  whoever	  invented	  the	  zip	  ‘Julius’.	  I	   call	   such	   names,	   whose	   reference	   is	   fixed	   by	   a	   description,	   ‘descriptive	  names’.	  (…)	  [I]t	  is	  not	  very	  plausible	  to	  deny	  that	  ‘Julius’	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  same	  semantical	  category	  as	  other	  proper	  names.	  (Evans	  1982:	  31).	  	  Notice	  that	  ‘Julius	  invented	  the	  zip’	  is	  immune	  relative	  to	  ‘Julius’.	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Let	  us	  have	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  what	  makes	  it	  the	  case	  that	  ‘Julius	  invented	  the	  zip’	  is	  immune.	  What	  ensures	  its	  IEM	  is	  the	  way	  that	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘Julius’	  is	  fixed.	   It	   cannot	   be	   the	   case	   that	   Julius	   did	   not	   invent	   the	   zip;	   Julius	   is	   just	  whoever	  invented	  the	  zip.	  This	  conforms	  to	  our	  original	  suggestion	  that	  the	  way	  that	  the	  reference	  is	  fixed	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  explaining	  IEM.	  However,	  descriptive	  names	  including	  stipulation-­‐based	  names	  are	  atypical	  for	   the	  reason	  that	   they	  are	  very	  rare.	  The	  examples	  of	  descriptive	  names	  are	  ‘Vulcan’,	  	  ‘Deep	  Throat’,	  ‘Neptune’,	  	  ‘Jack	  the	  Ripper’	  and	  ‘Julius’.	  Proper	  names,	  demonstratives	  and	  other	  singular	  referring	  terms	  are	  not,	  in	  general,	  like	  that.	  In	   order	   to	   fix	   the	   referent	   of	   singular	   terms,	   we	   typically	   cannot	   find	   an	  appropriate	  description	  shared	  and	  known	  by	  the	  users	  of	   them	  (Evans	  1982:	  48-­‐49).	  There	  are	  certain	  reasons	  to	  hold	  that	  stipulation-­‐based	  descriptive	  names	  are	   atypical	   for	   IEM.	  One	  might	  worry	   that	   even	   if	   descriptive	   or	   stipulation-­‐based	  names	  in	  a	  judgement	  are	  immune,	  because	  their	  reference	  is	  fixed	  in	  an	  unusual	  way,	  this	  might	  be	  unique	  to	  them.	  	  	  ‘Julius’	  as	  a	  descriptive	  name	  is	  atypical	   for	   immunity	  because	   it	  does	  not	  employ	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  of	  the	  object	  which	  is	  the	  referent.	  Evans	  emphasises	  that	  there	  is	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  involved	  in	  fixing	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘Julius’.	  Evans	  distinguishes	  IEM	  in	  a	  narrow	  and	  in	  a	  broad	  sense.	  Thoughts	  about	  ‘Julius’	  are	  immune	  only	   in	   a	  broad,	   but	  not	   in	   a	  narrow	  sense.	   IEM	   in	   the	  narrow	  sense	  requires	   that	   (i)	   the	   thought	   is	   identification-­‐free,	   but,	   additionally,	   (ii)	   the	  thought	  has	  to	  be	  based	  on	  ways	  of	  gaining	  information	  from	  object(s)	  (Evans	  1982:	   31-­‐32,	   180-­‐182).	   The	   cases	   of	   IEM	   in	   a	   narrow	   sense	   are	   different	  because	  they	  employ	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  of	  the	  object.	  	  	  
5.1.	  An	  objection	  	   	  An	   obvious	   worry	   here	   is	   whether	   I	   should	   generalize	   this	   result	   to	   other	  singular	   thoughts.	   Immune	   thought	   about	   Julius	   is	   not	   based	   on	   gaining	  information	  of	  an	  object	   in	   the	  world,	  but	  based	  on	  stipulation.	  So	  even	   if	   the	  explanation	   of	   IEM	   for	   descriptive	   names	   cannot	   be	   done	  without	   employing	  the	   reference-­‐fixing	   relation,	   why	   should	  we	   have	   to	   use	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	  relation	  to	  explain	  the	  IEM	  of	  ‘I’-­‐thoughts	  and	  demonstrative	  thoughts?	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If	   we	   examine	   the	   special	   explanations	   of	   IEM	   in	   first-­‐person	   IEM,	  demonstrative	   IEM	   and	   descriptive	   IEM,	   even	   though	   each	   explanation	   looks	  very	   different,	   there	   is	   one	   common	   aspect.	   The	   explanation	   in	   each	   case	  crucially	  alludes	  to	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  the	  relevant	  term	  is	  fixed.	  Stipulation-­‐based	   descriptive	   names	   can	   figure	   in	   immune	   judgements	   because	   the	  reference	   is	   determined	   by	   stipulation	   (which	   involves	   description).	   In	   first-­‐person	  IEM,	  immune	  judgements	  are	  possible	  because	  the	  subjects	  has	  special	  ways	   of	   knowing	   through	  which	   she	   knows	   of	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   and	   through	  which	   she	   self-­‐attributes	   qualities.	   In	   demonstrative	   IEM,	   the	   way	   a	   subject	  attends	  to	  an	  object	   in	  a	  specific	  situation	  and	  intends	  to	  refer	  to	   it	  by	  using	  a	  demonstrative	  fixes	  its	  referent.	  Once	  we	  accept	  that	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  is	  critical	  to	  the	  explanation	  of	  IEM	   we	   can	   see	   that	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   different	   kinds	   of	   immune	  thought	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  differences	  in	  their	  reference-­‐fixing	  rules.	  Thus,	   such	   an	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   can	   not	   only	   account	   for	   the	   similarities	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  IEM	  but	  also	  account	  for	  their	  differences.	  When	  the	  way	  of	  knowing	  plays	  a	  constitutive	  role	  in	  the	  reference	  fixing	  of	  the	  relevant	  term,	  then	  basis	  matters.	  For	  descriptive	  terms,	  ways	  of	  knowing	  do	  no	  figure	  in	  the	  reference	  fixing	  of	  the	  term,	  so	  basis	  does	  not	  matter.	  This	  explains	  why	  IEM	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  is	  basis-­‐relative	  (chapters	  1,	  3,	  and	  4)	  and	  that	  it	  is	  different	  from	  IEM	  in	  a	  broad	  sense.	  Consequently,	  involving	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  in	  the	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   accounts	   not	   only	   for	   the	   similarities	   but	   also	   the	  differences	  between	  Evans’s	  narrow	  and	  broad	  IEM.	  Thus	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  should	  figure	  into	  the	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  	  	  
6.	  Other	  Reasons	  for	  Using	  the	  Reference-­‐fixing	  Rule	  in	  Explaining	  IEM	  To	  provide	  further	  support	  for	  involving	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  in	  explaining	  IEM,	   I	  will	  examine	   three	  cases	  and	  show	  why	  not	  all	  of	   them	  are	   immune	  by	  using	   differences	   in	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule.	   This	   will	   demonstrate	   that	   the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  has	   to	   figure	   into	   the	  general	  explanation	  of	   IEM.	  Let	  me	  call	  these	  cases	  Dog	  Affair	  I-­‐III.	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In	  Dog	  Affair	   I,	   I	   see	   a	   dog	   that	   looks	   like	   it	   is	   barking	   (I	   do	   not	   hear	   it).	  Based	  only	  on	  vision	  I	  judge	  ‘That	  dog	  is	  barking’	  (W=vision).	  My	  intention	  (or	  salience	   in	  my	  environment)86	  fixes	  the	  referent	   to	   the	  dog	  which	  I	  see	  and	  to	  which	  I	  attend.	  As	  we	  expect,	  based	  only	  on	  vision	  –	  through	  which	  its	  reference	  is	  fixed	  –	  I	  cannot	  misidentify	  which	  dog	  is	  barking.	  It	  is	  because	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘that	  dog’	  is	  fixed	  by	  vision	  at	  that	  time	  and	  I	  only	  attend	  to	  that	  dog	  (or	  this	  is	  the	   only	   salient	   dog	   through	   vision	   at	   that	   time).	   Thus	   in	   Dog	   Affair	   I	   my	  judgment	  is	  immune	  relative	  to	  ‘that	  dog’	  (W=vision).	  	  	  In	   Dog	   Affair	   II,	   again	   I	   see	   a	   dog	   that	   looks	   like	   it	   is	   barking	   but	  additionally	  I	  hear	  the	  barking	  of	  a	  dog.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  I	  hear	  and	  what	  I	  see,	   I	   judge	   that	   that	   dog	   is	   barking	   (W=vision,	   audition).	   Vision	   provides	   us	  with	  the	  most	  detailed	  information	  and	  for	  evolutionary	  reasons	  our	  cognitive	  architecture	  is	  such	  that	  we	  mainly	  rely	  on	  vision	  if	  it	  is	  available	  to	  us	  in	  good	  viewing	  conditions	  (Burge	  2010).	  So	  in	  good	  viewing	  conditions	  I	  mean	  the	  dog	  that	  I	  see	  by	  ‘that	  dog’;	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘that	  dog’	  is	  fixed	  to	  the	  dog	  I	  see.	  Can	  I	  misidentify	  which	   dog	   is	   barking?	   Yes,	   indeed,	   I	   can	  misidentify	  which	   dog	   is	  barking.	   The	   audible	   dog	  might	   be	   barking	   while	   the	   visible	   one	   (which	   is	   a	  different	   one)	   is	   yawning.	   The	   reason	   why	   I	   can	   misidentify	   which	   dog	   is	  barking	   is	   this:	   the	   perceptual	   demonstrative’s	   reference	   is	   fixed	   to	   the	   dog	  which	  I	  see.	  Without	  invoking	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  we	  cannot	  explain	  what	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification	  in	  the	  second	  but	  not	  in	  the	  first	  case.	  	  To	  demonstrate	  the	  force	  of	  this	  point,	  let	  me	  consider	  Dog	  Affair	  III.	  I	  only	  hear	  a	  dog	  barking.	  I	  assert	  ‘that	  dog	  is	  barking’	  based	  only	  on	  audition.	  Could	  I	  misidentify	  which	  dog	  is	  barking?	  No,	  I	  cannot	  misidentify	  which	  dog	  is	  barking.	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   reference	   is	   fixed	   to	   the	  dog	   that	   I	  hear	  and	  misidentification	  cannot	  happen.	  There	  is	  only	  audition	  available	  to	  me	  to	  fix	  the	  referent	  to	  the	  dog.	  	  My	   suggestion	   for	   what	   explains	   demonstrative	   IEM	   is	   this:	   when	   a	  demonstrative	   thought,	  Fd	   (W)	   is	   immune,	   it	   has	   to	   be	   based	   on	   that	  way	   of	  
                                                86	  There	  are	  several	  objects	   in	  our	  environment	  but	  some	  of	   them	  are	  more	  salient.	  The	  most	  salient	  dog	  could	  be	  conceived	  as	  the	  dog	  which	  dispositionally	  attracts	  the	  most	  attention	  from	  a	   normal	   human	   viewer.	   Being	   the	   salient	   dog	   might	   fix	   the	   referent	   of	   a	   perceptual	  demonstrative	   without	   involving	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   user.	   I	   remain	   neutral	   but	   find	   the	  intention-­‐involving	  story	  more	  plausible.	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knowing	  through	  which	  the	  reference	  of	  the	  demonstrative,	  d,	  is	  fixed	  (when	  it	  is	   fixed).	   Relying	   on	   this,	   I	   can	   explain	   what	   opens	   the	   possibility	   of	  misidentification	  in	  Dog	  Affair	  II	  (the	  case	  which	  is	  not	  immune),	  but	  not	  in	  the	  other	  two	  affairs	  which	  are	  immune	  cases.	  In	  Dog	  Affair	  II	  the	  judgment	  is	  based	  on	   audition	   and	   vision.	   More	   precisely,	   the	   way	   of	   knowing	   on	   which	   the	  attribution	   of	   barking	   is	   based	   involves	   audition	   while	   the	   way	   of	   knowing	  through	  which	   the	   referent	  of	   the	  demonstrative	   is	   fixed	   is	  vision.	  This	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	  	  In	  Dog	  Affairs	  I	  and	  III,	  the	  judgments	  are	  immune	  because	  the	  basis	  (way	  of	   knowing)	   is	   restricted	   to	   that	   basis	   through	   which	   the	   referent	   of	   the	  demonstrative	  is	  fixed	  (at	  the	  time	  when	  it	  is	  fixed).	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  Dog	  Affair	   II.	   What	   opens	   the	   possibility	   of	   misidentification	   is	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  judgement	   not	   being	   identical	   with	   that	   basis	   through	   which	   the	   referent	   is	  fixed.	   This	   is	   what	   we	   would	   expect,	   but	   only	   if	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule	   is	  constitutive	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  One	  might	  object	  that	  we	  should	  hold	  that	  ‘that	  dog’	  in	  Dog	  Affair	  II	  is	  fixed	  both	  by	  vision	  and	  audition.	  But	  even	  in	  this	  case	  there	  is	  no	  item	  which	  can	  be	  immune	   because	   the	   reference	   is	   not	   fixed	   to	   a	   unique	   object.	   (Either	   the	  demonstrative	   only	   purports	   to	   refer	   or,	   on	   Evans	   view,	   there	   is	   no	  demonstrative	   thought.	   But	   for	   IEM	  we	   need	   a	   thought	   employing	   a	   singular	  
referring	   term	  relative	   to	  which	   it	   can	  be	   immune.)	  But	  again	   the	  explanation	  should	   and	  will	   rely	   on	  how	   the	   reference	  of	   the	  perceptual	   demonstrative	   is	  fixed.	   Involving	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule	   is	   a	   natural	   solution.	   This	   is	   exactly	  what	  I	  suggest.	  	  	  
7.	  The	  solution	  of	  the	  Missing	  Unique	  Object	  and	  the	  General	  Explanation	  
of	  Immunity	  to	  Error	  through	  Misidentification	  	  	  The	  missing	  unique	  object	   is	  a	  challenge	   for	  explaining	  how	   it	   is	  possible	   that	  for	   an	   immune	  demonstrative	   judgement	  Fd	   (W)	   only	   a	   unique	   object	   can	   be	  thought	   to	   be	  F	   on	   this	   basis	   B.	   For	   an	   immune	   demonstrative	   judgement	  Fd	  (W),	  there	  is	  a	  unique	  object	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘d’.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  clear	  what	  can	  ensure	  that	  only	  d	  can	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  F	  on	  this	  basis	  W.	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Nothing	  but	  a	  can	  be	  F	  iff	  for	  Fa	  (W)	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘a’	  is	  fixed	  through	  W	  and	   its	   F-­‐ness	   is	   known	   through	  W	  when	   its	   reference	   is	   fixed.	   This	   explains	  why	  we	  have	  a	  unique	  object	   the	  referent	  of	   ‘a’	  and	  why	  nothing	  but	  a	  can	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  F	  (W).	  Accordingly,	  my	  suggestion	  is	  that,	  for	  Fa,	  when	  one	  gains	  knowledge	  of	  the	  object,	  a,	  and	  of	  its	  F-­‐ness	  through	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  W1	  at	  time	  t0	  (where	  W1	  is	  the	   way	   through	   which	   a’s	   reference	   is	   fixed)	   then	   one	   cannot	   misidentify	  which	  object	  is	  F.	  If	  the	  only	  way	  to	  know	  of	  a	  and	  its	  F-­‐ness	  is	  through	  W1,	  at	  the	   time	   when	   its	   reference	   is	   fixed	   through	   W1,	   then	   nothing	   but	   a	   can	   be	  known	  to	  be	  F	  through	  W1	  at	  that	  time.	  This	  is	  the	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  How	   can	   we	   account	   for	   the	   difference	   between	   first	   person	   IEM	   and	  demonstrative	  IEM?	  A	  special	  explanation	  is	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  immunity	  of	  one	   kind	  of	   IEM,	   e.g.	   first	   person	   IEM.	   In	   contrast	   a	   general	   explanation	   is	   an	  explanation	   for	   all	   kinds	   of	   immune	   thought.	   I	   turn	   to	   discuss	   the	   special	  explanations	  of	  demonstrative	  and	  first-­‐person	  IEM.	  In	  chapter	  6	  we	  saw	  that	  the	  time	  of	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  and	  attention	  to	  a	  unique	   object	   matters	   for	   demonstrative	   thoughts	   but	   it	   does	   not	  matter	   for	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  herself	  from	  the	  inside.	  Only	  a	  unique	  object,	   the	  subject	  can	  be	  known	  from	  the	  inside,	  so	  one	  need	  not	  keep	  track	  and	  discriminate	  this	  object	  from	  other	  objects	  (Peacocke	  2013).	   As	   I	   have	   shown,	   the	   difference	   in	   conditions	   of	   IEM	   reflect	   the	  conditions	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  is	  fixed	  in	  each	  case.	  Using	  a	  demonstrative,	  d,	   for	  an	  object	  which	  one	  sees	  and	  attends	  to,	  and	  judging	   that	   it	   is	  F,	   is	  sufficient	   to	  make	  Fd	   (W=vision)	   immune	  relative	   to	   ‘d’.	  When	  one	  visually	  attends	  to	  an	  object	  and	  uses	  a	  demonstrative	  for	  it,	  then	  the	  way	   the	   reference	   of	   the	   demonstrative	   is	   fixed	   provides	   the	   unique	   object	  which	  one	  can	  think	  is	  F.	  The	  reason	  we	  have	  immune	  thoughts,	  for	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  and	  self-­‐ascriptions,	  Fa	  (W1),	  is,	  I	  suggest,	  that	  a’s	  reference	  is	  fixed	  through	  W1.87	  I	  have	  
                                                87	  I	  do	  not	  rule	  out	  that	  Evans	  might	  have	  something	  similar	  in	  mind	  and	  this	  explains	  why	  the	  Special-­‐basis	  explanation	  is	  different	  from	  Factual	  Identification-­‐freedom.	  Although	  this	  cannot	  be	   unless	   Evans	   would	   accept	   that	   first-­‐person	   and	   demonstrative	   IEM	   is	   of	   different	   kind.	  There	   are	   some	   reasons	   to	   think	   that	  Evans	  used	   IEM	   to	   find	  how	   the	   referent	   of	   a	   referring	  term	   is	   fixed.	   Evans	   says	   that	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘that’,	   ‘here’	   and	   ‘I’	   are	   not	   fixed	   by	   a	   definite	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argued	   the	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   of	   an	   ‘a’-­‐thought	   requires	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  for	  ‘a’	  as	  its	  constitutive	  part.88	  	  	   	  




The	  Simple	  View	  	  	  	  I	   am	   now	   in	   a	   position	   to	   propose	   an	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   how	   the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed.	  My	  proposal	  will	  be	  called	  the	  Simple	  View.	  There	  will	  be	  three	   parts	   to	   the	   exposition	   of	   the	   view	   in	   three	   chapters.	   In	   chapter	   8,	   I	  introduce	   the	   Simple	   View.	   In	   chapter	   9,	   I	   will	   use	   a	   test	   to	   argue	   for	   the	  proposed	   view.	   IEM	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions	   will	   be	   our	   guide	   in	   the	   test	   of	   the	  explanatory	   power	   of	   the	   Simple	   View.	   I	   will	   try	   to	   argue	   that	   unless	   the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  as	  I	  propose,	  IEM	  cannot	  be	  explained.	  To	  set	  up	  the	  test,	  I	  will	  list	  several	  essential	  features	  of	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  which	  should	  be	  accounted	  for	  on	  all	   views	   about	   how	   the	   reference	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed,	   including	   GRR,	   IEM	   and	  aboutness-­‐error	   freedom.	   I	  will	  demonstrate	   that	   the	  Simple	  View	  can	  explain	  all	  the	  listed	  essential	  features	  of	  the	  uses	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun,	  but	  other	  views	   cannot.	   A	   view	   is	   a	   good	   candidate	   to	   be	   the	   correct	   one	   only	   if	   its	  defender	   provides	   answers	   to	   the	   basic	   objections	   against	   it.	   In	   the	   final	  chapter,	  I	  answer	  the	  most	  pressing	  objections	  to	  the	  Simple	  View.	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Chapter	  8	  
The	  Simple	  View:	  Fixing	  the	  Reference	  of	  ‘I’	  
	  	  
Abstract	  How	  is	  the	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference	  possible?	  According	  to	  the	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference	  (included	  in	  GRR)	  the	  subject,	  by	   using	   ‘I’,	   cannot	   intend	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   wrong	   object;	   thus	   she	   is	  guaranteed	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   correct	   object.	   If	   uses	   of	   ‘I’	   are	   required	   to	  have	   guaranteed	   right	   reference,	   then	   the	   subject	   has	   to	   be	  presented	  with	  the	  object	  that	  she	  is	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistake.	  How	  is	  this	  possible?	  It	  requires	  that	  there	  should	  be	  some	  ways	  of	  knowing	  which	  enable	   the	   subject	   to	   be	   directly	   acquainted	   with	   herself	   without	   the	  possibility	  of	  mistake	  about	  which	  object	  she	  is.	  ‘I’	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  object	  which	  the	  subject	  is	  directly	  acquainted	  with	  from	  the	  inside.	  	  	  
1.	  The	  Building	  Blocks	  of	  the	  Simple	  View	  How	   is	   the	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	   reference	  possible?	   I	  want	   to	   uncover	  what	  enables	  GRR.	  To	  do	   this,	   let	  me	  begin	  with	  some	  observations	  about	   the	  character	   of	   the	   object	   that	   ‘I’	   refers	   to	   –	   but	   which	   describe	   the	   object	  independently	  of	  its	  being	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’.	  	  	  
1.1.	  The	  Object	  Under	  Permanent	  Care:	  the	  Exposed	  Object	  According	   to	   the	   Simple	  View,	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   the	   unique	   object	   that	   the	  subject	   knows	   about	   through	   special	   private	  ways	   of	   knowing.	  However,	   that	  object	   should	   be	   characterised	   independently	   of	   being	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   and	  from	  being	  the	  subject	  itself.	  Simply	  saying	  that	  for	  any	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	   is	   what	   ‘I’	   refers	   to	   or	   the	   subject	   is	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   would	   not	   be	   very	  explanatory.	  If	  we	  can	  characterise	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  independently	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  point	  of	  view,	  then	  we	  can	  check	  whether	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  to	  the	  right	  object,	  according	  to	  my	  proposed	  view.	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Let	  me	   look	   at	   an	   organism	  with	   cognitive	   abilities.	   Such	   an	   organism	   is	  typically	  able	   to	   take	  care	  of	   itself	  when	   it	   is	  awake.	   It	   is	  able	   to	  avoid	  danger	  and	   fulfil	   its	   desires	   in	   a	   more	   sophisticated	   and	   flexible	   manner,	   which	   is	  decoupled	   from	   environmental	   affordances	   (e.g.	   food	   affords	   eating),	   as	  compared	  to	  an	  organism	  without	  cognitive	  capacities.	  We	  can	  say	  that	  such	  an	  organism	   is	   able	   to	   take	   care	   of	   itself.	   To	   ‘take	   care	   of	   x’	   at	   least	   means	   to	  “sustain	  or	  increase	  x’s	  potential	  to	  survive”.	  	  For	  every	  organism,	  although	  it	  can	  care	  about	  other	  organisms,	  there	  is	  a	  unique	  object	  which	  it	  has	  to	  constantly	  care	  for.	  In	  order	  for	  an	  organism	  to	  be	  able	  to	  take	  care	  of	  any	  other	  organism,	   first	  of	  all,	   it	  has	  to	  permanently	  take	  care	  of	  itself.	  We	  are	  not	  surprised	  that	  the	  object	  requiring	  permanent	  care	  is	  the	  organism	  itself.	  The	  organism	  itself	  is	  the	  object	  under	  permanent	  care.	  	  	  For	  an	  organism,	  the	  ability	  to	  take	  care	  of	   itself	  requires	  that	   it	  knows	  of	  the	  object	  under	  permanent	  care.	  This	  ability	  requires	  that	  an	  organism	  have	  a	  relation	  to	  itself	  which	  is	  manifest	  in	  certain	  behavioural	  patterns,	  such	  as	  self-­‐directed	   actions.	   To	   perform	   self-­‐directed	   actions	   like	   eating,	   drinking	   or	  scratching,	  the	  organism	  has	  to	  know	  of	  the	  object	  under	  permanent	  care.	  	  The	  object	  under	  permanent	   care	   is	   the	   first	   building	  block	  of	   the	   Simple	  View.	  	  In	  psychology	  there	  is	  a	  very	  useful	  notion	  explaining	  how	  an	  organism	  can	  survive:	   having	   drives.	   A	   drive	   is	   something	   governing	   certain	   kinds	   of	  behaviour	   (including	   actions)	   of	   an	   organism	   in	   the	   relevant	   situation.	   Such	  kinds	  of	  actions	  are	  usually	  necessary	  for	  survival	  and	  reproduction.	  The	  drives	  are	   dispositions	   to	   act	   in	   suitable	   situations	   for	   sustaining	   the	   organism’s	   life	  preserving	  functions.	  Although	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  organism	  is	  driven	  by	  these	  drives,	  drives	  do	  not	   require	   that	   the	  organism	  knows	  of	   itself	   (as	   itself	  or	  de	  
se).	   There	   are	   plenty	   of	   drives	   to	   take	   care	   of	   an	   organism;	   feeling	   thirst	   or	  hunger	  will	  drive	  the	  organism	  to	  drink	  or	  eat	  in	  suitable	  situations.	  	  The	  object	  under	  permanent	  care	  is	  described	  relative	  to	  an	  acting	  animal.	  For	  an	  acting	  animal,	  the	  animal	  itself	  will	  be	  the	  object	  under	  permanent	  care.	  Animals	   collect	   food,	   eat,	   drink	   and	   reproduce.	  We	  might	   think	   of	   drives	   as	   a	  collection	  of	  capacities	  enabling	  these	  sorts	  of	  life	  sustaining	  actions.	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For	  humans,	  the	  object	  under	  permanent	  care	  will	  be	  the	  object	  that	  is	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘I’.	  A	  human	  subject	   can	   care	  about	   this	  object	   even	   if	   it	   is	  not	   yet	  able	  to	  employ	  the	  first	  person	  pronoun	  in	  thinking	  of	  itself.	  	  A	  crucial	  step	  is	  when	  the	  subject	  does	  not	  merely	  know	  of	  the	  object	  under	  permanent	  care	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  manifest	  in	  self-­‐directed	  action,	  but	  when	  it	  is	  able	  to	  consider	  the	  object	  under	  permanent	  care	  as	  an	  object.	  One	  marker	  for	  the	   emergence	   of	   this	   capacity	   is	   when	   an	   organism	   passes	   the	   mirror	   test	  (compare	  Peacocke	  2014,	  where	  he	  discusses	   ‘level	  one’	  de	  se	   content).	   In	   the	  mirror	  test,	  the	  experimenter	  puts	  a	  red	  dot	  (for	  children	  and	  apes)	  or	  a	  yellow	  line	  (for	  elephants)	  on	  their	  face.	  They	  are	  able	  to	  see	  this	  in	  a	  mirror.	  Passing	  the	  test	  requires	  that	  they	  remove	  the	  mark	  from	  themselves.	  This	  behaviour	  is	  taken	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   these	   creatures	   have	   implicit	   de	   re	   knowledge	   of	  themselves.	  The	  subject’s	  use	  of	  the	  first	  person	  pronoun	  might	  be	  anchored	  to	  this	   preliminary	   existing	   implicit	   de	   re	   knowledge	   of	   the	   object	   under	  permanent	  care.	  (This	  is	  suggested	  by	  the	  developmental	  trajectory	  of	  children.	  They	   pass	   the	   mirror	   test	   before	   they	   are	   able	   to	   use	   ‘I’.)	   The	   object	   under	  permanent	  care	  is	  the	  object	  which	  is	  the	  subject	  (in	  normal	  conditions).89	  	  It	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   subject	   to	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   always	   care	   for	   that	  object	   (under	   permanent	   care)	   so	   as	   to	   survive,	   therefore	   a	   subject	   has	   to	  permanently	   know	   of	   that	   object.	   Introspection,	   proprioception,	   kinaesthesia	  and	   several	   other	  ways	  of	   knowing	  enable	   the	   subject	   to	  know	  of	   that	  object.	  But	  internal	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ways	  a	  subject	  can	  be	  available	  to	  herself.	   Vision,	   audition	   and	   touch	   provides	   information	   of	   the	   subject	   to	   the	  subject	  most	  of	  the	  time	  when	  the	  subject	  is	  awake.	  In	  a	  sense,	  that	  object	  under	  permanent	   care	   is	   permanently	   exposed	   to	   the	   subject.90	  When	   the	   subject	   is	  able	   to	   know	   of	   the	   object	   under	   permanent	   care	   as	   an	   object,	   I	  will	   call	   the	  object	  under	  permanent	  care	  the	  exposed-­‐object.	  	  	  
                                                89	  Fainting	  or	  being	  in	  a	  coma,	  and	  similar	  conditions	  do	  not	  count	  as	  normal	  conditions.	  In	  such	  conditions	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  able	  to	  survive	  alone.	  90	  The	  subject	   is	  so	  much	  exposed	  to	  herself	   that	   there	   is	  a	  mechanism	  which	  reduces,	   for	   the	  subject,	  the	  available	  information	  of	  herself	  except	  in	  danger	  or	  situations	  when	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	   monitor	   whether	   things	   are	   as	   they	   are	   expected.	   This	   mechanism	   is	   called	   sensory	  attenuation	  (attenuation	  of	  information	  concerning	  the	  subject).	  For	  further	  discussion	  look	  at	  Frith	  (2005).	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1.2.	  Cassam’s	  Tool:	  Ways	  of	  Knowing	  In	  order	  to	  state	  the	  Simple	  View,	  I	  employ	  Cassam’s	  (2007)	  notion	  of	  ways	  of	  
knowing.	  Ways	  of	  knowing	  enable	  the	  subject	  to	  acquire	  knowledge	  or	  beliefs.91	  Let	  me	  go	  through	  a	   list	  of	  different	  ways	  of	  knowing	  and	  describe	  what	  their	  function	  is	  before	  I	  turn	  to	  discuss	  the	  dedicated	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  The	  subject	  has	  several	  ways	  of	  knowing	  of	  objects,	  events	  and	  state	  of	  affairs.	  Examples	  of	  ways	   of	   knowing	   are	   vision,	   audition,	   touch,	   testimony,	   proprioception,	  kinaesthesia,	  inference,	  memory	  and	  introspection.	  These	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  ways	  through	  which	  one	  can	  gain	  knowledge	  of	  objects	  and	  their	  properties	  or	  events.	  	  To	  get	  the	  relevant	  way	  of	  knowing	  we	  might	  just	  ask	  the	  subject	  when	  she	  knows	  p	  ‘how	  do	  you	  know	  that	  p?’92	  She	  might	  answer	  that	  she	  knows	  because	  she	   sees	   it	   (vision)	   or	   she	   remembers	   it	   (memory)	   or	   she	   had	   heard	   it	  somewhere	  (testimony).	  Whenever	  one	  believes	  that	  p	  but	  there	   is	  no	  answer	  whatsoever	   to	   the	   question	   how	   do	   you	   know	   that	   p,	   then	   p	   cannot	   be	  knowledge.	   In	   order	   to	   know	   that	   p	   there	   should	   be	   a	   way	   for	   the	   subject	  through	  which	  this	  knowledge	  is	  acquired.	  It	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  subject	  does	  not	  know	  in	  which	  way	  exactly	  she	  knows	  that	  p.	  However,	  for	  Cassam,	  if	  the	  subject	  knows	  p,	   then	   there	  has	   to	  be	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	   that	  provides	   the	  answer	   to	   the	   question	   ‘How	   do	   you	   know	   that	   p?’	   even	   if	   the	   subject	   is	   not	  aware	  of	  it.	  (Note	  that	  my	  claims	  are	  restricted	  to	  values	  of	  p	  which	  concern	  a	  singular	   thought	   of	   a	   particular	   object.	   Some	   general	   thoughts	   might	   be	  acquired	  without	  a	  particular	  basis	  –	  way	  of	  knowing.93)	  	  
                                                91	  Shoemaker	   (1968:	   547,	   footnote	   7)	   and	   Evans	   (1982:	   180)	   both	   use	   the	   notion	   of	  ways	   of	  knowing	  in	  their	  discussions	  of	  IEM,	  but	  only	  very	  occasionally.	  92	  It	   is	   a	   question	   whether	   a	   subject	   can	   be	   completely	   ignorant	   of	   which	   way	   one	   gains	  knowledge.	  Still,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  only	  an	  ideal	  subject	  can	  always	  answer	  the	  question	  ‘How	  do	  you	  know	  it?’	  but	  the	  average	  subject	  does	  not	  always	  know	  this	  answer.	  But	  I	  take	  it	  that	  we	  typically	  know	  the	  answer.	  93	  One	  might	  object	   that	   there	  are	   several	   things	  which	  we	   simply	  know	   like	   ‘Elephants	  don’t	  wear	  galoshes	  in	  the	  wild’	  without	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  dedicated	  to	  it.	  The	  reason	  why	  we	  know	  this	  about	  elephants	   is	   that	  we	   infer	   from	  things	  which	  we	  know	  that	   this	  should	  be	  the	  case.	  Moreover,	  we	  acquire	  most	  of	  our	  general	  thoughts	  through	  inference.	  When	  I	  discuss	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  I	  am	  thinking	  mainly	  about	  singular	  thoughts,	  particular	  events	  and	  individual	  objects.	  A	  belief	   like	   ‘the	  world	  around	  us	  and	  objects	   in	   it	  exist’	  might	  be	  such	  that	  we	  were	  born	  prepared	   to	   believe	   it.	   There	   seem	   to	   be	   no	  ways	   of	   knowing	   for	   this.	   Self-­‐identity	   could	   be	  another	   similar	   example.	   Such	   general	   thoughts	   seem	   to	   be	   presuppositions	   of	   most	   of	   our	  other	   thoughts.	  We	   presuppose	   them	   in	   some	  way.	   Thus	   I	   do	   not	   hold	   that	   there	   cannot	   be	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It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  any	  answer	  should	  be	  accepted	  to	  ‘how	  do	  you	  know	  that	   p?’	   There	   are	   certain	   methods	   like	   guessing	   or	   wishful	   thinking	   which	  might	   guide	   action	   or	   thought,	   if	   the	   subject	   wishes	   to	   rely	   on	   them.	   But	  guessing	  never	  provides	  knowledge	  to	  the	  subject	  about	  something	  other	  than	  ‘what	  would	  I	  guess	  now?’	  The	  question	   ‘How	  do	  you	  know	  that	  p?’	  cannot	  be	  answered	  by	  saying	  I	  guessed	   it	  or	   I	  know	  it	   through	  wishful	   thinking.	  What	   I	  guess	   or	   I	   am	   wishfully	   thinking	   might	   be	   true.	   But	   knowledge	   cannot	   be	   a	  happy	  accident.	  These	  are	  not	  such	  epistemologically	  useful	  relations	  to	  objects	  or	  state	  of	  affairs,	  which	  would	  make	  knowledge	  possible.	  Accordingly,	  guessing	  and	  wishful	  thinking	  are	  not	  ways	  of	  knowing	  of	  objects	  in	  the	  world.	  	  This	  thought	  is	  similar	  to	  what	  Evans	  was	  after	  when	  he	  required	  channels	  of	   information	   for	  knowledge	  of	  objects	   (except	   for	  stipulative	  names).94	  But	   I	  find	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘way	  of	  knowing’	  more	  precise	  because	  my	  brain	  has	  channels	  of	   information	  which	   could	  never	  provide	  me	  directly	  with	   conscious	   content	  (e.g.	  the	  monitoring	  of	  blood	  pressure).	  The	  brain	  monitors	  changes	  but	  not	  all	  channels	  of	   information	   involved	   in	   this	  enable	   the	  subject	   to	  know	  of	  objects	  (including	  herself).	  	  Summing	  up,	  there	  are	  two	  contrasts	  here.	  First	  of	  all,	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  such	  that	  they	  enable	  knowledge.	  Second,	  knowledge	  is	  not	  merely	  information	  that	  is	  available	  to	  the	  subject’s	  cognitive	  system	  in	  some	  way.	  	  	  Now	   I	   turn	   to	   the	   second	   point,	   the	   difference	   between	   information	   and	  knowledge.	   Ways	   of	   knowing	   are	   those	   channels	   of	   information	   which	   can	  provide	   conscious	   content	   to	   the	   subject.	   There	   are	   channels	   of	   information	  providing	   only	   content	   which	   is	   never	   available	   to	   the	   subject.	   A	   channel	   of	  information	   which	   provides	   knowledge	   is	   a	   way	   of	   knowing.	   But	   there	   are	  channels	  of	  information	  which	  are	  not	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  	  A	   subject’s	  heartbeat	   rate	   is	  monitored	  by	   the	   subject’s	  brain,	   although,	   if	  you	  ask	  a	   subject	   to	   report	   it,	   you	  might	   find	  people	  who	  do	  not	  have	  a	  good	  sense	   of	   their	   heartbeat	   rate.	   So	   it	   seems	   in	   such	   cases	   the	   subject	   relies	   on	  guessing.	   Thus	   this	   information	   is	   not	   available	   through	   a	   dedicated	   way	   of	  knowing	  for	  this	  subject.	  Even	  so,	  the	  subject’s	  brain	  relies	  on	  this	  information	  
                                                                                                                                     knowledge	  which	  is	  acquired	  without	  employing	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  even	  though	  these	  cases	  are	  exceptional.	  	  94	  Recall	  descriptive	  names	  like	  ‘Julius’.	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and	  regulates	  heartbeat	  changes	  if	  it	  is	  necessary.	  In	  this	  case,	  what	  is	  computed	  over	  in	  the	  brain	  is	  information	  and	  not	  knowledge	  or	  belief.	  	  What	   enables	   the	   subject	   to	   know	   of	   herself	   could	   be	   a	   private	   way	   of	  knowing	  of	  herself	   –	   as	  we	   learned	   from	  Shoemaker	   in	   chapter	  4.	   Shoemaker	  writes:	  “[E]ach	  person	  knows	  of	  his	  own	  mental	  or	  psychological	  states	  in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  no	  other	  person	  could	  know	  of	  them”	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  565).	  I	  follow	  this	  suggestion	  and	  try	  to	  find	  those	  ways	  of	  knowing	  of	  the	  subject	  which	  are	  ways	  of	  knowing	  only	  of	  the	  subject.	  What	  are	  the	  constraints	  which	  make	  the	  subject’s	  directly	  acquaintance	  with	  the	  exposed	  object	  (herself)	  possible?	  	  
2.	   Constraints	   on	   those	   Ways	   of	   Knowing	   which	   would	   Provide	   Direct	  
Acquaintance	  with	  the	  Exposed	  Object	  	  I	   turn	   to	   discuss	   the	   constraints	   which	   provide	   us	   with	   dedicated	   ways	   of	  knowing	   of	   the	   subject.	   My	   guide	   will	   be	   the	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	  reference.	  My	   guiding	   question	  will	   be:	  how	   is	   it	   possible	   that	   the	   subject	  
knows	  of	  an	  object	  (which	  is	  herself)	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistake?	  	  
	  
2.1.	  The	  First	  Constraint:	  the	  Privacy	  Constraint	  	  Frege	   claims	   that	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   concerning	   how	   I	   know	   of	   the	   object	  which	  I	  am	  and	  how	  I	  know	  of	  other	  objects	  in	  the	  world.	  There	  is	  a	  privileged	  way	  of	  knowing	  of	   the	  object	   that	   is	   the	  subject	  which	   is	  only	  available	   to	   the	  subject.	   	   “Now	   everyone	   is	   presented	   to	   himself	   in	   a	   particular	   and	   primitive	  way,	  in	  which	  he	  is	  presented	  to	  no-­‐one	  else”	  (Frege	  1956:	  17).95	  I	  called	  such	  a	  way	   through	  which	   the	   subject	   is	   acquainted	  with	   the	   object,	  where	   it	   is	   not	  accessible	  to	  others,	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing.	  Shoemaker	  puts	  this	  point	  like	  that:	  “Now	  there	  is	  a	  perfectly	  good	  sense	  in	  which	  my	  self	  is	  accessible	  to	  me	  in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  not	  to	  others.	  There	  are	  predicates	  which	  I	  apply	  to	  others,	  and	  which	  others	   apply	   to	  me,	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   observations	   of	   behaviour,	   but	  which	  I	  do	  not	  ascribe	  to	  myself	  on	  this	  basis,	  and	  these	  predicates	  are	  precisely	  
                                                95	  I	  do	  not	  discuss	  the	  interpretation	  on	  which	   ‘being	  presented’	  means	  a	  peculiar	  first	  person	  mode	  of	  presentation.	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those	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  which	  is	  immune	  to	  error	  through	  misidentification”	  (Shoemaker	  1968:	  562).96	  	  According	  to	  privacy,	  there	  is	  a	  privileged	  way	  of	  being	  presented	  with	  the	  object	  which	  is	  myself.	   I	  might	  add	  that	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  private	  way	  of	  knowing.97	  As	  I	  put	  it,	  there	  are	  ways	  of	  knowing	  of	  the	  object,	  myself,	  which	  are	  not	  available	  to	  anyone	  but	  me.	  Others	  cannot	  know	  of	  the	  object,	  me,	   through	  these	  ways.	  	  Let	  me	  elaborate	  the	  idea	  a	  bit	  further.	  Suppose	  there	  is	  an	  object	  o	  which	  I	  see	   in	   good	   lighting	   conditions.	  Vision,	   audition,	   touch	   are	   such	   senses	  where	  anyone,	   in	   the	   same	   spatiotemporal	   position	   as	   I	   am,	   equipped	   with	   reliably	  working	   senses,	   would	   similarly	   be	   able	   to	   perceive	   and	   thereby	   be	   able	   to	  know	   of	   any	   object	   which	   I	   perceive.	   In	   contrast,	   introspection,	   kinaesthetic	  sense,	   proprioception	   and	   nociception	   are	   not	   at	   all	   like	   vision.	   If	   I	   feel	   a	  stomach	   ache	   through	   nociception,	   it	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	   others	   to	   be	   in	   the	  same	  spatiotemporal	  position	  as	  me	  to	  feel	  it.	  	  Only	   the	   subject	   can	  know	  of	   the	  exposed	  object	   and	   its	   features	   through	  these	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Note	  that	  I	  am	  merely	  recording	  a	  fact	  about	  our	  nature	  when	  I	  observe	  that	  there	  are	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  	  	  
2.1.2.	  The	  Privacy	  Constraint	  What	  does	   a	  private	  way	  of	   knowing	   consist	   in?	  Privacy	   restricts	   the	  ways	  of	  knowing	   to	   those	   through	   which	   only	   the	   subject	   can	   know	   of	   a	   particular	  content,	   C,	   through	   that	   way	   of	   knowing,	   W1.	   This	   does	   not	   exclude	   the	  possibility	   that	  others	  can	  know	  of	   that	  particular	  content,	  C,	   through	  another	  way	  of	  knowing,	  W2.	  
                                                96	  I	   called	   this	   the	   special	   basis	   explanation	   of	   IEM.	   This	   can	   be	   read	   as	   requiring	   such	   self-­‐knowledge	   to	   be	   non-­‐perceptual.	   A	   judgment	   would	   be	   immune	   even	   when	   based	   solely	   on	  proprioception	  or	  kinesthesia	  (perceptual	  faculties).	  Thus	  the	  non-­‐perceptual	  interpretation	  is	  wrong.	  	  97	  For	  Shoemaker,	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  non-­‐observational	  and	  non-­‐perceptual,	  but	  I	  do	  not	   suppose	   this.	  Martin	   (1993)	   argued	   that	   pain	   is	   perceptual	   faculty	   and	  Burge	   (2010)	   has	  argued,	   based	   on	   the	   lack	   of	   constancies,	   that	   pain	   and	   proprioception	   are	   non-­‐perceptual.	  Constancy	  is	  required	  if	  changes	  in	  lighting	  or	  other	  conditions	  require	  it	  so	  that	  we	  can	  track	  an	  object	  as	  the	  same	  across	  different	  conditions.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  I	  do	  not	  see	  why	  something	  like	   that	   would	   be	   required	   for	   pain	   to	   fulfil	   its	   function.	   I	   treat	   nociception	   as	   a	   perceptual	  faculty	  but	  this	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  my	  arguments.	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In	  my	  reconstruction,	  Frege’s	  suggestion	  is	  that	  privacy	  might	  be	  a	  natural	  constraint	  on	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  which	  only	  presents	  the	  subject	  to	  herself.	  So	  let	  us	   take	  privacy	  as	   the	   first	   constraint	  on	  an	  appropriate	  way	  of	  knowing.	  But	  one	  might	  certainly	  entertain	  some	  worries	  about	  privacy;	  now	  I	  turn	  to	  discuss	  them.	  	  
2.1.3.	  A	  Worry	  about	  Privacy	  One	  might	  worry	  that	  some	  brain	  scanning	  technique	  might	  turn	  a	  private	  way	  of	   knowing	   to	   a	   public	   way	   of	   knowing.	   By	   scanning	   the	   brain	   it	   seems	   that	  anybody	   can	   access	   any	   content	   which	   is	   in	   the	   brain,	   including	   information	  available	  to	  the	  subject	  by	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  This	  is	  right.	  Through	  brain	  scanning	   the	   content	  will	   be	   available	   to	   anybody	   in	   an	   appropriate	   position	  (viewing	   the	  scanner),	  but	   it	  will	  be	  not	  available	  through	   the	   same	   kind	   of	  
way	  as	  it	  is	  to	  the	  subject.	  Suppose	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  my	  pain	  by	  feeling	  it.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  content	  that	  is	  private,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  the	  intentional	  object	  that	  is	  private.	  The	  access	  to	  that	  content	  is	  private	  and	  this	  is	  a	  crucial	  difference.	  Frege’s	  thesis,	  as	  I	  understand	   it,	   is	  about	   the	  access.	  The	  content	   like	   ‘I	  have	  a	  stomachache’	   is	  available	  by	  report,	   so	  even	   testimony	  can	  deliver	   the	  content	  gained	   through	  private	  way	  of	  knowing	  to	  others.	  	  
2.1.4.	  Privacy	  is	  not	  Sufficient	  My	  question	  is	  how	  the	  subject	  can	  know	  of	  the	  object,	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistake.	  We	  have	  to	  test	  the	  idea	  that	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing	  provide	   the	   subject	   for	   the	   subject	   in	   the	   required	   manner.	   If	   privacy	   is	  sufficient	   then	   the	   only	   object	  which	   I	   could	   know	   through	   a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing	  should	  be	  me.	  Let	  us	  suppose	  I	  am	  pregnant	  and	  near	  term	  with	  a	  baby.	  I	  know	  of	  my	  baby	  and	  its	  movements	  and	  hiccups	  by	  experiencing	  strange	  things	  from	  the	  inside.	  He	  likes	  to	  make	  somersaults.	  I	  know	  exactly	  when	  he	  makes	  a	  somersault,	  and	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nobody	  can	  know	  this	   in	   the	  same	  way	  as	   I	  know	  it.	   I	  know	  of	  his	  somersault	  because	  I	  know	  of	  him,	  but	  still	  I	  know	  it	  from	  the	  inside.98	  	  Privacy	  requires	  that	  only	  the	  subject	  can	  know	  of	  a	  particular	  content	  (e.g.	  baby	  is	  somersaulting),	  C,	  while	  others	  cannot	  know	  of	  that	  particular	  content,	  C,	   through	   that	  way	  of	   knowing,	  W1.	   Privacy	   is	   satisfied	   for	   knowledge	  of	   the	  baby	  and	  his	  movements.	  (One	  can	  know	  that	  she	  has	  a	  baby	  without	  testimony,	  but	  only	  through	  feeling	  it	  from	  the	  inside	  and	  from	  general	  facts.)	  I	  can	  know	  of	  my	  baby	  and	   its	  movements	   from	  the	   inside.	  But	   I	  am	  not	  my	  baby.	  Thus	   it	   is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  privacy	  is	  sufficient	  to	  provide	  only	  the	  exposed	  object	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistake,	  as	  GRR	  requires.	  One	  may	  worry	  that	  I	  know	  of	  my	  baby	  through	  inference	  and	  inference	  is	  not	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing.	  Even	  if	  I	  know	  it	  through	  inference,	  this	  inference	  is	  only	  based	  on	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing	  –	  if	  I	  infer	  that	  I	  have	  a	  baby	  based	  on	  what	   I	   feel	   from	  the	   inside.	   In	   this	  case	  even	   if	   this	  knowledge	  were	  based	  on	  inference,	   its	   primary	   source	   would	   still	   be	   the	   private	   way	   of	   knowing.	   If	  privacy	   were	   sufficient	   for	   knowing	   of	   the	   exposed	   object	   then	   privacy	   plus	  inference	  should	  be	  sufficient	   too.	  But	   this	   is	  not	   the	  case.	  Thus	  privacy	   is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  that	  I	  know	  of	  the	  exposed	  object.	  	  One	  might	   object	   that	   the	   relevant	   experience	   is	   a	   tactile	   experience	   and	  touch	  is	  a	  multiple-­‐object	  way	  of	  knowing.	  This	  might	  be	  right;	  however	  I	  need	  not	  deny	  this	  in	  general.	  Touch	  on	  occasion	  can	  be	  private	  way	  of	  knowing.	  The	  only	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  the	  way	  of	  knowing	  relative	  to	  these	  contents	  (knowing	  of	   the	   baby	   and	   her	   movements)	   are	   private	   and	   not	   available	   to	   others.	  Consequently,	  privacy	  on	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  a	  unique	  object	  –	  as	  the	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference	  requires.	  	  If	   the	   subject	  knew	  only	  of	  a	  unique	  object	   through	  some	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing	   this	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   sufficient	   for	   a	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	  reference.	  When	  we	  discussed	  Shoemaker	  and	  Evans,	  we	   found	  that	   there	  are	  some	  ways	  of	  knowing	  through	  which	  only	  a	  unique	  object	  can	  be	  known	  and	  Martin	  offers	  something	  on	  the	  same	   lines.	  This	  will	  be	  the	  second	  constraint:	  the	  unicity	  constraint.	  
                                                98	  Ma	  case	  is	  inspired	  by	  O’Brien’s	  internal	  baby-­‐monitor.	  This	  device	  only	  provides	  information	  for	  the	  mother	  of	  the	  baby	  in	  the	  womb	  (O'Brien	  2007).	  The	  internal	  baby-­‐monitor	  has	  privacy	  and	  unicity	  (the	  next	  feature)	  so	  I	  will	  discuss	  it	  later.	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2.2.	  Martin’s	  Point:	  the	  Sole-­‐object	  View	  	  
2.2.1.	  The	  Second	  Constraint:	  the	  Unicity	  Constraint	  on	  Way	  of	  Knowing	  	  M.	   G.	   F.	   Martin	   (1995)	   put	   forward	   a	   very	   influential	   proposal	   according	   to	  which	   bodily	   awareness	   is	   awareness	   of	   a	   unique	   object:	   the	   living	   body.	  Proprioception,	   kinaesthesia,	   sense	   of	   heat/balance/pressure/pain	   and	   many	  other	   channels	   of	   information	   are	   integrated	   into	   bodily	   awareness.	   Bodily	  awareness	  cannot	  provide	  anything	  but	   information	  of	  a	  unique	  object	  and	  its	  parts.	  	  One	   criterion	   for	  whether	   some	   form	   of	   sensory	   awareness	   constitutes	   a	  perceptual	  faculty	  is	  whether	  illusion	  is	  possible.	  Bodily	  awareness	  is	  subject	  to	  illusion.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  phantom	  limb	  the	  subject	  thinks	  there	  is	  a	  limb	  which	  is	  part	  of	  her	  body	  even	  though	  the	  limb	  has	  been	  amputated.	  After	  surgery	  and	  in	   war	   this	   is	   a	   very	   common	   illusion	   or	   delusion.	   The	   possibility	   of	   illusion	  provides	   a	   good	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   bodily	   awareness	   is	   a	   perceptual	  faculty.99	  According	  to	  Martin,	  bodily	  awareness	  is	  a	  perceptual	  faculty	  and	  only	  one	  object	  and	  its	  parts	  can	  be	  known	  through	  it.	  	  How	  do	  we	  get	   the	   sole	  object	   according	   to	  Martin?	  On	  Martin’s	  view	   the	  sole	  object	  has	  to	  be	  determined	  in	  a	  mind-­‐independent	  way;	  it	  cannot	  just	  be	  whatever	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  through	  bodily	  awareness.	  Otherwise	  the	  thesis	  would	  be	  uninformative.	  	  My	   solution	   is	   to	   use	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘exposed	   object’.	   This	   is	   characterised	  independently	  of	  being	  experienced	  from	  the	  inside	  or	  being	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’.	  	  	  
2.2.2.	  The	  Unicity	  Constraint	  	  The	  unicity	   constraint	   restricts	  ways	  of	  knowing	   to	   those	   through	  which	  only	  one	  object	  can	  be	  known.	  I	  count	  nociception,	  sense	  of	  balance,	  introspection	  or	  proprioception	  as	  different	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Unicity,	  as	  I	  construe	  it,	  will	  be	  a	  constraint	  on	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  	  	  
                                                99	  I	   think	   bodily	   awareness	   is	   perceptual	   but	   I	   do	   not	   assume	   it.	   If	   it	   were	   not	   perceptual	   it	  would	  be	  still	  true	  that	  only	  that	  object	  which	  is	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  known	  through	  it.	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2.2.3.	  A	  Worry	  A	  pressing	  worry	  that	  I	  have	  to	  face	  is	  the	  many	  parts	  worry.	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  many	  parts	  of	  my	  body	  so	  it	  seems	  that	  it	   is	  not	  a	  single	  object	  which	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  any	  more.	  	  In	  reply:	  First,	  note	  that	  all	  my	  body	  parts	  are	  only	  derivatively	  identifiable.	  There	   is	   a	   representation	   of	   the	   body:	   the	   body	  model	   (Tsakiris	   2010,	   Longo	  and	  Haggard	  2012,	  Wong	  2015).	  The	  parts	  of	  the	  body	  are	  identified	  relative	  to	  the	  body	  model.	  So	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  object	  that	  I	  can	  be	  aware	  of.	  But	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  very	  same	  object	  can	  be	  different.	  I	  might	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  whole	  object	  or	  I	  might	  pay	  attention	  to	  its	  parts.	  The	  existence	  of	  the	  part	  is	  in	  some	  sense	  dependent	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  whole	  object.	  Roughly,	  part	  of	  x	  as	  part	   cannot	  exist	  unless	  x	   exists,	   thus	  part	  experienced	  as	  part	   is	   ontologically	   dependent	   on	   the	  whole.	   Parts	   cannot	   be	  understood	  unless	   the	  whole	   is	   in	  some	  sense	  understood;	   thus	  knowledge	  of	  parts	  is	  epistemologically	  dependent	  on	  presupposition	  of	  the	  whole.	  Second,	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   in	   the	   experience	   of	   body	   parts	   when	  experiencing	  them	  as	  parts	  or	  as	  a	  whole.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  experiences	   of	   body	   ownership	   in	   two	   different	   pathologies:	  somatoparaphrenia	   and	   alien	   limb	   syndrome.	   Patients	   suffering	   from	  somatoparaphrenia	  do	  not	  feel	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  over	  their	  hand.	  They	  deny	  that	   one	   of	   their	   hands	   is	   their	   own	   hand,	   but	   assume	   that	   it	   has	   an	   owner	  (Vallar	   and	   Ronchi	   2009).	   They	   believe	   that	   it	   is	   someone	   else’s	   hand	   (e.g.	  husband/doctor/niece).	  Thus	  they	  experience	  the	  hand	  as	  part	  of	  someone	  else	  –	  not	  as	  a	  whole.	  There	  is	  another	  delusion	  showing	  that	  one	  might	  experience	  her	  hand	  as	  a	  whole	  but	  not	  as	  a	  part.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  alien	  limb	  symptom,	  patients	  do	  not	   feel	   a	   sense	   of	   ownership	   over	   their	   hand,	   but	   do	   not	   attribute	   it	   to	  themselves	  or	  anyone	  else	  (Vallar	  and	  Ronchi	  2009;	  de	  Vignemont	  2007,	  2011).	  They	   experience	   an	   object,	   namely,	   an	   alien	   limb,	   attached	   to	   them.	   Such	   a	  patient	  is	  aware	  of	  her	  hand	  as	  a	  whole,	  a	  limb	  without	  an	  owner,	  but	  not	  as	  a	  part.	   Thus	   even	   in	   experience	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   between	  being	   aware	   of	   a	  part	  as	  a	  part	  or	  being	  aware	  of	  a	  part	  as	  a	  whole.	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When	  one	  experiences	  her	  hand	  as	  her	  hand	  then	  she	  is	  typically	  aware	  of	  herself	  from	  the	  inside.	  When	  one	  experiences	  a	  part	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  whole	  then	  one	  thereby	  experiences	  the	  whole.	  Thus	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  only	  object	  which	  is	  available	   to	   the	  subject	   through	  private	  and	  unique-­‐object	  ways	  of	  knowing	   is	  the	  exposed	  object	  even	  when	  one	  only	  experiences	  parts	  of	  it.	  	  
2.3.	  Privacy	  and	  Unicity	  are	  not	  Sufficient	  	  Are	  the	  two	  constraints	  privacy	  and	  unicity	  sufficient	  for	  providing	  the	  exposed	  object	  (the	  subject)?	  Let	  us	  consider	  the	  following	  situation	  for	  making	  it	  clear	  why	  privacy	  and	  unicity	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  get	  the	  exposed	  object.	  	  There	   is	   interesting	   research	   where	   scientists	   build	   brain-­‐computer	  interfaces.100	  In	  such	  cases	  there	  is	  a	  silicon	  chip	  built	  into	  the	  brain	  which	  can	  read	   what	   one	   thinks	   and	   which	   can	   be	   used	   as	   a	   source	   of	   information,	   an	  artificial	   way	   of	   knowing.	   After	   a	   short	   training	   phase	   one	   can	   learn	   to	   gain	  information	   through	   this	   device	   and	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   control	   something	   built	  into	   this	   closed	   system	   through	   this	   chip	   –	   even	   a	   helicopter.	   The	   example	   is	  based	   in	   reality;	  brain-­‐computer	   interfaces	  were	  designed	  by	   the	  Pentagon	   to	  enable	   pilots	   to	   have	   faster	   reaction	   times	   when	   they	   fly	   a	   helicopter	   or	   an	  airplane.	  This	  would	  result	  in	  a	  reduction	  of	  error.	  An	  apparatus	  reading	  brain	  waves	  translates	  the	  patterns	  of	  firing	  in	  the	  brain	  to	  pre-­‐set	  actions	  which	  the	  computer	  implements.	  	  Suppose	  I	  have	  a	  computer	  chip	  in	  my	  brain	  which	  is	  of	  a	  unique	  design	  –	  it	  only	   works	   with	   my	   brain,	   and	   I	   can	   monitor	   a	   super	   advanced	   helicopter’s	  state	  with	  this	  gadget.	  I	  can	  fly	  the	  helicopter	  as	  well.	  Let	  me	  call	  this	  example	  
Helicopter	  from	  the	  Inside.	  I	  have	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing	  of	  the	  helicopter	  that	  cannot	  be	  available	  to	  anybody	  except	  me	   in	  this	  way.	   I	  know	  only	  of	   the	  helicopter	  through	  this	  artificial	  way	  of	  knowing.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  natural	  design.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  which	  enables	  me	  to	  gain	  knowledge	  of	  this	  helicopter.	  	  
                                                100	  Another	   example	   is	   the	   internal	   baby-­‐monitor	   which	   I	   mentioned	   earlier	   (O'Brien	   2007).	  This	   device	   has	   privacy	   and	   unicity	   but	   does	   not	   provide	   the	   subject	   for	   the	   subject.	   My	  argument	   uses	   the	   same	   strategy	  which	  was	   developed	  by	  O’Brien	   to	   argue	   against	   a	   certain	  characterisation	  of	  knowing	  from	  the	  inside.	  Privacy	  and	  unicity	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  restrict	  the	  ways	  of	  knowing	  to	  those	  which	  only	  provide	  the	  subject	  for	  the	  subject.	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In	  this	  case,	  I	  know	  of	  the	  helicopter	  through	  a	  private	  unique-­‐	  object	  way	  of	  knowing.	  Does	  this	  make	  me	  the	  helicopter?	  Obviously,	  the	  helicopter	  cannot	  be	  me.	   Consequently,	   knowing	   an	   object	   through	   a	   private	   and	   unique-­‐object	  ways	   of	   knowing	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   ensure	   that	   what	   is	   known	   is	   only	   the	  subject	   and	   nothing	   else	   –	   as	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	   reference	   requires.	  Privacy	  and	  unicity	  as	  constraints	  on	  ways	  of	  knowing	  do	  not	  guarantee	  that	  the	  only	  object	  which	  could	  be	  known	  is	  the	  exposed	  object.	  	  
2.4.	  The	  Third	  Constraint:	  Internality	  What	   ensures	   that	   through	   proprioception,	   kinaesthesia,	   or	   sense	   of	   balance	  only	   the	   subject	   can	   be	   known?	   If	   they	   are	   internal	   channels	   of	   information,	  then,	   for	  the	  subject,	  only	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  known	  through	  them.	  Let	  me	  call	  all	  systems	  which	  store,	  use	  and	  update	   information	  computational	   systems.	  For	  a	  computational	  system,	  S,	  a	  channel	  of	  information	  which	  only	  monitors	  S	  is	  an	  internal	  channel.	  For	  a	  computational	  system	  S,	  when	  S	  has	  a	  channel	  of	  information	  C	  which	  only	  monitors	  states	  of	  affair	  (processes	  and	  events)	   in	  S	  and	  only	  S,	  then	  C	  is	  an	  internal	  channel	  of	  information.	  	  When	   my	   computer	   flashes,	   indicating	   that	   it	   is	   out	   of	   battery,	   or	   a	   car	  shows	   that	   it	   is	   out	   of	   oil,	   then	   this	   information	   is	   coming	   from	   an	   internal	  channel	   of	   information.	   Some	   of	   the	   channels	   of	   information	   in	   humans	   (a	  computational	   system	   as	   well)	   are	   internal	   channels	   of	   information.	   When	   a	  group	  has	  a	  closed-­‐circuit	  television	  or	  phone	  then	  these	  are	  internal	  channels	  of	   information	   relative	   to	   that	   group.	   What	   makes	   it	   the	   case	   that	  proprioception,	   kinaesthesia,	   introspection	   or	   sense	   of	   balance	   and	   heat	   (and	  several	  other	  special	  ways	  of	  knowing)	  cannot	  be	  of	  anything	  but	  the	  subject	  is	  this:	  they	  are	  internal	  channels.	  	  Internality	  is	  a	  constraint	  on	  channels	  of	  information	  and	  not	  only	  on	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  A	  channel	  of	  information	  might	  not	  be	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  so	  in	  this	  case	   it	   cannot	   provide	   the	   subject	   for	   the	   subject.	   For	   example,	   channels	   of	  information	  provide	  heartbeat,	  blood	  pressure	  and	  sugar	  level	  monitoring,	  but	  these	  channels	  of	  information	  never	  become	  ways	  of	  knowing	  in	  their	  own	  right	  for	  the	  subject	  because	  they	  do	  not	  provide	  conscious	  content.	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2.4.1.	  A	  worry	  But	  is	  it	  not	  the	  case	  that	  internality	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  channels	  of	  information	  alone	  is	  sufficient	  to	  provide	  the	  exposed	  object	  as	  the	  unique	  object	  which	  can	  be	   known	   through	   this	   way?	   No.	   First	   of	   all	   through	   an	   internal	   channel	   of	  information	  many	  objects	  can	  be	  known,	  like	  through	  a	  closed-­‐circuit	  camera	  or	  phone.	   A	   group	   of	   doctors	   or	   a	   rescue	   squad	   might	   operate	   in	   a	   noisy	  environment	   and	   use	   a	   closed-­‐circuit	   phone	   to	   communicate	   only	   with	   each	  other.	   The	   channel	   of	   information	   is	   internal,	   but	   all	   the	   doctors/rescuers	  (objects)	   and	   what	   they	   say	   can	   be	   known	   through	   it.	   Internal	   channels	   of	  information	  neither	  need	  to	  be	  private	  nor	  unique	  object	  channels.	  	  Internality	  does	  not	  require	  that	  there	   is	  a	  subject	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  the	   information.	   Internality	   requires	   unicity	   to	   ensure	   that	   it	   is	   information	  about	   a	   unique	   object	   and	   privacy	   for	   ensuring	   that	   it	   is	   information	   for	   the	  subject.	   Internality	  ensures	  that	  the	  one	  of	  whom	   the	  information	  is	  about	  and	  the	  one	  for	  whom	  the	  information	  is	  for	  cannot	  be	  different.	  Thus	  internality	  for	  channels	  of	  information	  of	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  providing	  knowledge	  of	  a	  unique	  object.	  	  
2.5.	  What	  is	  Missing?	  Are	  we	  done?	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  these	  constraints	  –	  privacy,	  unicity	  and	  internality	  –	  are	  sufficient	  to	  put	  the	  subject	  into	  the	  position	  to	  know	  that	  she	  
knows	   of	   herself	   through	   such	   special	   ways	   of	   knowing.	   For	   using	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   we	   find	   it	   plausible,	   as	   Evans	   (1982),	   Peacocke	   (2008)	   and	  O’Brien	   (2007)	   do,	   that	   the	   subject	   knowingly	   and	   intentionally	   refers	   to	  herself.	   The	   subject	   knows	   that	   she	   is	   referring	   to	   herself	   and	   the	   subject	  intends	  to	  refer	  to	  herself	  by	  using	  ‘I’.	  But	  can	  the	  subject	  know	  that	  she	  knows	  of	  herself	  whenever	  she	  knows	  of	  an	  object	  through	  private	  (P),	  unique	  object	  (U)	  and	  internal	  (I)	  ways	  of	  knowing?	  Let	   me	   call	   such	   ways	   of	   knowing	   which	   are	   private,	   unique	   object	   and	  internal	  ways	  of	  knowing:	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	   knowing.	  They	  ensure	   that	  only	  the	  exposed	  object	  (the	  subject)	  can	  be	  known	  through	  them.	  Accordingly,	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  necessarily	  of	  the	  exposed	  object,	  the	  subject.	  However,	  being	  self-­‐reflexive	  for	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  ensure	  that	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the	  subject	  knows	  that	  it	  is	  of	  herself.	  We	  need	  more	  in	  order	  to	  put	  the	  subject	  in	  a	  position	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  the	  content	  –	  provided	  by	  a	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  –	  is	  of	  herself.	  	  	  	  
2.6.	  The	  Last	  Constraint:	  a	  Constraint	  on	  Awareness	  There	   should	   be	   some	   kind	   of	   knowledge	   which	   enables	   the	   subject	   to	   self-­‐ascribe	  what	   is	   known	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	   knowing.	  Which	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  would	  be	  able	  to	  govern	  self-­‐ascription?	  Consider	   the	   following	   story.	   Suppose	   an	   old	   friend	   of	   yours,	   Adorno,	  approaches	  you	  on	  the	  street	   in	  a	   foggy	  day	  and	  whispers	   into	  your	  ear	   ‘I	   feel	  your	  pain’.	  Adorno	   is	   an	  economist;	  he	  means	  what	  he	   says.	  Adorno	  means	   it	  non-­‐metaphorically	  as	  always.	  He	  thinks	  what	  he	  feels	  is	  your	  pain.	  You	  might	  wonder	  whether	  he	  puts	  his	  non-­‐existent	  poetic	  hat	  on,	  but	  you	  should	  exclude	  this	   firmly.	   So,	   you	   would	   be	   pretty	   worried.	   You	   would	   prefer	   to	   have	   a	  psychiatrist	  at	  hand,	  or	  seek	  help	  from	  a	  doctor	  or	  at	   least	  not	  be	  alone	  in	  the	  dark	  with	  an	  economist	  who	  seems	  to	  feel	  your	  pain.	  This	  is	  surprising!	  We	  do	  make	  mistakes	   and	   we	   are	   not	   referred	   to	   the	   psychiatrist	   for	   our	  mistakes.	  Normally,	  we	  are	  not	  distressed	  by	  mistakes	  or	  false	  beliefs	  of	  others.101	  	  Compare	   this	   case	   with	   another	   one.	   Suppose	   on	   another	   foggy	   day	   that	  Adorno	   goes	   to	   you	   and	   whispers	   to	   you	   that	   ‘There	   are	   no	   black	   swans’.	  Nothing	  would	  make	  you	  worry!	  You	  will	   be	  neither	   surprised	  nor	  disturbed.	  You	  would	   not	  wish	   that	   a	   psychiatrist	   should	   be	   around	   and	   help.	   You	  may	  send	  Adorno	  to	  Regents	  Park	  to	  look	  at	  the	  two	  black	  swans	  on	  the	  lake	  far	  from	  the	  city.	  Similarly,	   if	  Liz	  says	   ‘Marble	  Arch	  does	  not	  exist’	  you	  just	  point	  to	  the	  Marble	  Arch	  to	  change	  Liz’s	  view	  on	  that	  matter.	  You	  have	  no	  similar	  move	  to	  make	   to	   show	   that	   one	   cannot	   feel	   (non-­‐metaphorically)	   the	   pain	   of	   others.	  Mistakes	  can	  be	  corrected	  but	  not	  mistakes	  of	   the	   first	  kind.	  Thus	  you	  cannot	  direct	  Adorno’s	  attention	  to	   the	  evidence	  or	  ground	  which	   is	  only	  available	   to	  him.	  
                                                101	  There	  are	  some	  exceptions	  but	  they	  are	  of	  different	  kind.	  If	  one	  would	  say	  ‘I	  figured	  out	  that	  2+2=5’,	  you	  would	  be	  pretty	  worried	  as	  well.	  But	  this	  is	  failure	  of	  basic	  rational	  capacities	  and	  this	  makes	  it	  disturbing.	  This	  is	  a	  less	  likely	  (but	  possible)	  explanation	  for	  the	  economist	  friend	  case	  as	  well.	  Moreover	  nobody	  ever	  dared	  to	  think	  that	  ‘I	  have	  pain’	  is	  analytic	  while	  one	  might	  hold	  this	  for	  ‘2+2=4’.	  
 158	  
The	   evidence	   (reason	   or	  whatever	   grounds	   or	   justifies	   it)	   seems	   to	   come	  from	   the	   inside	   and	   it	   cannot	   come	   from	   anywhere	   else.102	  Let	   me	   elaborate	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  evidence.	  If	  I	  say	  ‘I	  have	  a	  headache’,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  feel	  anything	  then	   I	   am	   not	   justified/entitled	   to	   self-­‐ascribe	   a	   headache.	   I	   call	   ‘evidence’	  whatever	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  case	  when	  I	  feel	  a	  headache	  and	  the	  case	  when	   I	   do	   not	   feel	   headache.	   In	   the	   second	   case	   I	   lack	   evidence	   for	   the	   self-­‐ascription	  of	  headache.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  for	  normal	  people,	  when	  one	  knows	  of	  a	  state	  from	  the	  inside	  through	   a	   self-­‐reflexive	  way	   of	   knowing	   then	   one,	   thereby,	   is	   in	   a	   position	   to	  self-­‐ascribe	   it.	   Something	   makes	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   automatic.	   Such	   self-­‐attribution	  cannot	  be	  defeated	  by	  evidence	  for	  attributing	  that	  state	  to	  someone	  else.	  I	  might	  not	  have	  pain	  when	  I	  seem	  to	  feel	  it,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  that	  what	   I	   feel	   from	   the	   inside	   is	   someone	   else’s	   pain	   and,	   as	   a	   mistake,	   I	  misattribute	  the	  pain	  to	  myself.	  Let	  me	  call	  what	  makes	  this	  possible,	  which	  is	  a	  constraint	   on	   awareness:	  automaticity.	   Unless	   one	   is	   delusional	   or	   rationally	  impaired,	   automaticity	   enables	   self-­‐ascription	   of	   states	   known	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing.	   Automaticity	   enables	   the	   content	   known	   through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  to	  be	  self-­‐ascribed,	  given	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  able	  to	  use	   ‘I’.	  But	  automaticity	  (registration	  of	  self-­‐significance)	   is	  already	  present	  before	  one	  acquires	  the	  mastery	  of	  ‘I’.	  Automaticity	   is	   different	   from	   what	   enables	   other	   kinds	   of	   automatic	  attribution.	  When	  a	  puppet	  moves	  when	  one	  speaks	  beside	  it	  the	  sound	  seems	  to	   come	   from	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   puppet.	   This	   is	   provided	   by	   an	   automatic	  mechanism.	   But	   in	   this	   case	   I	   can	   have	   defeating	   evidence,	   and,	   in	   fact,	   I	   do,	  since	  I	  know	  puppets	  do	  not	  speak.	  So	  I	  do	  not	  attribute	  speech	  to	  the	  puppet.	  I	  can	  always	  have	  defeating	  evidence.	  Evidence	  for	  the	  contrary	  will	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  each	  time	  for	  such	  perceptual	  cases	  which	  are	  not	  based	  solely	  on	  self-­‐
                                                102	  One	   could	  object	   (like	  Peacocke,	  Wright	  would)	   to	  my	  use	  of	   the	  word	   evidence.	  On	   some	  views	   self-­‐ascription	  of	  pain	   is	   groundless	   (or	   the	   subject	  has	   a	  default	   entitlement).	   	  But	  my	  idea	   is	  not	  dissimilar;	   there	   is	   some	  kind	  of	  asymmetry	  between	  what	   justifies	  or	  entitles	   the	  self-­‐ascriptions	   based	   on	   knowing	   from	   the	   inside	   as	   opposed	   other-­‐ascriptions.	   It	   cannot	   be	  groundless	   in	   a	   sense	   that	   whenever	   the	   subject	   wishes	   to	   self-­‐ascribe	   property	   F	   then	   the	  subject	   is	   in	   a	   position	   to	   self-­‐ascribe	   it.	   There	   should	   be	   correctness	   conditions	   of	   a	   self-­‐ascription.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  F	  is	  always	  true	  or	  it	  is	  always	  true	  when	  the	  subject	   only	  wish	   to	   self-­‐ascribe	   it.	   Imagining	  p	   and	  believing	   on	   this	   ‘basis’	  makes	   the	  belief	  ‘groundless’.	  I	  call	  ‘evidence’	  whatever	  supports	  thinking	  p	  or	  makes	  self-­‐ascription	  correct.	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reflexive	  ways	   of	   knowing.	   In	   contrast,	   for	   feeling	   a	   headache	   through	   a	   self-­‐reflexive	  way	  of	  knowing	  there	  cannot	  be	  such	  defeating	  evidence	  which	  makes	  me	  attribute	  the	  headache	  to	  someone	  other	  than	  me.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  mistake	  that	   your	   economist	   friend	   committed	   in	   the	   first	   case	   is	   very	   unusual.	   For	  normal	   mistakes	   one	   certainly	   would	   not	   consult	   a	   psychiatrist	   or	   think	   of	  irrationality.	  Thus	  the	  case	  is	  indeed	  very	  strange.	  Through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  the	  healthy	  subject	  cannot	  ascribe	  F	  to	   anything	   but	   herself.	   But	   what	   enables	   her	   to	   know	   that	   it	   is	   of	   herself?	  Before	  one	  acquires	  the	  mastery	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  one	  knows	  of	  her	  body	   and	   mind	   already.	   The	   reason,	   as	   I	   understand	   it,	   is	   this:	   the	  content/information	  automatically	  has	  non-­‐defeasible	   self-­‐significance.	  Self-­‐significance	  can	  be	  read	  off	  from	  the	  way	  the	  creature	  acts	  upon	  the	  information	  she	  received	  before	  she	  is	  able	  to	  use	  ‘I’.	  The	  self-­‐directed	  actions	  show	  that	  the	  creature	   receives	   self-­‐significant	   information.	   And	   the	   non-­‐defeasible	   self-­‐significance	  enables	  the	  subject	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  exposed	  object.103	  What	   does	   non-­‐defeasible	   self-­‐significance	  mean?	   To	   have	   non-­‐defeasible	  self-­‐significant	   information	   means	   that	   the	   information	   potentially	   has	  immediate	   implications	   for	   the	   subject’s	   action.	   Self-­‐significance	   should	   be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  disposition	  to	  self-­‐directed	  action.	  (The	  subject	  might	  not	   act	   for	   some	   reason	   but	   if	   the	   subject	   were	   to	   act	   then	   the	   information	  would	  have	  significance	   for	  self-­‐directed	  action.	  This	   is	  very	  similar	   to	  Perry’s	  notion	  of	  ‘self-­‐significance’.)	  If	  the	  subject	  feels	  thirsty,	  she	  will	  drink	  if	  there	  is	  a	   drink	   in	   the	   vicinity,	   and	   if	   the	   subject	   feels	   out	   of	   balance,	   the	   subject	  will	  adjust	   her	   posture.	   The	   subject	   might	   be	   wrong	   that	   she	   is	   thirsty	   or	   out	   of	  
                                                103	  The	  self-­‐reflexivity	  of	  ways	  of	  knowing	  secure	   that	   just	  and	  only	   the	  subject	  can	  be	  known	  through	  such	  special	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  But	  the	  subject	  might	  not	  be	  aware	  of	  this.	  Automaticity	  enables	  the	  subject	  (who	  is	  able	  to	  use	  ‘I’)	  to	  self-­‐ascribe	  whatever	  she	  knows/believes	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing	   automatically.	   The	   registration	   of	   the	   non-­‐defeasible	   self-­‐significance	  (automaticity)	  enables	  the	  subject	  to	  self-­‐ascribe	  it.	  This	  capacity	  of	  self-­‐ascription	  for	   ‘I’-­‐users	   is	   provided	   by	   a	   mechanism	   which	   might	   break	   down,	   as	   Campbell	   (1999b)	  observed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  syndrome	  called	  ‘inserted	  thought’.	  	  One	  might	  object	  that	  it	  is	  coherent	  even	  for	  a	  normal	  subject	  to	  think	  that	  someone	  else	  is	  the	   thinker	  of	  her	  own	  thought.	   Imagine	  a	  case	  of	  hypnosis	  or	  brain	  stimulation	  which	  makes	  one	  think	  something.	  However,	  such	  a	  case	  only	  affects	  the	  autonomy	  of	  thinking.	  But,	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  who	  is	  the	  thinker	  is	  not	  altered.	  Here,	   control	  over	  one’s	  own	  thinking	  processes	  would	  be	   lost	   or	   radically	  diminished,	   but	  without	   altering	  who	   the	   thinker	  of	   the	   thought	   is.	  A	   less	  unusual	   case	   for	   losing	   control	   over	   one’s	   own	   thinking	  processes	   is	   anger.	   So	   the	  notions	   of	  being	  in	  control	  of	  a	  thought	  and	  being	  the	  thinker	  of	  a	  thought	  should	  be	  distinguished.	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balance	  but	  she	  cannot	  be	  wrong	  about	  who	  should	  drink	  or	  adjust	  her	  posture	  given	  that	  it	  is	  known	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Self-­‐significance	  is	   the	   registration	   that	   the	   property	   concerns	   the	   exposed	   object	   for	   self-­‐directed	  action	  guidance.	  	  The	   subject	   need	  not	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   self-­‐significant	   content	   in	   order	   for	  her	  self-­‐directed	  action	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  it.	  The	  exposed	  object	  is	  known	  before	  one	  acquires	  the	  mastery	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun,	  as	  the	  one	  which	  one	  has	  to	   care	   for	   through	   self-­‐directed	   actions.	   It	   seems	   that	   the	   self-­‐significance	   of	  the	  information	  is	  registered	  before	  one	  acquires	  the	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  and	  this	  enables	  the	  subject	  to	  care	  for	  itself	  before	  knowing	  of	  itself.	  Passing	   the	  mirror	   test	   for	   self-­‐recognition	   for	   a	   creature	   is	   sufficient	   for	  knowing	   of	   the	   exposed	   object	   as	   an	   object.	   Animals	   like	   elephants,	   apes	   and	  kids	  (before	  speech	  acquisition)	  can	  pass	   the	  mirror	   test.	  This	   is	  sufficient	   for	  attributing	  de	  re	   content	   (for	   elephants,	   apes,	   children)	  of	   the	  exposed	  object.	  This	   is	   already	   the	   registration	   of	   the	   self-­‐significance	   of	   the	   content.	   The	  registration	   of	   self-­‐significance	   is	   a	   disposition	   to	   self-­‐directed	   action	   –	   a	  disposition	  toward	  removing	  the	  mark	  from	  the	  forehead.	  For	  a	  subject	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  know	  of	  the	  exposed	  object	  as	  an	  object	  before	  one	   acquires	   mastery	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun.	   When	   a	   child	   learns	   the	  language	  and	  is	  only	  able	  to	  use	  her	  proper	  name	  for	  herself	  then	  it	  seems	  the	  child	   is	   able	   to	   think	   of	   herself	   as	   an	   object.	  When	   one	   learns	   to	   use	   ‘I’,	   one	  learns	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  exposed	  object	  which	  one	  already	  knows	  from	  the	  inside.	  Let	  us	  compare	  merely	  knowing	  of	  the	  exposed	  object	  with	  the	  use	  of	  ‘I’.	  In	  the	  former	  case	  the	  subject	  only	  knows	  of	  the	  object	  which	  is	  herself	  but	  does	  not	   intentionally	   and	   knowingly	   refer	   to	   herself	   as	   herself.	   But	   knowing	   of	  herself	   (de	   re)	   already	   draws	   on	   the	   self-­‐significance	   of	   the	   information	  received.	  The	  mechanism	   that	   underpins	   automatic	   registration	   of	   self-­‐significance	  for	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  might	  malfunction.	  But	  in	  this	  case	  there	  will	  be	  other	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  for	  which	  automaticity	  holds	  –	  and	  which	  make	  self-­‐ascription	  possible	  if	  the	  subject	  is	  able	  to	  use	  ‘I’.	  Proprioception,	  kinaesthesia,	  sense	   of	   balance,	   introspection	   and	   many	   other	   ways	   of	   knowing	   are	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Some	  of	  them	  might	  cease	  to	  be	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	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of	  knowing	  or	  self-­‐ascriptions	  based	  on	  them	  might	  cease	  to	  be	  automatic,	  but	  still	  there	  will	  be	  always	  other	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  which	  provide	  the	  exposed	  object.	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  exposed	  object	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	   enables	   the	   subject	   to	   know	   of	   the	   object	   that	   she	   is	   without	   the	  possibility	  of	  mistake.	  	  To	  sum	  up,	  automaticity	  is	  the	  registration	  of	  self-­‐significance	  (disposition	  to	  self-­‐directed	  action).	  The	  registration	  of	  self-­‐significance	  enables	  the	  subject	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  exposed	  object;	  thus	  it	  is	  present	  before	  one	  acquires	  mastery	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  	  	  
2.6.1.	  Automaticity	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  registration	  of	  self-­‐significance	  but	  
what	  is	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  it?	  The	  registration	  of	  self-­‐significance	  can	  be	  reflected	  in	  experience.	  One	  of	  these	  ways	   is	   feeling	   ownership	   over	   a	   limb.	   The	   positive	   evidence	   for	   this	   is	   the	  rubber	   hand	   illusion.	   The	   Rubber-­‐hand	   illusion	   (RHI)	   (Botvinick	   and	   Cohen	  1998;	  Tastevin	  1937,	  Maravita,	  Spence	  and	  Driver	  2003,	  Tsakiris	  2010)	  appears	  when	  certain	  conditions	  are	  met	  in	  the	  standard	  set	  up.	  The	  participant	  places	  his	  hand	  on	   the	   table	  behind	  a	   screen,	   so	   that	  he	   is	  deprived	  of	   vision	  of	   this	  hand.	   The	   subject	   sees	   a	   rubber	   hand	   in	   an	   anatomically	   congruent	   position	  with	  her	  own	  unseen	  hand.	  After	  simultaneous	  stimulation	  on	  both	  the	  rubber	  and	  the	  real	  hand	  75	  %	  of	   the	  participants	  report	  a	   feeling	  of	  ownership	  over	  the	  rubber	  hand	  and	  they	  feel	  the	  touch	  to	  be	  where	  they	  see	  it.	  In	  contrast	  this	  is	   not	   the	   case	   in	   the	   non-­‐simultaneous	   condition.	   This	   counts	   as	   evidence	   in	  favour	   of	   thinking	   that	   there	   is	   in	   some	   cases	   a	   positive	   phenomenology	   of	   a	  feeling	  of	  ownership	  over	  a	  limb.	  It	  is	  observed	  that	  one	  has	  no	  tendency	  to	  act	  with	   a	   limb	  over	  which	  one	  does	  not	   feel	   ownership.	  A	  physical	   threat	   to	   the	  rubber	   hand	   during	   the	   synchronous	   condition	   is	   treated	   by	   the	   subject	   as	   a	  threat	  to	  the	  subject	  herself;	   it	   induces	  withdrawal	  behaviour	  of	  the	  real	  hand	  (Ehrsson	  et	  al	  2007).	  This	  is	  one	  way	  of	  registering	  self-­‐significance,	  but	  there	  should	  be	  other	  ways	  of	   registering	   self-­‐significance,	   like	   for	  hunger	  or	   thirst,	  where	  ownership	  is	  not	  involved.	  	  	  Let	   me	   call	   the	   knowledge	   acquired	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	   way(s)	   of	  knowing	  by	  automatic	   registration	  of	   significance,	  and	  which	  results	   in	  a	   self-­‐
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ascription:	  self-­‐reflexive	  knowledge.	  Accordingly,	  what	  we	  have	  found	  is	  this	  proprioception,	   introspection	   and	   alike	   provide	   self-­‐reflexive	   knowledge	   if	  automaticity	  (undefeatable	  registration	  of	  self-­‐significance)	  obtains.	  	  To	   sum	   up,	  we	   found	   four	   constraints	  which	  might	   enable	   the	   subject	   to	  know	  of	  the	  object	  which	  she	  is	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistake.	  Privacy	  and	  unicity	  are	  constraints	  on	  way	  of	  knowing,	  while	   internality	   is	  a	  constraint	  on	  channels	  of	  information.	  The	  fourth	  constraint,	  automaticity,	   is	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  registration	  of	  the	  self-­‐significance	  of	  content	  gained	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  	  I	  need	  one	  more	  element	  to	  complete	  my	  account:	  the	  subject’s	  referential	  intention.	   If	   the	  subject	   intends	   to	   refer	   to	   the	  exposed	  object	  known	   through	  self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing	   whenever	   she	   uses	   ‘I’	   then	   she	   cannot	   be	  mistaken	  about	  which	  object	  it	  is.	  But	  unless	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  exposed	  object	   known	   through	   a	   self-­‐reflexive	   way	   of	   knowing	   when	   automaticity	  obtains,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  else	  could	  make	  GRR	  possible.	  	  This	  gives	  us	  all	  the	  material	  that	  I	  need	  for	  articulating	  the	  Simple	  View.	  In	  the	  following	  section	  I	  will	  present	  the	  Simple	  View.	  This	  will	  be	  the	  answer	  to	  my	  guiding	  question	  how	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference	  is	  possible.	  	  	  
3.	  The	  Simple	  View	  I	  am	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  state	  a	  broad	  outline	  of	  the	  Simple	  View.	  The	  Simple	  View	  is	  simple	  because	  it	  does	  not	  suppose	  more	  than	  that	  the	  subject	  uses	   ‘I’	  for	  the	  object	  of	  which	  she	  knows	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  The	  subject’s	  use	  of	   ‘I’	   fixes	   the	   referent	  of	   ‘I’	   to	   this	  object.	  The	  exposed	  object	   is	  necessarily	   the	   subject,	   and,	   the	   subject,	   by	   using	   ‘I’,	   intends	   to	   refer	   to	   this	  object.	  Exactly	  this	  makes	  it	  possible	  that	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  have	  the	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference.104	  
                                                104	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  Simple	  View	  and	  Campbell’s	  (1994a)	  Perceptual-­‐Demonstrative	  Model	   for	   ‘I’	   is	   worthy	   of	   further	   discussion.	   A	   useful	   starting	   point	   of	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  views	  is	  my	  distinction	  between	  first-­‐person	  and	  demonstrative	  IEM.	   However,	   both	   views	   emphasise	   direct	   acquaintance	   for	   understanding	   the	   first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  Note	  that	  the	  Simple	  View	  allows	  that	   introspection	  provides	  the	  subject	  with	  direct	  acquaintance	  with	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  even	  though	  introspection	  is	  not	  a	  perceptual	  faculty.	  Using	  a	  Demonstrative	  Model	  for	  ‘I’	  seems	  to	  commit	  one	  to	  denying	  that	  the	  cognitive	  significance	  of	  essential	   indexicals	   is	   of	   different	   kind	   from	   the	   cognitive	   significance	   of	   non-­‐essential	  indexicals.	  I	  would	  also	  resist	  this	  point.	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One	  might	  think	  that	  there	  is	  a	  simpler	  view	  than	  the	  Simple	  View;	  that	  is,	  the	  subject	  knows	  that	  ‘I’	  stands	  for	  myself	  or	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  myself	  by	  using	  ‘I’.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  this	  can	  work.	  It	  seems	  that	  one	  knows	  of	  the	  object	  that	  is	  the	  referent	   of	   ‘I’	   from	   the	   inside	   and	   knows	   it	   in	   such	   way	   that	   one	   cannot	   be	  mistaken	  which	  object	  it	  is.	  When	  I	  am	  hungry	  I	  know	  which	  object	  my	  hunger	  concerns	  and	  I	  feed	  the	  right	  object.	  This	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  knowledge	  that	  ‘I’	  stands	  for	  myself,	  because	  this	  does	  not	  tell	  you	  which	  object	  you	  need	  to	  care	  about.	  Second	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  and	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘myself’	  are	  not	  fixed	  independently	   from	   each	   other.	   ‘Myself’	   presupposes	   the	   capacity	   to	  understand	  and	  use	  ‘I’.	  It	  is	  because	  either	  the	  same	  rule	  fixes	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  and	  ‘myself’	  or	  what	  fixes	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  involved	  in	  fixing	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘myself’.	  Even	  developmentally,	  understanding	  and	  using	   ‘myself’	   comes	  much	  later	  than	  understanding	  ‘I’	  (Rochat	  2003).105	  According	  to	  the	  Simple	  View	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  object	  of	  which	  the	  subject	  knows	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  For	  a	  subject	  who	  uses	  ‘I’,	   there	   is	   always	  at	   least	  one	  way	  of	  knowing	  which	   is	   self-­‐reflexive	  and	   for	  which	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  self-­‐significance	  is	  automatic.	  Introspection	  or	  one	  of	  the	  bodily	  senses	  is	  always	  at	  hand	  whenever	  the	  subject	  is	  thinking	  and	  in	  a	  position	  to	  self-­‐ascribe	  something.	  	  In	  my	  view	  there	  is	  a	  single	  object,	  the	  exposed	  object	  which	  is	  necessarily	  the	  subject;	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  exposed	  object	  which	  she	  knows	  from	  the	  inside.	  This	  fixes	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’.	  	  




Description	  of	  the	  feature	  	  1.	  Privacy	  for	  W	  (P)	   Only	  the	  subject	  can	  have	  this	  way	  of	  knowing	  W1	  for	  knowing	  of	  this	  content,	  C.	  	  2.	  Unicity	  for	  W	  (U)	   Only	  a	  unique	  object	  can	  be	  known	  through	  the	  way	  of	  knowing.	  
                                                105	  The	  capacity	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  is	  prior	  and	  presupposed	  by	  the	  capacity	  to	  use	  ‘myself’.	  To	  know	  what	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  cannot	  derive	  from	  another	  referring	  term	  the	  referent	  of	  which	  is	  fixed	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun,	  or	  which	  at	  least	  employs	  the	  way	  as	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed.	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  3.	  Internality	  for	  channels	  of	  information	  (I)	   The	  channel	  of	  information	  provides	  information,	  for	  x,	  of	  states,	  processes	  and	  events	  in	  x.	  	  	  	  Self-­‐reflexive	  W	   The	  ways	  of	  knowing	  which	  are	  1-­‐3	  (PIU)	  are	  self-­‐reflexive.	  	  4.	  Automaticity	  for	  registration	  of	  self-­‐significance	  (A)	  	   Automaticity	   is	   a	   constraint	   on	   the	   registration	   of	   the	  self-­‐significance	  of	  content	  gained	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  	  
Table	  1.	  	  Constraints.	  	  The	  referent	  of	   ‘I’	   according	   to	  my	  proposal	   is	   fixed	   to	   that	  special	  object:	   the	  exposed	   object,	   the	   only	   one	   that	   is	   known	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	  knowing.	   Whenever	   the	   subject	   uses	   ‘I’,	   at	   least	   one	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	  knowing	  is	  available	  to	  the	  subject.	  The	  subject	  simply	  uses	   ‘I’	   for	  the	  exposed	  object	  and	  this	  fixes	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’.	  This	  is	  my	  view.	  This	  explains	  how	  GRR	  is	  possible	   –	   why	   the	   subject	   cannot	   be	   mistaken	   about	   which	   object	   she	   is	  referring	  to	  by	  using	  ‘I’.	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Chapter	  9	  
The	  Simple	  View:	  The	  Test	  
 
	  
Abstract	  I	   will	   argue	   for	   the	   Simple	   View	   by	   showing	   how	   it	   passes	   the	  Reference-­‐fixing	  Test.	  In	  order	  to	  pass	  the	  test,	  a	  view	  must	  be	  able	  to	  account	   for	   the	   essential	   features	   of	   ‘I’	  with	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule	  for	   ‘I’.	   IEM	   and	   GRR	   are,	   of	   course,	   the	   key	   features	   but	   there	   are	  several	  other	  features	  as	  well.	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  Simple	  View	  can	   elegantly	   account	   for	   all	   of	   these	   features.	   Passing	   the	   test	  demonstrates	   the	   Simple	  View’s	   explanatory	  power.	   I	  will	   argue	   that	  unless	   one	   accepts	   the	   Simple	  View,	   IEM,	   guaranteed	   right	   reference	  and	  aboutness-­‐error	  freedom	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  for.	   It	   follows	  that	  the	   Simple	   View	   is	   the	   most	   fundamental	   explanation	   of	   how	   the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed.	  	  	  
1.	  Preliminaries	  In	   the	   literature	   there	   is	  a	   test	   for	   the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  of	   the	   first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  The	  idea	  is	  simple.	  If	  we	  wish	  to	  have	  a	  theory	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   is	   fixed,	   then	   this	   theory	   should	   account	   for	   all	  essential	  features	  of	  the	  uses	  of	  the	  ‘I’	  (Peacocke	  2008,	  Campbell	  2012).	  I	  called	  this	   the	   Reference-­‐fixing	   Test.	   According	   to	   Peacocke	   and	   Campbell,	   the	   key	  features	   of	   the	   uses	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   are	   IEM	   and	   GRR.	   There	   are	  good	  reasons	  to	  think	  they	  are	  the	  key	  features	  of	  the	  first	  person	  pronoun.	  GRR	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  all	  uses	  of	   ‘I’,	  thus	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  for	  ‘I’	  has	  to	  account	  for	  it.	  IEM	  is	  explained	  by	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  the	  relevant	  kind	  of	  term	  is	  fixed	  (chapter	  7).	  Thus	  if	  the	  Simple	  View	  is	  correct	  then	  it	  should	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  first-­‐person	  IEM	  and	  why	  it	  is	  different	  from	  demonstrative	  IEM.	  In	   the	   first	   part	   of	   the	   thesis,	   I	   already	   discussed	   the	   most	   important	  features	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun:	   GRR,	   IEM	   and,	   a	   further	   feature,	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aboutness-­‐error	  freedom.	  But	  a	  longer	  list	  of	  features	  might	  make	  our	  test	  even	  better.	   So	   I	  will	   expand	   the	   test	   to	   include	   the	   seven	   essential	   features	   listed	  below.	  	  	  
Features	  of	  ‘I’	  
	  	  
Description	  of	  the	  feature	  	  1.	  IEM	   Certain	  self-­‐ascriptions	  made	  on	  a	  certain	  basis	  are	   immune	  to	  error	   through	   misidentification.	   For	   Fa	   based	   on	   a	   way	   of	  knowing	  W,	  who	  is	  F	  cannot	  be	  misidentified.	  	  	  2.	  GRR	   GRR	  is	  a	  guarantee	  against	  (i)	  lack	  of	  referent	  and	  (ii)	  incorrect	  reference.	  	  3.	  Aboutness-­‐error	  freedom	   For	   a	   self-­‐ascription,	   the	   subject	   cannot	   be	   mistaken	   about	  whom,	  which	   object,	   she	   is	   thinking	   about.	   For	   uses	   of	   ‘I’,	   the	  speaker’s	  and	  the	  semantic	  referent	  cannot	  be	  different.	  
	  4.	  Error	  =	  delusion	   There	   are	   certain	   mistakes	   which	   might	   count	   as	   a	   sign	   of	  delusion	   in	   certain	   conditions	   (e.g.	   “The	   pain	   which	   I	   feel	   is	  yours”).	  	  	  5.	  Semantic	  irreducibility	  (Castaneda)	   The	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   other	   kinds	   of	  referring	   terms,	   like	   demonstratives,	   definite	   descriptions,	  proper	  names,	  or	  anything	  else.	  ‘I’	  is	  irreducibly	  first	  personal	  in	  its	  semantic	  role.	  	  6.	  In	  using	  ‘I’,	  the	  subject	  is	  knowingly	  &	  intentionally	  referring	  to	  oneself	  	  	  
In	  using	  ‘I’	  1. The	  subject	  refers	  to	  herself	  (the	  exposed	  object)	  2. The	  subject	  intends	  to	  refer	  to	  herself	  (the	  exposed	  
object)	  3. The	  subject	  (implicitly)	  knows	  that	  she	  is	  referring	  to	  herself	  (λx(x	  refers to	  x).	  
 7.	  Functional	  irreducibility	  	   Uses	  of	  ‘I’	  have	  immediate	  consequences	  for	  the	  subject’s	  action.	  	  
Table	  2.	  	  Features	  of	  the	  first	  person	  pronoun.	  	  I	  will	  go	  through	  each	  of	  the	  seven	  features,	  showing	  how	  the	  Simple	  View	  can	  account	   for	   each	   feature.	   I	   begin	   with	   the	   most	   important	   part	   of	   the	   test:	  whether	  the	  Simple	  View	  can	  explain	  first-­‐person	  IEM.	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2.	  The	  First	  Essential	  Feature:	  IEM	  IEM	  became	  an	  important	  topic	  starting	  with	  Shoemaker	  because	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	   teach	  us	   something	   about	   the	   first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  But	   it	   remains	  unclear	  what	  this	  is.	  Shoemaker	  claims	  that	  the	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐ascription	  requires	  the	  capacity	   for	   immune	   self-­‐ascription,	   but	   he	   does	   not	   develop	   the	   idea	  (Shoemaker	   1968:	   565-­‐566).	   The	   Simple	   View	   will	   elucidate	   why	  understanding	  IEM	  is	  essential	  for	  understanding	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  and	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  self-­‐ascription.	  So	  what	  follows	  is	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  by	  understanding	  first-­‐person	  IEM.	  	  In	   the	   first	  part	  of	   the	  thesis,	   I	  argued	  that	  self-­‐ascription	  –	  based	  on	  only	  knowing	   from	   the	   inside	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	   knowing	   –	   is	   immune	  relative	   to	   ‘I’	   (chapter	   2-­‐8).	   We	   have	   found	   that	   the	   question	   of	   IEM	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions,	  the	  referentiality	  of	  ‘I’,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  are	  intimately	  related	  (chapters	  1	  and	  2)	  and	  saw	  that	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  is	  basis-­‐relative	  (chapters	  1,	  3,	  4,	  and	  6).	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  general	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   requires	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule	   (chapter	   7).	  We	  saw	  that	   there	  are	   two	  different	  kinds	  of	   IEM:	   first-­‐person	  and	  demonstrative	  IEM	  (chapter	  6).	  	  The	   Simple	   View	   offers	   connections	   between	   these	   seemingly	   unrelated	  segments.	   The	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	   by	   the	   subject’s	   use	   of	   ‘I’	   to	   the	   exposed	  object	  known	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  When	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  based	   only	   on	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing,	   then	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   is	  immune.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   reference	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	   through	   such	   ways	   of	  knowing.	  Thus	  without	  specifying	  the	  basis,	  we	  cannot	  evaluate	  whether	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  is	  immune.	  For	  IEM	  it	  matters	  how	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  because	  the	  reference	  is	  fixed	  through	  it.	  	  I	  will	  present	   four	  questions	  about	   first-­‐person	   IEM.	   If	   the	  Simple	  View	   is	  the	  correct	  view	  then	  the	  Simple	  View	  should	  help	  us	  answer	  these	  questions.	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2.1.	  The	  Reference-­‐fixing	  Test	  for	  the	  Simple	  View:	  
The	  explanation	  of	  first-­‐person	  IEM	  	  If	  the	  Simple	  View	  is	  the	  correct	  view	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed,	  then	  it	  has	  to	  explain	  first-­‐person	  IEM	  by	  answering	  the	  following	  questions:	  	  1. What	  accounts	  for	  first-­‐person	  IEM	  as	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  IEM?	  2. Is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  if	  I	  encounter	  the	  same	  object	  twice,	  at	  different	  times,	  then	  this	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification?	  3. Why	  are	  self-­‐ascriptions	  immune	  only	  on	  a	  certain	  basis?	  	  4. How	   can	   the	   Simple	   View	   account	   for	   the	   IEM	   of	   the	   self-­‐ascriptions	  based	  on	  a	  certain	  way	  of	  knowing?	  	  I	  will	  start	  with	  the	  first	  question.	  	  	  
2.2.	  What	  accounts	  for	  first-­‐person	  IEM	  as	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  IEM?	  	  According	  to	  the	  general	  explanation	  of	  IEM,	  Fa	  (W)	  is	  immune	  iff	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘a’	  is	  fixed	  through	  W	  at	  the	  time	  when	  it	  is	  fixed.	  However,	  the	  reference	  of	  a	  perceptual	  demonstrative	  expression	   is	   fixed	   in	  a	  different	  way	   from	  how	   the	  reference	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed.	   This	   explains	   the	   difference	   between	   first-­‐person	   and	  demonstrative	  IEM.	  	  For	   perceptual	   demonstratives,	   typically	  multiple-­‐object	  ways	   of	   knowing	  are	   available	   to	   fix	   their	   reference	   to	   one	   of	   the	   perceived	   objects.	   Thus,	   for	  demonstrative	  thought	  the	  basis	  alone	  typically	  cannot	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	  A	  self-­‐ascription	  could	  be	  based	  on	  two	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  and	  remain	  immune.	  In	  contrast,	  when	  a	  demonstrative	  thought	  is	  based	  on	  more	  than	  one	  way	  of	  knowing	  and	  it	  is	  fixed	  through	  one	  of	  them	  (e.g.	  vision),	  then	  it	  loses	  its	  IEM.	  I	  develop	  this	  in	  the	  following	  example.	  Let	  us	  suppose	  that	  I	  see	  a	  dog	  and	  hear	  a	  dog	  barking,	  and	  based	  on	  these	  modalities	   (Wvision,	  Waudition)	   I	   think	   that	   dog	   is	   barking,	  where	   the	   referent	   of	  ‘that	  dog’	   is	  fixed	  by	  vision.	  In	  this	  case	  I	  can	  misidentify	  which	  dog	  is	  barking	  because	   that	  which	   I	   hear	  might	   not	   be	   the	   one	  which	   I	   see.	   On	   these	   bases,	  Wvision,	  Waudition,	  misidentification	  is	  possible.	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In	  contrast,	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  that	  I	  am	  distressed	  about	  being	  out	  of	  balance	  is	  based	  on	  two	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  (sense	  of	  balance,	  introspection),	  but	   it	   remains	   immune.	   It	   seems	   that	   two	  radically	  different	  ways	  of	  knowing	  can	   be	   the	   basis	   while	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   remains	   immune.	   On	   these	   bases	  (Wsense	  of	  balance,	  Wintrospection)	  misidentification	  is	  not	  possible.	  The	  object	  which	  I	  think	   of	   cannot	   be	   different	   only	   because	   it	   is	   based	   on	   two	   different	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing	   for	   self-­‐ascriptions.	   The	   Simple	   View	   accounts	   for	  this	  difference	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘I’	   is	  fixed	  to	  the	  exposed	  object	  which	  the	  subject	  knows	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  According	   to	   the	   general	   explanation	   of	   IEM,	   Fa	   (W)	   is	   immune	   iff	   the	  reference	  of	  ‘a’	  is	  fixed	  through	  W	  (at	  the	  time	  t	  when	  it	  is	  fixed).	  This	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  I	  cannot	  have	  an	  immune	  judgment	  which	  is	  based	  on	  knowing	  of	  the	  object	  at	  different	  times.	  Is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  reidentification	  always	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification?	  	  	  
2.3.	   Is	   it	   the	   case	   that	   if	   I	   encounter	   the	   same	   object	   twice,	   at	   different	  
times,	  then	  this	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification?	  I	  will	  show	  that	  first	  person	  IEM	  and	  demonstrative	  IEM	  are	  different	  because	  their	   reference-­‐fixing	   rules	   are	   different.	   Encountering	   an	   object	   twice	   opens	  the	   possibility	   of	   misidentification	   for	   demonstrative	   thoughts,	   but	   not	  necessarily	  for	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  	  One	   might	   encounter	   an	   object	   twice	   and	   attribute	   F-­‐ness	   based	   on	   the	  supposed	   second	   encounter	   of	   that	   object	   to	   the	   object	   which	   was	   initially	  encountered.	  However	  this	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification	  of	  what	  is	  
F	  for	  a	  demonstrative	  thought.	  	  Consider	  a	  case	  when	  I	  see	  a	  bird	   twice	  (2	  minutes	  apart)	  and	  think	   I	  see	  the	  same	  bird;	  I	  have	  an	  identity	  presupposition	  (that	  bird1=that	  bird2).	  We	  have	  two	  tokens	  of	  the	  same	  type	  of	  demonstrative.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  bird	  looks	  sky	  blue	  the	  first	   time	  when	  I	  see	  a	  bird.	   In	  this	  case	  I	  can	  go	  wrong	  whether	  that	  bird2	  is	  sky	  blue	  B=vision	  used	  on	  two	  different	  occasions.	  	  In	  contrast,	  when	  I	  think	  of	  myself	  at	  two	  different	  times	  (2	  minutes	  apart)	  based	  on	  what	  I	  feel	  from	  the	  inside,	  misidentification	  is	  not	  possible.	  First	  I	  am	  in	  pain	  and	  2	  minutes	  later,	  I	  am	  no	  longer	  in	  pain.	  In	  thinking	  that	  I	  was	  in	  pain,	  
 170	  
but	   it	   has	   subsided,	   I	   cannot	   go	  wrong	   about	  whose	   pain	   has	   subsided.	   (This	  notice	  of	  change	  seems	  to	  rest	  on	  an	  identity	  assumption	  that	  the	  one	  who	  was	  in	   pain	   is	   the	   one	   who	   is	   not	   in	   pain	   now.106)	   To	   think	   that	   my	   pain	   has	  disappeared	  requires	  presupposing	  that	  I	  am	  not	  in	  pain	  now,	  and	  I	  cannot	  go	  wrong	   in	   thinking	   of	   the	   one	  who	   is	   not	   in	   pain	   now.	   And	  when	   I	   remember	  feeling	  pain	  from	  the	  inside	  (2	  minutes	  ago),	  I	  cannot	  go	  wrong	  whose	  pain	  I	  am	  remembering.	   In	  contrast,	   for	  demonstratives,	  encountering	  an	  object	  twice	   in	  two	  different	  times	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification.	  	  The	   Simple	   View	   offers	   a	   straightforward	   explanation	   for	   this	   difference.	  The	   object	   that	   the	   subject	   knows	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing	   is	  necessarily	  the	  subject	  herself.	  Thus	  when	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  twice	  at	  different	  times	   for	   the	   object	  which	   she	   knows	   through	   a	   self-­‐reflexive	   basis,	   then	   the	  subject	  cannot	  go	  wrong.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  even	  if	  the	  basis	  is	  different	  but	  self-­‐reflexive.	   In	   contrast,	   for	   demonstratives,	   such	   mistakes	   can	   happen	   if	   one	  encounters	  an	  object	  twice	  in	  different	  times	  –	  even	  if	  the	  judgements	  are	  made	  on	  the	  same	  basis.	  	  The	   reason	   for	   this	   lies	   in	   the	   differences	   in	   how	   the	   reference	   of	   ‘I’	   and	  ‘that’	  is	  fixed.	  A	  perceptual	  demonstrative’s	  reference	  is	  typically	  fixed	  through	  a	  multiple-­‐object	  way	  of	   knowing	   (vision/touch/audition)	   to	  one	  of	   the	  many	  objects	  which	   is	  perceived.107	  Multiple-­‐object	  ways	  of	  knowing	  allow	   that	   two	  different	   objects	   can	  be	   found	   in	   the	   same	   location	   at	   different	   times	   and	   the	  two	  objects	  might	  be	  indistinguishable.	  Thus,	  one	  might	  suppose	  that	  they	  are	  the	  same.	  It	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification	  when	  one	  supposes	  that	  in	  two	  different	  times	  one	  encounters	  the	  same	  object.	  In	  contrast,	  when	  the	  way	  of	  knowing	  is	  a	  self-­‐reflexive	  way	  of	  knowing	  and	  one	  encounters	  an	  object	  at	  two	  different	  times,	  (putting	  aside	  quasi-­‐memory	  cases)	  it	  remains	  the	  case	  that	  the	  object	  encountered	  cannot	  be	  anything	  but	  the	  subject.	  Consequently,	  what	  accounts	   for	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   IEM	   of	   demonstrative	   thought	   and	  self-­‐ascription	  might	  well	  be	   the	  difference	   in	  how	  the	  reference	   is	   fixed	   for	  a	  demonstrative	  and	  for	  ‘I’.	  	  
                                                106	  I	  am	  setting	  aside	  quasi-­‐memory	  cases.	  These	  were	  discussed	  in	  the	  Appendix	  to	  chapter	  3.	  107	  If	   I	   use	   a	  demonstrative	   to	   that	  object	  which	   I	   feel	   from	   the	   inside	   then	   this	  would	  not	  be	  known	  through	  multiple-­‐object	  way	  of	  knowing.	  But	  such	  a	  use	  is	  atypical.	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2.4.	  Why	  are	  self-­‐ascriptions	  IEM	  only	  on	  a	  certain	  basis?	  	  Self-­‐ascriptions	   are	   immune	   iff	   they	   are	   based	   on	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	  knowing.	  Through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  the	  only	  object	  which	  can	  be	  known	  is	  the	  subject.108	  A	  self-­‐ascription	  not	  solely	  based	  on	  a	  self-­‐reflexive	  way	  of	   knowing	   is	   not	   immune.	   This	   provides	   the	   reason	   why	   the	   IEM	   of	   self-­‐ascription	  is	  basis-­‐relative.	  	  
2.5.	  How	  can	  the	  Simple	  View	  account	  for	  the	  IEM	  of	  the	  self-­‐ascriptions	  
based	  on	  a	  certain	  way	  of	  knowing?	  	  Self-­‐ascriptions	   are	   immune	   iff	   they	   are	   based	   solely	   on	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	  knowing.	   If	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   based	   on	   self-­‐reflexive	   and	   non-­‐self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  then	  it	  will	  not	  be	  immune.	  (‘I	  have	  my	  legs	  crossed’	  based	  on	  proprioception	  and	  vision	  is	  not	  immune.	  The	  one	  whom	  I	  see	  might	  have	  her	  legs	  crossed	  while	  mine	  are	  not.)	  The	  reason	  why	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  based	  only	  on	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  is	  immune	  is	  this:	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  to	  the	  only	  object	  that	  can	  be	  known	  through	  these	  ways.	  The	  subject	  uses	   ‘I’	   for	  the	   exposed	   object	  which	   the	   subject	   knows	   of	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	  knowing.	  Thus	  whatever	   the	  subject	  self-­‐ascribes	  based	  on	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  on	  this	  basis	  will	  be	  immune.	  	  What	  ensures	  that	  the	  object	  known	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  is	   necessarily	   the	   subject?	   The	   object	   known	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	  knowing	  is	  necessarily	  the	  object	  which	  is	  the	  subject	  because	  of	  the	  features	  of	  such	  ways	   of	   knowing.	  A	   self-­‐reflexive	  way	  of	   knowing	  obeys	  privacy,	   unicity	  and	  internality.	  Internality	  guarantees	  that	  x	  receives	  information	  of	  x	  without	  supposing	   that	  x	   is	   a	   unique	  object	   (x	  might	  be	   a	   group	  or	  part	   of	   an	  object).	  However,	   unicity	   ensures	   that	   x	   in	   the	   second	   occurrence,	   what	   is	   known	  (object	   position)	   is	   a	   unique	   object,	   while	   privacy	   ensures	   that	   x	   in	   the	   first	  occurrence,	  who	  knows	  of	  x	  (subject	  position)	  is	  a	  unique	  object.	  Consequently,	  together	   internality,	   unicity	   and	   privacy	   ensure	   that	   what	   is	   known	   for	   the	  subject	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  is	  necessarily	  the	  subject.	  But	  what	  could	  ensure	  that	   the	  subject	  necessarily	   intends	  to	  refer	   to	  this	  object	   and	   not	   another	   one?	   The	   answer	   is	   simple:	   the	   subject’s	   referential	  
                                                108	  There	  are	  some	  counterexamples	  to	  this	  claim	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  10.	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intention	   is	   required	   for	   being	   able	   to	   use	   ‘I’.	   It	   is	   because	   what	   fixes	   the	  referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   this:	   the	   subject	   uses	   ‘I’	   for	   the	   object	   of	   which	   she	   knows	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Without	  this	  ‘I’	  cannot	  be	  used.	  	  What	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if	  the	  Simple	  View	  were	  not	  true?	  If	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  were	   not	   fixed	   to	   the	   exposed	   object	   known	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	  knowing,	  then	  it	  would	  not	  be	  necessary	  that	  the	  subject	  always	  uses	  ‘I’	  for	  this	  object.	  If	  the	  subject	  uses	   ‘I’	   for	  some	  description	  of	  herself	  or	  a	  demonstrated	  object,	   or	   a	   combination	  of	   these,	   or	   something	   else,	   then	  nothing	   can	   ensure	  that	  she	  necessarily	  uses	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  object	  that	  is	  herself.	  Castaneda,	  Anscombe,	  and	  Perry	  observed	  that	   there	   is	  no	  description,	  demonstration	  or	  a	  hybrid	  of	  them	  to	  which	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  can	  be	  reduced;	  in	  some	  counterfactual	   situation	   they	   would	   not	   get	   the	   referent	   correct. 109 	  This	  indicates	  that	  a	  description	  or	  demonstrative	  should	  not	  be	  involved	  in	  how	  the	  reference	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed.	   But	   this	   raises	   the	   question	   of	  what	   ensures	   that	   the	  subject	  gets	  the	  object	  right?	  	  The	  second	  feature	  in	  the	  Reference-­‐fixing	  test	  is	  GRR.	  Here	  I	  continue	  our	  discussion	  with	  GRR.	  	  	  
3.	  Other	  Essential	  Features	  
3.1.	  GRR	  Guaranteed	   right	   reference	   is	   a	   double	   guarantee	   for	   a	   referring	   expression	  type.	  Accordingly,	  whenever	  a	  token	  of	  this	  type	  is	  used	  it	  cannot	  lack	  reference	  (GRR1)	  and	  it	  cannot	  be	  used	  incorrectly	  or	  have	  mistaken	  reference	  (GRR2).	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  common	  ground	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  have	  GRR.110	  	  A	   guarantee	   against	   lack	   of	   reference	   requires	   that	   uses	   of	   ‘I’	   cannot	   lack	  referent.	  According	  to	  the	  Simple	  View,	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  so	  unless	  the	  subject	  
                                                109	  There	  are	  obvious	  candidates	  to	  answer	  this	  worry,	  e.g.	  Kaplan’s	  Dthat.	  But	  this	  would	  only	  be	   needed	   if	   the	   subject	   cannot	   know	   of	   the	   object	   by	   direct	   acquaintance.	   There	   could	   be	   a	  definite	  description	  with	  rigid	  designation	  and	  this	  would	  get	  the	  object,	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’,	  right.	  But	  this	  might	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  enable	  the	  subject	  to	  know	  which	  object	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  whenever	  she	  can	  use	  ‘I’.	  A	  definite	  description,	  like	  a	  descriptive	  name,	  does	  not	  provide	  direct	  knowledge	  of	  the	  exposed	  object,	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’,	  for	  the	  subject.	  110	  The	  only	  objector	  against	  GRR	  is	  Evans,	  who	  does	  not	  hold	  it	  for	  brain	  in	  the	  vat	  cases.	  I	  set	  such	  cases	  aside.	   It	   is	  unclear	   in	  such	  cases	  which	  creature	  could	  use	   ‘I’	   if	   there	   is	  no	  subject.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  an	  issue	  for	  Evans.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  why	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  wouldn’t	  be	  sufficient	  to	  turn	  this	  creature	  into	  a	  subject.	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exists	   ‘I’	  cannot	  be	  used.	  Still	   the	  Simple	  View	  cannot	  claim	  to	  be	  privileged	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  guarantee	  against	  lack	  of	  reference,	  because	  other	  views	  can	  account	   for	   this	   in	  a	  very	  similar	  manner	  as	  well.	  But	   the	  second	  guarantee	   is	  special.	  The	  Simple	  View	  can	  account	  for	  it	  by	  exploiting	  such	  resources	  which	  are	  not	  available	  for	  any	  other	  view.	  I	  argued	  that	  GRR2	  requires	  that	  the	   intended	  reference	  and	  the	  semantic	  reference	  cannot	  come	  apart	   for	  all	  uses	  of	   ‘I’.	  This,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  above,	   is	  just	   aboutness-­‐error	   freedom.	   Thus	   I	   will	   answer	   how	   the	   guarantee	   against	  incorrect	  reference	  can	  be	  secured	  and	  explained	  according	  to	  the	  Simple	  View	  by	  answering	  how	  aboutness-­‐error	  freedom	  is	  possible.	  	  	  
3.2.	  Aboutness-­‐error	  freedom	  Kripke	  (1977)	  distinguishes	  between	  speaker’s	  referent	  and	  semantic	  referent.	  The	  speaker,	  by	  using	  a	  singular	  term,	  might	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  different	  thing	  than	  the	  semantic	  referent	  of	  that	  term,	  if	  there	  is	  any	  (it	  might	  lack	  reference).	  Based	   on	   Kripke’s	   idea,	   I	   worked	   out	   the	   notion	   of	   aboutness-­‐error	   for	  those	   cases	   when	   both	   the	   speaker’s	   and	   the	   semantic	   reference	   pick	   out	   a	  unique	  object,	  but	   they	  are	  different.	  When	  the	  speaker’s	  referent	  (that	  object	  the	   speaker	   intends	   to	   refer	   to)	   is	   different	   from	   the	   semantic	   referent	   (that	  object	  the	  referring	  term	  conventionally	  in	  this	  context	  refers	  to)	  this	  is	  called	  an	   aboutness-­‐error.	  Aboutness-­‐error	   requires	   that	   both	   the	   speaker’s	   and	   the	  semantic	   referent	   are	   individual	   objects	   but	   they	   are	   different.	   When	   the	  speaker’s	  referent	  cannot	  be	  different	   from	  the	  semantic	  referent,	   I	  called	  this	  aboutness-­‐error	  freedom.	  	  As	  I	  argued,	  aboutness-­‐error	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  all	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  In	  using	  ‘I’,	  I	  cannot	  intend	  to	  use	  it	  for	  anyone	  but	  the	  object	  which	  is	  me.111	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  I	  cannot	  be	  wrong	  about	  whom	  I	  intend	  to	  think	  about	  or	  refer	  to	  because	  I	  cannot	  be	  wrong	  about	  whom	  I	  am	  thinking	  about.	  112	  I	  always	  get	   its	  referent	  right.	  	  
                                                111	  “Guaranteed	  reference	  for	  that	  name	  "X"	  in	  this	  further	  sense	  […]	  would	  entail	  a	  guarantee,	  not	  just	  that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  X,	  but	  also	  that	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  X	  is	  X.”	  (Anscombe	  1975:	  151).	  	  112	  I	  argued	  that	  aboutness-­‐error	  is	  different	  from	  misidentification.	  I	  always	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  myself	  when	  I	  use	  ‘I’.  
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It	  is	  not	  obvious	  what	  excludes	  aboutness-­‐error.	  But	  if	  we	  accept	  the	  Simple	  View,	  aboutness-­‐error	  freedom	  is	  no	  longer	  surprising.	  The	  Simple	  View	  has	  a	  simple	  explanation	  for	  this.	  According	  to	  the	  Simple	  View	  whenever	  the	  subject	  uses	   ‘I’,	   she	   uses	   it	   for	   the	   exposed	   object	   which	   she	   knows	   from	   the	   inside	  (through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  based	  on	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  that	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  wrong	  about	  which	  object	  she	  is	  thinking	  of,	  because	  only	  a	  unique	  object,	  the	  exposed	  object	  which	  is	  necessarily	  the	  subject,	  can	  be	  known	  from	  the	  inside.	  Intending	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  exposed	  object	  known	  through	  such	  ways	  cannot	  go	  wrong.	  Only	   one	   object	   can	   be	   known	   through	   these	   ways	   of	   knowing	   and	   the	  subject	   is	   automatically	   aware	   of	   which	   one	   it	   is:	   the	   primary	   object	   of	   care.	  Unless	   this	   automaticity	   breaks	   down,	   the	   subject	   cannot	   be	  mistaken	  which	  object	  it	  is.	  Whenever	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’,	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	   knowing	   is	   available	   to	   the	   subject,	   enabling	   the	   subject	   to	   get	   the	   object	  (which	   she	   is)	   right.	   At	   least	   introspection	   or	   bodily	   awareness	   is	   always	  available	   to	   the	   subject,	   thus	   there	   is	   at	   least	   one	  way	   that	   she	   knows	  which	  object	  she	  is	  from	  the	  inside.	  	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  it	  is	  disturbing	  if	  I	  see	  Ceausescu’s	  doppelganger	  but	  it	   is	  not	  disturbing	   if	   I	   see	  my	  own	  doppelganger.	   (Ceausescu	  –	   the	  Romanian	  dictator	  –	  had	  many	  doppelgangers	  to	  replace	  him	  in	  events	  which	  were	  either	  unimportant	   or	   too	   important.	   Ceausescu	  was	   afraid	   of	   assassination	   and	  not	  without	   reason.)	   I	   know	   perfectly	  well	   which	   object	   I	   am,	   the	   object	   which	   I	  know	   from	   the	   inside.	   So	   someone	  might	   be	  my	   doppelganger,	   but	   I	   have	   no	  difficulty	   knowing	   which	   one	   I	   am.	   However,	   I	   would	   have	   difficulties	  differentiating	  Ceausescu	  from	  his	  doppelganger.	  	  To	  sum	  up,	  knowing	  from	  the	  inside	  presents	  the	  object	  which	  is	  the	  subject	  in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   the	   subject	   cannot	   be	  mistaken	   about	  which	   object	   she	   is.	  There	  is	  no	  other	  way	  of	  knowing	  (other	  than	  the	  self-­‐reflexive	  ones)	  which	  can	  provide	   the	   subject	   with	   such	   certainty.	   So	   to	   make	   all	   self-­‐ascriptions	  aboutness-­‐error	   free	   requires	   that	   the	   subject	   use	   ‘I’	   for	   the	   exposed	   object	  (known	   from	   the	   inside).	   Accordingly,	   the	   Simple	   View	   can	   account	   for	   the	  aboutness-­‐error	  freedom	  of	  all	  self-­‐ascriptions.	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3.3.	  Error	  is	  delusion	  The	   next	   feature,	  which	   I	   shall	   discuss,	   is	   error	   is	  delusion.	   Recall	   the	   Adorno	  case,	  when	  Adorno	  claims	  that	  he	  feels	  your	  pain	  from	  the	  inside.	  Call	  this	  the	  
error	   is	  delusion	  case.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  mistake	  like	  others.	  One	  who	  is	  mistaken	  about	  that	  shows	  a	  symptom	  of	  a	  mental	  illness	  or	  cognitive	  disturbance.	  This	  is	  surprising.	  Usually	  mistakes	  come	  at	  a	  much	  cheaper	  price.	  A	  mistake	  usually	  cannot	  provide	  a	  reason	  to	  refer	  someone	  to	  a	  psychiatrist	  or	  be	  read	  as	  a	  sign	  of	   delusion.	   Something	   has	   prevented	   us	   from	   making	   such	   mistakes.	   There	  should	  be	  an	  explanation	  why	  one	  cannot	  think	  that	  what	  he	  feels	   is	  someone	  else’s	   pain	   based	   on	   feeling.	   In	   contrast,	   in	   other	   cases,	   there	   is	   publicly	  available	  evidence	  and	  we	  can	  always	  try	  to	  make	  the	  evidence	  apparent	  to	  the	  other	  person.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Adorno	  affair.	  The	  evidence	  which	  one	  has	  (if	  one	  has	  any)	  is	  not	  public,	  but	  private.	  If	  we	  speak	  about	  correctness	  conditions,	  then	  the	  correctness	  conditions	  would	  be	  tied	  to	  some	  internal	  state	  of	   the	   subject.	   The	   evidence	   should	   come	   from	   the	   inside,	   so	   if	   one	   lacks	   this	  then	  you	  cannot	  change	  his	  mind.	  What	  can	  account	  for	  this?	  	  On	  the	  Simple	  View	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  to	  the	  exposed	  object	  known	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Thus	  a	  private	  access	  to	  the	  ground	  or	  evidence	   behind	   such	   assertions	   is	   exactly	  what	   the	   Simple	   View	   predicts	   on	  self-­‐reflexive	   bases.	   This	   accounts	   for	   this	   kind	   of	   first	   person/third	   person	  asymmetry	  that	  we	  have	  found	  in	  the	  Adorno	  affair.	  	  	  
3.4.	  Forms	  of	  irreducibilities	  I	  turn	  to	  discuss	  other	  features	  which	  seem	  generally	  accepted	  beside	  GRR	  and	  IEM.	  The	  Simple	  View	  has	  to	  account	  for	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  and	  other	  singular	  referring	  terms.	  I	  will	  discuss	  three	  different	  ways	  to	  spell	  out	  what	  the	  irreducibility	  of	  first-­‐person	  might	  mean.	  	  	  
3.4.1.	  Semantic	  irreducibility	  I	  turn	  to	  discuss	  Castaneda’s	  point	  about	  the	  semantic	  irreducibility	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  	  I	   take	   this	  as	  a	  simple	  point	   that	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	   first-­‐person	  pronoun	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  other	  kinds	  of	  referring	  expressions.	  I	  label	  this	  semantic	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irreducibility.	   Castaneda	  writes:	   “The	   first	  person	  pronoun	  used	   indexically	   is	  not	  reducible	  to	  other	  mechanisms	  of	  reference”	  (1989:	  80).	  The	  replacement	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun,	  used	  indexically,	  by	  any	  co-­‐referring	  expression	  fails	  to	  preserve	  truth	  and	  meaning.	  Let	  me	  illustrate	  this	  with	  some	  examples.	  The	   truth	   of	   the	   sentence	   ‘I	   am	   uttering	   nothing’	   is	   contingent	   or	   the	  sentence	  is	  at	  least	  not	  a	  flat	  contradiction	  (p	  and	  not	  p),	  as	  Castaneda	  observes.	  Let	  us	  replace	   ‘I’	  with	   the	  person	  uttering	  this	  token.	  The	   truth	  of	   the	  sentence	  ‘The	  person	  uttering	  this	  token	  is	  uttering	  nothing’	  is	  a	  flat	  contradiction.	  Thus	  it	   is	   necessarily	   false	   (Castaneda	   1989:	   208-­‐209).	   I	   might	   add	   that	   rigid	  designation	  does	  not	   help.	  Kaplan’s	   ‘Dthat’	  will	   pick	  up	   the	   same	  object	   in	   all	  possible	  worlds,	  thus	  it	  rigidifies	  the	  description.	  ‘Dthat	  the	  person	  uttering	  this	  token	  is	  uttering	  nothing’	  remains	  a	  flat	  contradiction.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  ‘I’,	  the	  subject	   is	  able	   to	   think,	   for	  all	  other	  referring	  expressions	  referring	  to	  her	  (e.g.	   a	   perceptual	   demonstrative),	   that	   this	   term	   is	   not	   referring	   to	   her	  (Castaneda	  1988:	  71-­‐73).	  This	  is	  a	  quick	  illustration	  of	  the	  irreducibility	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  	  Castaneda	  argued	  that	  any	  replacement	  of	   the	   token	   first-­‐person	  pronoun	  used	  indexically	  with	  a	  proper	  name,	  a	  definite	  description	  or	  a	  demonstrative	  will	  fail	  for	  similar	  reasons.	  “The	  first-­‐person	  pronoun,	  without	  predicating	  self-­‐hood,	   purports	   to	   pick	   out	   a	   self	   qua	   self	   and	   (…)	   it	   invariably	   succeeds”	  (Castaneda	  1966a:	  90).	  No	  referring	  term	  other	  than	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  can	  have	  exactly	  this	  function.	  Thus	  ‘I’	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  any	  other	  referring	  expression.113	  	  This	   datum	   has	   to	   be	   accommodated.	   The	   Simple	   View	   seems	   to	  accommodate	  this	  perfectly	  well	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  radical	  differences	  between	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  compared	  to	  other	  singular	  terms.	  The	  subject	  is	  directly	  acquainted	  with	  the	  exposed	  object	  (the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’)	  through	  the	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Because	   these	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  such	   that	  only	  the	  exposed	  object	  can	  be	  known	  through	  them,	   the	  mistake	  of	  which	  object	   I	  know	  about	  is	  not	  possible.	  Only	  ‘I’	  has	  aboutness-­‐error	  freedom	  and	  the	  Simple	  View	  nicely	  accounts	  for	  this.	  I	  suggest	  that	  one	  reason	  why	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  
                                                113	  I	  might	  add	  that	  ‘I’	  is	  generally	  semantically	  irreducible	  –	  but	  not	  necessarily	  for	  every	  single	  token–	  so	  this	  allows	  for	  exceptions	  (see	  Boer	  and	  Lycan	  1980).	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first-­‐person	  pronoun	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  other	  kinds	  of	  referring	  expressions	  because	   none	   of	   these	   candidate	   expressions	   can	   secure	   aboutness-­‐error	  freedom.	  	  	  
3.4.2.	  Knowingly	  and	  intentionally	  referring	  to	  oneself	  For	  using	   ‘I’,	   the	   subject	   knowingly	   and	   intentionally	   refers	   to	   herself.	   This	   is	  supposed	  to	  capture	  the	  point	  which	  Castaneda	  was	  making	  according	  to	  Evans	  (1982)	  and,	  following	  him,	  Peacocke	  (2008).	  	  When	  the	  subject	  uses	   ‘I’	   then	  the	  subject	  knows	  that	  she	  refers	  to	  herself	  and	   the	   subject	   intends	   to	   refer	   to	   herself.	   This	   is	   argued	   to	   be	   essential	   for	  understanding	   the	   function	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   in	   our	   language.	   The	  only	  point	  which	  I	  shall	  discuss	  is	  whether	  the	  meaning	  or	  the	  function	  of	  ‘I’	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  function	  of	  knowingly	  and	  intentionally	  referring	  to	  oneself.	  	  Castaneda	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  two	  types	  of	  judgment:	  first-­‐personal	  and	  non	  first-­‐personal	  judgement.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  editor	  of	  Soul	  thinks	   ‘The	  editor	  of	  Soul	   is	  underpaid’	   (J).	  Whatever	  makes	  the	  thought	   ‘I	  am	  underpaid’	  (K)	  said	  by	  the	  editor	  true	  makes	  J	  true	  as	  well.	  Still	  there	  can	  be	  a	  difference.	  According	  to	  Castaneda,	  J	  leaves	  it	  open	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  speaker	  knows	   that	   he	   himself	   is	   the	   editor	   of	   Soul.	   For	   K,	   the	   editor	   necessarily	   and	  knowingly	   thinks	  of	  himself	  when	  he	  uses	   ‘I’,	  but	   this	   is	  not	   the	  case	  when	  he	  asserts	  J.	  	  I	   can	   refer	   to	  myself	  without	   using	   ‘I’.	  What	   is	   the	   difference?	   In	   using	   a	  referring	   expression	   other	   than	   ‘I’	   for	   myself,	   I	   might	   not	   know	   that	   I	   am	  referring	   to	  myself.	  However,	   this	   is	   excluded	   for	  uses	  of	   ‘I’.	  When	  Oedipus114	  announces,	  “I	  will	  find	  the	  killer	  of	  Laius”,	  then	  he	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  say	  that	  he	  will	  find	  himself.	  Unbeknownst	  to	  him,	  he	  is	  the	  killer	  of	  Laius	  and	  de	  re	  speaks	  of	  himself.115	  	  
                                                114	  Oedipus	  is	  the	  son	  of	  Laius	  (in	  the	  story	  of	  Oedipus),	  but	  at	  first	  Oedipus	  does	  not	  know	  this.	  He	  does	  not	  even	  know	  that	  his	  name	  is	  Oedipus	  (until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story).	  	  115	  One	  possible	  way	   to	  capture	  self-­‐ascriptions	   is	   to	  use	  de	  se	   content.	  De	  se	   content	   requires	  exactly	   the	   feature	   that	   is	   captured	   by	   knowingly	   and	   intentionally	   referring.	   Because	   of	  restrictions	  of	  space	  and	  time,	  I	  will	  not	  discuss	  de	  se	  content.	  I	  think	  de	  se	  content	  is	  a	  modelling	  device	  for	  first	  person	  content	  and	  it	  is	  a	  good	  one.	  But	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  from	  features	  of	  the	  
de	  se	  content	  I	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  read	  of	  all	  the	  features	  of	  the	  first	  person	  content.	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According	  to	  Evans	  the	  difference	  can	  be	  captured	  precisely	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  knowingly	  and	  intentionally	  referring	  to	  oneself	  (Evans	  1982:	  207-­‐209).	  This	  contains	  three	  components.	  	  The	   first	   component	   is	   this:	   the	   subject	   refers	   to	   herself	   (the	   exposed	  object).	  The	   second	   component	   is	   this:	   the	   subject	   intends	   to	   refer	   to	  herself	   (the	  exposed	  object)	  by	  using	  ‘I’.	  	  The	  third	  component	  is	  this:	  the	  subject	  at	  least	  implicitly	  knows	  that	  she	  is	  referring	   to	   herself,	   i.e.	   λx(x	   refers to	   x).	   Evans	   used	   the	   lambda	   operator	   to	  capture	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   subject	   knows	   that	   she	   is	   referring	   to	   herself.	   This	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  what	  the	  subject	  knows	  is	  not	  just	  that	  under	  one	  or	  another	  mode	   of	   presentation	   the	   subject	   knows	   that	   she	   refers	   to	   herself,	   but	   the	  subject	   knows	   in	   a	   genuinely	   first	   personal	   manner	   that	   she	   is	   referring	   to	  herself	   λx(x	   refers to	   x).	   The	   lambda	   operator	   nominalises	   the	   predicate	   and	  makes	  it	  sure	  that	  x	  thinks	  of	  herself	  under	  the	  same	  mode	  of	  presentation	  (x)	  as	  that	  under	  which	  she	  thinks	  that	  it	  is	  herself	  to	  whom	  he	  refers	  to	  (x).	  	  The	   characterisation	   of	   knowingly	   and	   intentionally	   referring	   is	   the	  following:	  1.	  The	  subject	  refers	  to	  herself	  (the	  exposed	  object)	  2.	  The	  subject	  intends	  to	  refer	  to	  herself	  (the	  exposed	  object)	  3.	  The	  subject	  (implicitly)	  knows	  that	  she	  is	  referring	  to	  herself	  (λx(x	  refers to	  x).	  Thus	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  knowingly	  and	  intentionally	  referring	  might	  provide	  the	  most	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	  ‘I’.	  My	  complaint	  is	  this:	  knowingly	  and	  intentionally	  referring	  to	  oneself	  is	  not	  sufficient	   for	   providing	   an	   explanation	   aboutness-­‐error	   freedom	   and	   for	   the	  IEM	  of	  certain	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  There	  is	  nothing	  in	  knowingly	  and	  intentionally	  referring	  which	  specifies	  how	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  object	  which	  she	  is.	  This	  view	   allows	   that	   one	  might	   always	   try	   to	   use	   ‘I’	   for	   the	  wrong	   object	   –	   even	  while	   knowing	   that	   by	   using	   ‘I’	   she	   is	   referring	   to	   herself,	   intends	   to	   refer	   to	  herself	  and	  knows	  that	  she	  is	  supposedly	  referring	  to	  herself.	  	  But	   if	   one	   does	   not	   know	   which	   object	   she	   is	   one	   might	   get	   the	   object	  wrong.	   If	   knowingly	   and	   intentionally	   referring	   to	   herself	  would	   be	   sufficient	  
 179	  
for	  using	   ‘I’	   then	   this	  would	  allow	   that	  one	  might	  use	   ‘I’	   for	   the	  wrong	  object.	  This	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  I	  intend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  wrong	  object	  because	  I	  think	  that	  object	  is	  me.	  Why	  cannot	  I	  be	  mistaken	  about	  which	  object	  I	  am?	  How	  do	  I	  know	  of	  the	  object	  which	   I	   should	   use	   ‘I’	   for?	  Why	  would	   I	   use	   ‘I’	   for	   this	   object?	   If	   there	  were	  no	  other,	  more	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	  what	  we	  refer	  to	  other	  than	  the	   fact	   that	   we	   knowingly	   and	   intentionally	   referring	   to	   oneself	   in	   using	   ‘I’,	  then	   GRR	   would	   seem	   surprising.	   Knowingly	   and	   intentionally	   referring	   to	  oneself	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  advantage	  to	  the	  subject	  for	  knowing	  which	  object	  she	   is.	  Nothing	  would	   rule	   out	   the	   possibility	   that	   I	   think	   of	   the	  wrong	   living	  body	   as	   me	   and	   intend	   to	   use	   ‘I’	   for	   this	   body.	   To	   rule	   out	   this	   possibility	  requires	   that	   I	   use	   ‘I’	   for	   the	   exposed	   object	   and,	   thereby,	   for	   myself,	   as	   I	  suggest.	  	  Recall:	   Wittgenstein	   and	   Anscombe	   were	   trying	   to	   understand	   the	  conditions	  on	  how	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  if	  ‘I’	  refers.	  It	  seemed	  to	   them	   that	   if	   ‘I’	   refers	   then	   it	   is	   radically	   different	   how	   one	   knows	   of	   the	  referent	   of	   ‘I’	   compared	   to	   how	   one	   knows	   of	   the	   referent	   of	   other	   kind	   of	  referring	  terms.	  I	  think	  they	  were	  correct	  in	  claiming	  this	  but	  wrong	  in	  thinking	  that	   it	   follows	   that	   ‘I’	   does	   not	   refer.	   It	   seems	   that	   the	   way	   that	   the	   subject	  knows	   of	   the	   object	   which	   she	   is	   provides	   the	   key	   for	   understanding	   what	  differentiates	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  from	  other	  referring	  terms.	  I	   know	   which	   object	   I	   am	   without	   the	   possibility	   of	   mistake.	   When	   the	  subject	  uses	   ‘I’	   then	  the	  subject	  cannot	  be	  mistaken	  about	  which	  object	  one	   is	  thinking	   about.	   When	   I	   meet	   my	   doppelganger	   I	   would	   have	   no	   difficulty	  whatsoever.	  If	  ‘I’	  were	  only	  for	  knowingly	  and	  intentionally	  referring	  to	  myself,	  then	   I	   might	   possibly	   take	   a	   doppelganger	   of	   mine	   to	   be	   me.	   However,	  doppelgangers	   are	   safe	   –	   this	   cannot	   happen	   (unless	   one	   is	   delusional	   or	  irrational).	  But	  it	  would	  be	  a	  surprise	  that	  we	  cannot	  make	  such	  mistakes	  if	  the	  idea	   of	   knowingly	   and	   intentionally	   referring	   to	   oneself	   would	   capture	   the	  meaning	  of	  ‘I’	  completely.	  The	   Simple	   View	   accounts	   for	   how	   aboutness-­‐error	   freedom	   is	   possible.	  Knowingly	  and	  intentionally	  referring	  to	  oneself	  would	  not	  put	  me	  in	  a	  position	  to	   know	   of	   a	   (physical)	   object	   which	   I	   am	  without	   the	   possibility	   of	  mistake	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ever.	   But	   bodily	   self-­‐ascriptions	   made	   on	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing	   are	  immune.	   Again,	   this	   would	   come	   as	   a	   surprise	   if	   the	   idea	   of	   knowingly	   and	  intentionally	  referring	  to	  oneself	  would	  capture	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘I’	  completely.	  This	   suggests	   that	   we	   have	   to	   modify	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘knowingly	   and	  intentionally	   referring	   to	   oneself’.	   In	   the	   original	   formulation	   (Evans),	   the	  lambda	  operator	  nominalises	  the	  predicate	  and	  ensures	  that	  x	  thinks	  of	  herself	  under	  the	  same	  mode	  of	  presentation	  (x)	  as	  x	  knows	  of	  herself.	  This	  seems	  to	  suggest	   that	   the	   subject	  must	  know	  explicitly	   that	   she	   is	   self-­‐referring.	  This	   is	  not	  necessary.	  On	  my	  view,	   this	  knowledge	  could	  be	   implicit	  because	   the	  self-­‐reflexivity	  of	  ways	  of	  knowing	  already	  ensures	  self-­‐reflexivity.	  	  One	  might	  only	  have	  implicit	  knowledge	  that	  one	  is	  referring	  to	  oneself	  by	  using	   ‘I’	   (in	   the	   third	   component)	   initially	  when	  one	   learns	   to	  use	  of	   ‘I’.	   Later	  this	  knowledge	  becomes	  explicit.	  The	  subject	  first	  only	  implicitly	  knows	  that	  she	  is	  referring	  to	  herself	  (λx(x	  refers to	  x);	  this	  is	  sufficient	  for	  using	  ‘I’.	  The	  subject	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  (explicitly)	  know	  that	  she	  is	  referring	  to	  herself	  if	  she	  has	  the	  mastery	   of	   the	   required	   concepts	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   entertain	   self-­‐reflexive	  thoughts.	  For	  using	  ‘I’,	  knowledge	  of	  self-­‐reflexivity	  cannot	  be	  explicit	  from	  the	  beginning.	   It	   is	  an	  achievement	   to	  be	  able	   to	   form	  these	  thoughts.	  The	  subject	  simply	   uses	   ‘I’	   for	   the	   exposed	   object	   without	   needing	   to	   have	   more	   than	  implicit	  knowledge	  of	  knowingly	  and	  intentionally	  self-­‐referring.	  	  In	   sum,	   it	   is	   true	   that	   when	   one	   uses	   ‘I’	   then	   one	   knowingly	   and	  intentionally	   refers	   to	   oneself,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   the	   most	   fundamental	  understanding	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘I’.	  	  	  
3.4.3.	  Functional	  irreducibility	  According	   to	  Perry	  (1979),	  uses	  of	  essential	   indexicals	   (‘I’,	   ‘here’,	   ‘now’,	   ‘that’)	  have	  a	  specific	  functional	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  thinker.	  The	  thinker	  has	  to	   be	   able	   to	   display	   the	   appropriate	   course	   of	   action	   related	   to	   the	   token	  indexical	   in	   the	   situation,	   including	   ‘I’.	   For	   Perry,	   it	   is	   constitutive	   of	   a	   self-­‐ascription,	   that	   the	   subject	   be	   disposed	   to	   act	   appropriately.	   An	   appropriate	  action	  of	  the	  subject	  might	  be	  some	  action	  from	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  actions	  in	  a	  suitable	  circumstance.	  Earlier	  Kaplan	  pressed	  a	  similar	  point.	  For	  thinking	  “I	  am	  on	  fire”	  the	  appropriate	  thing	  to	  do	  is	  to	  put	  out	  the	  fire	  for	  myself.	  To	  think	  ‘I	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am	  making	  a	  mess’	   is	  very	  different	   from	  de	  re	   thinking	  of	  myself	   ‘that	  one	   is	  making	  a	  mess’	  without	  knowing	  that	  it	  is	  me.	  An	  ‘I’-­‐thought	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  de	  re	   thought	  of	  myself	  where	  I	  might	  not	  realise	  that	   it	   is	  of	  myself.	  This	  much	  is	  clear.	  	  ‘I	  am	  making	  a	  mess’	  thought	  by	  me	  has	  limited	  accessibility.	  This	  thought	  is	   only	   accessible	   to	   me	   –	   in	   a	   first	   personal	   manner.	   The	   thought	   is	   only	  accessible	   to	  me	  when	   I	  know	  who	   is	  making	   the	  mess.	   I	   can	  understand	   that	  Caesar	   is	   making	   a	   mess	   even	   if	   I	   do	   not	   know	   who	   is	   Caesar.	   But	   I	   cannot	  understand	   that	   I	   am	   making	   a	   mess	   uttered	   by	   me	   unless	   I	   know	   who	   is	  making	  the	  mess.	  Everybody	  can	  believe,	  on	  some	  occasion,	  of	  Perry,	  that	  Perry	  is	  making	   a	  mess,	   but	   only	  Perry	   can	  believe	   ‘I	   am	  making	   a	  mess’	   of	   himself	  when	  he	  is	  making	  a	  mess.	  This	  thought	  has	  limited	  accessibility;	  only	  Perry	  can	  access	  the	  first	  personal	  thought.	  Neither	  ‘I’,	   ‘now’	  nor	  ‘here’	  can	  be	  eliminated	  by	   other	   indexicals	   or	   referring	   expressions	   because	   of	   their	   limited	  accessibility.	  	  The	  Simple	  View	  can	  accommodate	  Perry’s	  point	  about	  limited	  accessibility	  for	   ‘I’-­‐thoughts.	  Only	   the	  subject	  can	  know	  of	   the	  exposed	  object	   through	  self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing	   and	   this	   accounts	   for	   its	   limited	   accessibility.	   The	  way	   as	   the	   subject	   knows	   of	   that	   object	   is	   special	   and	   only	   available	   to	   the	  subject.	  This	  makes	   an	   ‘I’-­‐thought	   (like	   the	   thought	   that	   I	   am	  making	  a	  mess)	  only	  available	  in	  this	  way	  to	  the	  subject.	  This	  is	  reflected,	  as	  Perry	  observed,	  in	  the	  way	  first-­‐personal	  thoughts	  have	  immediate	   consequences	   for	   action	   as	   well.	   On	   the	   Simple	   View,	   the	   subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  exposed	  object,	  the	  one	  under	  permanent	  care.	  The	  reason	  why	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  exposed	  object	  is	  because	  the	  subject	  has	  to	  take	  care	  of	  the	  exposed	  object	  in	  order	  to	  survive.	  Its	  self-­‐significance	  marks	  the	  object	  under	  permanent	  care.	  Self-­‐significance	  is	  a	  propensity	  for	  self-­‐directed	  action,	  where	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐directed	  outcome	  is	  the	  goal.	  For	  example,	  hunger	  triggers	  eating.	  The	  subject	  will	  eat	  when	  she	  is	  hungry	  and	  extinguish	  the	  fire	  when	  her	  hair	  is	  on	  fire	  because	  the	  self-­‐significance	  of	  the	  content	  enables	  her	  to	  do	  so.	  On	   the	   Simple	   View,	   the	   exposed	   object	   known	   through	   these	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	   knowing	   is	   already	   that	   which	   one	   has	   self-­‐directed	   dispositions	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toward.	   Thus,	   the	   Simple	   View	   would	   predict	   that	   first-­‐personal	   thoughts	  should	  have	  immediate	  consequences	  for	  the	  subject’s	  action.	  	  
4.	  IEM	  and	  GRR	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  cannot	  be	  explained	  unless	  the	  Simple	  
View	  is	  the	  most	  fundamental	  explanation	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  accept	  that	  only	  the	  Simple	  View	  can	   account	   for	   all	   features	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun.	   For	   example,	  aboutness-­‐error	   freedom,	  GRR	  and	  IEM	  are	  described	  from	  the	  subject’s	  point	  of	   view.	  However	   if	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	  not	   fixed	   from	   the	   subject’s	   point	   of	  view,	  then	  nothing	  can	  account	  for	  this.	  For	  uses	  of	  ‘I’,	  aboutness-­‐error	  freedom,	  IEM	  and	  GRR	  are	  features	  protecting	  the	  subject	  from	  certain	  kinds	  of	  errors.	  If	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  in	  an	  objective	  manner	  (not	  employing	  the	  subject’s	  perspective)	   then	  nothing	   can	  explain	  what	  provides	   the	  epistemic	   advantage	  for	  the	  subject.	  	  If	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   judgment	   and,	   in	   particular,	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	  knowing	  do	  not	  play	  any	  role	  in	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  then	  nothing	  (or	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what)	  can	  explain	  why	  on	  some	  bases	  certain	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	  immune.	   It	   would	   be	   mere	   good	   fortune.	   Moreover,	   nothing	   would	   rule	   out	  aboutness-­‐error.	  But	  aboutness-­‐error	   is	  not	  possible	  and	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	  have	  GRR,	  including	   a	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	   reference.	   These	   features	   cannot	   be	  explained	  unless	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	  through	  the	  subject’s	  point	  of	  view.	  We	  have	  seen	  how	  to	  account	  for	  all	  the	  abovementioned	  seven	  features	  of	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  using	  the	  Simple	  View.	  Consequently,	  the	  Simple	  View	  looks	  promising	  as	  an	  account	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed.	  	  	  
5.	  Summary	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	   I	  have	  discussed	  seven	  features	  of	   the	  use	  of	   ‘I’;	   I	  have	  argued	  that	   the	   Simple	   View	   can	   account	   for	   all	   the	   seven	   features	   in	   an	   elegant	  manner.	  The	  most	  crucial	  features	  are	  IEM,	  GRR	  and	  Aboutness-­‐error	  freedom.	  Neither	  of	  them	  can	  be	  explained	  unless	  we	  accept	  the	  Simple	  View.	  If	  the	  way	  that	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  does	  not	  involve	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  then	  nothing	  can	  explain	  that	  only	  those	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	  immune	  which	  are	  based	   on	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing.	   Only	   the	   subject	   has	   a	   guarantee	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against	  incorrect	  reference	  and	  only	  the	  subject	  cannot	  misidentify	  who	  is	  F	  for	  
Fi	  based	  only	  on	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Thus	  unless	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  –	  as	  I	  suggest–	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  then	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	   account	   for	   these	   features.	   Thus	   I	   think	   we	   have	   very	   strong	   reasons	   for	  accepting	  the	  Simple	  View.	  But	  to	  display	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  view	  I	  will	  discuss	  several	  objections	  in	  the	  next	  and	  final	  chapter.	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Chapter	  10	  




Source	  1.	  How	  does	  the	  hearer	  understand	  the	  speaker’s	  use	  of	  ‘I’?	  	   A	  common	  worry	  	  2.	  The	  simple	  view	  is	  only	  about	  the	  psychological	  background,	  but	  not	  about	  the	  semantic	  question	  of	  	  fixing	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’.	  	  	  
Fregean	  objection	  	  	  3.	  The	  Standard	  Objection:	  The	  token-­‐reflexive	  rule	  (TRR)	  for	  ‘I’	  fixes	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’,	  so	  we	  do	  not	  need	  another	  explanation!	  	  	  	  	  
Defenders	  of	  TRR	  	  4.	   What	   makes	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   a	   public	   object	   when	   it	   is	  fixed	   through	   a	   private	   way	   of	   knowing?	  	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  private	  object.	  	  	  
Wittgensteinian	  objection	  	  	  5.	  Anscombe’s	  challenge:	  	  The	   Simple	   View	   denies	   the	   possibility	   that	   one	   can	   use	   ‘I’	  without	  being	   acquainted	  with	  herself.	  But	  Anscombe	   claims	  that	   a	   subject	   can	   use	   ‘I’	   in	   the	   sensory	   deprivation	   tank	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  acquaintance.	  	  	  
Anscombe’s	  challenge	  	  	  
6.	   Introspection	  provides	  no	  object	  which	   the	   subject	   knows	  of.	  	  	   Hume’s	  difficulty	  	  	  7.	  One	  subject	  might	  be	  split	   into	  different	  bodies,	  where	  the	  cognitive	  system	  might	  be	  in	  a	  body	  distinct	  from	  that	  housing	  the	  senses	  –	  this	  threatens	  my	  claim	  that	  only	  a	  unique	  object	  can	  be	  known	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  	  	  
Dennett’s	  and	  Strawson’s	  objections	  	  8.	   Asserting	   ‘I	   am	   out	   of	   balance’	   based	   on	   vision	   and	  introspection	   is	   immune.	   But	   it	   is	   not	   based	   only	   on	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  –	  as	  my	  explanation	  of	   the	   IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  would	  require.	  	  	  
Proffitt’s	  and	  Shoemaker’s	  	  objection	  	  9.	  The	  notion	  of	   ‘self	  as	  subject’	  accounts	   for	   the	   IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  Nothing	  else	  is	  needed.	  	  	   Longuenesse’s	  objection	  10.	  Is	  it	  possible	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  without	  having	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing?	  	  	   Anscombe	  
Table	  3.	  	  List	  of	  objections.	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We	   have	   learned	   that	   the	   Simple	   View	   is,	   plausibly,	   the	   most	   fundamental	  explanation	   of	   how	   the	   reference	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed.	   But	   this	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	  accepting	   the	   Simple	   View	   unless	   I	   can	   answer	   the	  most	   powerful	   objections	  against	   it.	   The	   objections	   presented	   below	   are	   independent	   from	   each	   other,	   so	  
they	  can	  be	  read	  and	  considered	  separately.	  	  	  
I.	  General	  objections:	  
1.	  Objection	  1:	  
A	  Worry	  about	  Understanding	  The	   first	   worry	   is	   about	   how	   the	   hearer	   understands	   uses	   of	   ‘I’;	   this	   is	   an	  obvious	   question	   that	   has	   to	   be	   settled	   in	   the	   beginning.	   Whatever	   way	   the	  reference	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	   it	   has	   to	   be	   done	   in	   an	   intersubjective	   way	   that	   is	  available	   to	  others.	  Language	   is	   for	  communication.	  On	  the	  Simple	  View,	  what	  enables	   the	  hearer	   to	  understand	  the	  subject’s	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	   (where	   the	  hearer	   is	  not	  the	  subject)?	  	  When	  I	  hear	  someone	  using	  ‘I’,	  I	  will	  understand	  that	  the	  user	  is	  using	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  object	  which	  the	  user	  knows	  though	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	   I	   take	  the	  speaker	  to	  be	  speaking	  about	  that	  object	  which	  she	  knows	  from	  the	  inside.	  Despite	  this	  being	  a	  simple	  answer,	  it	  raises	  some	  further	  worries.	  	  
1.1.	  The	  first	  worry	  How	  does	  the	  hearer	  (other	  than	  the	  subject)	  understand	  ‘I’?	  	  The	  reason	  the	  hearer	  can	  understand	  uses	  of	   ‘I’	   is	  this:	   the	  hearer	  knows	  that	   the	   subject	   has	   an	   intimate	   private	   access	   to	   the	   object	  which	   is	   herself.	  That	  is	  to	  say	  the	  subject	  knows	  things	  about	  herself	   ‘from	  the	  inside’	  directly.	  This	  grounds	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  subject.	  This	  does	  not	  require	  more	  than	  a	  basic	   theory	  of	  mind	  (Perner	  1991)	  and,	   in	  some	  ways,	  understanding	  what	  private	  access	  is.	  	  The	  basic	  theory	  of	  mind,	  in	  this	  sense,	  only	  requires	  knowledge	  that	  other	  human	  beings	  have	  beliefs,	  desires	  and	  pains	  (etc.)	  and	  that	  these	  are	  available	  to	  them	  in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  they	  are	  not	  available	  to	  others.	  The	  subject	  knows	  of	  her	   own	   thoughts,	   desires	   and	   beliefs	   in	   a	   private	  way.	   However,	   one	   knows	  that	  a	  good	  way	  to	  know	  of	  someone	  else’s	  thoughts,	  desires,	  pains	  or	  intentions	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is	   hearing	   them	   report	   about	   these	   things.	  This	   shows	   that	  we	  know	   in	   some	  way	   that	   the	   other	   subject	   has	   private	   access	   to	   his	   thoughts,	   feelings	   and	  desires.	  Understanding	  this	  does	  not	  require	  that	  subjects	  are	  able	  to	  articulate	  what	   they	  understand	  verbally.	   The	   subject	   uses	   ‘I’	   in	   a	   certain	  way	   and	  only	  assumes	  that	  others	  use	  ‘I’	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  	  The	  subject	  knows	  how	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  and	  assumes	  that	  others	  use	  ‘I’	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  she	  does	  without	  necessarily	  being	  able	  to	  spell	  out	  the	  rule	  and	  how	  to	  use	  it.	  Knowing	  how	  to	  use	  the	  rule	  might	  consist	  in	  some	  form	  of	  implicit	  and	  non-­‐propositional	  knowledge.	  I	  know	  how	  to	  walk	  or	  talk	  but	  I	  cannot	  describe	  how	   to	   do	   it	   in	   propositional	   terms	   correctly.	   I	   implicitly	   know	   the	   rules	   of	  language	   I	   employ	   but	   need	   not	   explicitly	   know	   the	   rules.	   The	   Simple	   View	  describes	   the	   practice	   of	   how	   the	   subject	   uses	   ‘I’	   and	   only	   requires	   that	   the	  subject	  knows	  how	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  and	  how	  to	  understand	  others’	  uses	  of	  ‘I’.	  	  Kripke	  provides	   a	   similar	   answer	   to	   this	  worry	   in	  his	   account	   of	   the	   first	  person	  pronoun,	  which	  I	  endorse:	  “If	  it	  is	  the	  sense	  determined	  by	  its	  subject’s	  first-­‐person	  acquaintance	  with	  herself,	   how	  can	   it	  be	  used	   to	   communicate	   to	  someone	  else?	  (…)	  The	  hearer	   is	  aware	  that	  each	  person,	   including	  the	  hearer	  herself,	  uses	   ‘I’	   to	   refer	   to	  herself	  by	  direct	   self-­‐acquaintance.	  Hence,	  knowing	  what	   it	   is	   in	   one’s	   own	   case	   and	   taking	   it	   to	  be	   the	   same	  way	   for	   others,	   one	  understands	  what	  the	  first-­‐person	  statement	  is,	  even	  though	  it	  has	  a	  sense	  that	  is,	  strictly	  speaking,	  incommunicable	  to	  the	  hearer.”	  (Kripke	  2011c:	  303).	  	  	  
1.2.	  The	  second	  worry	  Though	  Kripke	  answers	  our	  original	  question,	  he	  also	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  new	  question:	   Why	   don’t	   I	   discuss	   the	   problem	   of	   sense	   for	   the	   first-­‐person	  pronoun?	  ‘Sense’	  might	  be	  understood	  in	  different	  ways.116	  If	  ‘sense’	  means	  only	  ‘mode	  of	  presentation	  which	  solves	   the	  Frege-­‐puzzle’	   (discussed	  briefly	   in	   the	  chapter	  6)	  then,	  in	  this	  sense,	  my	  token	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  has	  a	  different	  sense	  (MP)	  from	  my	  proper	  name.	  If	  ‘sense’	  means	  whatever	  fixes	  the	  referent	  then	  I	  provide	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun,	  but	  if	  direct	  acquaintance	  excludes	  that	  there	  is	   a	   sense	   for	   ‘I’	   then	   I	  have	  no	   sense	   in	   this	   sense.	   I	   remain	  neutral	   on	   these	  questions.	  My	  answer	  depends	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  sense	  employed.	  	  
                                                116	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  different	  notions	  of	  sense	  see	  Sainsbury	  (2002	  and	  2005).	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1.3.	  The	  third	  worry	  One	  may	   object	   that	   in	   a	   strict	   sense	   the	  way	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	   for	   a	  subject	  is	  not	  intersubjective.	  We	  agree.	  One	  could	  hold	  that	  whatever	  way	  the	  referent	  is	  fixed,	  it	  should	  be	  shared	  (Frege	  1952),117	  but	  the	  Simple	  View	  offers	  a	  way	  through	  which	  the	  referent	  is	  fixed	  which	  is	  private.	  In	  some	  sense	  this	  is	  correct.	  The	  referent	  is	  fixed	  through	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  But	  it	  is	  shared	  in	  that	  for	  everyone	  it	  is	  fixed	  in	  the	  same	  way;	  thus	  everyone	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  is	  fixed	  for	  herself	  and	  for	  others.	  So	  this	  is	  unproblematic.	  	  
2.	  Objection	  2:	  	  
Fregean	  Objection	  A	   Fregean	   might	   worry	   that	   the	   Simple	   View	   is	   alluding	   to	   psychological	  processes	  and	  ways	  of	  knowing	  in	  the	  specification	  of	  reference	  and	  truth	  and	  claim	  a	  semantic	  account	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  should	  not	  allude	  to	  these.	  Thus	   a	   Fregean	   might	   claim	   that	   the	   Simple	   View	   only	   provides	   the	  psychological	   underpinnings	   or	   causal	   enabling	   conditions	   of	   what	   is	  constitutive	  at	  the	  semantic	  level.	  Accordingly,	  they	  would	  claim	  that	  the	  Simple	  View	   is	   a	   psychological	   explanation	   and	   this	   is	   independent	   of	   the	   semantic	  explanation.	  	  With	   the	   exception	   of	   demonstratives	   and	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun,	   the	  desire	  for	  semantic	  explanation	  without	  mentioning	  psychological	  processes	  or	  ways	   of	   knowing	   makes	   perfect	   sense.	   But	   this	   cannot	   be	   generalised	   to	  indexicals	  which	  require	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  object	  like	  ‘I’	  or	   ‘that’	  (perceptual	  demonstratives).	  Let	  me	  reformulate	  the	  Fregean	  objection.	  	  
2.1.	  The	  first-­‐person	  perspective	  The	  question	  can	  be	  put	  like	  this:	  could	  it	  be	  that	  the	  first-­‐person	  point	  of	  view	  is	  necessary	  for	  fixing	  the	  reference	  of	   ‘I’?	  (By	  the	  ‘first-­‐person	  point	  of	  view’	  I	  
                                                117	  Frege	   (1956)	   seems	   to	   agree	   with	   us	   and	   says	   that	   ‘I’	   is	   an	   exception:	   the	   mode	   of	  presentation	  that	  fixes	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  cannot	  be	  shared	  (Frege	  1956:	  17).	  There	  is	  a	  point	  of	  disagreement	   with	   Frege.	   Frege	   does	   not	   allow	   that	   direct	   acquaintance	   can	   figure	   into	   the	  mode	  of	   presentation	   (reference-­‐fixing).	   I	   am	   inclined	   to	   think	   that	   the	  mode	  of	   presentation	  can	   be	   provided	   partially	   by	   direct	   acquaintance	   at	   least	   for	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   (and	  demonstratives).	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only	  mean	   the	   subject’s	   point	   of	   view;	   it	   does	   not	   require	   the	  mastery	   of	   the	  first-­‐person	   pronoun.)	   If	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   has	   to	   have	   a	   shared	  meaning,	   then	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  how	  the	   first-­‐person	  perspective	  can	  be	  essential	  for	  understanding	  it.	  If	  the	  first-­‐person	  perspective	  were	  not	  constitutive	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	   then	   all	   essential	   epistemic	   features	   of	   ‘I’	   should	   appear	  from	   the	   third-­‐person	  point	  of	   view.	  However	   this	   is	  not	   the	   case.	  Thus	   there	  are	   reasons	   to	   think	   that	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	   from	   the	   first-­‐person	  perspective.	  	  Nevertheless,	   if	   it	   turned	   out	   that	   the	   first-­‐person	   perspective	   is	   not	  constitutive	   in	   fixing	   the	   reference	   of	   ‘I’	   then	   I	   would	   be	   providing	   the	  psychological	  explanation.	  I	  doubt	  this.	  But	  even	  if	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  the	  most	  fundamental	   explanation	   of	   ‘I’	  would	   be	   this	   so-­‐called	   psychological	   one.	   It	   is	  because	   only	   this	   can	   accommodate	   the	   first	   person	   perspective	   which	   is	  essential	  for	  understanding	  the	  first	  person	  pronoun.	  	  	  
2.2.	  Answering	  the	  Fregean	  objection:	  
Third-­‐person	  versus	  first-­‐person	  point	  of	  view	  Now	  I	  will	  try	  to	  show	  that	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  has	  to	  be	  fixed	  from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective.	  This	  is	  because	  until	  I	  show	  that	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  has	  to	  be	  fixed	  from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective,	  the	  Fregean	  objection	  does	  not	  lose	  its	  bite.	  Let	  me	  give	  a	  rough	  idea	  of	  what	  the	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  is.	  The	  third-­‐person	   perspective	   is	   not	   from	   a	   first-­‐person,	   a	   second-­‐person	   (hearer)	   or	   a	  joint	   (we)	   perspective;	   these	   perspectives	   require	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	  subject.	   The	   third	   person	   perspective	   is,	   at	   least,	   a	   subject	   independent	  perspective	  like	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  map.	  Roughly,	  a	  city	  on	  a	  map	  is	  presented	  from	  a	   third	  person	  perspective.	   In	   contrast,	  when	   I	   feel	  pain	   this	   is	   from	   the	  first	  person	  perspective.118	  Call	  a	  singular	  term	  the	  reference	  of	  which	  is	  fixed	  or	  determined	  through	  the	   third-­‐person	   point	   of	   view	   a	   3P	   singular	   term.	   3P	   singular	   terms,	   like	  
                                                118	  Castaneda’s	   notion	   of	   ‘He*’	   ensures	   that	   the	   subject	   is	   thinking	   of	   himself	   as	   himself	   and	  introduced	   as	   a	   technical	   device	   to	   capture	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun.	   ‘He*’	   could	   be	   seen	   as	  capturing	  ‘I’	  from	  the	  third-­‐person	  point	  of	  view.	  On	  my	  view	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  reductionist	  attempt;	  this	  might	  not	  fit	  the	  original	  intention	  of	  the	  author.	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proper	  names,	  are	  such	   that	   they	  cannot	  have	  essential	   features	  requiring	   the	  first-­‐person	  point	  of	  view.	  	  Essential	  features	  of	  a	  singular	  term	  reveal	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  singular	  term.	  It	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  necessary	   feature,	  but	   it	   is	  constitutive	   for	  understanding	  x.119	  The	   essential	   features	   of	   a	   singular	   term	   arguably	   derive	   from	   how	   their	  reference	   is	   fixed.	   For	   a	   3P	   singular	   term	   the	   essential	   features	   would	   be	  naturally	  provided	  from	  the	  third	  person	  perspective.	  If	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  were	  fixed	  by	  employing	  the	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  (as	   many	   might	   think)	   then	   IEM	   and	   GRR	   would	   seem	   miraculous.	   For	   a	  reference	   fixed	   from	   the	   third-­‐person	   perspective	   no	   advantage	   for	   the	   first-­‐person	   perspective	   can	   be	   given.	   So	   how	   could	   a	   use	   of	   a	   3P	   singular	   term	  acquire	  such	  features	  which	  are	  features	  only	  from	  a	  first-­‐person	  point	  of	  view?	  This	   can	   only	   be	   explained	   if	   the	   reference	   is	  actually	   fixed	   through	   the	   first-­‐person	  point	  of	  view,	  even	  though	  the	  reference	  appears	  to	  be	  fixed	  through	  a	  third-­‐person	  point	  of	  view.	  Alternatively,	   if	  we	  stay	  with	  the	   idea	  of	   ‘I’	  being	  a	  3P	  singular	  term,	  one	  has	  to	  argue	  against	  GRR	  and	  IEM	  being	  essential	  features	  of	  uses	  of	   ‘I’.	  But	  possessing	  GRR	  and	   IEM	  seem	  to	  be	   the	  cornerstones	  of	   the	  understanding	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun.	   GRR	   and	   IEM	   are	   exactly	   the	  features	  which	  we	  should	  explain	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun.	  Similarly,	   the	   referent	   cannot	   be	   fixed	   from	   the	   2nd-­‐person	   or	  we-­‐perspective	  unless	   the	   essential	   features	   of	   it	   come	   from	   the	   relevant	   perspective.120	  Consequently,	   ‘I’	  cannot	  be	  a	  3P	  singular	  term.	  Call	  this	  radical	   irreducibility	  
thesis	  (RIT).	  	  RIT	   =	   the	   reference	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   cannot	   be	   fixed	   from	  perspectives	  other	  than	  the	  first-­‐person	  perspective.	  	  	  To	  summarise,	  the	  RIT	  for	  ‘I’	  requires	  that	  a	  singular	  term	  fixed	  from	  the	  third	  person	   perspective	   cannot	   be	   endowed	   with	   features	   from	   the	   first	   person	  
                                                119	  A	   discussion	   of	  what	   it	  means	   to	   concern	   the	   nature	   of	   something	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Burge	  (2010:	  last	  chapter).	  120	  The	   reference	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   cannot	   be	   fixed	   from	   the	   plural-­‐you	   or	   we-­‐perspective	  as	  well	  because	  its	  essential	  features	  are	  strictly	  restricted	  to	  the	  first-­‐person	  point	  of	  view.	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perspective.	   However,	   ‘I’	   has	   such	   features.	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   radical-­‐irreducibility	  cannot	  be	  satisfied,	  and	  GRR	  and	  IEM	  cannot	  be	  explained,	  unless	  the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	   from	   the	   first	   person	   perspective.	   Thus,	   I	   have	   to	  allude	   to	   psychological	   processes	   without	   which	   self-­‐reflexive	   features	   of	  special	   ways	   of	   knowing	   cannot	   be	   explained.	   These	   are	   required	   to	   explain	  how	  the	  essential	  features	  of	  ‘I’	  are	  possible.	  	  	  	  
3.	  Objection	  3:	  	  
The	  Standard	  Objection	  The	   standard	   objection	   against	   the	   Simple	   View	   is	   that	   the	   Simple	   View	   is	  superfluous,	  because	  the	  token	  reflexive	  rule	  for	  ‘I’	  is	  all	  what	  we	  need	  for	  fixing	  the	  referent	  of	   ‘I’.	  This	   is	  a	  powerful	  objection	  which	  naturally	  pops	  into	  one’s	  mind.	  There	  are	  only	  a	  few	  points	  in	  philosophy	  which	  everyone	  agrees	  on;	  one	  of	  them	  is	  that	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  refer	  to	  the	  speaker	  (Kaplan	  1989).	  There	  are	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  token	  reflexive	  rule	  (TRR)	  for	   ‘I’;	   I	   think	  they	  all	  try	  to	  capture	  the	  same	  idea.121	  In	  formulating	  the	  TRR	  for	  ‘I’,	  one	  might	  use	  ‘thinker’	  instead	  of	   ‘speaker’,	   because	   in	   uttering	   a	   sentence	   containing	   ‘I’,	   one	   might	   not	   be	  voicing	  her	   thought	  –	  variations	  are	  plenty.	  Peacocke’s	   fundamental	   reference	  rule	   for	   ‘I’	   (hence	  FRR)	   is	   one	   variation	   among	  many.	  The	  FRR	   for	   ‘I’	   roughly	  states	  that	  a	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  refers	  to	  the	  producer	  of	  the	  thinking.	  There	  are	  standard	  objections	   to	   the	   token	  reflexive	  rule	   for	   ‘I’,	  but	   they	  are	  not	  considered	   to	  be	  fatal	  (e.g.	  Bermúdez	  1998).	  I	   need	   not	   argue	   against	   the	   TRR	   for	   ‘I’	   because	   I	   think	   that	   it	   is	   a	   good	  approximation	  for	  understanding	  ‘I’	  and	  how	  its	  reference	  is	  fixed	  from	  a	  third-­‐person	  point	  of	  view.	  First-­‐person	  reference	  is	  fixed	  from	  a	  first-­‐person	  point	  of	  view	  but	  it	  should	  be	  understandable	  from	  a	  third-­‐person	  point	  of	  view.	  	  
                                                121	  A	  possible	  model	   for	   first-­‐person	   content	   is	  de	  se	   thought.	  De	  se	   thought	   requires	   that	   the	  subject	  knows	  that	  she	  is	  referring	  to	  herself	  while	  de	  re	  thought	  about	  the	  subject	  only	  requires	  that	  the	  subject	  in	  fact	  refers	  to	  herself.	  Recanati	  criticised	  de	  se	  thought	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  cannot	  capture	  the	  cognitive	  significance	  reflected	  in	  IEM.	  Only	  some	  self-­‐ascriptions	  made	  on	  certain	   bases	   are	   immune.	   Thus	   the	   cognitive	   significance	   derived	   from	   IEM	   is	   basis	   relative.	  But	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	  self-­‐ascriptions	  independently	  of	  their	  basis.	  Thus	  de	  se	   thought	  which	  is	  a	  model	   for	  self-­‐ascription	   independently	   from	  their	  bases	  cannot	  account	   for	   the	  cognitive	  significance	  derived	  from	  IEM.	  Morgan	  (2012)	  has	  a	  different	  argument	  for	  the	  same	  conclusion	  that	  de	  se	  thought	  and	  IEM	  are	  orthogonal	  questions.	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My	  response	  to	  the	  standard	  objection	  is	  this:	  the	  TRR	  for	  ‘I’	  cannot	  be	  the	  most	   fundamental	  explanation	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	  unless	   it	  can	  account	  for	  IEM	  and	  GRR.	  To	  show	  this,	  let	  us	  consider	  two	  plausible	  claims:	  1. The	  TRR/FRR	  for	  ‘I’	  provides	  the	  rule	  how	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  (Shoemaker	  1968,	  Peacocke	  2008:	  92,	  Campbell	  2012).	  2. The	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  for	  ‘I’	  should	  account	  for	  all	  essential	  	  features	  of	  uses	  ‘I’	  (Peacocke	  2008:	  92-­‐98,	  Campbell	  2012).	  	  I	  will	  call	  the	  second	  claim	  the	  accountability	  claim.	  It	  is	  a	  natural	  thought	  that	  the	   essential	   features	   of	   ‘I’	   should	   be	   accounted	   for	   by	   its	   reference	   fixing	  rule.122	  Consequently,	  our	  task	  is	  to	  examine	  whether	  the	  essential	  features	  of	  ‘I’	  can	   be	   accounted	   for	   by	   employing	   the	   TRR	   for	   ‘I’.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   this	   is	  impossible.	   The	   accountability	   claim	   has	   to	   be	   met	   by	   something	   else	   –	   the	  Simple	  View	  is	  our	  natural	  suggestion	  for	  this	  purpose.	  	  	  
3.1.	  What	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  TRR	  (FRR)	  for	  ‘I’?	  IEM,	  as	  I	  argued,	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  way	  that	  the	  referent	  of	  a	  singular	  term	  is	  fixed	   (chapter	   7).	   IEM	   is	   basis	   relative.	   Thus,	   if	   basis	  matters	   for	   IEM	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions	   then	   it	  has	   to	  matter	   for	   the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	   for	   ‘I’.	  And	  basis	  matters	   for	   understanding	   the	   guarantee	   against	   incorrect	   reference.	   What	  could	   enable	   the	   subject	   to	   know	   which	   object	   is	   the	   speaker	   without	   the	  possibility	  of	  mistake	   (as	   the	  guarantee	  against	   incorrect	   reference	   requires)?	  My	   answer	   is	   that	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	   knowing	   can	   ensure	   this.	  When	   one	  knows	   an	   object	   from	   the	   outside	   one	   always	   can	   make	   a	   mistake	   if	   one	  encounters	   this	   object	   twice.	   Only	   knowing	   the	   object	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	   knowing	   guarantee	   that	   whenever	   I	   encounter	   the	   object	   I	   will	  encounter	  the	  same	  object	  (setting	  aside	  quasi-­‐memory	  cases).	  To	  adopt	  the	  TRR	  (/FRR)	  for	  ‘I’	  assumes	  that	  ways	  of	  knowing	  do	  not	  play	  any	  role	  in	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed.	  Without	  using	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  the	  guarantee	  against	  incorrect	  reference	  cannot	  be	  explained.	  There	  is	   no	   other	   candidate	   which	   can	   provide	   knowledge,	   for	   the	   subject,	   of	   the	  
                                                122	  GRR	  has	   to	   be	   accounted	   for	   because	   it	   is	   a	   feature	   of	   all	   uses	   of	   ‘I’	   so	  whatever	   fixes	   the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  should	  offer	  this	  feature	  as	  necessary	  for	  all	  uses	  of	  ‘I’.	  IEM	  has	  to	  be	  accounted	  for	  because	   the	  general	   explanation	  of	   IEM	   involves	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule	  –	   as	   I	   discussed	  before.	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exposed	  object	   (the	   subject)	  without	   the	  possibility	   of	  mistake.	   Consequently,	  the	   TRR	   or	   the	   FRR	   for	   ‘I’	   is	  missing	   the	   basis	   –	   the	  way	   of	   knowing	   –	   as	   its	  constitutive	   part,	   but	   this	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   explanation	   of	   GRR2.	   The	  accountability	  claim	  is	  violated.	  How	  could	  the	  TRR	  for	  ‘I’	  account	  for	  the	  IEM	  of	  basis	  relative	  judgements	  (chapters	   4	   and	   6)?	   A	   self-­‐ascription	   based	   only	   on	   proprioception	   or	  introspection	  is	  immune,	  but	  the	  same	  self-­‐ascription	  based	  on	  an	  external	  way	  of	   knowing	   is	   not	   immune	   (chapters	   3	   and	  4).	   The	  TRR	   for	   ‘I’	   cannot	   explain	  this,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  basis	  as	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	   rule.	   IEM	   is	   basis	   relative	   but	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	   independently	  from	   ways	   of	   knowing	   according	   to	   the	   TRR	   and	   the	   FRR	   for	   ‘I’.	   All	   basis-­‐independent	  ways	  of	   fixing	   the	   referent	  will	   fail	   to	  explain	  how	   the	  basis	  of	   a	  judgment	  makes	  a	  difference	  between	  a	  judgement	  being	  immune	  and	  not	  being	  immune.	  Again,	  the	  accountability	  claim	  is	  violated.	  Neither	  IEM	  nor	  GRR	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  TRR	  or	  the	  FRR.	  	  	  
3.2.	  The	  First-­‐person	  Point	  of	  View	  What	   is	  missing	   in	   the	   TRR/FRR	   for	   ‘I’	   is	   the	   first	   person	   point	   of	   view.	   The	  essential	  features	  of	  ‘I’	  provide	  epistemic	  advantages	  only	  for	  the	  subject	  (IEM,	  GRR2);	  this	  cannot	  be	  unless	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  from	  the	  subject’s	  point	  of	   view.	   IEM	   and	   GRR	   cannot	   be	   explained	   unless	   the	   reference	   of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed	  from	   the	   first-­‐person	   perspective.	   TRR/FRR	   for	   ‘I’	   violates	   both	   the	   radical-­‐irreducibility	  thesis	  and	  the	  accountability	  claim.	  Thus,	  the	  TRR/FRR	  for	  ‘I’	  only	  remains	  a	  good	  and	  useful	  specification	  of	  what	  the	  role	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  without	  telling	  us	  how	  its	  reference	  is	  fixed.	  Another	   option	   is	   that	   action	   awareness	   grounds	   the	   use	   of	   ‘I’.	   What	  grounds	   the	   thinker/producer’s	   knowledge	   of	   being	   the	   agent	   is	   agent	  awareness	   on	   this	   view.	   On	   views	   like	   O’Brien	   (2007)	   and	   Peacocke	   (2008),	  action	   awareness	   provides	   for	   the	   subject	   the	   knowledge	   of	   who	   is	   the	  thinker/producer	  of	  the	  subject’s	  thought.	  To	  know	  that	  I	  am	  the	  thinker	  or	  the	  producer	  of	  the	  thought	  plausibly	  requires	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  	  	  What	  matters	  for	  us	  is	  only	  this.	  If	  action	  awareness	  grounds	  the	  use	  of	  ‘I’,	  then	   it	   is	  on	   the	  condition	   that	   this	  kind	  of	  action	  awareness	   is	  only	  based	  on	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self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  But	  agent	  awareness	  is	  not	  always	  only	  based	  on	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.123	  One	  might	  be	  mistaken	  who	  the	  agent	  is,	  but	  in	   this	   case	   the	   basis	   or	   channel	   which	   provides	   action	   awareness	   is	   not	   an	  internal	  channel	  or	  basis.	  Let	  me	  emphasise	  that	  the	  self-­‐reflexivity	  of	  the	  ways	  of	  knowing	  matters	   for	  ensuring	  GRR	  and	  IEM.	  This	   is	  because	  the	  subject,	  by	  using	  ‘I’,	  cannot	  be	  mistaken	  about	  which	  object	  she	  is	  thinking	  of	  and	  intends	  to	  refer	  to.	  Updating	  the	  TRR	  or	  FRR	  for	  ‘I’	  with	  action	  awareness	  from	  the	  side	  of	  the	  subject	  might	  enable	  a	  holder	  of	  such	  a	  view	  to	  satisfy	  the	  radical	  irreducibility	  thesis	   but	   it	   cannot	   satisfy	   the	   accountability	   claim.	   Such	   views	   (adding	   the	  relevant	  kind	  of	  action	  awareness	  to	  TRR)	  cannot	  explain	  IEM.	  The	  basis	  (ways	  of	  knowing)	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  explanation.	  Such	  a	  view	  cannot	  explain	  how	  the	  same	  judgment	  can	  be	  immune	  on	  one	  basis	  and	  not	  immune	  on	  another	  basis.	  	  	  
3.3.	  TRR/FRR	  and	  semantic	  irreducibility	  It	   is	   assumed	   that	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   is	   semantically	  irreducible.	   But	   the	   TRR/FRR	   for	   ‘I’	   seems	   to	   assume	   that	   it	   is	   partially	  reducible,	  each	   involves	  a	  descriptive	  element.	  Thus	  another	  advantage	  of	   the	  Simple	  View	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  suppose	  that	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  partially	  by	   a	   description	   such	   as	   ‘the	   speaker/thinker/producer…’	   or	   that	   it	   even	   has	  any	  descriptive	  component	   in	   it.	  Even	  a	  direct	  reference	  theorist	   like	  Recanati	  assumes	   the	   TRR	   for	   ‘I’	   as	   the	   most	   fundamental	   understanding	   of	   ‘I’	   and	  explicitly	   states	   that	   there	   is	   a	   descriptive	   element	   in	   it	   (Recanati	   2007:	   13).	  This	   is	   surprising	   because	   direct	   reference	   theories	   (like	   Recanati’s)	   were	  worked	  out	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  view	  that	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  should	  use	  a	  descriptive	   component.124	  This	  problem	  can	  be	   solved,	  but	   a	   view	  which	  does	  
                                                123	  We	   can	   find	   evidence	   for	   external	   cue	   integration	   in	   agency	   self-­‐ascriptions	   in	   healthy	  subjects	  (Moore,	  Wegner,	  and	  Haggard	  2009)	  and	   in	   the	  pantomime	  experiment	  one	  commits	  an	   aboutness	   error	   about	  who	   is	   the	   agent	   (Wegner	  2002).	   The	  pantomime	   illusion	   (Wegner	  2005)	   is	   as	   follows.	   The	   assistant	   of	   the	   experimenter,	   A,	   puts	   her	   hands	   where	   a	   different	  subject	   B’s	   arms	   usually	   are.	   B	   does	   not	   see	   his	   own	   arms,	   just	   A’s	   arms	   straight	   ahead.	   The	  experimenter	   gives	   an	   order	   “Flex	   your	  wrist!”	   A’s	   wrist	   flexes	  where	   B’s	   wrist	   usually	   is.	   B	  should	  not	  move	  his	   limbs	  at	  all.	  However,	  B	   reports	   that	  he	   felt	   that	  he	  did	   the	  wrist	   flexing	  movement	  to	  a	  certain	  extent.	  This	  is	  striking	  as	  B’s	  hand	  was	  not	  even	  there	  where	  A’s	  hands	  (which	  were	  flexing)	  were	  and	  B’s	  hands	  were	  stationary.	  124	  The	  only	  exceptions	  would	  be	  descriptive	  or	  stipulative	  names	  as	  Evans’s	  ‘Julius’	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  7.	  (The	  referent	  of	  a	  descriptive	  name	  is	  fixed	  by	  a	  definite	  description.)	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not	   require	   any	   descriptive	   element	   seems	   to	   be	   stronger.	   One	   of	   the	   major	  advantages	   of	   the	   Simple	   View	   is	   that	   it	   completely	   eliminates	   descriptive	  elements	  from	  how	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed.	  	  	  
4.	  Objection	  4:	  	  
Wittgensteinian	  Objection	  One	  possible	  understanding	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  worry	  about	  IEM	  is	  as	  follows.	  If	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  a	  public	  (physical)	  object	  then	  the	  subject	  has	  to	  recognise	  this	   object	   when	   she	   refers	   to	   it.	   Recognition	   (of	   objects	   such	   as	   bodies)	  requires	   employment	   of	   a	   non-­‐private	   way	   of	   knowing	   like	   vision.125 	  But	  because	   the	   subject	   using	   ‘I’,	   in	   some	   cases,	   need	   not	   recognise	   the	   object	   in	  such	  a	  way,	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  in	  this	  cases	  cannot	  be	  a	  public	  (physical)	  object.	  Wittgenstein	   assumes	   that	   through	   a	   private	   way	   of	   knowing	   only	   a	   private	  object	   can	   be	   known	   (or	   private	   access	   only	   provides	   a	   private	   object).	  Similarly,	   Anscombe	  worried	   that	   ‘I’	   cannot	   refer	   because	   the	   subject	   cannot	  know	   of	   the	   material	   object	   which	   is	   the	   referent	   of	   ‘I’	   for	   all	   uses	   of	   ‘I’.126	  Acquaintance	  with	   a	   physical	   object	   through	   a	   private	  way	   of	   knowing	   is	   not	  even	  conceivable.	  The	  argument	  presupposes	  either	  that	  	  1. nothing	  can	  be	  known	  through	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing	  or	  2. through	   private	   ways	   of	   knowing	   only	   a	   private	   object	   (non-­‐physical	  Cartesian	  Ego)	  can	  be	  known.	  I	  will	  show	  that	  both	  presuppositions	  are	  mistaken.	  The	  first	  option	  is	  just	  false,	  I	  can	  know	  of	  my	  hunger,	  my	  intention	  and	  my	  pain	   through	   a	   private	   way	   of	   knowing	   (even	   if	   this	   is	   not	   my	   only	   way	   of	  knowing	   of	   them).	   Thus	   something	   can	   be	   known	   through	   private	   ways	   of	  knowing.	  	  Even	   Anscombe	   (in	   Intention)	   allows	   that	   the	   subject	   knows	   of	   her	   own	  physical	  action	  without	  observation	  ‘from	  the	  inside’	  (even	  if	  one	  cannot	  use	  ‘I’	  to	  refer).	  This	  shows	  that	  she	  cannot	  hold	  the	  first	  presupposition.	  
                                                125	  McDowell	  (2013)	  thinks	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  and	  Anscombe’s	  worry	  about	  whether	  ‘I’	  refers	  is	   about	   whether	   we	   are	   physical	   objects.	   But	   this	   is	   only	   part	   of	   the	   question	   raised	   by	  Anscombe.	  The	  crucial	  question	  is	  how	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  this	  object.	  126	  Both	  Wittgenstein	   and	   Anscombe	   argued	   against	   the	   referentiality	   of	   ‘I’.	   Hamilton	   (1991)	  and	   O’Brien	   (1994,	   2007)	   have	   argued	   that	   even	   the	   most	   charitable	   reconstruction	   of	   the	  argument	  remains	  unsound.	  I	  find	  the	  subjectless	  views	  untenable	  and	  lacking	  any	  plausibility.	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The	   second	   presupposition	   seems	   to	   me	   to	   be	   what	   is	   in	   play	   in	   the	  argument.	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Anscombe	  were	  worried	   that	   if	   ‘I’	   refers	   then	   the	  Cartesian	  has	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  we	  are	  Cartesian	  Egos.	  This	  requires	  the	  second	  presupposition	  that	  through	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing	  only	  a	  private	  object	  can	  be	  known	  if	  anything.	  	  The	   problem	   with	   the	   second	   presupposition	   is	   this:	   even	   if	   a	   way	   of	  knowing	   is	   private	   it	   does	   not	   necessitate	   that	  what	   is	   known	   through	   it	   is	   a	  private	  object.	  When	  I	  know	  that	  my	  heartbeats	  are	  quick	  from	  the	  inside,	  this	  alone	  does	  not	  make	  the	  quick	  beating	  of	  my	  heart	  a	  private	  event.	  It	  is	  a	  public	  event	  available	  to	  the	  subject	  through	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing.	  The	  experience	  of	   it	   is	   private.	   But	   the	   object,	   my	   heartbeat	   is	   available	   to	   others	   by	   other	  means,	  e.g.	  through	  a	  stethoscope.	  Even	  for	  Wittgenstein	  one’s	  heartbeat	  cannot	  be	   a	   private	   object.	   Thus	   even	   for	   him	   a	   public	   object	   can	   be	   known	   through	  private	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Wittgenstein	  might	  object	  that	  ‘object’	  means	  object	  proper,	  not	  an	  event	  or	  a	  state.	  A	  proper	  object	  is	  fully	  present	  in	  any	  moment,	  it	  does	  not	  unfold	  in	  time	  and	  it	  is	  not	  a	  property,	  an	  event,	  or	  a	  state.	  But	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  my	  heart	  when	  I	  am	   aware	   of	   my	   quick	   heartbeat	   from	   the	   inside.	   My	   heart	   is	   not	   a	   private	  object.	  Consequently,	  knowing	  of	  something	  through	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing	  does	   not	  make	   the	   thing	  which	   I	   know	  of	   private.	   The	   channel	   or	   the	   vehicle	  through	  which	  I	  know	  is	  private	  but	  not	  necessarily	  the	  object	  which	  I	  know	  of.	  Touch	   could	   be	   used	   as	   a	   private	   and	   as	   a	   non-­‐private	   way	   of	   knowing.	  When	  I	  concentrate	  on	  how	  it	  feels	  to	  touch	  a	  square	  object	  then	  I	  use	  touch	  as	  a	  private	   way	   of	   knowing	   on	   this	   occasion.	   There	   are	   further	   examples	   of	  knowing	  a	  proper	  object	   through	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing.	   I	  can	  know	  of	  my	  baby	  or	  my	  kidney	  stone	  through	  touch	  (used	  as	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing)	  and	  maybe	  inference.	  Babies	  and	  kidney	  stones	  are	  physical	  objects.	  Thus	  a	  physical	  object	  can	  be	  known	  through	  private	  way	  of	  knowing.	  Let	  me	  emphasise	  that	  privacy	  is	  the	  feature	  of	  the	  way	  of	  knowing	  and	  not	  the	  feature	  of	  the	  object.	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4.1.	  Against	  Wittgenstein	  Wittgenstein	   argued	   that	   a	   token	   ‘I’	   in	   immune	   self-­‐ascriptions	   cannot	   be	  referring	  because	  it	  only	  could	  refer	  to	  a	  Cartesian	  Ego	  –	  a	  private	  object.	  If	  the	  subject	   can	   be	   known	   through	   private	   ways	   of	   knowing	   then	   it	   should	   be	   a	  private	  object.	  This	  worry	  is	  unjustified	  for	  another	  reason.	  The	  subject’s	  brain	  (or	   mind)	   already	   processes	   self-­‐relevant	   information	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	  brain	   integrates	   information	   from	   private	   and	   non-­‐private	   ways	   of	   knowing.	  Non-­‐private	   ways	   of	   knowing	   are	   ways	   of	   knowing	   of	   multiple	   objects.	   The	  subject	  can	  know	  through	  non-­‐private	  ways	  of	  knowing	  like	  vision,	  audition	  or	  touch	  public	  (physical)	  objects	   like	  stones,	  onions	  and	  people.	  When	  the	  brain	  processes	   information	   of	   the	   subject,	   external	   (vision,	   audition,	   touch)	   and	  internal	   information	   (from	   proprioception,	   kinaesthesia)	   is	   integrated	  (Knoblich	   et	   al.	   2005,	   Moore,	   Wegner,	   Haggard	   2009,	   De	   Vignemont	  forthcoming,	  Wong	   forthcoming).	   Thus	   the	   subject	   cannot	   be	   a	   private	   object	  because	   visual,	   audio,	   tactile	   information	   are	   integrated	   with	   information	  known	  from	  the	  inside	  about	  the	  subject.	  	  Let	   us	   look	   at	   the	   sense	   of	   balance.	   There	   are	   visual	   cues,	   including	   the	  visual	   flow	   of	   changes	   in	   the	   environment	   relative	   to	   the	   movement	   of	   the	  subject,	  and	  this,	  along	  with	  balance	  organs	  in	  the	  inner	  ear,	  enables	  the	  brain	  to	  register	  whether	  the	  subject	   is	   in	  balance.	  So	   in	  this	  sense	  the	  subject	  need	  not	  even	  know	  that	  she	  is	  a	  physical	  object;	  her	  brain	  takes	  her	  to	  be	  a	  physical	  object.	  The	  subject’s	  knowledge	  of	  herself	   is	  already	  based	  on	   the	  assumption	  that	   she	   is	   a	  physical	   object.	  However	   this	   leaves	   it	   open	  whether	   the	   subject	  explicitly	   knows	   that	   she	   is	   a	   physical	   therefore	  public	   object.	   This	   opens	   the	  possibility	  of	  error	  about	  which	  kind	  of	  thing	  we	  are	  even	  if	  the	  working	  of	  our	  brain	  presupposes	  that	  we	  are	  physical	  objects.127	  	  Thus	   from	   the	   IEM	   of	   certain	   self-­‐ascriptions,	   one	   cannot	   argue	   for	   the	  claim	  that	  we	  are	  Cartesian	  Egos/non-­‐physical	  objects.	  	  	  
                                                127	  Evolution	  might	  have	  made	  a	  mistake.	  So	  I	  am	  not	  arguing	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  are	  physical	  objects	  or	  essentially	  human	  animals	  because	  our	  brains	  suppose	  that	  we	  are	  physical	  objects.	  I	  only	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  private	  and	  non-­‐private	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  integrated.	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5.	  Objection	  5:	  
Anscombe’s	  Challenge	  The	   Simple	   View	   requires	   the	   subject’s	   direct	   acquaintance	   with	   the	   object	  which	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  for	  all	  uses	  of	  ‘I’.	  Anscombe	  poses	  a	  challenge	  to	  this	  with	  her	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank.	  In	  such	  a	  tank	  the	  subject	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  and	  think	  a	  thought	  like	  ‘I	  was	  stupid	  to	  agree	  with	  this	  experiment’.	  But	  how	  can	  the	  subject	  be	  directly	  acquainted	  with	  the	  object	  which	  she	  is,	  in	  the	  sensory	   deprivation	   tank?	   The	   Simple	   View	   cannot	   be	   correct	   unless	   this	   is	  possible.	  Thus	  this	  is	  a	  powerful	  challenge	  to	  the	  Simple	  View.	  	  The	  answer	  is	  straightforward.	  Introspection	  is	  one	  of	  several	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  through	  which	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  acquainted	  with	  the	  object	  which	  is	  herself.	  	  But	   how	   is	   knowledge	   of	   an	   object	   through	   introspection	   is	   possible?	   In	  order	  to	  accept	  introspection	  as	  an	  answer	  I	  have	  to	  show	  that	  an	  object	  can	  be	  known	  thorough	   introspection.	  This	  requires	   that	   I	  answer	  Hume’s	  scepticism	  about	  introspection.	  	  
6.	  Objection	  6:	  
Hume’s	  Difficulty:	  Restating	  Anscombe’s	  Challenge	  Hume	   famously	   denied	   that	   the	   subject	   knows	   of	   herself	   through	   experience	  from	   the	   inside	   or	   through	   introspection.	   When	   he	   tried	   to	   find	   himself	   by	  directing	   his	   attention	   inward	   he	   did	   not	   find	   anything	   but	   sensations.	   To	  translate	   his	   worry	   against	   our	   view	   would	   amount	   to	   saying	   that	   through	  introspection	   and	   bodily	   experience	   (e.g.	   proprioception,	   kinaesthesia)	   the	  subject	  cannot	  be	  known	  in	  a	  direct	  manner.	  There	  is	  no	  object	  to	  be	  found.	  It	  seems	  to	  Hume	  that	  one	  is	  not	  acquainted	  with	  oneself	  though	  an	  internal	  way	  of	   knowing:	   introspection	   or	   bodily	   awareness.	   Anscombe	   might	   repeat	   this	  worry.	   To	   refer	   to	   a	   physical	   object	   that	   is	   present	   I	   have	   to	   be	   directly	  acquainted	  with	   this	   object.	   But	   one	   cannot	   be	   acquainted	  with	   that	   physical	  object,	  herself	  e.g.	  in	  the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank.	  How	  does	  it	  come	  about	  that	  one	  can	  use	  ‘I’	  in	  this	  situation?	  I	  agree	   that	   introspection	  seems	  to	  be	  radically	  different	   from	  perception.	  On	   the	   face	   of	   it	   introspection	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   directed	   at	   the	   exposed	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object,	  but	  at	  states	  and	  events	   in	   the	  mind.	  However,	  whenever	  one	  knows	  a	  property,	   state	   or	   event	   through	   introspection,	   one	   is	   automatically	   in	   a	  position	  to	  self-­‐ascribe	  this	  if	  one	  is	  a	  healthy	  subject.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  there	  is	  no	  perceptual	  encountering	  of	  the	  exposed	  object.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  we	   can	   gain	   knowledge	   of	   ourselves	   through	   introspection.	   How	   is	   this	  possible?	  	  Let	   us	   step	   back	   and	   look	   carefully	   at	   what	   we	   should	   do	   according	   to	  Hume.	  The	  first	  step	  is	  to	  redirect	  our	  attention	  inward.	  Where	  do	  we	  direct	  our	  attention?	  We	  direct	  it	   inward.	  But	  this	  seems	  to	  presuppose	  that	  the	  subject’s	  aim	   is	   to	   know	   of	   herself	   by	   directing	   her	   attention	   inward.	   When	   Hume	  changes	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  attention,	  then	  he	  cannot	  direct	  it	  inward	  unless	  he	  knows	  that	  he	  is	  directing	  his	  attention	  to	  what	  he	  knows	  from	  the	  inside.	  The	  distinction	   between	   inside	   and	   outside	   is	   the	   shift	   from	   the	   subject’s	  surroundings	   to	   the	   subject.	   Thus,	   even	  Hume	   knows	   in	   some	  way	   that	   he	   is	  knowing	  of	  himself	  when	  he	  turns	  his	  attention	  inward	  even	  if	  he	  does	  not	  feel	  justified	  to	  use	  the	  term	  ‘self’	  for	  what	  he	  finds.	  	  One	  might	   argue	   that	   the	   subject	   cannot	  direct	   his	   attention	   inward	   after	  acquiring	   the	  mastery	  of	   the	   first-­‐person	  pronoun	  unless	  one	  knows	   that	   it	   is	  directed	  to	  oneself.	  There	  is	  no	  open	  question	  of	  the	  form	  ‘Is	  it	  me?’/‘Is	  it	  of	  me?’	  for	  who	  it	   is	  that	  one	  knows	  through	  introspection.	  For	  healthy	  subjects	  these	  questions	  are	  not	  open	  questions.	  Let	  me	  demonstrate	  what	  I	  mean.	  Suppose	  I	  am	  in	  a	  Crystal	  building	  where	  everything	   is	   of	   transparent	   crystals.	   It	   is	   a	   building	   in	   the	   organic	   style	   of	  architecture	   but	   nearly	   completely	   transparent.	   I	   can	   sit	   on	   my	   chair	   if	   I	  recognise	  it	  and	  I	  can	  look	  out	  of	  the	  window	  if	  I	   find	  it.	  But	  I	  can	  simply	  look	  through	  the	  walls.	  I	  will	  see	  through	  and	  see	  the	  world	  around	  me.	  When	  I	  walk	  it	   looks	   like	   I	   am	  walking	   in	   the	   air.	   In	   order	   to	   see	   the	   Crystal	   room,	   crystal	  chair	  and	  crystal	  table,	  or	  the	  transparent	  crystal	  ice-­‐cream,	  I	  have	  to	  direct	  my	  attention	   to	   them.	   I	   need	  not	   know	   it	   as	   a	   crystal	   room	  or	   crystal	   chair	   but	   I	  have	   to	  know	   it	  under	   some	  mode	  of	  presentation.	   If	   I	  want	   to	   see	   the	  world	  outside	   the	  room	  I	  only	  have	   to	   look	   through	  the	  crystal.	   In	  contrast,	   I	   cannot	  see	   the	   crystal	   room	   unless	   I	   direct	   my	   attention	   to	   it.	   I	   cannot	   direct	   my	  attention	   to	   it	   unless	   I	   know	   of	   it.	   Similarly,	   normally	   I	   only	   see	   the	   world	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around	  me.	  I	  only	  pay	  attention	  to	  myself	  if	  I	  decide	  to	  do	  it	  or	  if	  something	  goes	  wrong	  and	  this	  captures	  my	  attention.	  	  There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  endogenous	  and	  exogenous	  attention.	  When	  an	  outside	  stimulus	  triggers	  the	  attention	  shift	  then	  it	  is	  exogenous.	  To	  be	  more	  precise,	  when	  the	  stimulus	  attracts	  attention,	  the	  attention	  shift	  is	  exogenous.	  It	  does	  not	  derive	   from	   the	   subject’s	  decision.	  A	   sudden	  sharp	  pain	  might	  be	  an	  exogenous	   stimulus	   in	   a	   sense	   that	   it	   grabs	   attention	   independently	   from	   the	  subject’s	   intention.	   But	   for	   endogenous	   attention	   the	   subject’s	   intention	   is	  operative	  in	  shifting	  attention.	  	  Our	   worry	   for	   Hume	   is	   for	   endogenous	   attention	   shifts.	   When	   Hume	  
decides	   to	   observe	   his	   sensations	   and	   not	   the	   world	   around	   him,	   then	   he	  directs	  his	  attention	  to	  himself	  and,	  in	  some	  sense,	  unless	  Hume	  knows	  this,	  the	  direction	  shift	  cannot	  happen.	  For	  Hume,	  using	  ‘I’	  and	  ‘Hume’	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  thing.	   Hume	   has	   no	   difficulty	   in	   seeing	   Hume.	   He	  would	   not	   have	   difficulties	  seeing	   himself	   as	   himself	   in	   the	  mirror	   or	   seeing	   his	   hand	   as	   his	   hand	   (even	  while	  writing	  that	  he	  does	  not	  find	  himself	  in	  introspection).	  In	  this	  sense	  Hume	  knows	   of	   himself	   through	   external	   ways	   of	   knowing.	   Only	   finding	   himself	  through	  internal	  ways	  of	  knowing	  causes	  trouble.	  Hume	  does	  not	  find	  the	  object	  which	  he	  is	  in	  introspection.	  Thus,	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’,	  the	  self,	  is	  a	  physical	  object,	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  find	  the	  self	  he	  has	  to	  be	  turning	  his	  attention	   inward.	  What	   enables	   the	   possibility	   of	   our	   directing	   our	   attention	  inward	  after	  acquiring	  the	  mastery	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  that	  one	  has	  to	  know	  that	  one	  turns	  her	  attention	  inward	  to	  herself.	  But	  if	  Hume	  insists	  that	  inward	  directed	  attention	  is	  not	  self-­‐directed,	  then	  we	  need	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  this	  shift	  from	  outward	  to	  inward	  is	  possible	  –	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  missing	  its	  target.	  Hume	  has	  to	  answer	  this	  question;	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	   seems	   to	  me	   to	  be	  on	   the	  Humeans	  or	  whoever	  wants	   to	  hold	  such	  a	  view.	  My	  explanation	  is	  simple;	  the	  ability	  of	  such	  an	  attention	  shift	  presupposes	  that	  the	  subject	  knows	  that	  she	  knows	  of	  herself	   from	  the	  inside.	  So	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  we	  know	  that	  we	  know	  of	  ourselves	  from	  the	  inside.	  But	  how	  can	  I	  know	  of	  the	  object	  which	  is	  me	  from	  the	  inside?	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6.1.	  Knowing	  of	  an	  object	  What	  does	  it	  take	  to	  know	  of	  the	  exposed	  object	  (de	  re)	  or	  the	  exposed	  object	  as	  subject	  (de	  se	  –	  knowingly	  and	  intentionally	  referring	  to	  herself)?	  	  The	   exposed	   object	   is	   certainly	   registered	   as	   object	   (de	   re)	   when	   it	   is	  named.	  Children	  use	  their	  proper	  names	  for	  themselves	  before	  using	  ‘I’	  (Rochat	  2003).	  Understanding	  their	  proper	  name,	  passing	  the	  mirror	  test	  or	  pointing	  to	  themselves	   seem	   to	   be	   sufficient	   for	   de	   re	   knowledge	   of	   the	   exposed	   object.	  However,	  de	  se	  knowledge	  requires	  more.	  How	  can	   the	   subject	  know	  of	   the	  exposed	  object	   as	  oneself	   (de	  se)?	  What	  kind	  of	  acquaintance	  is	  required	  for	  this?	  	  
6.2.	  Hume’s	  objection	  restated	  One	  might	  think	  that	  what	  I	  know	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  is,	  at	  most,	  a	  feature	  or	  a	  part	  of	  me,	  but	  I	  am	  not	  acquainted	  with	  the	  object	  which	  is	  myself	   through	   such	  ways	   of	   knowing.	  Hume’s	   objection	  might	   be	   put	   in	   this	  way:	  even	  if	  we	  accept	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  this	  does	  not	  suffice	  for	  accepting	  direct	  acquaintance	  with	  the	  exposed	  object.	  How	  can	  one	  be	  acquainted	  with	  an	  object	  without	  discriminating	  or	  identifying	  that	  object?	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  possible.	  	  
6.3.	  Acquaintance	  When	  I	  see	  an	  object	  then	  I	  am	  acquainted	  with	  it.	  Let	  us	  get	  clear	  on	  differences	  in	  different	  types	  of	  acquaintance.	  	  There	  are	  three	  relevant	  alternative	  ways	  of	  seeing	  something	  which	  is	  an	  object.	  	  First,	   I	  might	   look	  at	  an	  object	  without	  knowing	  that	   it	   is	  an	  object.	  Let	  us	  imagine	  a	  stonefish	  on	  a	  stone.	  (A	  stonefish	  looks	  just	  like	  a	  stone.)	  In	  this	  case,	  I	  might	  not	  be	  able	   to	  distinguish	   it	   from	   the	  stone	  when	   I	   see	   it	   as	  part	  of	   the	  stone.	  I	  am	  not	  acquainted	  with	  the	  stonefish.	  Second,	  I	  might	  look	  at	  a	  stonefish	  as	  an	  object	  but	  think	  that	  it	  is	  a	  separate	  stone.	  In	  this	  case	  as	  Crane	  would	  put	  it	  I	  lack	  the	  canonical	  concept:	  stonefish.	  I	  know	  of	  the	  object	  (de	  re)	  but	  view	  the	  object	  under	  the	  wrong	  concept:	  stone.	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Third,	   I	  might	   look	  at	  a	  stonefish	  as	  a	  stonefish.	   I	  know	  of	  the	  object	  de	  re	  and	  view	  it	  under	  the	  correct	  canonical	  concept.	  Fourth,	  I	  might	  be	  looking	  at	  a	  giant	  stonefish	  as	  a	  stonefish	  in	  murky	  water.	  I	  only	  see	  parts	  of	   it	  as	  my	  eyes	  explore	   it	  but	  never	   the	  whole.	   I	  know	  of	   the	  object	  de	  re	  and	  view	  it	  under	  the	  correct	  canonical	  concept.	  	  	  I	  might	  put	  the	  difference	  between	  these	  scenarios	  like	  this.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  I	   am	   not	   acquainted	   with	   anything.	   In	   the	   second,	   I	   am	   acquainted	   with	   the	  stonefish	  as	  an	  object	  –	  it	  is	  a	  de	  re	  acquaintance	  with	  it.	  In	  the	  two	  last	  cases,	  I	  am	  acquainted	  with	  it	  as	  a	  stonefish.	  In	  the	  fourth	  case	  I	  am	  acquainted	  with	  a	  part	  and	  thereby	  with	  the	  whole.	  Let	  us	  call	  this	  part-­‐for-­‐whole	  acquaintance.	  There	  could	  be	  similar	  stages	  in	  being	  acquainted	  with	  oneself.	  	  	  
6.4.	  Answer	  to	  Hume	  Being	  acquainted	  with	  a	  part	  is	  being	  acquainted	  with	  the	  whole	  as	  for	  a	  giant	  stonefish	   –	   part-­‐for-­‐whole	   acquaintance.	   We	   are	   acquainted	   with	   the	   Earth	  (construed	   broadly	   including	   everything	   which	   is	   on	   it).128	  What	   we	   actually	  experience	  (being	  awake)	  is	  always	  only	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Earth.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  prevent	   us	   from	   being	   acquainted	   with	   the	   Earth.	   We	   typically	   need	   not	  discriminate	  or	  identify	  the	  Earth.	  However,	  this	  is	  still	  direct	  acquaintance	  with	  the	  object.	  Even	  if	  I	  see	  my	  body	  most	  of	  the	  time	  I	  only	  see	  part	  of	  it	  but	  this	  is	  a	  way	  of	  being	  directly	  acquainted	  with	  it.	  	  Let	  me	   illustrate	   this	   point.	   If	   I	  were	   living	   in	   a	  whale	   than	   I	  would	   have	  direct	   acquaintance	  with	   the	  whale	   around	  me	   –	   given	   that	   I	   know	   that	   I	   am	  living	   in	  a	  whale.	  Even	  when	  I	  see	  an	  orange	  I	  do	  not	  see	   its	  backside,	   thus	   in	  some	   sense	   I	   never	   see	   the	   whole	   object	   unless	   it	   is	   round	   and	   rotating	   or	  rolling	  rhapsodically	  (not	  on	  one	  axis)	  –	  but	  this	  is	  rare.	  Most	  of	  the	  time	  we	  see	  or	  touch	  only	  part	  of	  the	  object	  in	  question;	  it	  is	  either	  because	  our	  attention	  is	  restricted	  or	  because	  the	  object	  is	  too	  big.	  When	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  herself	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  it	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  part-­‐for-­‐whole	  direct	  acquaintance	  which	  we	  have	  with	  the	   Earth	   and	   in	   the	   other	   examples	   above.	   When	   you	   turn	   your	   attention	  
                                                128	  If	  Earth	  is	  not	  a	  singular	  referring	  expression	  then	  only	  think	  of	  the	  giant	  stonefish	  in	  murky	  water	  or	  the	  whale	  when	  one	  lives	  in	  it.	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inward	   (to	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	   knowing)	   you	   are	   not	   able	   to	   distinguish	   or	  identify	  an	  object	  that	  is	  yourself	  while	  you	  are	  directly	  acquainted	  with	  it.	  You	  are	  usually	  acquainted	  with	  it	  by	  being	  acquainted	  with	  a	  part	  of	  it	  or	  a	  feature	  of	  it.	  Through	  proprioception	  I	  can	  pay	  attention	  to	  my	  whole	  body	  (if	  I	  wish	  to	  do	   so)	   but	   this	   is	   unusual.	   The	   subject’s	   knowledge	   of	   the	   object	   that	   she	   is	  referring	  to	  by	  using	  ‘I’	  is	  provided	  by	  being	  acquainted	  with	  a	  part,	  a	  feature,	  or	  whole	  of	  it.	  	  One	  might	  object	  that	  I	  could	  see	  the	  Earth	  if	  I	  were	  out	  in	  space	  or	  the	  giant	  stonefish	   by	   swimming	   away.	   Yes,	   but	   similarly	   I	   can	   see	  myself	  when	   I	   look	  into	   a	   mirror	   and	   I	   can	   feel	   my	   whole	   body	   from	   the	   inside	   through	  proprioception.	   It	   is	   possible	   to	   pay	   attention	   to	  my	  whole	   body	   and	  not	   just	  parts	  but	  the	  default	  would	  be	  being	  aware	  of	  only	  part	  of	  it.	  	  Which	  kind	  of	  acquaintance	  is	  sufficient	  to	  turn	  my	  attention	  inward?	  De	  re	  acquaintance	  with	  the	  object	  which	  is	  me	  might	  be	  sufficient	  for	  an	  exogenous	  shift	  of	  my	  attention	  inward.	  But	  to	  decide	  (endogenous)	  to	  shift	  my	  attention	  inward	   and	   not	   to	   the	   world	   requires	   de	   se	   acquaintance	   with	   the	   object	   as	  myself.	  To	  know	  where	  to	  shift	  my	  attention	  requires	  paying	  attention	  to	  myself	  as	  myself.	  	  Accordingly,	   the	   putative	   answer	   to	   Hume	   and	   Anscombe	   should	   be	   the	  following.	  To	  search	  in	  our	  sensations	  or	  in	  introspection	  for	  the	  whole	  subject	  is	  to	  search	  in	  the	  wrong	  place.	  Mostly	  parts	  or	  features	  of	  it	  can	  be	  found	  unless	  one	   pays	   attention	   to	   the	  whole.	   But	   to	   know	   this,	   the	   subject	   already	   has	   to	  know	   that	   she	  knows	  of	   the	  object	  which	   is	   the	   subject	   through	  such	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Unless	  the	  subject	  knows	  this,	  she	  is	  not	  able	  to	  switch	  her	  attention	  intentionally	  from	  outwards	  to	  inwards	  in	  a	  reliable	  way.	  The	  subject	  shifts	  her	  attention	  inward	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  knowledge	  of	  the	  object	  which	  is	  herself.	  The	  subject	   might	   turn	   her	   attention	   to	   her	   whole	   body	   without	   identifying	   or	  discriminating	  the	  object.	  If	  the	  subject	  is	  able	  to	  gain	  knowledge	  through	  these	  ways	  of	  knowing	  of	  herself	  as	  herself	  then	  she	  has	  to	  know	  that	  it	  is	  of	  herself.	  If	  the	  subject	  did	  not	  know	  that	  she	  is	  paying	  attention	  to	  herself	  then	  she	  would	  not	   be	   able	   to	   gain	   knowledge	   through	   these	   ways	   of	   knowing	   of	   herself	   as	  herself.	  Yet	  it	  seems	  that	  a	  subject	  is	  able	  to	  gain	  knowledge	  of	  herself	  as	  herself	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through	  these	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Let	  me	  make	  a	  remark	  about	  subjectless	  views	  like	  Anscombe’s	  view	  before	  answering	  Anscombe’s	  challenge.	  	  
6.5.	  Troubles	  for	  the	  subjectless	  views	  of	  ‘I’?	  On	  some	  subjectless	  views	  of	  self-­‐ascription	  all	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	  subjectless	  (e.g.	  Anscombe,	  Lichtenberg).	  For	  all	   subjectless	   judgements	   (“It	   is	   raining”	  or	  “It	  is	  snowing”)	  there	  cannot	  be	  mistakes	  of	  misidentification.	  A	  dummy	  subject	  like	   ‘it’	   does	   not	   afford	  misidentification.	   If	   self-­‐ascriptions	   are	   all	   subjectless	  then	  all	  of	  them	  should	  to	  be	  immune.	  	  This	   is	  not	   the	  case.	  Only	  some	  self-­‐ascriptions	  are	   immune,	  but	  not	  all	  of	  them.	  Thus	   these	   subjectless	   views	  of	   ‘I’	   cannot	   explain	  why	   some	  but	  not	   all	  self-­‐ascriptions	   are	   immune.	   This	   counts	   as	   an	   additional	   reason	   for	   not	  accepting	  such	  subjectless	  views.	  However,	  subjectless	  views	  are	  untenable	  for	  several	  other	  commonly	  discussed	  reasons.129	  	  
6.6.	  Returning	  to	  Anscombe’s	  challenge	  To	   answer	   Anscombe’s	   challenge	   we	   have	   to	   look	   at	   what	   introspection	  requires.	   Introspection	   is	   only	   a	   way	   of	   knowing	   for	   the	   subject	   of	   her	   own	  thoughts,	  desires,	  wishes,	  hopes,	  and	  intentions	  and	  generally	  about	  her	  mental	  attitudes	  and	  the	  content	  of	  her	  thoughts.	  According	  to	  the	  Simple	  View,	  in	  the	  sensory	   deprivation	   tank	   the	   subject	   only	   knows	   of	   herself	   through	  introspection	  while	   other	   ways	   of	   knowing	   are	   shut	   off.	   It	   is	   plausible	   that	   I	  know	   of	   the	   content	   of	   my	   thoughts	   and	   know	   that	   they	   are	   my	   thoughts	  through	  introspection.	  There	   is	  something	  special	   in	   the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank.	   I	   typically	  can	  attend	  to	  the	  world	  or	  to	  myself.	  I	  am	  usually	  in	  a	  position	  to	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	   external	   ways	   of	   knowing	   (vision,	   audition,	   touch)	   or	   to	   internal	   ways	   of	  knowing	   (introspection,	   proprioception).130	  In	   order	   to	   employ	   introspection	  one	  has	  to	  direct	  one’s	  attention	  inward	  and	  thereby	  to	  oneself.	  This	  capacity	  to	  
knowingly	   turn	   our	   attention	   inward	   (endogenously)	   requires	   having	   the	  
                                                129	  I	  find	  it	  plausible	  that	  the	  subjectless	  views	  (where	  ‘I’	  is	  not	  a	  referring	  term)	  are	  untenable	  (Harcourt	  2000,	  Campbell	  2004,	  Peacocke	  2008).	  	  130	  One	   might	   turn	   her	   attention	   outward	   and	   to	   herself.	   Looking	   at	   my	   hand	   or	   my	   mirror	  image	  is	  a	  case	  of	  this.	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implicit	  knowledge	  that	  one	  knows	  of	  herself	  through	  these	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  In	  the	   deprivation	   tank	   this	   attentional	   switch	   is	   unnecessary	   because	   no	   other	  option	   is	   available	   to	   the	   subject.	   One	   should	   not	   expect	   the	   subject	   to	  discriminate,	   to	   identify,	   to	  recognise	  or	  single	  out	  an	  object	   in	   the	  perceptual	  field	  when	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  is	  not	  a	  perceptual	  faculty,	  like	  introspection131,	  or	  when	  it	  is	  a	  unique	  object	  perceptual	  faculty	  like	  proprioception.132	  	  	  
6.7.	  How	  could	  I	  have	  direct	  acquaintance	  in	  the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank?	  It	   is	   only	   fair	   to	   ask	   the	   following	   question.	   How	   could	   introspection,	   for	   the	  subject,	   provide	   direct	   acquaintance	   with	   herself?	   Although	   the	   switch	   of	  attention	   from	   internal	   to	   external	   way	   of	   knowing	   is	   not	   possible	   in	   the	  sensory	   deprivation	   tank,	   introspection	   is	   still	   available	   to	   the	   subject.	   One	  might	   employ	   her	   memory	   or	   her	   introspection.	   This	   ability	   to	   switch	   from	  direct	  acquaintance	  to	  memory	  might	  be	  crucial	  in	  understanding	  how	  one	  can	  directly	   know	   of	   the	   object	   which	   she	   is.	   This	   switch	   would	   not	   be	   possible	  unless	  one	  knows	  how	  one	  knows	  of	  herself.	  What	  enables	   the	   subject	   to	  use	  introspection	   is	   the	   ability	   to	   know	   that	   she	   knows	   of	   herself	   through	  introspection.	   Having	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing	   enable	   us	   to	   be	   directly	  acquainted	  with	  ourselves.	  	  
                                                131	  If	   introspection	   were	   a	   perceptual	   faculty	   then	   it	   should	   be	   understood	   on	   our	   model	   of	  proprioception.	  In	  this	  case	  what	  I	  hold	  for	  proprioception	  would	  be	  applicable	  to	  introspection.	  132	  Let	  me	  raise	  a	  worry	  about	  deprivation	  tanks.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  a	  subject	  in	  the	  deprivation	  tank	  is	  able	  to	  know	  ever	  that	  she	  is	  awake	  after	  long	  immersion.	  The	  subject	  might	  not	  be	  able	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  because	  the	  shift	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  ways	  of	  knowing	  is	  not	  possible.	  The	  ability	   to	   shift	   between	   internal	   and	   external	   ways	   of	   knowing	   might	   be	   critical	   to	   staying	  awake.	  Anecdotal	  reports	  from	  sensory	  deprivation	  tanks	  in	  currently	  in	  use	  (where	  one	  floats	  in	  a	  fluid	  in	  the	  dark	  in	  silence)	  claim	  that	  subjects	  start	  to	  lose	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  awake;	  they	  are	  unable	   to	  distinguish	  whether	   they	   are	   awake	  or	  dreaming.	   It	   could	   feel	   like	  being	   in	   the	  Matrix	  when	  one	  does	  not	  know	  whether	  she	  is	  dreaming	  or	  not.	  This	  needs	  empirical	  support.	  Experiments	   are	   needed	   to	   establish	   this	   by	   recording	   brain	   activity	   during	   deprivation.	   It	  might	   turn	   out	   that	   we	   need	   external	   ways	   of	   knowing	   to	   know	   that	   we	   are	   awake	   and	  distinguish	   it	   from	   dreaming.	   In	   light	   of	   new	   empirical	   evidence	   it	   might	   turn	   out	   that	   the	  subject	  is	  not	  able	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  in	  the	  sensory	  deprivation	  tank	  because	  she	  loses	  the	  capacity	  to	  be	  sure	   that	   she	   is	   awake	   –	   after	   a	   certain	   extended	   period	   of	   immersion.	   This	   would	   provide	  further	  support	  for	  my	  claim	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  attention	  shift	  from	  internal	  to	  external	  ways	  of	  knowing	  is	  important	  for	  understanding	  how	  we	  know	  of	  ourselves.	  The	  capacity	  to	  employ	  introspection	   may	   require	   that	   the	   subject	   is	   in	   fact	   able	   to	   shift	   attention	   from	   internal	   to	  external	  ways	  of	  knowing.	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7.	  Objection	  7:	  	  
The	  Wrong	  Object	  Objection	  to	  direct	  acquaintance	  According	   to	   the	   Simple	  View	  only	   the	   exposed	  object	   can	  be	  known	   through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  and	  the	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  for	  this	  object.	  A	  possible	  objection	  against	  the	  Simple	  View	  is	  to	  show	  that	  the	  subject	  might	  only	  think	  she	  knows	  of	  the	  exposed	  object	  from	  the	  inside	  when	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  	  
7.1.	  Strawson	  and	  Dennett	  I	  will	   first	   describe	   two	   thought	   experiments	   and	   then	   show	  why	   the	   Simple	  View	   escapes	   the	   difficulty	   raised	   by	   them.	   In	   the	   first	   thought	   experiment,	  Strawson	   (in	   the	   chapter	   ‘Persons’	   in	   Individuals)	   describes	   a	   scenario	  where	  each	  of	  the	  senses,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  brain,	  are	  placed	  in	  different	  bodies.	  There	  are	  5	  different	  bodies	  for	  the	  5	  senses	  and	  1	  additional	  body	  for	  the	  brain.	  Content	  from	  all	  senses	  is	  transferred	  to	  the	  brain	  with	  some	  transmitters.	  The	  bodies,	  where	  the	  senses	  and	  the	  brain	  are	  placed,	  are	  in	  6	  indistinguishable	  segments	  of	  our	  world.	  There	  is	  no	  seeming	  difference	  or	  mismatch	  between	  what	  one	  or	  the	   other	   sense	   gains	   in	   terms	   of	   information	   (even	   though	   they	   are	  experienced	   through	  different	  bodies).	   From	   the	   subject’s	   point	   of	   view,	   from	  the	  inside,	  everything	  is	  indistinguishable	  from	  a	  case	  when	  all	  the	  senses	  are	  in	  one	  body.	   I	  can	  add	  a	  7th	  body	  and	  rewire	   the	  subject’s	  proprioception	   to	   this	  body.	  We	  should	  place	  it	  into	  a	  new	  indistinguishable	  segment	  of	  our	  world.	  The	  subject	  receives	  information	  from	  the	  7	  bodies	  and	  everything	  seems	  to	  him	  as	  it	  seems	  to	  us.	  The	  subject	  is	  ignorant	  about	  all	  of	  these	  rewirings.	  Let	  us	  forget	  about	  the	  feasibility	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  these	  arrangements	  and	  suppose	  no	  error	  in	  the	  design	  or	  in	  the	  synchronisation	  occurs.	  	  If	  my	  intention	  cannot	  seemingly	  control	  what	  is	  happening	  I	  would	  figure	  out	   that	   something	   is	   illusory.	   So	   let	  me	  add	   that	  all	  7	  bodies	  move	  when	   the	  imaginary	   subject	   wants	   his	   body	   to	   move	   in	   exactly	   the	   same	   manner.	  Assuming	  no	  mistake	  happens	  everything	  will	  look	  the	  same	  as	  the	  usual	  set	  up	  with	  a	  unique	  body.	  	  The	  question	  will	  be	  how	  such	  a	  subject	  can	  use	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  exposed	  object.	  It	  seems	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  object	  which	  is	  available	  to	  her	  and	  which	  seems	  to	   be	   the	   exposed	   object.	   Introspection	   and	   proprioception	   provide	   different	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bodies.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   rules	   governing	   the	   use	   of	   ‘I’	   and	   the	   use	   of	  demonstratives	  for	  such	  creatures	  cannot	  be	  as	  it	  is	  for	  us.	  	  In	  Dennett’s	   imaginary	   scenario	   (from	   “Where	  am	   I?”),	   there	   is	   a	  brain	   in	  the	  vat	  (Dennett’s	  brain)	  and	  the	  body	  controlled	  by	  it.	  The	  body	  is	  miles	  away	  from	   the	   brain.	   Dennett’s	   brain	   in	   the	   vat	   controls	   a	   remote	   body	   by	   a	  sophisticated	   sustaining	   system	   and	   information	   channels	   between	   them.	  (Imagine	   an	   elaborate	   secret	   operation	   of	   the	   kind	   to	   save	   the	   world	   that	   is	  often	   seen	   on	  movie	   screens;	   think	   of	   this	   as	   happening	   in	   reality.	  When	   the	  body	   explodes	   because	   it	   is	   inevitable	   in	   this	   hazardous	   operation,	   then	   the	  brain	  will	  be	  hooked	  up	  with	  the	  next	  body.)	  	  Remember	   that	  we	   are	   supposing	   that	   in	   both	   cases	   (Dennett,	   Strawson)	  the	  subject	  is	  ignorant	  about	  what	  is	  happening	  with	  her.	  	  The	  difficulties	  for	  the	  Simple	  View,	  raised	  by	  the	  two	  thought	  experiments,	  are	   similar.	   It	   only	   seems	   to	   the	   subject	   that	   she	   gains	   knowledge	   from	   the	  inside	  (though	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing)	  when	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  It	  only	  appears	   to	   the	   subject	   that	   she	   knows	   of	   the	   exposed	   object	   through	  proprioception,	  but	   this	   is	   a	  mistake.	  There	   is	  no	  unique	  non-­‐scattered	  object	  which	   is	   the	   exposed	   object.	  When	  we	   think	   of	   a	   singular	   referring	   term	  we	  think	  about	  a	  unique	  object	  which	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  such	  a	  term.	  	  	  
7.2.	  Could	  the	  patterns	  of	  inference	  for	  uses	  of	  referring	  expressions	  be	  
intact	  in	  Strawson’s	  and	  Dennett’s	  case?	  Could	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  be	  
used?	  It	  is	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  have	  fixed	  inference	  rules	  and	  refers	  to	  a	  particular	   physical	   object	   (Campbell	   2002,	   2004).	   A	   singular	   referring	   term	  refers	   to	   a	   particular	   object	   and	   enables	   us	   to	   make	   inferences	   and	   gather	  knowledge.	  According	  to	  the	  fixed	  reference	  rules,	  from	  ‘Fa’	  and	  ‘Ga’	   it	   follows	  ‘Fa	  and	  Ga’.	  When	  one	  thinks	  ‘Bog	  (a	  dog)	  is	  black’	  and	  of	  the	  same	  dog	  ‘Bog	  is	  barking’,	   it	   follows	   that	   ‘Bog	   is	   black	   and	   barking’.	  When	   there	   is	   a	   dog	   in	   a	  location	  and	  I	  see	  and	  hear	   it	   then	  I	  am	  entitled	  to	  think	  of	   it	  as	  the	  same	  dog	  unless	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary.	  	  Referring	  expressions	  including	  ‘I’	  cannot	  be	  used	  in	  such	  situations	  if	  they	  cannot	  follow	  fixed	  inference	  patterns	  which	  are	  necessary	  for	  uses	  of	  them.	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However,	  if	  I	  were	  Strawson’s	  puppet	  if	  I	  see	  and	  hear	  a	  dog	  barking	  in	  the	  same	   location,	   then	   the	   default	   entitlement	   cannot	   be	   that	   I	   see	   and	  hear	   the	  same	  dog.	  This	  would	  be	  a	  mistake.	  Vision	  and	  audition	  are	  in	  different	  bodies	  in	  different	  segments	  of	  our	  world.	  Thus	  the	  dogs,	  the	  one	  viewed	  and	  the	  one	  heard,	  are	  always	  different.133	  I	  never	  ever	  can	  see	  and	  hear	   the	   same	  dog	   in	  such	   scenarios.	   Consequently,	   the	   inference	   rules	   seem	   invalid	   for	   Strawson’s	  puppet.	  What	  we	  think	  about	  reference	  would	  be	  violated	  in	  these	  scenarios.	  For	  example,	  from	  ‘I	  see	  my	  nose’	  and	  ‘I	  touch	  my	  nose’,	  I	  should	  be	  able	  to	  infer	  that	  ‘I	  touch	  my	  nose	  which	  I	  see’.	  Vision	  and	  touch	  are	  in	  different	  bodies.	  Thus,	   for	   Strawson’s	   case	   what	   I	   see	   and	   what	   I	   touch	   are	   always	   different	  objects.	  	  When	  I	  claim	  I	  hear,	  touch	  and	  see	  myself	  then	  I	  will	  hear	  see	  and	  touch	  3	  different	  bodies	  and	  my	  cognition	  will	  be	  on	  the	  4th	  body.	  It	  seems	  I	  would	  use	  ‘I’	  for	  random	  objects.	  Uses	  of	  ‘I’	  could	  not	  have	  GRR	  or	  IEM.	  	  Thus	  Strawson’s	  puppet	  could	  only	  use	  ‘I*’	  (some	  term	  that	  has	  a	  superficial	  resemblance	   to	   ‘I’	   but	   is	   distinct),	   but	   not	   ‘I’.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   the	  puppet’s	   use	   of	   ‘I*’	   does	   not	   allow	   for	   inferences,	  which	  we	   take	   for	   granted.	  This	  again	  violates	  basic	  inference	  rules.	  	  In	  sum,	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  Strawson’s	  puppet	  can	  use	  ‘I’	  if	  ‘I’	  is	  a	  referring	  term	  referring	  to	  a	  particular	  object.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  use	  of	  ‘I’*	  in	  Strawson-­‐like	  situations	  has	  the	  rules	  or	  epistemic	  constraints	  which	  are	  necessary	  for	  uses	  of	  ‘I’.	  Even	  if	  in	  this	  case	  use	  of	  ‘I’*	  cannot	  have	  the	  rules	  and	  epistemic	  constraints	  which	  our	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  has	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  clear	  that	  this	  would	  support	  that	  our	  use	  of	  ‘I’	  cannot	  have	  any	  regularity	  or	  epistemic	  constraint.	  On	  the	   contrary,	   it	   seems	   that	   Strawson’s	   puppet	   cannot	   use	   ‘I’	   only	   ‘I*’	   with	  different	  rules.	  	  Dennett’s	   puppet	   will	   self-­‐ascribe	   mental	   and	   physical	   predicates	   and	  attribute	  it	  to	  supposedly	  the	  same	  object.	  But	  in	  this	  situation	  the	  self-­‐ascribed	  mental	  (psychological)	  and	  physical	  (material)	  predicates	  cannot	  be	  true	  of	  the	  same	  object.	  One	  might	  think	  that	  ‘I*’	  (used	  in	  this	  way)	  is	  ambiguous	  (Stanley	  1998)	  and	  have	  different	  referents	  and	  this	  is	  why	  the	  inference	  does	  not	  work.	  
                                                133	  The	  dog	  which	  is	  seen	  is	  barking	  (a	  Gettier	  case	  because	  in	  the	  segments	  of	  world	  where	  the	  bodies	  are	  placed	  everything	  is	  the	  same)	  but	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  justified	  in	  thinking	  this.	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But	   then	   ‘I*’	   is	   different	   from	   ‘I’;	   for	   ‘I’	   there	   is	   no	   such	   ambiguity	   (Stanley	  1998).	  	  If	   Dennett’s	   and	   Strawson’s	   puppets	   were	   in	   a	   position	   to	   know	  what	   is	  happening	  then	  I	  think	  they	  would	  refrain	  from	  using	   ‘I’	  and	   ‘that’	   in	  a	  way	  as	  we	  use	  it.	  They	  might	  introduce	  new	  referring	  terms	  with	  new	  inference	  rules.	  If	  the	  puppets	  were	  informed	  about	  exactly	  what	  is	  happening	  then	  they	  would	  not	   think	   they	   know	  of	   the	   exposed	   object	   through	   proprioception.	   Thus	   this	  situation	  would	  not	  provide	  an	  objection	  to	  the	  Simple	  View.	  Dennett’s	  and	  Strawson’s	  case	  do	  not	  question	  the	  basic	  inference	  rules	  for	  ‘I’	  or	   ‘that’	  or	   in	  general.	  The	   inference	  rules	  are	  sufficiently	  plausible	  or	  even	  necessary	   for	   understanding	   ‘I’	   and	   demonstratives	   or	   even	   for	   the	  referentiality	  of	  referring	  terms	  (Campbell	  2002).	  Thus	  it	  seems	  using	  ‘I’	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  such	  subjects	  only	  uses	  of	  ‘I*’.	  	  However,	  it	  seems	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  I	  still	  have	  to	  consider	  whether	  it	   is	   possible	   that	   one	   knows	   of	   the	  wrong	   object	   through	   a	   purportedly	   self-­‐reflexive	  way	  of	  knowing.	  I	  will	  turn	  to	  this.	  	  
7.3.	  Rewiring	  I	  do	  not	  assume	  that	  whenever	  the	  subject	  thinks	  that	  she	  gets	   information	  of	  the	  exposed	  object	  through	  seemingly	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  then	  she,	  in	  fact,	  gets	  information	  of	  the	  exposed	  object.	  It	  might	  only	  seem	  to	  the	  subject	  that	  what	  she	  knows	  is	  of	  the	  exposed	  object.	  If	  the	  subject	  is,	  unbeknownst	  to	  herself,	  proprioceptively	  rewired	  with	  someone	  else,	  then	  it	  will	  only	  appear	  to	  the	  subject	  that	  she	  knows	  of	  herself	  through	  proprioception.	  But	  this	  cannot	  be	  unless	   the	   way	   of	   knowing	   is	   altered	   and	   loses	   its	   internality	   –	   and	   the	  proprioception	  of	  the	  other	  person,	  to	  whom	  one	  is	  rewired,	  loses	  its	  privacy.	  	  Suppose	  that	  I	  am	  rewired	  with	  Mary	  and	  I	  have	  proprioceptive	  awareness	  of	  Mary’s	  body	  and	  mine	  as	  well.	  Suppose	  that	  I	  judge	  ‘I	  have	  my	  legs	  crossed’	  –	  based	  on	  proprioception	  only.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  mistaken	  about	  which	  object	  she	  knows	  of.	  The	  subject	  uses	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  exposed	  object,	  but	  the	  object	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  the	   exposed	   object	   is	   necessarily	   the	   subject	   iff	   it	   is	   known	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing.	   But	   altered	   proprioception	   lacks	   internality.	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Proprioceptive-­‐rewiring	  is	  such	  a	  case.	  Thus,	  in	  such	  a	  situation,	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  mistaken	  about	  whether	  this	  object	  known	  through	  rewired-­‐proprioception	  is	  she	  herself.	  	  We	  should	  not	  forget	  that	  there	  is	  multisensory	  integration	  of	  information	  about	  one’s	  body	  coming	  from	  different	  modalities	  (Knoblich	  et	  al.	  2005,	  Moore,	  Wegner,	   Haggard	   2009,	   De	   Vignemont	   forthcoming,	   Wong	   forthcoming).	   My	  judgment	  is	  based	  only	  on	  proprioception.	  Multisensory	  integration	  makes	  the	  possibility	  that	  I	  might	  be	  rewired	  without	  knowing	  it	  soon	  after	  very	  unlikely.	  If	  one	  is	  rewired	  it	  will	  be	  weird.	  If	  the	  other’s	  legs	  are	  crossed,	  but	  not	  mine,	  I	  might	   see	  my	  uncrossed	   legs	   and	   feel	   legs,	  which	   are	   supposedly	  mine,	   to	   be	  crossed.	  It	  will	  be	  evident	  that	  my	  proprioception	  is	  no	  longer	  reliable,	  so,	  even	  before	   I	   realise	   this,	   my	   brain	   will	   stop	   relying	   on	   proprioception	   or	   even	  recognise	   that	   the	  channel	  provides	   information	  which	   is	  not	  about	  me.	  Thus,	  after	  the	  rewiring,	  ignorance	  about	  the	  rewiring	  is	  possible,	  but	  only	  for	  a	  very	  short	  time.	  	  Rewired-­‐proprioception	  becomes	  a	  multiple-­‐object	  way	  of	  knowing	  and	  the	  subject	  will	  be	  in	  the	  position	  to	  figure	  this	  out.	  I	  initially	  construed	  the	  modal	  force	  of	  IEM	  as	  that	  of	  epistemic	  impossibility:	  misidentification	  is	  not	  possible,	  for	  all	  the	  subject	  knows	  from	  the	  subject’s	  perspective.134	  	  (See	  the	  discussion	  of	  Strong	  Identification-­‐freedom	  in	  chapter	  6,	  part	  I.)	  Given	  that	  proprioception	  is	   rewired,	   it	   may	   be	   that	   misidentification	   is	   still	   epistemically	   impossible	  initially	  for	  the	  rewired	  subject,	  but	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  he	  will	  come	  to	  realise	  that	  proprioception	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  sole-­‐object	  faculty	  in	  a	  short	  time.	  Afterwards	  self-­‐ascription	  based	  on	  proprioception	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  immune.	  The	   Simple	  View	  deals	  with	   such	   cases	   by	   strengthening	   the	  modal	   force	  involved	   in	  IEM,	  so	  that	  error	  through	  misidentification	   is	  both	  physically	  and	  epistemically	  impossible.	  According	  to	  the	  Simple	  View,	  a	  condition	  on	  the	  IEM	  of	   self-­‐ascriptions	   is	   that	   the	   self-­‐ascription	   has	   to	   be	   based	   on	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	   It	   is	  not	  enough	  that	   the	  subject	   treats	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  as	  
                                                134	  Epistemic	  possibility	  can	  be	  understood	  on	  Edgington’s	  framework,	  or	  in	  other	  frameworks	  –	  although	  we	  prefer	  that	  epistemic	  possibility	  has	  no	  logical	  relation	  to	  physical	  possibility	  as	  Edgington	  argues.	  For	  Edgington,	  a	  thought	  that	  p	  can	  be	  epistemologically	  possible	  for	  all	  we	  know,	   even	   if	   it	   is	   –	   in	   fact	   –	   physically	   not	   possible.	   We	   remain	   neutral	   whether	   logical	  possibility	   is	   different	   in	   kind	   from	   other	   notions	   of	   possibility,	   which	   Edgington	   denies	  (Edgington	  2004).	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self-­‐reflexive	  –	  the	  way	  of	  knowing	  has	  to	  actually	  be	  self-­‐reflexive.	  So,	  in	  light	  of	  this	   condition,	   if	   a	   self-­‐ascription	  Fi	   is	  based	  on	   self-­‐reflexive	  way	  of	  knowing	  then	   the	   subject	   cannot	   misidentify	   who	   is	   F.	   Consequently	   for	   judgements	  based	   on	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing	   misidentification	   is	   physically	  impossible	  as	  well.	  	  	  
II.	  Objections	  to	  the	  Claim	  that	  the	  SV	  explains	  IEM	  	  My	  main	  strategy	  is	  to	  show	  that	  IEM	  and	  GRR	  cannot	  be	  explained	  unless	  the	  Simple	   View	   is	   correct.	   Thus	   any	   objection	   to	   the	   claim	   that	   only	   the	   Simple	  View	  can	  explain	   IEM	  is	  an	  objection	  against	   the	  credibility	  of	  our	  reasons	   for	  accepting	  the	  Simple	  View.	  I	  turn	  to	  discuss	  such	  objections.	  First	  I	  have	  to	  raise	  an	  objection	  from	  Proffitt	  and	  Shoemaker	  against	  my	  own	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  	  
8.	  Objection	  8:	  
Proffitt-­‐Shoemaker	  Objection	  One	  may	   object	   (as	   the	   psychologist	   Dennis	   Proffitt	   did	   in	   response	   to	  me	   in	  conversation)	  to	  the	  claim	  that	   immune	  self-­‐ascription	  could	  only	  be	  based	  on	  
solely	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  ‘I	  am	  out	  of	  balance’	  is	  based	  partially	  on	  visual	  clues	  (in	  Proffitt’s	  theory	  it	  is	  mainly	  based	  on	  visual	  flow	  –	  the	  change	  of	  visual	   angle	   and	   size	   of	   objects	   related	   to	   the	   subject’s	  movement).	   Similarly,	  Shoemaker	  might	   object	   that	   ‘I	   see	   a	   canary’	   is	   immune	   based	   on	   vision	   and	  introspection	  –	  as	  this	  is	  one	  of	  his	  examples	  of	  IEM.	  This	  is	  a	  pressing	  objection	  against	   the	   thought	   that	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   (B)	   is	   immune	   iff	   it	   is	  based	  only	   on	  self-­‐reflexive	  way	  of	  knowing.	  	  The	  answer	  is	  as	  follows,	  when	  I	  integrate	  visual	  clues	  and	  gain	  the	  content	  	  ‘I	   am	  out	   of	   balance’,	   the	   visual	   content	  which	   I	   gain	   through	  vision	  need	  not	  involve	  the	  subject.	  There	  are	  two	  possibilities:	  either	  I	  see	  myself	  or	  not.	  If	  the	  visual	   content	   includes	   the	   subject	   as	   a	  visible	  element	   then	   I	   can	  misidentify	  who	   is	   out	   of	   balance.	   In	   this	   case	   my	   judgment	   is	   not	   based	   only	   on	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  The	  one	  whom	  I	  see	  and	  who	  is	  out	  of	  balance	  might	  not	  be	  me.	  However,	  if	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  visual	  content	  then	  the	  self-­‐
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ascription	  is	  immune.	  In	  this	  case,	  I	  do	  not	  gain	  information	  about	  who	  is	  out	  of	  balance	  through	  vision.	  	  Thus	  for	  immune	  self-­‐ascription,	  Fi,	   it	  is	  only	  required	  that	  the	  subject	  has	  to	   know	   of	   the	   object	   which	   she	   believes	   is	   F	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	  knowing.	  This	  might	  require	  a	  slight	  revision	  of	  the	  original	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  	  The	  revised	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  is	  as	  follows:	  	   	  ‘I	   am	  F’	   based	  on	  W	   is	   immune	   iff	  who	   is	  F	   is	  known	  only	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	  W.	  	  	  To	  sum	  up,	  what	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  misidentification	  is	  that	  the	  object	  to	  which	  I	  attribute	  F-­‐ness	  is	  known	  through	  non-­‐self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  But	  if	  the	  object	  to	  which	  I	  attribute	  F-­‐ness	  is	  only	  known	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	   knowing	   then	   my	   self-­‐ascription	   is	   immune.	   This	   can	   accommodate	  cases	   like	   Shoemaker’s	   example	   ‘I	   see	   a	   canary’	   where	   the	   canary	   is	   known	  through	   vision	   and	   the	   one	  who	   sees	   it	   is	   known	   through	   introspection.	   The	  visual	  content	  does	  not	  include	  the	  subject.	  Misidentification	   is	   possible	   even	   in	   this	   case	   –	   bases	   do	   matter	   for	   IEM.	  Imagine	  a	  case	  where	  the	  one	  who	  sees	  a	  canary	  first	  wins	  $999999999999.	   I	  have	  a	  pair	  of	  Google	  glasses	  showing	  where	  I	  am	  and	  whether	  I	  see	  a	  canary.	  Canaries	  are	  exceedingly	  hard	  to	   identify	  so	  I	  need	  the	  Google	  glass	  to	  tell	  me	  that	   I	   succeeded	   in	  seeing	  a	  canary.	  My	  bases	   for	  claiming	   ‘I	   see	  a	  canary’	  are	  introspection,	  vision	  and	  testimony.	  It	  may	  very	  well	  be	  that	  when	  I	  think	  I	  see	  a	  canary	   then	  someone	  else	  sees	  one	  and	  wins.	  After	  all,	  Google	  glasses	  are	  not	  infallible.	  	  
9.	  Objection	  9:	  	  
Longuenesse’s	  Objection	  If	   IEM	  of	   self-­‐ascription	   can	  be	   explained	  otherwise	   than	   I	   explain	   it	   then	  my	  argument	  for	  the	  explanatory	  advantage	  of	  the	  Simple	  View	  would	  be	  radically	  weakened.	  There	  is	  an	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  that	  I	  have	  not	  discussed	  yet.	  In	  the	  Neo-­‐Kantian	  tradition	  there	   is	  a	  distinction	  between	  self	  as	  subject	  and	  self	  as	  object.	   Beatrice	   Longuenesse	   (2012	   and	   in	   her	   forthcoming	   book)	   uses	   this	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distinction	  for	  understanding	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  Being	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  mental	   state	   is	   such	   that	   nobody	   except	   the	   subject	   can	   occupy	   that	   position.	  The	   subject	   use	  of	   ‘I’	   derives	   from	  Kant’s	  notion:	   self	   as	   subject.	  According	   to	  Kant	  all	  of	  my	  thoughts	  p1-­‐pn	  can	  be	  amended	  by	  adding:	  ‘I	  think	  that…’	  before	  them.	  Longuenesse	  unlike	  Kant	  only	  discusses	  self-­‐ascriptions	  and	  employs	  the	  notion	  of	  being	  the	  subject	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  IEM.	  	  According	   to	   her,	   owing	   to	   the	   unity	   of	   consciousness,	   the	   subject	   of	   the	  mental	  state	  or	  perception	  is	  unique.	  This	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  ‘I	  see	  that	  p’	  or	  ‘I	  think	   that	  p’.	   Such	  uses	   of	   ‘I’	   are	   called	   the	   subject	   uses	   of	   ‘I’,	  marking	   that	   it	  expresses	  who	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  mental	  state.135	  For	  predicates	  like	   ‘…think	  that	  p’,	  ‘…feel	  that	  p’	  and	  ‘…see	  that	  p’	  it	  cannot	  be	  misidentified	  who	  is	  the	  one	  in	   the	   subject	   position.	   Shoemaker’s	   example	   ‘I	   see	   a	   parrot’	   is	   explained	  similarly.	  It	  is	  immune	  because,	  for	  the	  subject,	  a	  misidentification	  of	  who	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  her	  experience	  or	  thinking	  is	  not	  possible.	  	  Longuenesse’s	  idea	  is	  that	  whenever	  I	  think	  ‘I	  think/feel/see	  that	  p’	  I	  cannot	  thereby	  be	  thinking	  that	  somebody	  else	  thinks/feels/sees	  that	  p.	  The	  notion	  of	  the	   subject	   and	   the	   apprehension	   of	   ‘I’	   cannot	   come	   into	   existence	   without	  presupposing	   the	   unity	   of	   consciousness.	   So,	   because	   of	   the	   unity	   of	  consciousness,	   the	  subject	   is	   in	  a	  position	   to	  know	  that	   she	   is	   the	  subject	  and	  nobody	   else	   can	   be	   in	   that	   position.	   For	   such	   a	   view	   the	   specification	   of	   the	  basis	  on	  which	  I	  judge	  that	  I	  am	  the	  subject	  seems	  not	  to	  be	  necessary.	  This	  is	  because	  for	  the	  subject	  the	  predicate	  itself	  (thinking/perceiving)	  and	  the	  unity	  of	   consciousness	   ensure	   that	   the	   subject	   cannot	   be	   misidentified.	   This	   is	   the	  core	  of	  how	  Longuenesse	  explains	  the	  IEM	  of	  mental	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  This	  view	  seems	  to	  have	  some	  plausibility.	  If	  this	  were	  the	  correct	  explanation	  of	  IEM	  then	  we	  do	  not	  need	  the	  Simple	  View	  and	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  judgment	  would	  be	  irrelevant	  for	  that	  kind	  of	  (mental)	  IEM.	   (Longuenesse	   allows	   another	   kind	   of	   IEM	   which	   is	   weaker	   and	   basis	  matters.)	  Consequently,	  this	  would	  undermine	  our	  strategy	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  SV.	  However,	  this	  view	  has	  some	  difficulties.	  Consider	  the	  next	  example!	  I	  judge	  	  ‘I	   see	  myself	   in	   the	   mirror’.	   There	   are	   two	   occurrences	   of	   ‘I’;	   the	   second	   is	  
                                                135	  The	  self	  as	  subject	   in	  Kant	   is	  different	   from	  Wittgenstein’s	  notion:	   ‘I’	  used	  as	  a	  subject.	  For	  Wittgenstein	  we	  have	  to	  have	  a	  self-­‐ascription	  but	  not	  for	  Kant.	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‘myself’.136	  Usually	   we	   were	   interested	   in	   ‘the	   one	   whom	   I	   see’,	   the	   second	  occurrence	  of	   ‘I’.	   Let	  us	   set	  aside	   the	  second	  occurrence.	  We	  are	   interested	   in	  whether	  ‘the	  one	  who	  sees	  me’	  can	  be	  misidentified	  (the	  first	  occurrence	  of	  ‘I’).	  This	   ascribes	   being	   the	   subject	   and	   such	   according	   to	   Longuenesse	   has	   to	   be	  immune.	   According	   to	   Peacocke	   (2008)	   and	   Longuenesse	   only	   the	   second	  occurrence	  (‘myself’)	   can	  be	  misidentified,	   the	   first	  cannot	  be.	  But,	   in	   fact,	   the	  one	   who	   sees	   me	   (1st	   occurrence)	   can	   be	   misidentified.	   If	   I	   am	   looking	   at	  someone	  in	  the	  mirror	  and	  think	  that	  I	  am	  that	  one,	  then	  she	  has	  to	  look	  at	  me	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  I	  look	  at	  her.	  Consequently,	  if	  I	  am	  not	  seeing	  myself	  then	  it	  is	  someone	  else	  who	  I	  see	  in	  the	  mirror	  and	  who	  sees	  me	  in	  the	  mirror.	  If	  I	  see	  someone	  else,	   e.g.:	  Dorothea,	   then	   the	  one	  whom	  I	   see,	  Dorothea,	   looks	  at	  me	  through	  the	  mirror	  and	  sees	  me.	  She	   is	   the	  subject	  of	  her	  seeing	  me.	  Thus	  the	  one	  who	  sees	  me	  can	  be	  misidentified	  on	  this	  basis	  vision.	  	  Longuenesse	  may	  respond	  by	  claiming	  that	  this	  is	  not	  subject	  use	  of	  ‘I’.	  But	  then	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  when	  we	  have	  a	  subject	  use	  of	  ‘I’.	  If	  this	  is	  not	  a	  subject	  use	  of	  ‘I’	   then	   for	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   like	   ‘I	   see	  myself	   in	   the	  mirror’	   we	   need	   further	  information	  to	  decide	  when	  and	  how	  it	  counts	  as	  a	  subject	  use	  of	  ‘I’.	  The	  ‘I	  see…’	  seems	  to	  be	  insufficient	  to	  decide	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  subject	  use	  of	  ‘I’.	  However,	  this	  was	  assumed	  in	  the	  setup	  of	  her	  view.	  	  Longuenesse	  might	  reply	  that	  knowing	  who	  sees	  me	  in	  the	  mirror	  when	  it	  is	   the	  subject	  use	  of	   ‘I’	   is	  based	  on	  introspection	  and	  vision.	  But	  knowing	  who	  sees	  me	  in	  the	  mirror	  when	  it	  is	  someone	  else	  is	  based	  only	  on	  vision.	  I	  am	  not	  sure.	  But	  this	  might	  be	  the	  case.	  If	  this	  is	  right	  then	  not	  only	  the	  subject	  position	  matters	   but	   the	   basis	   as	   well.	   We	   agree	   on	   this	   point.	   But	   according	   to	   my	  explanation,	  what	  matters	   is	  whether	   I	   know	  based	   on	   vision	  who	  sees	  me.	   If	  yes,	   then	   misidentification	   can	   happen.	   But	   then	   my	   view	   seems	   to	  accommodate	  the	  data	  better;	  basis	  matters	  and	  the	  basis	  has	  to	  be	  specified.	  Longuenesse	   might	   offer	   that	   for	   each	   self-­‐ascription	   and	   even	   for	   all	  thoughts	   there	   is	   a	   thought	   ‘I	   think	   (as	   an	   agent)	   that	   p’.	   This	   might	   be	  something	   which	   we	   are	   able	   to	   know	   based	   on	   introspection.	   These	  attributions	   seem	   to	  be	   immune,	  but	   I	  would	  worry	   that	   they	  are	   infallible	  as	  well.	  There	  are	  two	  worries.	  (i)	  	  ‘I	  think…’	  (where	  ‘think’	  means	  being	  the	  agent	  
                                                136	  I	  follow	  Peacocke	  in	  assuming	  that	  ‘myself’	  is	  an	  occurrence	  of	  ‘I’	  (Peacocke	  2008).	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of	  the	  thinking)	  can	  be	  attached	  to	  any	  thought,	  not	  only	  to	  self-­‐ascriptions,	  (ii)	  following	  this	  procedure	  the	  thought	  ‘I	  think	  that	  p’	  will	  be	  infallible.	  Infallibility	  will	  become	  the	  explanatory	  target.	  From	  infallibility	  IEM	  follows.	  (This	  violates	  the	  self-­‐sufficiency	  principle	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  5;	   IEM	  becomes	  a	  derivative	  feature.)	  	  Longuenesse	   distinguishes	   mental	   and	   bodily	   self-­‐ascriptions	   and	   argues	  that	  mental	   self-­‐ascriptions	   have	   a	   stronger	   IEM.	   Yet	   there	   is	   a	   gap	   between	  whether	   infallibility	  or	   immunity	  matters.	  Why	  would	   IEM	  be	   the	  explanatory	  target	  when	  it	  only	  follows	  from	  infallibility?	  	  	  
10.	  Objection	  10: 
Is	  it	  possible	  to	  use	  ‘I’	  without	  having	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing?	  	  	  I	  have	   to	  settle	  one	   last	  objection	  which	  some	  might	  raise	  at	   this	  point.	  There	  could	   be	   a	   creature	  without	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	   knowing,	   but	   this	   creature	  seems	   to	   be	   able	   to	   use	   ‘I’.	   This	   creature	   is	   able	   to	   take	   care	   of	   itself;	   the	  creature	  de	  re	  knows	  of	  itself	  and	  is	  not	  under	  systematic	  delusion/error.	  This	  is	  an	  objection	  because	  it	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  Simple	  View.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  this	  creature	  only	  seems	  to	  be	  able	  to	  use	  ‘I’,	  but	  effectively	  it	   cannot	   use	   ‘I’.	   They	   can	   only	   use	   a	   referring	   term	  which	   is	   a	   proper	   name	  because	  it	  lacks	  GRR.	  Let	  us	  consider	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  Anscombe’s	  thought	  experiment	  about	   ‘A’-­‐users	  (Anscombe	  1975).	   ‘A’	   is	  a	  referring	  term	  similar	  to	  ‘I’	  but	  its	  reference	  is	  fixed	  differently.	  ‘A’	  purports	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  subject	  but	  in	  the	   following	  way.	  The	   ‘A’-­‐user	  uses	   ‘A’	  only	   for	   the	   foreshortened	  object	   that	  the	  user	   sees	  when	  she	   looks	  down.	   ‘A’-­‐users	   cannot	  use	   ‘I’	   and	  only	  know	  of	  their	  body	  by	  perceptual	  observation	  or	  testimony.	   I	  add	  that	   they	  cannot	  use	  ‘A’	   for	   the	   object	   they	   know	   through	   proprioception	   and	   other	   self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  They	  are	  deprived	  of	  all	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.137	  	  ‘A’-­‐users	  do	  not	  know	  of	  the	  exposed	  object	   from	  the	  inside.	  One	  could	  be	  mistaken	   about	  whom	  one	   sees.	   Thus,	   ‘A’-­‐users	   can	  be	  mistaken	   about	  which	  object	  they	  use	   ‘A’	  to	  refer	  to.	   If	  an	   ‘A’-­‐user	   looks	  down	  she	  might	  see	  another	  body	  than	  her	  own	  body.	  Such	  a	  subject	  knows	  through	  multiple-­‐object	  ways	  of	  
                                                137	  According	  to	  Anscombe	  proprioception	  is	  non-­‐observational	  but	  ‘A’-­‐users	  would	  become	  ‘I’-­‐users	  if	  they	  were	  using	  ‘I’	  for	  the	  exposed	  object.	  Thus	  we	  have	  to	  rule	  this	  out.	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1.	  The	  Simple	  View	  I	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   Simple	   View	   provides	   the	   most	   fundamental	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  of	   ‘I’	   is	   fixed.	   I	  will	   rehearse	   the	  basics	  of	  the	  Simple	  View.	  According	  to	  the	  Simple	  View	  the	  subject	  knows	  of	  the	  object,	  which	   she	   is,	   through	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing.	   Self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	  knowing	  satisfy	  privacy,	  unicity	  and	  internality	  (chapter	  8).	  	  The	  first	  constraint,	  privacy,	  is	  a	  constraint	  on	  a	  kind	  of	  way	  of	  knowing	  W.	  It	   ensures	   that	   only	   the	   subject	   can	   gain	   knowledge	   of	   the	   particular	   state	   of	  affair	   in	   question	   through	   this	   kind	   of	   way	   of	   knowing	   W.	   For	   example,	  proprioception	  only	  provides	  content	  about	  the	  subject.	  Thus	  proprioception	  is	  a	  private	  way	  of	  knowing	  relative	  to	  all	  contents	  which	  can	  be	  gained	  through	  this	  kind	  of	  W.	  The	  second	  constraint,	  unicity,	  is	  a	  constraint	  on	  a	  kind	  of	  W	  ensuring	  that	  only	  a	  single	  object	  can	  be	  known	  through	  this	  kind	  of	  W.	  The	  third	  constraint,	  internality,	  is	  a	  constraint	  on	  a	  channel	  of	  information.	  It	  ensures	  that	  X	  receives	  information	  of	  X	  –	  while	  X	  might	  refer	  to	  a	  group,	  an	  individual,	  or	  parts	  of	  the	  organism.	   Some	   channels	   of	   information	   of	   the	   subject	   are	  ways	   of	   knowing.	  Proprioception,	   kinaesthesia,	   nociception	   and	   introspection	   are	   the	   most	  obvious	   examples	   of	   self-­‐reflexive	   channels	   of	   information	  which	   are	  ways	   of	  knowing.	  The	  object	  which	   is	  known	   though	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	   is	  necessarily	   the	   subject.	   Self-­‐reflexive	  ways	   of	   knowing	   satisfy	   privacy,	   unicity	  and	  internality.	  Privacy	  ensures	  that	  such	  a	  way	  of	  knowing	  is	  only	  available	  for	  the	   subject,	   S.	   Unicity	   requires	   that	   only	   a	   unique	   object	   Q	   can	   be	   known	  through	   it;	   and	   internality	   ensures	   that	   S=Q.	   Thus,	   necessarily	   the	   subject,	   S,	  knows	  of	  S	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  Consequently,	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  only	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  known.	  	  The	   subject	   is	   not	   yet	   in	   a	   position	   to	   know	   that	   she	   knows	   of	   herself	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  But	  such	  contents	  which	  are	  acquired	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing	  have	  self-­‐significance	  before	  the	  subject	  
 217	  
acquires	   the	   mastery	   of	   the	   first-­‐person	   pronoun.	   When	   content	   has	   self-­‐significance	  then	  the	  subject	  has	  a	  disposition	  to	  act	  in	  a	  self-­‐directed	  manner,	  e.g.	  when	  it	  feeds	  itself	  (X	  acts	  on	  X).	  	  When	   I	   say	   ‘I	   combed	  my	  hair’	   the	  action	   is	   self-­‐directed.	  Eating,	  drinking	  and	   scratching	   have	   a	   self-­‐directed	   structure	   (X	   act	   on	   X).	   Feeling	   hungry,	  thirsty,	  or	   itchy	  dispose	   the	  subject	   to	  act	  on	   the	  subject	  –	   it	   is	  a	  selection	   for	  self-­‐directed	   action.	   The	   first-­‐person	   pronoun	   is	   used	   for	   the	   exposed	   object	  which	  one	  knows	  from	  the	   inside	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  The	  subject	  may	  use	  her	  own	  proper	  name	   for	   the	  exposed	  object,	  but	   the	  subject	  might	  make	  a	  mistake	  whose	  name	  it	  is.	  In	  contrast,	  mistake	  concerning	  which	  object	   the	   subject	   uses	   ‘I’	   for	   is	   not	   possible.	   The	   exposed	   object	   (known	  through	  self-­‐reflexive	  ways	  of	  knowing)	  is	  necessarily	  the	  subject.	  ‘I’	  is	  used	  for	  this	  object.	  	  	  
2.	  The	  Referentiality-­‐test	  It	   is	  easy	  to	  propose	  a	  view.	  What	  is	  hard	  is	  deciding	  whether	  it	   is	  correct.	  My	  strategy	  was	   to	  use	   the	  Reference-­‐fixing	   test	   from	  Peacocke	   (2008	  and	  2012)	  and	  Campbell	  (2012)	  to	  test	  the	  Simple	  View.	  The	  idea	  is	  straightforward.	  If	  we	  wish	  to	  have	  a	  theory	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  is	  fixed,	  then	  this	  should	  account	  for	  all	  essential	  features	  of	  the	  uses	  of	  the	  ‘I’.	  If	  uses	  of	  ‘I’	  have	  essential	   features,	   like	  GRR,	  and	  some	  self-­‐ascriptions	  being	   IEM,	   then	  the	   reference-­‐fixing	   rule	   for	   ‘I’	   cannot	   be	   such	   that	   it	   renders	   an	   essential	  feature	  to	  be	  contingent.	  Thus	  the	  reference-­‐fixing	  rule	  cannot	  allow	  a	  failure	  of	  GRR.	  	  The	   explanation	   of	   IEM	   teaches	   us	   that	   IEM	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   how	   a	  singular	   term’s	   reference	   is	   fixed	  and	  how	  the	  subject	  gains	  knowledge	  of	   the	  object	  which	   is	   the	  referent	  (chapters	  1,	  4,	  6,	  7).	  The	  reason	  we	  have	   immune	  thought,	  Fa	  (W),	   is,	   I	  suggest,	   that	  a’s	  reference	   is	   fixed	  through	  W.	  I	  provided	  several	  reasons	  for	  accepting	  that	  first-­‐person	  IEM	  and	  demonstrative	  IEM	  are	  different	  kinds	  of	  IEM	  (chapter	  6).	  However	  what	  accounts	  for	  their	  differences	  are	  the	  differences	  in	  their	  reference	  fixing-­‐rule	  (chapter	  9).	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3.	  Passing	  the	  Referentiality-­‐test	  My	   positive	   argument	   for	   the	   Simple	   View	   is	   to	   show	   that	   it	   passes	   the	  Referentiality-­‐test.	  The	  Simple	  View	  enables	  us	  to	  account	  for	  how	  a	  guarantee	  against	   incorrect	   reference	   is	   possible	   (chapter	   9).	   The	   guarantee	   against	  incorrect	   reference	   requires	   that	   the	   subject	   cannot	   intend	   to	   use	   ‘I’	   for	   the	  wrong	  object;	  the	  intended	  and	  the	  semantic	  referent	  of	   ‘I’	  cannot	  be	  different	  (chapter	  2).	  At	  first	  sight	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  impossible	  –	  or	  even	  mystical.	  For	  all	  singular	  referring	  terms	  it	  seems	  I	  could	  be	  ignorant	  about	  what	  its	  referent	  is	  except	   for	  my	  use	  of	   the	  first-­‐person	  pronoun.	   If	   the	  subject	  did	  not	  use	   ‘I’	   for	  the	  exposed	  object	  then	  nothing	  could	  explain	  what	  excludes	  such	  a	  mistake.	  	  The	  Simple	  View	  also	  enables	  us	  to	  account	  for	  how	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  made	  on	  a	  certain	  basis	  is	  possible.	  I	  argued	  that	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  is	  basis-­‐relative	   (chapters	   3-­‐4)	  which	   allows	   that	   the	   basis	   (way	   of	   knowing)	   plays	   a	  role	   in	   the	   reference-­‐fixing	   of	   ‘I’.	   Made	   on	   a	   certain	   basis,	   a	   self-­‐ascription	   is	  immune	   because	   this	   is	   one	   of	   the	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing	   and	   the	  referent	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed	  through	  such	  ways	  of	  knowing	  (chapter	  9).	  The	  basis,	  way	  of	  knowing,	  is	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  TRR	  for	  ‘I’,	  thus	  it	  is	  not	  possible	   that	   the	   TRR	   for	   ‘I’	   can	   explain	  why	   IEM	   of	   self-­‐ascriptions	   is	   basis-­‐relative.	  However	  the	  Simple	  View	  states	  that	  ‘I’	  is	  used	  for	  the	  object	  which	  is	  known	   thought	   self-­‐reflexive	   ways	   of	   knowing.	   Thus	   the	   Simple	   View	   can	  account	  for	  and	  would	  predict	  the	  basis-­‐relativity	  of	  the	  IEM	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions.	  	  In	  view	  of	  the	  range	  of	  aspects	  of	  the	  first	  person	  pronoun	  it	  can	  explain,	  the	  Simple	  View	  is,	  plausibly,	  the	  best	  account	  we	  have	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  of	  ‘I’	  is	  fixed.	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